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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PROGRESS AND TERMINATION

OF THE

ROMAN REPUBLIC.

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ERRATA.

Page 154, line 1, for *o* read *of*.
196, —— 2, for *of empire* read *of the empire*.
435, —— 15, for *besiegers* read *besieged*.
444, —— 18, for *Sextus* read *Cæcus*.
447, —— 6, for *Acroceraunus* read *Acroceraunus*.
457, —— 3, for *exercise* read *the exercise*.
459, —— 15, for *when* read *at which*.
489, —— 25, for *Macedonia* read *Epirus*.
499, —— 15, for *that they* read *who*.
510, —— 24, for *expressing in* read *containing*.
520, —— ult. for *to* read *by*.
530, —— 16, for *eighth of December* read *tenth of November*.

THE HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

State of the Commonwealth and Numbers of the People.——Characters of Perſons who began to appear in the Times of Sylla.——Faction of Lepidus.——Sertorius harbours the Marian Party in Spain.——Is attacked by Metellus and Pompey.——His Death, and final Suppreſſion of the Party.——Firſt Appearance of C. Julius Cæſar.——Tribunes begin to treſpaſs on the Laws of Sylla.——Progreſs of the Empire.——Preparations of Mithridates.——War with the Romans.——Irruption into Bithynia.——Siege of Cyzicus.——Raiſed.——Flight of Mithridates.——Lucullus carries the War into Pontus.——Rout and Diſperſion of the Army of Mithridates.——His Flight into Armenia.——Conduct of Lucullus in the Province of Aſia.

CHAP. I.

THE public was ſo much occupied with the conteſt of Sylla and his antagoniſts, that little elſe is recorded of the period in which it took place. Writers have not given us any diſtinct account of the condition of the city, or of the number of citizens. As the

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State was divided into two principal factions, the office of Cenſor was become too important for either party to entruſt it with their opponents, or even in neutral hands. The leaders of every faction, in their turn, made up the rolls of the People, and diſpoſed, at their pleaſure, of the equeſtrian and ſenatorian dignities.

At a ſurvey of the city, which is mentioned by Livy [1], preceding the admiſſion of the Italians on the rolls of the People, the number of citizens was three hundred and ninety-four thouſand three hundred and thirty-ſix. At another ſurvey, which followed ſoon after that event, they amounted, according to Euſebius, to four hundred and ſixty-three thouſand [2]; and it ſeems that the whole acceſſion of citizens from the country made no more than ſixty-eight thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty-four. The great ſlaughter of Romans and Italians, in which it is ſaid that three hundred thouſand men were killed, preceding the laſt of theſe muſters, and the difficulty of making complete and accurate liſts when the citizens were ſo much diſperſed, will account for the ſeemingly ſmall increaſe of their numbers.

In this period were born, and began to enter on the ſcene of public affairs, thoſe perſons whoſe conduct was now to determine the fate of the republic. Pompey had already diſtinguiſhed himſelf, and was a perſon of real conſequence. He had been educated in the camp of his father, and, by accident, at a very early age; and, before he had attained to any of the ordinary civil or political preferments, commanded an army. Cicero, being of the ſame age, began to be diſtinguiſhed at the bar. He pleaded, in the ſecond conſulate of Sylla, the cauſe of Roſcius Amerinus, in which he was led to cenſure the actions of Chryſogonus and other favourites of the Dictator, and, by his freedom in that inſtance, gained much honour to himſelf.

[1] Liv. lib. lxiii. [2] Euſeb. in Chronico.

Cæſar,

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Cæſar, now connected with the family of Cinna, whoſe daughter he had married, and being nearly related to the elder Marius, who had married his aunt, narrowly eſcaped the ſword of the prevailing party. Being commanded to ſeparate from his wife, he retained her in defiance of this order, and for his contumacy was put in the liſt of the proſcribed. He was ſaved, however, by the interceſſion of ſome common friends, whoſe requeſt in his favour Sylla granted, with that memorable ſaying, "Beware of him: there is many a Marius in the "perſon of that young man." A circumſtance which marked at once the penetration of Sylla and the early appearances of an extraordinary character in Cæſar.

Marcus Porcius, afterwards named Cato of Utica, was about three years younger than Cæſar, and being early an orphan, was educated in the houſe of an uncle, Livius Druſus. While yet a child, liſtening to the converſation of the times, he learned that the claim of the Italian allies, then in agitation, was dangerous to the Roman commonwealth. Pompedius Silo, who managed the claim for the Italians, amuſing himſelf with the young Cato, preſſed him with careſſes to intercede with his uncle in their behalf; and, finding that he was not to be won by flattery, likewiſe tried in vain to intimidate him by threatening to throw him from the window. "If this were a man," he ſaid, "I believe we ſhould obtain no ſuch favour." In the height of Sylla's military executions, when his portico was crowded with perſons who brought the heads of the proſcribed to be exchanged for the reward that was offered for them, Cato being carried by his tutor to pay his court, aſked, if "no one hated this man "enough to kill him?" "Yes, but they fear him ſtill more than they "hate him." "Then give me a ſword," ſaid the boy, "and I will "kill him." Such were the early indications of characters which afterwards became ſo conſpicuous in the commonwealth.

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With the unprecedented degradation of the Tribune Octavius, and the ſubſequent murder of Tiberius Gracchus, began, among the parties at Rome, a ſcene of injuries and retaliations, with intervals of anarchy and violent uſurpation, which muſt have ſpeedily ended in the ruin of the commonwealth, if the ſword had not paſſed at laſt into hands that employed it for the reſtoration of public order, as well as for the avenging of private wrongs.

It is indeed probable, that none of the parties in theſe horrid ſcenes had a deliberate intention to ſubvert the government, but all of them treated the forms of the commonwealth with too little reſpect; and, to obtain ſome revenge of the wrongs which they themſelves apprehended or endured, did not ſcruple in their turn to violate the laws of their country. But to thoſe who wiſhed to preſerve the commonwealth, the experience of fifty years was now ſufficient to ſhow, that attempts to reſtore the laws by illegal methods, and to terminate animoſities by retorted injuries and provocations were extremely vain. The exceſs of the evil had a tendency to exhauſt its ſource, and parties began to nauſeate the draught of which they had been made ſo plentifully to drink. There were, nevertheleſs, ſome dregs in the bottom of the cup, and the ſupplies of faction which were brought by the riſing generation, were of a mixture more dangerous than thoſe of the former age. The example of Sylla, who made himſelf lord of the commonwealth by means of a military force, and the ſecurity with which he held his uſurpation during pleaſure, had a more powerful effect in exciting the thirſt of dominion, than the political uſes which he made of his power or his magnanimity in reſigning it, had to reſtrain or to correct the effects of that dangerous precedent. Adventurers accordingly aroſe, who, without provocation, and equally indifferent to the intereſts of party as they were to thoſe of the republic, proceeded, with a cool and deliberate purpoſe, to

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gratify their own ambition and avarice, in the ſubverſion of the government of their country.

U. C. 675. M. Æm. Lepidus, Q. Lut. Catulus, Coſs.

While Sylla was yet alive, Æmilius Lepidus, a man of profligate ambition, but of mean capacity, ſupported by the remains of the popular faction, ſtood for the Conſulate, and was choſen, together with Q. Lutatius Catulus, the ſon of him who, with Marius, triumphed for their joint victory over the Cimbri, and who afterwards periſhed by the orders of that uſurper.

Pompey had openly declared for Lepidus, and was told upon that occaſion by Sylla, that he was ſtirring the embers of a fire which would in the end conſume the republic. After the death of Sylla it appeared, from a mark of diſapprobation well known to the Romans, that of not being mentioned in his will, that Pompey had loſt his eſteem. This prudent young man, however, in oppoſition to Lepidus and others, who wiſhed to inſult the memory of Sylla, was among the firſt in recommending and performing the honours that were paid to his remains.

Lepidus, upon his acceſſion to the Conſulate, moved for a recal of the proſcribed exiles, a reſtitution of the forfeited lands, and a repeal of all the ordinances of the late Dictator. This motion was formally oppoſed by Catulus; and there enſued between the two Conſuls a debate which divided the city. But the party of the Senate prevailed to have the motion rejected.

In the allotment of provinces the Tranſalpine Gaul had fallen to Lepidus; and, upon his motion being rejected in the aſſembly of the People, although it had been ſome time the practice for Conſuls to remain at Rome during their continuance in office, he prepared to leave the city, in order to take poſſeſſion of his province. This reſolution, as it implied great impatience to be at the head of an army, gave ſome jealouſy to the Senate, who dreaded the deſigns of a

Conſul

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Conſul deſirous to join military power with his civil authority. They recollected the progreſs of ſedition which began with the Gracchi and Apuleius raiſing popular tumults, and ended with Marius and Sylla leading Conſular armies in the city, and fighting their battles in the ſtreets. And in this point the deciſive ſpirit of Sylla, although it may have ſnatched the commonwealth from the flames by which it began to be conſumed, yet ſhowed the way to its ruin in the means which he employed to preſerve it [3]. The Senators were willing that Lepidus ſhould depart from the city; but they had the precaution to exact from him an oath, that he ſhould not diſturb the public peace. This oath, to avoid the appearance of any particular diſtruſt in him, they likewiſe exacted from his colleague [4].

Lepidus, notwithſtanding his oath, being arrived in his province, made preparations for war; and, thinking that his oath was binding only while he remained in office, determined to remain in Gaul at the head of his forces until the term was expired. The Senate, in order to remove him from the army, appointed him to preſide at the election of his ſucceſſor. But he neglected the ſummons which was ſent to him for this purpoſe, and the year of the preſent Conſuls was by this means ſuffered to elapſe, before any election was made.

The ordinary ſucceſſion being thus interrupted, the Senate named Appius Claudius, as Interrex, to hold the elections, and at the ſame time deprived Lepidus of his command in Gaul. Upon this information he haſtened to Italy with the troops he had already aſſembled, and greatly alarmed the republic. The Senate gave to Appius Claudius, and to Catulus, in the quality of Proconſul, the uſual charge to watch over the ſafety of the State. Theſe officers accordingly, without delay, collected a military force, while Lepidus advanced through Etruria,

[3] Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. i. [4] Ibid.

and

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and publiſhed a manifeſto, in which he invited all the friends of liberty to join him, and made a formal demand of being re-inveſted with the conſular power. In oppoſition to this treaſonable act of Lepidus, the Senate republiſhed the law of Plautius, by which the Prætors were required, in the ordinary courſe of juſtice, to take cognizance of all attempts to levy war againſt the State, and joined to it an additional clauſe or reſolution of their own, obliging thoſe magiſtrates to receive accuſations of treaſon on holy-days, as well as on ordinary days of buſineſs.

Mean time Lepidus advanced to the gates of Rome, ſeized the Janiculum and one of the bridges that led to the city. He was met by Catulus in the Campus Martius, repulſed and routed. All his party diſperſed; he himſelf fled to Sardinia, and ſoon after died. His ſon, a young man, with part of the army, retired to Alba, and was there ſoon after taken, and ſuffered for a treaſon in which he was engaged by his father.

Marcus Brutus, the father of him who, in the continuation of theſe troubles, afterwards fell at Philippi, having joined with Lepidus in this raſh and profligate attempt againſt the republic, was obliged at Mantua to ſurrender himſelf to Pompey, and, by his orders, was put to death. But the moſt conſiderable part the army of Lepidus penetrated, under the conduct of Perperna, into Spain, and joined Sertorius, who was now become the refuge of one party in its diſtreſs, as Sylla had formerly been of the other. In this province accordingly, while peace began to be reſtored in Italy, a ſource of new troubles was opening for the State. The prevailing party in the city was willing to grant an indemnity, and to ſuffer all proſecution, on account of the late offences, to drop; the extreme to which Sylla had carried the ſeverity of his executions, diſpoſing the minds of men to the oppoſite courſe of indulgence and mercy.

Before the arrival of Lepidus with his army in Italy, Mithridates had ſent to obtain from the Senate a ratification of the treaty he had

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concluded with Sylla: but upon a complaint from Ariobarzanes, that the king of Pontus had not himſelf performed his part of that treaty by the complete reſtitution of Cappadocia, he was directed to give full ſatisfaction on this point before his negotiation at Rome could proceed. He accordingly complied; but by the time his ambaſſador brought the report, the Romans were ſo much occupied by the war they had to maintain againſt Lepidus and his adherents, that they had no leiſure for foreign affairs. This intelligence encouraged Mithridates to think of renewing the war. Senſible that he could not rely on a permanent peace with the Roman republic, he had already provided an army, not ſo conſiderable in reſpect to numbers as that which he formerly had, but more formidable by the order and diſcipline he had endeavoured to introduce on the model of the legion. He flattered himſelf that the diſtraction under which the Romans now laboured at home, would render them unable to reſiſt his forces in Aſia, and give him an opportunity to remove the only obſtruction that remained to his own conqueſts. He avoided, in the time of a negotiation, and without the pretext of a new provocation, to break out into open hoſtilities; but he encouraged his ſon-in-law Tigranes, king of Armenia to make war on the Roman allies in his neighbourhood, and thereby laid the foundation of a quarrel which he might either adopt or decline at pleaſure. This prince accordingly, being then building a city, under the name of Tigranocerta, for which he wanted inhabitants, made an incurſion into the kingdom of Cappadocia, carried off from thence three hundred thouſand of the People to repleniſh his new ſettlement.

Soon after this infraction of the peace, Mithridates, in order to have the co-operation of ſome of the parties into which the Roman State was divided, entered into a treaty with Sertorius, and wiſhed, in concert with this general, to execute the project of a march, by a route afterwards practiſed by the Barbarians who invaded the Roman empire.

empire. From the ſhores of the Euxine it appeared eaſy to paſs over land to the Adriatic, and once more to repeat the operations of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal, by making war on the Romans in their own country.

Sertorius, who had erected the ſtandard of the republic in Spain, gave refuge to the Roman exiles from every quarter, and was now at the head of a formidable power, compoſed of Italians as well as natives of that country. By his birth and abilities he had pretenſions to the higheſt preferments of the State, and had been early diſtinguiſhed as a ſoldier, qualified either to plan or to execute. He was attached to Marius in the time of the Cimbric war, and became a party with this leader in his quarrel with Sylla. His animoſity to the latter was increaſed by the mutual oppoſition of their intereſts in the purſuit of civil preferments. At the beginning of the civil war Sertorius took an active part, but ſhowed more reſpect to the conſtitution of his country, and more mercy to thoſe who were oppoſed to him, than either of his aſſociates Marius or Cinna. When his party were in poſſeſſion of the government, he was appointed to command in Spain, and, after the ruin of their affairs in Italy, withdrew into that Province. He was received as a Roman governor; but, ſoon after the other party prevailed in Italy, was attacked on their part by Caius Annius, who came with a proper force to diſlodge him. He had eſtabliſhed poſts on the Pyrenees for the ſecurity of his province; but the officer to whom they were entruſted being aſſaſſinated, and the ſtations deſerted, the enemy had free acceſs on that ſide. Not in condition to maintain himſelf any longer in Spain, he embarked with what forces he had at Carthagena, and continued for ſome years, with a ſmall ſquadron of Cilician galleys, to ſubſiſt by the ſpoils of Africa and the contiguous coaſts. In this ſtate of his fortunes he formed a project to viſit the Fortunate Iſlands, and if a ſettlement could be effected there, to bid farewel for ever to

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the Roman world; to its factions, its diviſions, and its troubles. But while he was about to ſet ſail in ſearch of this famous retreat in the ocean, he received an invitation from the unſubdued natives of Luſitania to become their leader. At their head his abilities ſoon made him conſpicuous. He affected to conſider the Luſitanians as the Senate and People of Rome, treating the eſtabliſhment of Sylla in Italy as a mere uſurpation. He himſelf took the enſigns of a Roman officer of State, ſelected three hundred of his followers, to whom he gave the title of Senate, and in all his tranſactions with foreign nations, aſſumed the name and ſtile of the Roman Republic. In treating with Mithridates he refuſed to cede the province of Aſia, or to purchaſe the alliance of that prince by any conceſſions injurious to the Roman empire, of which he affected to conſider himſelf and his Senate as the legal head.

While Sertorius was acting this farce, the report of his formidable power, the late acceſſion he had gained by the junction of ſome of the Marian forces under the command of Perperna, and his ſuppoſed preparations to make a deſcent upon Italy, gave an alarm at Rome. Metellus had been ſome time employed againſt him in Spain; but being ſcarcely able to keep the field, his oppoſition tended only to augment the reputation of his antagoniſt. The Conſuls lately elected were judged unequal to this war, and the thoughts of all men were turned on Pompey, who, though yet in no public character, nor arrived at the legal age of ſtate preferments, had the addreſs on this, as on many other occaſions, to make himſelf be pointed at as the only perſon who could effectually ſerve the republic. He was accordingly, with the title of Proconſul, joined to Metellus in the conduct of the war in Spain [a]. It no doubt facilitated the career of this young man's pretenſions, that few men of diſtinguiſhed abilities were

U. C. 676. D. Junius Brutus, Mam. Emilianus Livianus.

[a] Claudius, in making this motion, alluding to the inſignificance of both Conſuls, ſaid, that Pompey ſhould be ſent pro Conſulibus.

now

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now in view to ſuſtain the fortunes of the republic. Such men, of whatever party, had always, in their turns, been the firſt victims of the late violent maſſacres; and the party of Sylla, which was now the republic, when conſidered as a nurſery of eminent men, had ſome diſadvantage, perhaps in the ſuperiority of its leader, who was himſelf equal to all its affairs, and taught others to confide and obey, not to act for themſelves. Pompey was not of an age to have ſuffered from this influence. He came into the party in its buſieſt time, and had been entruſted with ſeparate commands. He had already obtained for himſelf part of that artificial conſideration which, though it cannot be ſupported without abilities, often exceeds the degree of merit on which it is founded; and this conſideration to the end of his life he continued to augment with much attention and many concerted intrigues. He had a genius for war, and was now about to improve it in the conteſt with Sertorius, an excellent maſter, whoſe leſſons were rough but inſtructive.

Pompey having made the levies deſtined for this ſervice, paſſed the Alps by a new route, and was the firſt Roman general who made his way into Spain through Gaul and the Pyrennees. Soon after his arrival, a legion that covered the foragers of his army was intercepted and cut off by the enemy. Sertorius was engaged in the ſiege of Laura. Pompey advanced to relieve it. Sertorius, upon his approach, took poſt on an eminence. Pompey prepared to attack him, and the beſieged had hopes of immediate relief. But Sertorius had made his diſpoſition in ſuch a manner, that Pompey could not advance without expoſing his own rear to a party that was placed to attack him. "I will teach this pupil of Sylla," he ſaid, "to look "behind as well as before him;" and Pompey, ſeeing his danger, choſe to withdraw, leaving the town of Laura to fall into the enemy's hands, while he himſelf continued a ſpectator of the ſiege, and of the deſtruction of the place. After this unſucceſsful be-

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ginning of the war, he was obliged to retire into Gaul for the winter[7].

U. C. 677. Cn. Octavius, C. Scribonius Curio.

The following year, Cn. Octavius and C. Scribonius Curio being Conſuls, Pompey ſtill remained in his command; and, having repaſſed the Pyrennees, directed his march to join Metellus. Sertorius lay on the Sucro[8], and wiſhed to engage him before the junction; and Pompey, on his part, being deſirous to reap the glory of a ſeparate victory, an action enſued, in which the wing on which Pompey fought was defeated by Sertorius; but the other wing had the victory over Perperna. As Sertorius was about to renew the action on the following day, he was prevented by the arrival of Metellus. "If the old woman had not interpoſed," he ſaid, "I ſhould have whipt the boy, and ſent him back to his ſchools at Rome."

This war continued about two years longer with various ſucceſs, but without any memorable event, until it ended by the death of Sertorius, who, at the inſtigation of Perperna, was betrayed and aſſaſſinated by a few of his own attendants. Perperna, having removed Sertorius by this baſe action, put himſelf at the head of the army, and endeavoured to keep them united, at leaſt until he ſhould be able to purchaſe his peace at Rome. He was, however, deſerted by numbers of his own people, and at laſt ſurpriſed by Pompey, and ſlain. He had made offers to diſcloſe the ſecrets of the party, and to produce the correſpondence which many of the principal citizens at Rome held with Sertorius, inviting him to return into Italy, and promiſing to join him with a formidable power. The letters were ſecured by Pompey, and, without being opened, were burned. So maſterly an act of prudence, in a perſon who was yet conſidered as a young man, has been deſervedly admired. It ſerved to extinguiſh all the remains

[7] Plutarch. in Pompeio & Sertorio. Appian. Liv. Obſequens. Frontinus Stratagim. lib. ii. c. 5.

[8] The Xucar, which falls into the Bay of Valentia.

of

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of the Marian faction, and reconciled men, otherwiſe diſaffected, to a ſituation in which they were aſſured of impunity and concealment.

While Pompey was thus gathering laurels in the field, C. Julius Cæſar, being about ſeven years younger, that is, twenty-three years of age, was returned from Aſia; and, to make ſome trial of his parts, laid an accuſation againſt Dolabella, late Proconſul of Macedonia, for oppreſſion and extortion in his province. Cotta and Hortenſius, appearing for the defendant, procured his acquittal. Cicero ſays, that he himſelf was then returned from a journey he had made into Aſia, and was preſent at this trial. The following year Cæſar left Rome, with intention to paſs ſome time under a celebrated maſter of rhetoric at Rhodes. In his way he was taken by pirates, and detained about forty days, until he found means to procure from Metellus a ſum of fifty talents[a], which was paid for his ranſom. He had frequently told the pirates, while yet in their hands, that he would puniſh their inſolence; and he now told them to expect the performance of his promiſe. Upon being ſet on ſhore, he aſſembled and armed ſome veſſels on the coaſt, purſued and took his captors. Leaving his priſoners where he landed, he haſtened to Junius Silanus, the Proconſul of Bythinia, and applied for an order to have them executed; but being refuſed by this officer, he made his way back with ſtill greater diſpatch, and, before any inſtructions could arrive to the contrary, had the pirates nailed to the croſs. Such lawleſs banditti had long infeſted the ſeas of Aſia and of Greece, and furniſhed at times no inconſiderable employment to the arms of the republic. Servilius Vatia, who afterwards bore the title of Iſauricus, had lately been employed againſt them; and, after clearing the ſeas, endeavoured likewiſe to deſtroy or ſecure their ports and ſtrong holds

[a] Near to 10,000 l.

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on ſhore. They, nevertheleſs, recovered this blow, and continued to appear at intervals in new ſwarms, and to the great interruption of commerce by ſea, and of all the communications in the empire.

Under the reformations of Sylla, which, by diſarming the tribunitian power, in a great meaſure ſhut up the ſource of former diſorders, the republic was now reſtored to ſome degree of tranquillity, and reſumed its attention to the ordinary objects of peace. The bridge on the Tiber, which had been erected of wood, was taken down and rebuilt with ſtone; bearing the name of Æmilius, one of the Queſtors under whoſe inſpection the fabric had been reared; and as a public work of ſtill greater conſequence, it is mentioned, that a treatiſe on agriculture, the production of Mago a Carthaginian, and in the language of Carthage, was, by the expreſs orders of the Senate, now tranſlated into Latin. At the reduction of Carthage, the Romans were yet governed by huſbandmen, and, amidſt the literary ſpoils of that city, this book alone, conſiſting of twenty-eight rolls or volumes, was ſuppoſed to merit public attention, and was ſecured for the State. A number of perſons ſkilled in the Punic language, together with Silanus, who had the principal charge of the work, were employed in tranſlating it [20].

The calm, however, which the republic enjoyed under the aſcendant of the ariſtocracy, was not altogether undiſturbed. In the Conſulate of Cn. Octavius and C. Scribonius Curio, the Tribune Licinius made an attempt to recover the former powers of the office. He ventured, in preſence of both the Conſuls, to harangue the People, and exhorted them to reaſſume their antient rights. As a circumſtance which ſerves to mark the petulant boldneſs of theſe men, it is mentioned that the Conſul Octavius, on this occaſion, being ill, was muffled up, and covered with a dreſſing which brought

[20] Plin. lib. xviii. c. 3.

flies

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flies in great numbers about him. His colleague Curio, having made a vehement ſpeech, at the cloſe of it, the Tribune called out to Octavius, "You never can repay your colleague's ſervice of this day; "if he had not been near you, while he made this ſpeech, and beat "the air ſo much with his geſticulations, the flies muſt by this time "have eaten you up"." The ſequel is imperfectly known; but the diſpute appears to have been carried to a great height, and to have ended in a tumult, in which the Tribune Licinius was killed.

Upon a review of Sylla's acts intended to reſtore the authority of the Senate, it may be queſtioned, whether that clauſe in the law relating to the Tribunes, by which all perſons having accepted of this office were excluded from any further preferment in the State, may not have had an ill effect, and required correction. It rendered the Tribunate an object only to the meaneſt of the Senators, who, upon their acceptance of it, ceaſing to have any pretenſions to the higher offices of State, were, by this means, deprived of any intereſt in the government, and exaſperated againſt the higher dignities of the commonwealth. Aurelius Cotta, one of the Conſuls that ſucceeded Cn. Octavius and Curio, moved perhaps by this conſideration, propoſed to have that clauſe repealed, and was warmly ſupported by the Tribune Opimius, who, contrary to the prohibition lately enacted, ventured to harangue the People; and for this offence, at the expiration of his office, was tried and condemned [11].

U. C. 678. L. Octavius, C. Aurelius Cotta.

By the defects which the People began to apprehend in their preſent inſtitutions, or by the part which their demagogues began to take againſt the ariſtocracy, the Roman State, after a very ſhort reſpite, began to relapſe into its former troubles, and was again to exhibit the curious ſpectacle of a nation divided againſt itſelf, broken and diſtracted in its councils, which nevertheleſs prevailed in all its ope-

[11] Cicero de Claris Oratoribus. [12] Cicero, 3tio, in Verrem, & Pædianus, ibid.

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rations abroad, and gained continual acceſſions of empire, under the effect of convulſions which ſhook the commonwealth itſelf to its baſe; and, what is ſtill leſs to be paralleled in the hiſtory of mankind, was to exhibit the ſpectacle of a nation, which proceeded in its affairs abroad with a ſucceſs that may be imputed in a great meaſure to its diviſions at home.

War, in the detail of its operations, if not even in the formation of its plans, is more likely to ſucceed under ſingle men than under numerous councils. The Roman conſtitution, though far from an arrangement proper to preſerve domeſtic peace and tranquillity, was an excellent nurſery of ſtateſmen and warriors. To perſons brought up in this ſchool, all foreign affairs were committed with little reſponſibility and leſs controul. The ruling paſſion, even of the leaſt virtuous citizens, during ſome ages, was the ambition of being conſiderable, and of riſing to the higheſt dignities of the State at home. They enjoyed the condition of monarchs in the provinces; but they valued this condition only as it furniſhed them with the occaſion of triumphs, and contributed to their importance at Rome. They were factious and turbulent in their competition for power and honours in the capital; but, in order the better to ſupport that very conteſt, were faithful and inflexible in maintaining all the pretenſions of the State abroad. Thus Sylla, though deprived of his command by an act of the oppoſite party at Rome, and with many of his friends, who eſcaped from the bloody hands of their perſecutors, condemned and outlawed, ſtill maintained the part of a Roman officer of ſtate, and preſcribed to Mithridates, as might have been expected from him in the moſt undiſturbed exerciſe of his truſt. Sertorius, in the ſame manner, acting for the oppoſite faction, in ſome meaſure preſerved a ſimilar dignity of character, and refuſed to make conceſſions unworthy of the Roman republic. Contrary to the fate of other nations, where the ſtate is weak, while the conduct of indi-

viduals

viduals is regular; here the State was in vigour, while the conduct of individuals was in the higheſt degree irregular and wild.

The reputation, as well as the arms of the Romans, procured them acceſſions of territory without labour, and without expence. Kingdoms were bequeathed to them by will; as that of Pergamus formerly by the will of Attalus; that of Cyrene by the will of Ptolomy Appion; and that of Bithynia, about this time, by the will of Nicomedes. To the ſame effect, princes and ſtates, where they did not make any formal ceſſion of their ſovereignty, did ſomewhat equivalent, by ſubmitting their rights to diſcuſſion at Rome, and by ſoliciting grants from the Romans, of which the world now ſeemed to acknowledge the validity, by having recourſe to them as the baſis of tenures by which they held their poſſeſſions. In this manner, the ſons of the laſt Antiochus, king of Syria, ſtated themſelves as ſubjects or dependants of the Roman People, having paſſed two years at Rome, waiting deciſions of the Senate, and ſoliciting a grant of the kingdom of Egypt, on which they formed ſome pretenſions.

In Aſia, by theſe means, the Roman empire advanced on the ruin of thoſe who had formerly oppoſed its progreſs. The Macedonian line, in the monarchy of Syria, was now broke off, or extinct. The kingdom itſelf, conſiſting of many provinces, began to be diſmembered, on the defeat of Antiochus at Sipylus, by the defection of provincial governors and tributary princes, who, no longer awed by the power of their former maſter, entered into a correſpondence with the Romans, and were by them acknowledged as ſovereigns. In this manner the ſtates of Armenia, long ſubject to the Perſians, and afterwards to the Macedonians, now became the ſeat of a new monarchy under Tigranes. And, to complete this revolution, the natives of Syria, weary of the degeneracy and weakneſs of their own court, of the irregularity of the ſucceſſion to the throne of their own kingdom; weary of the fre-

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quent competitions which involved them in blood, invited Tigranes to wield a ſceptre which the deſcendants of Seleucus were no longer in condition to hold. This prince, accordingly, extended his kingdom to both ſides of the Euphrates, and held Syria itſelf as one of its diviſions [13].

In theſe circumſtances, the Romans were left undiſturbed to reeſtabliſh their province in the Leſſer Aſia: and under the auſpices of Servilius, who, from his principal acquiſition in thoſe parts, had the name of Iſauricus, were extending their limits on the ſide of Cilicia, and were haſtening to the ſovereignty of that coaſt, when their progreſs was ſuddenly checked by the re-appearance of an enemy, who had already given them much trouble in that quarter.

Mithridates, king of Pontus, who appears to have revived in his own breaſt the animoſities of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal againſt the Romans, had never ceaſed, ſince the date of his laſt mortifying treaty with Sylla, to deviſe the means of renewing the war. Having attempted in vain to engage Sylla in a league with himſelf againſt the Romans, he made a ſimilar attempt on Sertorius in Spain. Affecting to conſider this fugitive, with his little Senate, as heads of the republic, he preſſed for a ceſſion of the Roman province in Aſia in his own favour, and in return offered to aſſiſt the followers of Sertorius with all his forces in the recovery of Italy. In this negotiation, however, he found, as has been already remarked, that whoever aſſumed the character of a Roman officer of ſtate, ſupported it with a like inflexible dignity. Sertorius refuſed to diſmember the empire, but accepted of the proffered aid from Mithridates, and agreed to ſend him Roman officers to aſſiſt in the formation and diſcipline of his army.

The king of Pontus, now bent on correcting the error which is common in extenſive and barbarous monarchies, of relying intirely

[13] Strabo, lib. xi. fine.

on

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on numbers, inſtead of diſcipline and military ſkill, propoſed to form a more regular army than that which he had aſſembled in the former war; and, however little ſucceſsful in his endeavours, meant to rival his enemy in every particular of their diſcipline, in the uſe of their weapons, and in the form of their legion. With troops beginning to make theſe reformations, and amounting to one hundred and twenty thouſand foot, and ſixteen thouſand horſe, he declared war on the Romans, and, without reſiſtance, took poſſeſſion of Cappadocia and Phrygia, beyond the bounds they had ſet to his kingdom. As he was to act both by ſea and by land, he began with cuſtomary oblations to Neptune and to Mars. To the firſt he made an offering of a ſplendid carriage, drawn by white horſes, which he precipitated and ſunk in the ſea; to the other he made a ſacrifice, which, as deſcribed by the hiſtorian [14], filled the imagination more than any of the rites uſually practiſed by antient nations. The king, with his army, aſcended the higheſt mountain on their route, formed on its ſummit a great pile of wood, of which he himſelf laid the firſt materials, and ordered the fabric to be raiſed in a pyramidical form to a great height. The top was loaded with offerings of honey, milk, oil, wine, and perfumes. As ſoon as it was finiſhed, the army around it began the ſolemnity with a feaſt, at the end of which the pile was ſet on fire, and in proportion as the heat increaſed, the army extended their circle, and came down from the mountain. The flames continued to aſcend for many days, and were ſeen, it is ſaid, at the diſtance of a thouſand ſtadia, or above a hundred miles [15].

After this ſolemnity was over, Mithridates endeavoured to animate and to unite in a common zeal for his cauſe the different nations that were collected from remote parts of the empire, to form his army. For this purpoſe he enumerated the ſucceſſes by which he

[14] Appian. [15] Ibid. de Bell. Mithridat.

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had raiſed his kingdom to its preſent pitch of greatneſs, and repreſented the numerous vices of the enemy with whom he was now to engage, their diviſions at home and their oppreſſion abroad, their avarice, and inſatiable luſt of dominion.

The Romans were ſome time undetermined whom they ſhould employ againſt this formidable enemy. Pompey, being ſtill in Spain, ſaw with regret this ſervice likely to fall to the ſhare of another; and he had his partizans at Rome who would have gladly put off the nomination of any general to this command, until he himſelf could arrive with his army to receive it. He accordingly about this time wrote a letter to the Senate, complaining, in petulant terms, of their neglect, and of the ſtraits to which the troops under his command were reduced for want of pay and proviſions, and threatening, if not ſpeedily ſupplied, to march into Italy. The Conſul Lucullus, apprehending the conſequence of Pompey's preſence in Italy, at the head of an army, and wiſhing not to furniſh him with any pretence for leaving his preſent province, had the army in Spain completely ſupplied, and, at the ſame time, took proper meaſures to ſupport his own pretenſions to the command in Aſia. From his rank as the Conſul in office, he had a natural claim to this ſtation; and from his knowledge of the country and of the war [16] with this very enemy, in which he had already borne ſome part under Sylla [17], was intitled to plead his qualifications and his merits.

[16] Vide Ciceronis in Lucullo, c. 1 & 2.

[17] Plutarch. in Lucull. initio. edit. Lond. 4to. vol. iii p. 137.

Cicero is often quoted to prove that Lucullus, at this time, was a mere novice in war, and owed the knowledge by which he came to be diſtinguiſhed, to ſpeculation and ſtudy, not to experience. It is obſerved by lord Bolingbroke, that Cicero had an intereſt in having it believed, that great officers might be formed in this manner; and it is probable, that he affected to conſider the part which was aſſigned to Lucullus by Sylla, as mere civil employment. He is mentioned as having charge of the coinage with which Sylla paid his army, and of the fleet with which he tranſported them into Aſia: but it is not to be ſuppoſed, that theſe were the only operations confided by Sylla to a lieutenant of ſo much ability.

When

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When the provinces came to be diſtributed, the difficulties which preſented themſelves in Aſia were thought to require the preſence of both the Conſuls. The kingdom of Bythinia, which had been lately bequeathed to the Romans, was in danger of being invaded before they could obtain a formal poſſeſſion of this inheritance; at the ſame time that the enemy, by whom they were threatened, was not likely to limit his operations to the attack of that country. Of the Conſuls, Cotta was appointed to ſeize on the kingdom of Bythinia, and Lucullus to lead the army againſt Mithridates wherever elſe he ſhould carry the war. Cotta ſet out immediately for his province. Lucullus, being detained in making the neceſſary levies, followed ſome time afterwards; but before his arrival in Aſia, the king of Pontus had already invaded Bythinia, defeated the forces of Cotta, and obliged him to take refuge in Chalcedonia. The king of Pontus, being ſuperior both by ſea and by land, over-ran the country in the neighbourhood of this place; and, having broke the chain which ſhut up the mouth of the harbour, he entered and burnt ſome Roman gallies, which were ſtationed there. Not thinking it adviſeable to attack the town of Chalcedonia, he turned his forces againſt Cyzicus, a port on the Propontis, blocked up the place both by ſea and by land; and, being well-provided with battering engines, and the other neceſſaries of a ſiege, he had hopes of being ſoon able to reduce it by ſtorm. The inhabitants, nevertheleſs, prepared for their defence, in expectation of being ſpeedily relieved by the Romans.

Such was the ſtate of affairs when Lucullus arrived in Aſia; and having joined his new levies to the legions which had ſerved under Fimbria, and to the other troops already in the province, he aſſembled an army of about thirty thouſand men, with which he advanced to re-eſtabliſh Cotta in his province, and to relieve the town of Cyzicus. The king of Pontus, being elated by his ſucceſſes, and by the ſuperiority of his numbers, gave no attention to the motions of Lucul-

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lus, ſuffered him to get poſſeſſion of the heights in his rear, and to cut off his principal ſupplies of proviſions and forage. Truſting, however, that his magazines would not be exhauſted before he ſhould have forced the town of Cyzicus to ſurrender, he continued the ſiege. But his engines not being well ſerved, and the defence being obſtinate, his army began to be diſtreſſed for want of proviſions, and it became neceſſary to leſſen his conſumption. For this purpoſe he ſecretly moved away part of his cavalry. Theſe were intercepted by the Romans on their march, and cut off or diſperſed; and the king, being reduced with the remainder of his army to the greateſt diſtreſs, embarked on board one of his gallies, ordered the army to force their way to Lampſacus, while he himſelf endeavoured to eſcape with his fleet. The army being attacked by Lucullus, the greater part of them periſhed in paſſing the Aſopus and the Grannicus. The king himſelf, having put into Nicomedia, and from thence continuing his voyage through the Boſphorus to the Euxine, was overtaken on that ſea by a ſtorm, and loſt the greateſt part of his fleet. His own galley being ſunk, he himſelf narrowly eſcaped in a barge.

The whole force with which the king of Pontus had invaded Bythinia, being thus diſpelled like a cloud, Lucullus employed ſome time in reducing the towns into which any of the troops of Mithridates had been received; and having effectually deſtroyed the remains of the vanquiſhed army, took his route by Bythinia and Galatia towards Pontus. At his entrance into this kingdom was ſituated the town of Amyſus, a conſiderable fortreſs on the coaſt of the Euxine, into which the king had thrown a ſufficient force to retard his progreſs. Mithridates, under favour of the time he gained by the defence of this place, aſſembled a new army at Cabira, near the frontier of Armenia. Here he muſtered about forty thouſand foot, and a conſiderable body of horſe, and was ſoliciting the Scythians, Armenians, and all the nations of that continent to his aid. Lucullus,

in order to prevent, if poſſible, any further reinforcements to the enemy, committed the ſiege of Amyſus to Murena, and advanced with his army into the plains of Cabira. On this ground the Roman horſe received repeated checks from thoſe of the enemy, and were kept in continual alarm until their general, having time to obſerve the country, avoided the plains on which the king of Pontus, by means of his cavalry, was greatly ſuperior. Though very much ſtraitened for proviſions, Lucullus kept his poſition on the heights, until the enemy ſhould be forced to a general action. The ſkirmiſhes which happened between the foraging parties drew conſiderable numbers from the reſpective armies to engage; and the troops of Mithridates, having been routed in one of theſe partial encounters, the king took a reſolution to decamp in the night, and remove to a greater diſtance from the Romans. As ſoon as it was dark, the equipage and the attendants of the leading men in the camp, to whom he had communicated this reſolution, began to withdraw; and the army, greatly alarmed with that appearance, was ſeized with a panic, and could not be reſtrained from flight. Horſe and foot, and bodies of every deſcription crowded in diſorder into the avenues of the camp, and were trod under foot, or in great numbers periſhed by each other's hands. Mithridates himſelf, endeavouring to ſtop and to undeceive them, was carried off by the multitude.

The noiſe of this tumult being heard to a great diſtance, and the occaſion being known in the Roman camp, Lucullus advanced with his army to take advantage of the confuſion in which the enemy were fallen, and by a vigorous attack put many to the ſword, and haſtened their diſperſion.

The king was, by one of his ſervants, with difficulty mounted on horſeback, and muſt have been taken, if the purſuing party had not been amuſed in ſeizing ſome plunder, which he had ordered on purpoſe to be left in their way. A mule, loaded with ſome part of

the

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the royal treaſure, turned the attention of his purſuers, while he himſelf made his eſcape.

In his flight he appeared to be moſt affected with the fate of his women. The greateſt number of them were left at the palace of Pharnacea, a place that muſt ſoon fall into the hands of the enemy. He therefore diſpatched a faithful eunuch with orders to put them to death, leaving the choice of the manner to themſelves. A few are particularly mentioned. Of two, who were his own ſiſters, Roxana and Statira, one died uttering execrations againſt her brother's cruelty, the other extolling, in that extremity of his own fortune, the generous care he took of their honour. Monimé, a Greek of Miletus, celebrated for her beauty, whom the king had long wooed in vain with proffers of great riches, and whom he won at laſt only by the participation of his crown, and the earneſt of the nuptial rites, had ever lamented her fortune, which, inſtead of a royal huſband and a palace, had given her a priſon, and a barbarous keeper. Being now told, that ſhe muſt die, and that the manner of her death was left to her own choice, ſhe unbound the royal fillet from her hair, and, uſing it as a bandage, endeavoured to ſtrangle herſelf. It broke in the attempt: "Bauble," ſhe ſaid, "it is not fit even for this!" then ſtretching out her neck to the eunuch, bid him fulfil his maſter's purpoſe. Berenicé of Chios, another Græcian beauty, had likewiſe been honoured with the nuptial crown; and, having been attended in her ſtate of melancholy elevation by her mother, who, on this occaſion, likewiſe reſolved to partake of her daughter's fate; they choſe to die by poiſon. The mother intreated that ſhe mght have the firſt draught; and died before her daughter. The remainder of the doſe not being ſufficient for the queen, ſhe put herſelf likewiſe into the hands of the executioner, and was ſtrangled. By theſe deaths, the barbarous jealouſy of the king was gratified, and the future triumph of the Roman general deprived of its principal ornaments.

Lucullus,

CHAP. I.

Lucullus, after his late victory, having no enemy in the field to oppoſe him, paſſed through the country, and entered without moleſtation into many of the towns in the kingdom of Pontus. He found many palaces enriched with treaſure, and adorned with barbarous magnificence; and, as might be expected under ſuch a violent and diſtruſtful government, every where places of confinement crowded with priſoners of ſtate, whom the jealouſy of the king had ſecured, and whom his ſupercilious neglect had ſuffered to remain in cuſtody, even after his jealouſy was allayed.

Mithridates, from his late defeat, fled into Armenia, and claimed the protection of Tigranes, who, being married to his daughter, had already favoured him in his deſigns againſt the Romans.

This powerful prince, now become ſovereign of Syria as well as Armenia, ſtill continued his reſidence in the laſt of theſe kingdoms at Tigranocerta, a city he himſelf had built, filled with inhabitants, and diſtinguiſhed by his own name. On the arrival of Mithridates to ſue for his protection, Tigranes declined to ſee him, but ordered him a princely reception in one of the palaces.

Lucullus continued his purſuit of this flying enemy only to the frontier of Armenia, and from thence, ſending Publius Clodius, who was his brother-in-law, to the court of Tigranes, with inſtructions to require that Mithridates ſhould be delivered up as a lawful prey, he himſelf fell back into the kingdom of Pontus, and ſoon after reduced Amyſus, together with Sinopé, and other places of ſtrength, which were held by the troops of the king.

The inhabitants of theſe places had been originally colonies from Greece, and having been ſubdued by the Perſians, were, on the arrival of Alexander the Great, from reſpect to their origin, reſtored to their freedom. In imitation of this example, and agreeably to the profeſſion which the Romans ever made of protecting the liberties of Greece, Lucullus once more declared thoſe cities to be free. Having

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now ſufficient leiſure to attend to the general ſtate of the Roman provinces in Aſia, he found, that the collectors of the revenue, under pretext of levying the tax impoſed by Sylla, had been guilty of the greateſt oppreſſions. That the inhabitants, in order to pay this tax, borrowed money of the Roman officers and merchants at exorbitant intereſt; and, when the debts became equal to their whole effects, were then diſtrained for payment, under pain of impriſonment and even tortures: that private perſons were reduced to the neceſſity of expoſing their children to ſale, and corporations of ſelling the pictures, images, and other ornaments of their temples, in order to ſatisfy theſe inhuman creditors. Willing to reſtrain, or to correct theſe abuſes, the Proconſul ordered, that where the intereſt exacted was equal to the capital, the debt ſhould be cancelled; and in other caſes, fixed it at a moderate rate. Theſe acts of beneficence or juſtice to the provinces were, by the farmers of the revenue, repreſented as acts of oppreſſion and cruelty to themſelves, and were, among their connections, and the ſharers of their ſpoils at Rome, ſtated againſt Lucullus as ſubjects of complaint and reproach.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Eſcape and Revolt of the Gladiators at Capua.——Spartacus.——Action and defeat of Lentulus the Roman Conſul.——And of Caſſius the Prætor of Gaul.——Appointment of M. Craſſus for this Service.——Deſtruction of the Gladiators.——Triumph of Metellus and Pompey.——Conſulſhip of Pompey and Craſſus.——Tribunes reſtored to their former Powers.——Conſulate of Metellus and Hortenſius.——War in Crete.——Renewal of the war in Pontus and Armenia.——Defeat of Tigranes.——Negotiation with the King of Parthia.——Mutiny of the Roman Army.——Complaints of Pyracies committed in the Roman Seas.——Commiſſion propoſed to Pompey.——His Conduct againſt the Pirates.——His Commiſſion extended to Pontus.——Operations againſt Mithridates.——Defeat and Flight of that Prince.——Operations of Pompey in Syria.——Siege and Reduction of Jeruſalem.——Death of Mithridates.

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U. C. 680. M. Teren. Varro, C. Caſſ. Varus.

SOON after the war, of which we have thus ſtated the event, had commenced in Aſia, Italy was thrown into great confuſion by the accidental eſcape of a few gladiators from the place of their confinement at Capua. Theſe were ſlaves trained up to furniſh their maſters with a ſpectacle, which, though cruel and barbarous, drew numerous crowds of beholders. It was at firſt introduced as a ſpecies of human ſacrifice at funerals, and the victims were now kept by the wealthy in great numbers for the entertainment of the People, and even for private amuſement. The handſomeſt, the moſt active, and the boldeſt of the ſlaves and captives were ſelected for this purpoſe. They were ſworn to decline no combat, and to ſhun no hardſhip, to which they were expoſed by their maſters; they were of

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different denominations, and accuſtomed to fight in different ways; but thoſe from whom the whole received their deſignation, employed the ſword and buckler, or target; and they commonly fought naked, that the place and nature of the wounds they received might the more plainly appear.

Even in this proſtitution of valour, refinements of honour were introduced. There were certain graces of attitude which the gladiator was not permitted to quit, even to avoid a wound. There was a manner which he ſtudied to preſerve in his fall, in his bleeding poſture, and even in his death. He was applauded, or hiſſed, according as he ſucceeded or failed in any of theſe particulars. When, after a tedious ſtruggle, he was ſpent with labour and with the loſs of blood, he ſtill endeavoured to preſerve the dignity of his character, dropt or reſumed the ſword at his maſter's pleaſure, and looked round to the ſpectators for marks of their ſatisfaction and applauſe [1].

Perſons of every age, condition, and ſex, attended at theſe exhibitions; and when the pair who were engaged began to ſtrain and to bleed, the ſpectators, being divided in their inclinations, endeavoured to excite, by their cries and acclamations, the party they favoured; and when the conteſt was ended, called to the victor to ſtrike, or to ſpare according as the vanquiſhed was ſuppoſed to have forfeited or to have deſerved his life [2]. With theſe exhibitions, which muſt create ſo much diſguſt and horror in the recital, the Romans were more intoxicated than any populace in modern Europe now are with the baiting of bulls, or the running of horſes, probably becauſe they were more deeply affected, and more violently moved.

[1] Cicer. Tuſculanarum, lib. ii. c. 17.

[2] Cicero pro Sexto, c. 27. Tuſcul. Quæſt. Spartacus, lib. ii. c. 17.

Spartacus,

CHAP. II.

Spartacus, a Thracian captive, who, on account of his ſtrength and activity, had been deſtined for this barbarous profeſſion, with about ſeventy or eighty of his companions, eſcaped from their place of confinement, and arming themſelves with ſuch weapons as accident preſented to them, retired to ſome faſtneſs on the aſcent of Mount Veſuvius, and from thence haraſſed the country with robberies and murders. "If we are to fight," ſaid the leader of this deſperate band, "let us fight againſt our oppreſſors, and in behalf of our own "liberties, not to make ſport for this petulant and cruel race of men." Multitudes of ſlaves from every quarter flocked to his ſtandard. The Præfect of Capua armed the inhabitants of his diſtrict againſt them, but was defeated.

This feeble and unſucceſsful attempt to quell the inſurrection, furniſhed the rebels with arms, and raiſed their reputation and their courage. Their leader, by his generoſity in rejecting his own ſhare of any booty he made, by his conduct and his valour, acquired the authority of a legal commander; and, having named Crixus and Oenomaus, two other gladiators, for his ſubordinate officers, he formed the multitudes that reſorted to him into regular bodies, employed a certain number to fabricate arms, and to procure the neceſſary accommodations of a camp, till at length he collected an army of ſeventy thouſand men, with which he commanded the country to a great extent. He had already ſucceſſively defeated the Prætors Clodius, Varinus, and Coſſinius, who had been ſent againſt him with conſiderable forces, ſo that it became neceſſary to order proper levies, and to give to the Conſuls the charge of repreſſing this formidable enemy.

Spartacus had too much prudence to think himſelf fit to contend with the force of the Roman State, which he perceived muſt ſoon be aſſembled againſt him. He contented himſelf, therefore, with a more rational ſcheme of conducting his army by the ridge of the Appenines,

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Appenines, till he ſhould gain the Alps from whence his followers, whether Gauls, Germans, or Thracians, might ſeparate, each into the country of which he was a native, or from which he had been originally brought.

U. C. 681. L. Gell. Poplicola, Cn. Corn. Lent. Clodianus.

While he began his progreſs by the mountains, in order to execute this project, the Conſuls, Gellius and Lentulus, had already taken the field againſt him. They at firſt ſurpriſed and cut off a conſiderable body under Crixus, who had fallen down from the heights in order to pillage the country. But Lentulus afterwards preſſing hard upon Spartacus, who led the main body of the rebels, brought on an action, in which the conſular army was defeated with conſiderable loſs. Caſſius too, the Prætor of Ciſalpine Gaul, having advanced upon him with an army of ten thouſand men, was repulſed with great ſlaughter.

In conſequence of theſe advantages, Spartacus might no doubt have effected his retreat to the Alps; but his army being elated with victory, and conſidering themſelves as maſters of Italy, were unwilling to abandon their conqueſt. He himſelf formed a new project of marching to Rome; and for this pupoſe deſtroyed all his uſeleſs baggage and cattle, put his captives to death, and refuſed to receive any more of the ſlaves, who were ſtill in multitudes reſorting to his ſtandard. He probably expected to paſs the Roman armies without a battle, and to force the city of Rome itſelf by an unexpected aſſault. In this he was diſappointed by the Conſuls, with whom he was obliged to fight in the Picenum; and, though victorious in the action, he loſt hopes of ſurpriſing the city. But ſtill thinking himſelf in condition to keep his ground in Italy, he only altered his route, and directed his march towards Lucania.

The Romans, greatly embarraſſed, and thrown into ſome degree of conſternation, by the unexpected continuance of an inſurrection which had given them much trouble, expoſed their armies to much

danger, with little proſpect of honour; not being courted, as uſual, for the command, they impoſed it on Marcus Craſſus, then in the rank of Prætor, and ſuppoſed to be a perſon of conſequence, more on account of his wealth than of his abilities; though in this ſervice, after others had failed, he laid the foundation of a more favourable judgment. They at the ſame time ſent orders to Pompey, who had finiſhed the war in Spain, to haſten into Italy with his army; and to the Proconſul of Macedonia, to embark with what forces could be ſpared from his province.

Craſſus aſſembled no leſs than ſix legions, with which he joined the army which had been already ſo unſucceſsful againſt the revolt. Of the troops who had miſbehaved he is ſaid to have executed, perhaps only decimated, four thouſand, as an example to the new levies, and as a warning of the ſeverities they were to expect for any failure in the remaining part of the ſervice.

Upon his arrival in Lucania he cut off ten thouſand of the rebels who were ſtationed at a diſtance from the main body of their army, and he endeavoured to ſhut up Spartacus in the peninſula of Brutium, or head of land which extends to the Straits of Meſſina. The gladiators deſired to paſs into Sicily, where their fellow-ſufferers, the ſlaves of that iſland, were not yet intirely ſubdued, and where great numbers at all times were prepared to revolt; but they were prevented by the want of ſhipping. Craſſus at the ſame time undertook a work of great labour, that of intrenching the land from ſea to ſea with a ditch fifteen feet wide, and as many deep, extending, according to Plutarch, three hundred ſtadia, or above thirty miles. Spartacus endeavoured to interrupt the execution of this undertaking; but being repulſed in every attack, his followers began to deſpond, and entertained thoughts of ſurrendering themſelves. In order to ſupply by deſpair what they loſt in courage, he put them in mind that they fought not upon equal terms with their enemies; that they muſt either

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either conquer or be treated as fugitive ſlaves; and, to enforce his admonitions, he ordered one of his captives to be nailed to the croſs in ſight of both armies. "This," he ſaid to his own people, "is "an example of what you are to ſuffer if you fall into the ene-"my's hands."

Whilſt Craſſus was buſy completing his line, Spartacus prepared to force it; and, having provided faggots and other materials for this purpoſe, filled up the ditch at a convenient place, and paſſed it in the night with the whole body of his followers. He directed his march to Apulia, but was purſued, and greatly haraſſed in his flight.

Accounts being received at once in the camp of Craſſus and in that of Spartacus, that freſh troops were landed at Brunduſium from Macedonia, and that Pompey was arrived in Italy, and on his march to join Craſſus, both armies were equally diſpoſed to hazard a battle; the gladiators, that they might not be attacked at once by ſo many enemies as were collecting againſt them; and the Romans under Craſſus, that Pompey might not ſnatch out of their hands the glory of terminating the war. Under the influence of theſe different motives, both leaders drew forth their armies; and when they were ready to engage, Spartacus, with the valour rather of a gladiator than of a general, alighting from his horſe, and ſaying aloud, in the hearing of his followers, "If I conquer to-day, I ſhall be better mount-"ed; if not, I ſhall not have occaſion for a horſe," he plunged his ſword into the body of the animal. With this earneſt of a reſolution to conquer or to die, he advanced towards the enemy; directing the diviſion in which he himſelf commanded to make their attack where he underſtood the Roman general was poſted. He intended to decide the action by forcing the Romans in that quarter; but after much bloodſhed, being mangled with wounds, and ſtill almoſt alone in the midſt of his enemies, he continued to fight till he was killed; and the victory of courſe declared for his enemy. About a thouſand of the Romans

were ſlain; of the vanquiſhed the greateſt ſlaughter, as uſual in antient battles, took place after the flight began. The dead were not numbered; about ſix thouſand were taken, and, in the manner of executing the ſentence of death on ſlaves, they were nailed to the croſs in rows, that lined the way from Capua to Rome. Such as eſcaped from the field of battle, being about five thouſand, fell into the hands of Pompey, and furniſhed a pretence to his flatterers for aſcribing to him the honour of terminating the war.

The mean quality of the enemy, however, in the preſent caſe, precluded even Craſſus from the honour of a triumph; he could have only an ovation or military proceſſion on foot. But inſtead of the myrtle wreath, uſual on ſuch occaſions, he had credit enough with the Senate to obtain the laurel crown[y].

Pompey too arrived at the ſame time with new and uncommon pretenſions, requiring a diſpenſation from the law and eſtabliſhed forms of the commonwealth. The war he had conducted in Spain being of the nature of a civil war againſt Roman citizens or ſubjects, with a Roman general at their head, did not give a regular claim to a triumph: Pompey himſelf was yet under the legal age, and had not paſſed through any of the previous ſteps of Queſtor, Ædile and Prætor; yet on the preſent occaſion he not only inſiſted on a triumph, but put in his claim likewiſe to an immediate nomination to the office of Conſul.

It now became extremely evident, that the eſtabliſhed honours of the State, conferred in the uſual way, were not adequate to the pretenſions of this young man: that he muſt have new and ſingular appointments, or thoſe already known beſtowed on him in ſome new and ſingular manner. His enemies obſerved, that he avoided every occaſion of fair competition; that he took a rank of importance

[y] A. Gellius, lib. v.

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which he did not ſubmit to have examined; and that he ever aſpired to ſtand alone, or in the firſt place of public conſideration and dignity. His partizans, on the contrary, ſtated the extraordinary honours which had been done to him, as the foundation of ſtill farther diſtinctions[4]. In enumerating his ſervices upon his return from Spain, they reckoned up, according to Pliny, eight hundred and ſeventy-one towns, from the Pyrennees to the extremities of that country, which he had reduced; obſerved that he had ſurpaſſed the glory of all the officers who had gone before him in that ſervice; and, in conſequence of theſe repreſentations, though ſtill in a private ſtation, he was admitted to a triumph, or partook with Metellus in this honour.

Pompey had hitherto, in all the late diſputes, taken part with the ariſtocracy; but not without ſuſpicion of aiming too high for republican government of any ſort. While he ſupported the Senate, he affected a degree of pre-eminence above thoſe who compoſed it, and was not content with equality, even among the firſt Nobles of his country. He acquieſced, nevertheleſs, in the mere ſhew of importance, without aſſuming a power which might have engaged him in conteſts, and expoſed his pretenſions to too near an inſpection. Upon his approach at the head of an army from Spain, the Senate was greatly alarmed; but he gave the moſt unfeigned aſſurances of his intention to diſband his army as ſoon as they ſhould have attended his triumph. The Senate accordingly gave way to this irregular pretenſion, and afterwards to the pretenſion, ſtill more dangerous, which, without any of the previous conditions which the law required, he made to the Conſulate. Craſſus, who had been Prætor in the preceding year, now ſtood for the ſame office, entered into a concert with Pompey, and, notwithſtanding their mutual jealouſy of each other, they joined their intereſts, and were elected together.

U. C. 683. M. Licin. Craſſus, Cn. Pomp. Magnus.

[4] Vid. Cicer. pro Lege Manilia.

Under

Under the adminiſtration of theſe officers ſome important laws are ſaid to have paſſed, although moſt of the particulars have eſcaped the notice of hiſtorians. It appears that Pompey now began to pay his court to the People; and, though he profeſſed to ſupport the authority of the Senate, wiſhed to have it in his power, on occaſion, to take the ſenſe of what was called the aſſembly of the People againſt them, or, in other words, to counteract them by means of the popular tumults which bore this name.

The Tribunes, Quinctius and Palicanus, had for two years ſucceſſively laboured to remove the bars which had, by the conſtitution of Sylla, been oppoſed to the tribunitian power. They had been ſtrenuouſly reſiſted by Lucullus and others, who held the office of Conſul, during the dependence of the queſtions which had ariſen on that ſubject. By the favour of Pompey and Craſſus, however, the Tribunes obtained a reſtitution of the privileges which their predeceſſors, in former times of the republic, had ſo often abuſed; and, together with the ſecurity of their ſacred and inviolable character, and their negative in all proceedings of the State, they were again permitted to propoſe laws, and to harangue the people; a dangerous meaſure, by which Pompey at once rendered fruitleſs that reformation which was the only apology for the blood ſo laviſhly ſhed, not only by Sylla, but likewiſe by himſelf. Caius Julius Cæſar, at the ſame time, having the rank of Legionary Tribune conferred upon him by the choice of the People, was extremely active in procuring thoſe popular acts; a policy in which he was more conſiſtent with himſelf than Pompey, and only purſued the courſe of the party with which he embarked in his youth [3].

Under this Conſulate, and probably with the encouragement of Pompey, the law of Sylla, reſpecting the judicatures, was, upon the

[3] Suetonius in C. Jul. Cæſar. lib. i.

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motion of the Prætor, Aurelius Cotta, likewiſe repealed; and it was permitted to the Prætors to draught the judges in equal numbers from the Senate, the knights, and a certain claſs of the People *, whoſe deſcription is not clearly aſcertained. This was, perhaps, a juſt correction of Sylla's partiality to the Nobles; and, if it had not been accompanied by the former act, which reſtored the tribunitian power, might have merited applauſe.

Lex Aurelia Judiciaria.

In the mean time, corruption advanced among all orders of men with a haſty pace; in the lower ranks, contempt of government; among the higher, covetouſneſs and prodigality, with an ardour for lucrative provinces, and the opportunities of extortion and flagrant abuſe. As the offices of State at Rome began to be coveted with a view to the appointments abroad, with which they were followed, Pompey, in order to diſplay his own diſintereſtedneſs, with an oblique reproof to the Nobility who aſpired to magiſtracy with ſuch mercenary views, took a formal oath in entering on his Conſulate, that he would not, at the expiration of his office, accept of any government in the provinces; and by this example of generoſity in himſelf, and by the cenſure it implied of others, obtained great credit with the People, and furniſhed his emiſſaries, who were ever buſy in ſounding his praiſe, with a pretence for enhancing his merit. It may, however, from his character and policy in other inſtances, be ſuſpected, that he remained at Rome with intention to watch opportunities of raiſing his own conſideration, and of obtaining, by the ſtrength of his party, any extraordinary truſt or commiſſion of which the occaſion ſhould ariſe.

Pompey, in the adminiſtration of his Conſulate, had procured the revival of the Cenſors functions. Theſe had been intermitted about ſixteen years, during great part of which time the republic had been

* Tribuni Erarii.

in

in a ſtate of civil war; and the prevailing parties, in their turns, mutually had recourſe to acts of baniſhment, confiſcations, and military executions againſt each other. In ſuch times, even after the ſword was ſheathed, the power of Cenſor, in the firſt heat of party-reſentment, could not be ſafely intruſted with any of the citizens; and the attempts which were now made to revive it, though in appearance ſucceſsful, could not give it a permanent footing in the commonwealth. The public was arrived at a ſtate in which men complain of evils, but cannot endure their remedies.

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L. Gellius Poplicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, being entruſted, in the capacity of Cenſors, to make up the rolls of the People, muſtered four hundred and fifty thouſand citizens. They purged the Senate with great ſeverity, having expunged ſixty-four from the rolls, and among thoſe C. Antonius, afterwards Conſul, aſſigning as their reaſon, that he, having the command on the coaſts of Aſia and Greece, had pillaged the allies, and mortgaged and ſquandered his own eſtate. But what moſt diſtinguiſhed this Cenſorſhip was an incident, for the ſake of which, it is likely, the ſolemnity of the Cenſus had been now revived.

It was cuſtomary on thoſe occaſions for the Knights to paſs in review, each leading his horſe before the Cenſors. They were queſtioned reſpecting their age, their ſervices, and the perſons under whoſe command they had ſerved; and if they had already ſerved the ten years preſcribed by law, they received an exemption from future ſervices, and were veſted with the privileges which were annexed to this circumſtance. At this part of the ceremony the People were ſurpriſed to ſee their Conſul, Pompey the Great, deſcending into the market-place, leading his horſe in quality of a ſimple knight, but dreſſed in his conſular robes, and preceded by the lictors. Being queſtioned by the Cenſor, whether he had ſerved the ſtated number of years, he anſwered that he had, and all of them in armies commanded

manded by himſelf. This farce was received with loud acclamations of the People; and the Cenſors having granted the cuſtomary exemption, roſe from their ſeats, and, followed by a great multitude, attended this equeſtrian Conſul to his own houſe [7].

It is obſerved that Craſſus and Pompey, although they entered on office in concert, yet differed in the courſe of their adminiſtration on ſubjects which are not particularly mentioned. As Craſſus was in poſſeſſion of great wealth, he endeavoured, by his liberalities, to vie with the impoſing ſtate and popular arts of his colleague. He gave an entertainment to the whole People at ten thouſand tables, and diſtributed three months proviſion of corn. To account for his being able to court the People in this manner, it is ſaid, that he inherited from his father a fortune of three hundred talents, or near ſixty thouſand pounds; that he increaſed it, by purchaſing at a low price the eſtates of thoſe who were proſcribed in the late troubles, and by letting for hire the labour of a numerous family of ſlaves, inſtructed in various arts and callings; and was become ſo rich by theſe means, that when, ſome time after this date, he was about to depart for Aſia, and conſecrated the tenth part of his eſtate to Hercules, he was found to poſſeſs ſeven thouſand one hundred talents, or about one million three hundred and ſeventy thouſand and three hundred pounds ſterling [8].

Pompey, at the expiration of his year in the Conſulſhip, in obſervance of the oath he had taken, remained at Rome in a private ſtation; but, agreeably to the character he formerly bore, maintained the reſerve and ſtatelineſs of a perſon raiſed above the condition of a citizen, or even above that of the firſt Senators of conſular rank. Other candidates for conſideration and public honours endeavoured, by their talents and eloquence, to make themſelves neceſſary to thoſe who had

[7] Plutarch. in Pompeio.

[8] Plutarch. in Craſſo. As the intereſt of money was prohibited at Rome, under the denomination of uſury, but in fact was unlimited, the annual returns from ſuch a capital muſt have been immenſe.

affairs to ſolicit with the public, or even to make themſelves feared. They laboured to diſtinguiſh themſelves as able advocates or formidable accuſers at the bar, and to ſtrengthen their intereſt by procuring the ſupport of thoſe to whom their talents either were or might become of importance. Pompey, on the contrary, ſtating himſelf as an exception to common rules, avoided the courts of juſtice and other places of ordinary reſort, did not commit his talents to the public judgment, nor preſent his perſon to the public view; took the reſpect that was paid to him as a right; ſeldom went abroad, and never without a numerous train of attendants [o]. He was formed for the ſtate of a prince, and might have ſtolen into that high ſtation even at Rome, if men, born to equality, could have ſuffered an elevation which was not ſupported by adequate abilities; or had been willing, when troubled with faction, to forego their own importance, in order to obtain peace and the comforts of a moderate government. The pretenſions of Pompey, however, were extremely diſagreeable to the Senate, and not otherwiſe acceptable to the People, than as they tended to mortify the pride of that order of men.

CHAP. II.

The Conſulate of Craſſus and Pompey was ſucceeded by that of Q. Hortenſius and Q. Cæcilius Metellus. In the diſtribution of provinces, Crete, with the command of an armament to be ſent into that iſland, fell to the lot of Hortenſius; but this citizen, having acquired his conſideration by his eloquence in pleading the cauſes of his friends, and being accuſtomed to the bar, perhaps in a degree that interfered with his military character, declined to accept of this government; leaving it, together with the command of the army that was to be employed in the reduction of the iſland, to his colleague Metellus, who afterwards received the appellation of Creticus, from the diſtinction he acquired in this ſervice.

U. C. 684. Q. Hortenſius, Q. Cæcil. Metellus Creticus.

[o] Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp.

The

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The Cretans, and moſt of the other ſeafaring people on the confines of Aſia and Europe, had in the late war taken an active part againſt the Romans. They had, by the influence of Mithridates, and by their own diſpoſition to rapine and piracy, been led to prey upon the traders, and upon the carriers of the revenue that were frequently paſſing from the provinces to Rome. The deſire of ſharing in the profits that were made by this ſpecies of war, had filled the ſea with pirates and freebooters, againſt whom the Romans ſent forth a ſucceſſion of officers, with extenſive commands, on the coaſts both of Aſia and Europe. Among others, M. Antonius had been employed in this ſervice, and was accuſed of abuſing his power, by oppreſſing the Sicilians and the people of other maritime provinces, who were innocent of the crimes he was employd to repreſs. In a deſcent on the iſland of Crete he was defeated and killed [10], and left the Romans engaged with the people of that iſland in a war which was thought to require the preſence of one of the Conſuls. The lot, as has been obſerved, fell on Hortenſius, but was transferred to his colleague Metellus.

U. C. 685. L. Cæc. Metellus, Q. Mar. Rex.

Such was the ſtate of affairs, and ſuch the deſtination of the Roman officers, when Lucullus received from Tigranes a return to the demand which he made of having Mithridates delivered up as his priſoner. This prince, at the arrival of Clodius, who bore the meſſage, had made a progreſs to the coaſts of Phœnicia, and to the farther extremities of his empire. To verify the ſtate and title which he aſſumed of King of Kings, he affected, when he mounted on horſeback, to have four captive ſovereigns to walk by his ſtirrup, and obliged them, on other occaſions, to perform every office of menial duty and ſervile attendance on his perſon. Lucullus, inſtead of the ſtile which was affected by this prince, had accoſted him in his letter

[10] Pædianus in Orat. in Verrem.

only

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only with the ſimple title of king. His meſſenger, however, was admitted to an audience, and made his demand that Mithridates, a vanquiſhed prince, whoſe territories were already in the poſſeſſion of the Romans, ſhould be delivered up to adorn the victor's triumph. This, if refuſed, ſaid the bearer of the meſſage, the Roman general would be intitled to extort by force, and would not fail, with a mighty army for that purpoſe, to purſue his fugitive wherever he was received and protected. Tigranes, unuſed even to a plain addreſs, much leſs to inſult and threats, heard this demand with real indignation; and though, with an appearance of temper, he made offer of the cuſtomary preſents and honours to the perſon who delivered it, he took his reſolution againſt the Romans, and, from having barely permitted Mithridates to take refuge in his kingdom, determined to eſpouſe his cauſe. He gave for anſwer to Clodius, that he would not deliver up the unfortunate king, and that, if the Romans invaded his territories, he knew how to defend them. He ſoon afterwards admitted Mithridates into his preſence, and determined to ſupport him with the neceſſary force againſt his enemies.

Upon receiving this anſwer from Tigranes, Lucullus reſolved without delay to march into Armenia. He choſe for this expedition two legions and a body of horſe, on whom he prevailed, though with ſome difficulty, to enter on a new war at a time when they flattered themſelves that their labours were ended, and that the rewards they expected were within their reach. With haſty marches he arrived on the Euphrates, and paſſed that river before the enemy were aware of his approach. Tigranes treated the firſt reports of his coming with contempt, and ordered the perſon who preſumed to bring ſuch accounts to be puniſhed. But being aſſured, beyond a poſſibility of doubt, that an enemy was actually on his territories, he ſent Metrodorus, one of his generals, at the head of a conſiderable force, with orders to take alive the perſon of Lucullus, whom he

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was deſirous to ſee, but not to ſpare a man of the whole army beſides.

With theſe orders, the Armenian general ſet out on the road by which the Romans were ſuppoſed to advance, and haſtened to meet them. Both armies, on the march, had intelligence of each other. Lucullus, upon the approach of the enemy, halted, began to intrench, and, in order to gain time, detached Sextilius, with about three thouſand men, to obſerve the Armenians, and, if poſſible, without riſking an action, to amuſe them till his works were completed. But ſuch was the incapacity and preſumption of the enemy, that Sextilius, being attacked by them, gained an entire victory with but a part of the Roman army; Metrodorus himſelf being killed, his army was put to the rout with great ſlaughter.

After this victory Lucullus, in order the more effectually to alarm and to diſtract the Armenians, ſeparated his army into three diviſions. With one he intercepted and diſperſed a body of Arabs, who were marching to join the king; with another he ſurpriſed Tigranes himſelf, in a diſadvantageous ſituation, and obliged him to fly with the loſs of his attendants, equipage, and the baggage of his army. At the head of the third diviſion he himſelf advanced to Tigranocerta, and inveſted that place.

After theſe diſaſters Tigranes made an effort to aſſemble the force of his kingdom; and bringing into the field all the troops of his allies, as well as his own, he muſtered an army of one hundred and fifty thouſand heavy-armed foot, fifty-five thouſand horſe, and twenty thouſand archers and ſlingers. He was adviſed by Mithridates not to riſk a battle, but to lay waſte the country from which the Romans were ſupplied with proviſions, oblige them to raiſe the ſiege of Tigranocerta, and repaſs the Euphrates, with the diſadvantage of having an enemy ſtill in force to hang on their rear. This

counſel

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counsel of Mithridates, founded in the experience he had so dearly bought, was ill suited to the presumption of the king. He therefore advanced towards the Romans, impatient to relieve his capital, and the principal seat of his magnificence. Lucullus, trusting to the specimens he had already seen of the Armenian forces, ventured to divide his army, and, without raising the siege, marched with one division to meet this numerous enemy. In the action that followed, the Armenian horse being in the van, were defeated and driven back on the foot of their own army, threw them into confusion, and gave the Romans an easy victory, in which, with very inconsiderable loss to themselves, they made a great slaughter of the enemy. The king himself, to avoid being known in his flight, unbound the royal diadem from his head, and left it to become a part in the spoils of the day.

Mariæus, who commanded in Tigranocerta, hearing of his master's defeat, and fearing a revolt of the Greeks and other foreigners, who had been forced to settle at that place, ordered them to be searched and disarmed. This order they looked on as the prelude to a massacre, and crowding together, defended themselves with the staves and other weapons they could seize. They surrounded a party that was sent to disperse them, and having by that means got a supply of arms, they took possession of a tower which commanded one of the principal gates, and from thence invited the Romans to enter the place. Lucullus accordingly seized the opportunity, and became master of the city. The spoil was great; Tigranes having collected here, as at the principal seat of his vanity, the wealth and magnificence of his court.

Mithridates, who had been present in the late action, met the king of Armenia in his flight; and, having endeavoured to re-establish his equipage and his retinue by a participation of his own, exhorted him not to despair, but to assemble a new force, and to persist in the war. They agreed, at the same time, on an embassy to the king of

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Parthia, with offers of reconciliation on the part of Tigranes, who, at this time, was at war with that prince, and of ſatisfaction on the ſubjects in conteſt between them, provided the Parthians would join in the confederacy againſt the Romans. They endeavoured to perſuade the king, that he was by no means an unconcerned ſpectator in the preſent conteſt; that the quarrel which the Romans now had with the kings of Armenia and Pontus, was the ſame with that which they formerly had with Philip and with Antiochus; and which, if not prevented, they would ſoon have with Arſaces, and was no other than his being poſſeſt of a rich territory, which tempted their ambition and avarice. Thoſe republicans, they ſaid, originally had not any poſſeſſions of their own, and were grown rich and great only by the ſpoils of their neighbours. From their ſtrong hold in Italy, they had extended their empire on the Weſt to the coaſt of the ocean; and, if not ſtopped by the powerful monarchies that lay in their way, were haſtening to reach a ſimilar boundary on the Eaſt. The king of Parthia, they added, might expect to be invaded by theſe inſatiable conquerors, and muſt now determine whether he would engage in a war joined with ſuch powerful allies, of whom one by his experience, the other by his reſources, might enable him to keep the danger at a diſtance from his own kingdom[10], or wait until theſe powers being overthrown, and become an acceſſion to the Roman force, he ſhould have the conteſt to maintain in his own territory ſingly and unſupported from abroad. To theſe repreſentations Arſaces ſeemed to give a favourable ear, agreed to the propoſed confederacy, on condition that Meſopotamia, which he had formerly claimed, was now delivered up to him. At the ſame time he endeavoured to amuſe Lucullus with offers of alliance againſt the king of Armenia.

[10] Letter of Mithridates in the Fragments of Salluſt.

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In this conjuncture it probably was, that Lucullus, in the apprehenſion of being ſuperſeded and deprived of the honour of terminating the war, made his report that the kingdom of Mithridates was now in his poſſeſſion, and that the kingdom of Tigranes was alſo in his power; and therefore, that the Senate ſhould, inſtead of a ſucceſſor, ſend the uſual commiſſion to ſettle the form of the province, and to make a proper eſtabliſhment to preſerve the territories which he had already ſubdued. But after theſe repreſentations were diſpatched, it became apparent that the king of Parthia had deceived him with falſe profeſſions, while he actually made great progreſs in his treaty with the kings of Armenia and Pontus, and meant to ſupport them with all his force. In reſentment of this act of treachery, and to prevent the effects of it, Lucullus propoſed to carry the war into Parthia; and, for this purpoſe, ordered the legions that were ſtationed in Pontus to march without delay into Armenia. CHAP. III.

Theſe troops, however, already tired of the ſervice, and ſuſpecting that they were intended for ſome diſtant and hazardous enterpriſe, broke out into open mutiny, and refuſed to obey their officers. This example was ſoon afterwards followed by other parts of the army; and the general was obliged to confine his operations to the kingdom of Armenia. He endeavoured, by paſſing the mountains near to the ſources of the Euphrates and the Tigris, to penetrate as far as Artaxata, the capital of the kingdom. By this march he forced Tigranes once more to hazard a battle, and obtained a victory; but his own army, notwithſtanding their ſucceſs, were ſo much diſcouraged with the change of climate, which they experienced in aſcending the mountains of Armenia, and with the early and ſevere approach of winter in thoſe high lands, that they again mutinied, and obliged their general to change the plan of his operations. He turned his march to the ſouthward, fell down on Meſopotamia, and, after a ſhort ſiege, made himſelf maſter of Niſibis, a rich city in that territory, where,

with

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with other captives, he took Guras, brother to the king, who commanded in the place.

Here, however, the mutinous ſpirit ſtill continuing to operate in the Roman army, it began to appear, that the general, who had ſo often overcome the kings of Pontus and Armenia, was better qualified to contend with an enemy, than to win or to preſerve the good-will of his own troops. A report being ſpread that he was ſoon to be recalled, he, from that moment, loſt the ſmall remains of his authority; the legions deſerted their colours, and treated, with contempt or indifference, all the attempts he made to retain them.

This mutiny began in that part of the army, which, having been tranſported into Aſia, under the command of Valerius Flaccus, had murdered this general, to put themſelves under the command of Fimbria, and afterwards deſerted their new leader to join with Sylla. Such crimes, under the late unhappy diviſions of the republic, either remained unpuniſhed, or were ſtated as merits with the party in whoſe favour the crime was committed. Theſe legions, however, were, by Sylla, who was not willing to employ ſuch inſtruments, or to intruſt his own, or the fate of the commonwealth in ſuch hands, left in Aſia, under pretence of ſecuring the province; and they accordingly made a conſiderable part in the armies ſucceſſively commanded by Murena and by Lucullus. The diſpoſition which they now ſhewed, and that of the whole army, to diſorder and mutiny, was greatly excited by the factious ſpirit of Publius Clodius, the relation of Lucullus, who, having himſelf taken offence at the general, gave this ſpecimen of his future conduct in the State, by endeavouring to ſtir up rebellion among the troops. "We who "have already undergone ſo many hardſhips," he ſaid, "are ſtill "kept on foot to eſcort the camels that carry the treaſures of our gene-"ral, and made to purſue, without end, a couple of barbarous princes, "that lead us over deſarts, or uncultivated waſtes, while the ſol-

"diers

"diers of Pompey, after a few campaigns in Spain, or in Italy, are "enjoying the fruits of their labour in comfortable ſettlements, pro- "cured by the favour of their leader."

Lucullus was ſo much aware of the decline of his authority, that he did not chuſe to expoſe it, by attempting to effect even a mere change of poſition. He hoped, that while he iſſued no orders of any moment, the reſolution of his army not to obey him might remain a ſecret to the enemy. This ſtate of his affairs, however, ſoon became known to Mithridates, and filled him with hopes of being able to recover his kingdom. That he might not ſuffer the opportunity to eſcape him, he fell back into Pontus, with what troops he had then under his command, and, by his authority and influence over his own ſubjects, ſoon augmented his force, penetrated among the ſcattered quarters of the Romans, who were left to occupy the country, and ſeparately ſurpriſed or deſtroyed conſiderable bodies of their troops. Among theſe, he attacked and defeated Fabius, the officer who was truſted with the general command in that kingdom; and though now turned of ſeventy, expoſed his own perſon in the action, and received a wound which ſtopped him in the purſuit, and by that means prevented the full effect of his victory.

Lucullus, being informed of what had paſſed in Pontus, had influence enough with the army to put them in motion towards that kingdom with ſome appearance of order; but before his arrival, Mithridates had ſhut up Fabius in Cabira, and defeated Triarius with conſiderable ſlaughter. Here again the old man was wounded; and, to ſatisfy the army that he was not dead, was raiſed up into view, and remained in ſight of the army while his wound was dreſſed. In this laſt defeat the Romans loſt twenty-four legionary Tribunes, one hundred and fifty Centurions, and ſeven thouſand men.

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It was not doubted, however, that Lucullus, on his arrival, if the army had been diſpoſed to act under him, would have been able ſoon to retrieve his affairs: but he was at this time ſuperſeded; and it was known in the army, that Acilius Glabrio was ſet out from Rome to aſſume the command. The legions therefore, under pretence that Lucullus was no longer their general, and that they themſelves, by a decree of the People, had received their diſmiſſion, refuſed to obey him; and the men of his army, in great numbers, actually took the route of Cappadocia on their return to Italy.

This was the ſtate of affairs when the commiſſioners, who, upon the report of Lucullus, had been ſent by the Senate to ſettle the kingdom of Pontus in the form of a province, actually arrived. They found the Proconſul deſtitute of power in his own camp, and Mithridates, whom they believed to be vanquiſhed, again maſter of his own kingdom, and joining to the experience of old age all the ardour and enterpriſe of youth [11].

The Roman army in Aſia, as a prelude to their preſent defection, had been taught to upbraid the parſimony of their own general by a compariſon with the liberality and munificence of Pompey, and in this compariſon ſhowed a diſpoſition to change their leader, which, it is not doubted, Pompey, by his intrigues, and with the aid of his agents, greatly encouraged. He could in reality ill brook the private ſtation to which, by his late oath, in entering on the Conſulate, he had bound himſelf. He ſtudied to ſupport the public opinion of his importance, and wiſhed for an occaſion to derive ſome advantage from it; but nothing had occurred for two years that was worthy of the high diſtinction to which he aſpired. The command in Aſia he coveted the more, that it was ſecured to Lucullus by the ſplendor of his own ſucceſſes, and by the unanimous judgment of the Senate

[11] Appian. Bell. Mithridat. Plutarch. in Lucullo. Dio Caſſius.

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and Nobles, who knew his faithful attachment to their order, and his fidelity to the ariſtocratical part of the conſtitution. The difficulties in that ſervice were over, and nothing but the glory of terminating the war remained. Pompey, either from envy to Lucullus, or from a deſign to open a way to this glory for himſelf, contributed to the nomination of Glabrio, and to the nomination of the Prætors, who were ſent with ſeparate commands into the provinces of Aſia and Bythinia. If, upon this change, the war ſhould become unſucceſsful, or languiſh, he had hopes to be called for by the general voice of the People, as the only perſon fit to bring it to a happy concluſion. Meantime a project was ſtarted, which was likely to place him near to this ſcene of action, and to facilitate his removal, if judged expedient, to the command of the army in Pontus.

The pirates ſtill continued to infeſt the ſeas, and were daily riſing in their preſumption, and increaſing in their ſtrength. They received continual acceſſions of numbers from thoſe, who, by the unſettled ſtate of Aſia, were forced to join them for ſubſiſtence. The impunity which they enjoyed during the diſtractions of the Roman commonwealth, and the profits they made by their depredations encouraged many who frequented the ſeas to engage in the ſame way of life. They had been chaced, and numbers of them taken by M. Antonius the orator, by Servilius Iſauricus, and, laſt of all, by C. Antonius, the father of him who, in the capacity of Triumvir, is to become ſo conſpicuous in the ſequel of this hiſtory. But they had their retreats; and, upon the leaſt remiſſion of vigilance in the Roman officers, they again multiplied apace, put to ſea in formidable ſquadrons, and embarked ſuch numbers of men, as not only enabled them to ſcour the ſeas, but likewiſe to make deſcents on the coaſts, to enter harbours, deſtroy ſhipping, and pillage the maritime towns. They even ventured to appear off the mouth of the Tiber, and to plunder the town of Oſtia. All the coaſts of

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the empire were open to their depredations. The Roman magiſtrates were made priſoners in paſſing to and from their provinces; and citizens of every denomination, when taken by them, were forced to pay ranſom, kept in captivity, or put to death. The ſupply of proviſions to Italy was rendered extremely difficult, and the price in proportion enhanced. Every report on theſe ſubjects was exaggerated by the intrigues of Pompey, who perceived, in this occaſion of public diſtreſs, the object of a new and extraordinary commiſſion to himſelf.

Frequent complaints having been made, and frequent deliberations held on this ſubject in the Senate, Gabinius, one of the Tribunes, at laſt propoſed, that ſome officer of Conſular rank ſhould be veſted, during three years, with abſolute powers, in order to put an effectual ſtop to theſe outrages, and to eradicate the cauſe of them, ſo as to ſecure for the future the inhabitants of the coaſt, as well as to protect the navigation of the ſeas. As Gabinius was known to be in concert with Pompey, the deſign of the propoſition was manifeſt; and it was received in the Senate with a general averſion. "For "this," it was ſaid, "Pompey has declined the ordinary turn of "Conſular duty upon the expiration of his office, that he might "lie in wait for extraordinary and illegal appointments." Gabinius being threatened with violence if he ſhould perſiſt in his motion, thought proper to withdraw from the aſſembly.

A report was immediately ſpread in the city, that the perſon of the Tribune Gabinius had been actually violated; multitudes aſſembled at the doors of the Senate-houſe, and great diſorders were likely to follow; it was judged prudent for the Senate to adjourn; and the members, dreading ſome inſult from the populace, retired by ſeparate ways to their own houſes. Gabinius, without farther regard to the diſſent of the Senate, prepared to carry his motion to the People; but the other nine Tribunes were inclined to oppoſe him. Trebellius and Roſcius, in particular, promiſed, by their negative,

gative, to put a ſtop to any farther proceedings on that buſineſs. Pompey, in the mean time, with a diſſimulation which conſtituted part of his character, affected to diſapprove of the motion, and to decline the commiſſion with which it was propoſed to veſt him. He had recourſe to this affectation, not merely as the fitteſt means on the preſent occaſion to diſarm the envy of the Nobles, and to confirm the People in their choice; but ſtill more as a manner of proceeding which ſuited his own diſpoſition, no leſs deſirous to appear forced and courted into high ſituations, than ſolicitous to gain and to hold them. He thus provoked the citizens of his own rank, no leſs by the ſhallow arts which he practiſed to impoſe on the public, than by the ſtate which he aſſumed. He could ſcarcely expect to find a ſupport in the order of Nobles, and leaſt of all among thoſe who were likely to become the perſonal rivals of his fortune in the commonwealth: and yet it is mentioned, that Julius Cæſar, now about two-and-thirty years of age, and old enough to diſtinguiſh his natural antagoniſts in the career of ambition, took part with the creatures of Pompey on this occaſion. He was diſpoſed to court the People, and to oppoſe the ariſtocracy; either of which principles may explain his conduct in this inſtance. He had himſelf already incurred the diſpleaſure of the Senate, but more as a libertine than as a diſturber of the State, in which he had not hitherto taken any material part. In common with the youth of his time, he diſliked the Senators, on account of the remaining auſterity of their manners, no leſs than the inferior people diſliked them on account of their ariſtocratical claims to prerogative. But whatever we may ſuppoſe to have been his motives, Cæſar, even before he ſeemed to have formed any ambitious deſigns of his own, was ever ready to abet thoſe of every deſperate adventurer who counteracted the authority of the Senate, or ſet the orders of government at nought; and ſeemed to be actuated by a ſpecies of inſtinct, which ſet him at variance

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with thoſe forms of a civil nature, which checked the licence of faction [22].

On the day on which the queſtion on the motion of Gabinius was to be put to the People, Pompey appeared in the Comitium; and, if we may judge from the ſpeech which is aſcribed to him, employed a diſſimulation and artifice ſomewhat too groſs even for a popular aſſembly. He took occaſion to thank the People for the honours he had ſo often received; but complained, that, having already toiled ſo much in the public ſervice, he ſtill ſhould be deſtined for new labours. "You have forgotten," he ſaid, "the dangers I "encountered, and the fatigues I underwent, while yet almoſt a "boy, in the war with Cinna, in the wars in Sicily and in Africa, "and what I ſuffered in Spain, before I was honoured with any "magiſtracy, or was of age to have a place in the Senate. But I "mean not to accuſe you of ingratitude; on the contrary, I have "been fully repaid. Your nomination of me to conduct the war "with Sertorius, when every one elſe declined the danger, I con-"ſider as a favour; and the extraordinary triumph you beſtowed in "conſequence of it, as a very great honour. But I muſt entreat "you to conſider, that continued application and labour exhauſt the "powers of the mind as well as thoſe of the body. Truſt not to "my age alone, nor imagine that I am ſtill a young man, merely "becauſe my number of years is ſhort of what others have attained. "Reckon my ſervices and the dangers to which I have been expoſed; "they will exceed the number of my years, and ſatisfy you, that "I cannot longer endure the labours and cares which are now "propoſed for me. But if this be not granted me, I muſt beg "of you to conſider what loads of envy ſuch appointments are "likely to draw upon me from men, whoſe diſpleaſure, I know,

[22] Zonaras, An. lib. x. c. 3.

"you

" you neither do, nor ought to regard, although to me their envy
" would be a great misfortune: and I confeſs, that, of all the diffi-
" culties and dangers of war, I fear nothing ſo much as this. To
" live with envious perſons; to be called to account for miſcarriage,
" if one fails in public affairs; to be envied, if one ſucceeds; who
" would chuſe to be employed on ſuch conditions? For theſe, and
" many other reaſons, I pray you to leave me at reſt; leave me to
" the care of my family, and of my private affairs. As for the pre-
" ſent ſervice, I pray you to chuſe, among thoſe who deſire the em-
" ployment, ſome proper perſon; among ſo many, you cannot ſure-
" ly be at a loſs. I am not the only perſon that loves you, or that
" has experience in military affairs. There are many, whoſe names,
" to avoid the imputation of flattery, I will not mention."

To this ſpeech Gabinius replied; and, affecting to believe the ſincerity of Pompey's declarations, obſerved, that it was agreeable to the character of this great man, neither to deſire command, nor raſhly to accept of what was preſſed upon him. " They who are
" beſt able to ſurmount difficulties," he ſaid, " are likewiſe leaſt
" inclined to engage in them. But it is your buſineſs, fellow-citi-
" zens, to conſider, not what is agreeable to Pompey, but what is
" neceſſary to your own affairs; not to regard thoſe who court you
" for offices, but thoſe who are fit to diſcharge the duties of them.
" I wiſh we had many perſons of this deſcription, beſides the man I
" have propoſed to your choice. Did we not all wiſh for ſuch per-
" ſons likewiſe, when we ſearched among the young and the old for
" ſome one whom we could oppoſe to Sertorius, and found none
" but himſelf? But wiſhes cannot avail us; we muſt take men as
" they are; we cannot create them. If there be but one man formed
" for our purpoſe, with knowledge, experience, and good fortune,
" we muſt lay hold of him, and ſeize him, if neceſſary, even by
" force. Compulſion here is expedient and honourable for both
" parties;

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" parties; for thoſe who employ it, becauſe it is to find them a " perſon who can conduct their affairs; for him who ſuffers it, " becauſe he is to have an opportunity of ſerving his country, an " object for which no good citizen will refuſe to expoſe his perſon, " or to ſacrifice his life.

" Do you think that Pompey, while yet a boy, was fit to command " armies, to protect your allies, to reduce your enemies, to extend " your empire; but that now in the prime of life, ripe in wiſ- " dom and experience, he can ſerve you no longer? You em- " ployed the boy, you ſuffer the man to be idle. When a private " citizen of Equeſtrian rank, he was fit for war and affairs of ſtate; " now he is a Senator, he is fit for nothing! Before you had any " trial of him, you made choice of him for the moſt important truſt; " now that you have experience of his ability, of his conduct, and " of his ſucceſs, you heſitate. Is the preſent occaſion leſs preſſing " than the former? Is the antagoniſt of Sertorius not fit to contend " with pirates? But ſuch abſurdities cannot be received by the Ro- " man People. As for you, Pompey, ſubmit to the will of your " fellow-citizens. For this you was born, for this you was edu- " cated. I call upon you as the property of your country; I call " upon you as its defence and ſafe-guard; I call upon you to lay " down your life, if neceſſary. This I know, if your country re- " quire it, you will not, you cannot refuſe.

" But it is ridiculous to accoſt you in this manner; you, who " have proved your courage and your love to your country in ſo " many and ſuch arduous trials. Be ruled by this great aſſembly. " Deſpiſe the envy of a few, or ſtudy the more to deſerve the ge- " neral favour. Let the envious pine when they hear of your " actions, it is what they deſerve. Let us be delivered from the " evils that ſurround us, while you proceed to end your life as you " began it, with ſucceſs and with glory."

When

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When Gabinius had finiſhed his ſpeech, Trebellius, another of the Tribunes, attempted to reply; but ſuch a clamour was immediately raiſed by the multitude that he could not be heard. He then, by the authority of his office, forbad the queſtion; and Gabinius inſtantly propoſed to have the ſenſe of the Tribes, Whether Tribellius had not forfeited the character of Tribune? Seventeen Tribes were of this opinion, and the eighteenth would have made the majority, when Trebellius thought proper to withdraw his negative. Roſcius, another of the Tribunes, intimated by ſigns (for he could not be heard) that a ſecond ſhould be joined with Pompey in this commiſſion. But the clamour was renewed, and the meeting likely to end in riot and violence. Then all oppoſition to the motion was dropt. In this ſtate of affairs, Gabinius, truſting that, in the preſent humour of the People, no man would dare to oppoſe the meaſure, and wiſhing to increaſe the honour of Pompey's nomination, by the ſeeming concurrence of ſome of the more reſpectable citizens, called upon Catulus, who was then firſt on the roll of the Senate, to deliver his opinion, and led him up into the roſtra for this purpoſe.

This citizen, by the equability of his conduct, and by his moderation in ſupport of the ariſtocracy had great authority even with the oppoſite party. He began his ſpeech to the People with profeſſions of public zeal, which obliged him to deliver with plainneſs what he thought was conducive to their good, and which intitled him to a deliberate hearing, before they ſhould pronounce on the merits of what he was about to deliver. "If you liſten," he ſaid, "ſomething may ſtill be offered "to inform your judgment; if you break forth again into diſorders "and tumults, your capacity and good underſtanding will avail you "nothing. I muſt begin with declaring my opinion, that powers "ſo great, and for ſo long a time, as are now propoſed for Pompey, "ſhould not be committed to any ſingle citizen.

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" The precedent is contrary to law, and in itſelf, in the higheſt " degree, dangerous to the State. Whence came the uſurpations of " Marius, but from the habit of continued command; from his " being put at the head of every army, entruſted with every war, " and no leſs than ſix times re-elected Conſul in the ſpace of a few " years? What inflamed to ſuch a degree the arrogant ſpirit of " Sylla, but the continual command of armies, and the continual " power of Dictator? Such is human nature, that, in age as well as " in youth, we are debauched with power; and if inured for any " time to act as ſuperiors, we cannot ſubmit afterwards to the equal " and moderate ſtation of citizens.

" I ſpeak not with any particular reference to Pompey; I ſpeak " what the law requires, and what I am ſure is for your good. If " high office and command be an honour, every one who has pre- " tenſions ſhould enjoy them in his turn; if they be a load or a " burden, every one ought to bear his part. Theſe are the laws of " juſtice and of republican government. By obſerving them, republics " have an advantage over every other ſtate. By employing many " men in their turns, they educate and train many citizens for the " public ſervice, and have numbers amongſt whom they may chuſe " the fitteſt to ſerve on every particular emergence. But if we ſuffer " one or a few to engroſs every office of public ſervice or public " truſt, the liſt of thoſe who are qualified for any ſuch truſt will de- " creaſe in proportion. If we always employ the ſame perſon in " every public ſervice, we ſhall ſoon have no other perſon to employ. " Why were we ſo much at a loſs for experienced commanders when " Sertorius appeared to threaten Italy with an invaſion? Becauſe " command, for a conſiderable time before that period, had been en- " groſſed by a few, and thoſe few alone had any experience. Al- " though, therefore, I have the higheſt opinion of Pompey's abilities

" for this ſervice, I muſt prefer to his pretenſions the public utility " and the expreſs declaration of the laws.

" You annually elect Conſuls and Prætors: to what purpoſe? to " ſerve the State? or to carry for a few months the enſigns of power? " If to ſerve the State, why name private perſons with unprecedented " commiſſions to perform what your magiſtrates are either fit to per- " form, or are not fit to have been elected?

" If there be any uncommon emergency that requires more than " the ordinary exertions of government, the conſtitution has provided " an expedient. You may name a Dictator. The power of this " officer has no bounds, but in reſpect to the place in which it is to " be exerciſed, and to the time during which it is to laſt. It is " to be exerciſed within the limits of Italy, where alone the vitals " of the State can be expoſed to any great or preſſing attack; it is " limited to ſix months, a ſufficient period in which to remove the " cauſe of any ſudden alarm. But this unlimited power, which is " now propoſed for ſo long a time, and over the whole empire, muſt " end in calamities, ſuch as this and other nations have ſuffered " from the ambition and uſurpation of arbitrary and ſeditious men.

" If you beſtow unlimited power by ſea and by land on a ſingle " man, in what manner is he to exerciſe his power? Not by him- " ſelf in perſon, for he cannot be every where preſent; he muſt " have lieutenants or ſubſtitutes who act under his orders. He can- " not even attend to what is paſſing at once in Egypt and in Spain, " in Africa, Syria, and in Greece. If ſo, then why may not thoſe " who are to act be officers named by you, and not by any interme- " diate perſon; accountable to you, and not to another; and in the " dangers they run, animated with the proſpect of honour to them- " ſelves, not to a perſon who is unneceſſarily interpoſed between " them and their country? Gabinius propoſes to inveſt this officer " with authority to name many lieutenants; I pray you conſider,

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"whether theſe officers ſhould depend upon any intermediate perſon, "or upon yourſelves alone? and whether there be ſufficient cauſe to "ſuſpend all the legal powers, and to ſuperſede all the magiſtrates in "the commonwealth, and all the governors of provinces in every "part of your empire, in order to make war on pirates?"

So much of what Catulus is ſuppoſed to have delivered on this occaſion is preſerved among the fragments of Dion Caſſius. It is mentioned by others, that the audience expreſſed their good-will and reſpect for this Senator in a compliment which they paid to him, probably near the cloſe of his ſpeech, when urging ſome of his former arguments, he aſked, "If this man to whom alone, by thus "employing him in every ſervice, you give an opportunity of "learning the profeſſion of a ſtateſman or ſoldier, ſhould fall, to "whom will you next have recourſe?" The People anſwered, with a general acclamation, *To yourſelf*[13]. They revered, for a moment, the candour and ability of this eminent citizen, but could not withſtand the arts of Pompey, and the tide of popularity, which then ran ſo much in his favour.

This day being far ſpent in debate, another day was appointed in which to collect the votes, when a decree paſſed to veſt Pompey with the ſupreme command over all the fleets and armies of the republic, in every ſea without diſtinction or limit, and on every coaſt within four hundred ſtadia, or fifty miles of the ſhore. This commiſſion took place in Italy, and extended throughout every province, during three years from the time of paſſing the edict.

As Pompey owed theſe extraordinary powers intirely to the Tribune Gabinius, he intended to have employed him next in command to himſelf; but the law which excluded the Tribunes from ſucceeding to any ſuch commands, in the firſt year after the expiration of

[13] Cicero pro Lege Manlia.

their

their office, ſtood in the way of this choice; and Pompey did not perſiſt in it. CHAP. II.

Upon the publication of an edict inveſting an officer of ſuch renown with ſo high powers for reſtoring the navigation of the ſeas, corn and every other article of importation at Rome conſiderably fell in their price. The friends of Pompey already triumphed in the ſucceſs of their meaſure, and he himſelf ſoon after, notwithſtanding the meanneſs of the enemy oppoſed to him, gained much credit by the rapid, deciſive and effectual meaſures he took to obtain the end of his appointment. Although it was the middle of winter, a ſeaſon too rough, even in the Mediterranean, for ſuch ſhipping as was then in uſe, he gave orders to arm and put to ſea as many veſſels as could be collected on every part of the coaſt. In a little time he had returns of two hundred and ſeventy gallies fit for ſervice, one hundred and twenty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe embodied on the coaſts to which his command extended. That the pirates might be every where attacked at once, and find no refuge by changing their uſual places of retreat, he divided the maritime parts of the empire into ſeparate diſtricts, appointed lieutenants with full powers in each, aſſigned their ſtations, and allotted their quotas of ſhipping and troops. He himſelf, with a ſquadron of ſixty ſhips, propoſed to viſit every quarter, and to give his preſence where it ſhould be moſt required. He began with the coaſts of Spain and Gaul, and the ſeas of Sardinia and Corſica; and in paſſing from thence, while the fleet coaſted round the peninſula of Italy, he himſelf went on ſhore, and travelled by land to meet them at Brundiſium. In this journey, upon his approach to Rome, he enjoyed, in all reſpects, the ſtate of a great monarch, was received with acclamations by the People, and was courted by multitudes of every condition who went forth to receive him. All his complaints and repreſentations were received as commands. The Conſul Piſo, being ſuppoſed not to forward his levies

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with ſufficient alacrity, would have been degraded, if Pompey himſelf had not interpoſed to prevent a motion which the Tribune Gabinius intended to make for this purpoſe.

The fleet being arrived at Brundiſium, Pompey haſtened to join it, and from thence paſſed by the ſtations of his ſeveral lieutenants in the ſea-ports of Macedonia and Greece, to the coaſts of Pamphylia and Cilicia, which were the principal reſort of the pirates. Such of theſe banditti, as he took in his way, were treated with mildneſs; and this circumſtance, together with the great preparations which were reported from every quarter to be making againſt them, with the ſmall hopes they had of being able to eſcape, induced them, in great numbers, to ſurrender themſelves. In the bay of Cilicia he found a ſquadron of their ſhips aſſembled, and ready to cover the harbours at which they had been accuſtomed to collect their ſtores, and to lodge their booty. They ſeparated, however, upon his appearance, took refuge in different creeks of that mountainous coaſt, and afterwards ſurrendered at diſcretion, delivering up all the forts they had erected, with all their ſtores of timber, cordage, and ſails, of which they had made a conſiderable proviſion.

By theſe means the war was finiſhed about the middle of ſummer, ſix months after the nomination of Pompey to this command. In that time ſeventy-two gallies were ſunk, three hundred and ſix were taken, and a hundred and twenty piratical harbours or ſtrong-holds on ſhore were deſtroyed. Ten thouſand of the pirates were killed in action, and twenty thouſand, who had ſurrendered themſelves, remained priſoners at the end of the war. Theſe Pompey, having ſufficiently deprived of the means of returning to their former way of life, tranſplanted to different parts of the continent, where the late or preſent troubles, by thinning the inhabitants, had made room for them. Upon this occaſion he repeopled the city of Soli in Cilicia, which had been lately laid waſte, and forcibly emptied of its

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inhabitants by Tigranes, to repleniſh his newly eſtabliſhed capital of Tigranocerta in Armenia. After this re-eſtabliſhment of Soli, the place, in honour of its reſtorer, came to be known by the name of Pompeiopolis [14].

Whilſt Pompey was thus employed in diſpoſing of the pirates on the coaſt of Cilicia, he received a meſſage from Lappa in the iſland of Crete, now beſieged by Metellus, intimating that the people of this place, although they held out againſt Metellus, were willing to ſurrender to Pompey. This ſort of preference implying eſtimation and popular regard, was one of the temptations which Pompey was ſuppoſed unable to reſiſt; he accordingly, without conſulting with Metellus, ſent an officer to receive the ſurrender of Lappa.

Metellus had now been near two years in the iſland of Crete, had almoſt entirely reduced it, and had a near proſpect of that triumph, which he afterwards actually obtained, with the title of Creticus, on account of this conqueſt. Pompey's commiſſion, as commander in chief of all the ſea and land forces of Rome within fifty miles of the coaſt, no doubt, extended to this iſland; but it was juſtly reckoned invidious to interfere in the province of a Proconſul, whoſe appointment preceded his own. And this ſtep revived all the former imputations againſt him, that he conſidered himſelf as every one's ſuperior, ſtrove to ſuppreſs every growing fame, and threw his perſonal conſideration as a bar in the way of every riſing merit. Metellus, ſtung with reſentment, and truſting to the ſupport of the Senate, ventured to contemn his orders; even after Octavius, who had been ſent by Pompey to take the inhabitants of Lappa under his protection, had entered the town, and in his name commanded Metellus to deſiſt from the attack of a place already in poſſeſſion of the Romans. He nevertheleſs continued the ſiege, forced the town to ſurrender, and threatening to treat Octavius himſelf as a rebel,

[14] Dion. Caſſius, lib. xxxvi. c. 20.

obliged

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obliged him to leave the iſland. The Senate, without otherwiſe deciding the controverſy which was likely to ariſe on this ſubject, afterwards acknowledged Metellus as the conqueror of Crete, and decreed him a triumph in that capacity [15].

The diſpute, however, at this time, might have led to diſagreeable conſequences, if Pompey, while he was preparing to paſs into Crete againſt Metellus, had not found another object of more importance to his plan of greatneſs [16]. Lucullus had always appeared to him a more formidable rival in power and conſideration than Metellus, and the war in Pontus and Armenia likely to furniſh a more ample field of glory than the deſtruction of pirates.

Mithridates, though once nearly vanquiſhed, was, by means of the diſtractions which, commmunicating from the popular factions at Rome, had infected the army of Lucullus, enabled to renew the war with freſh vigour. Knowing that the Roman general was no longer obeyed, he not only returned, as has been mentioned, into his own kingdom, but, together with Tigranes, began to act on the offenſive, and made excurſions even into Cilicia. Acilius Glabrio, the Proconſul appointed to ſucceed in the command of the Roman army, hearing the bad ſtate of affairs, ſtopped ſhort in Bithynia, and even refuſed to furniſh Lucullus with the reinforcements he had brought from Italy. In theſe circumſtances the province of Aſia, likely to become a principal ſource of revenue to the commonwealth, was in imminent danger of being wreſted from their hands. The friends of Pompey ſeized the opportunity to obtain a farther enlargement of his powers. Manilius, one of the Tribunes, in concert with Gabinius, moved the People to extend his commiſſion to the provinces of Phrygia, Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Pontus; and of courſe to commit the war in Armenia and Pontus to his direction,

[15] Liv. Epit. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Dion. Caſſ. lib. xxxv.
[16] Dion. Caſſ. lib. xxxvi. c. 28.

This motion was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by Catulus, Hortenſius, and all the principal members of the Senate. It was ſupported by Marcus Tullius Cicero and by Caius Julius Cæſar, who both intended, on this occaſion, to court the popular party, by eſpouſing the cauſe of a perſon ſo much in favour with the People.

Cicero was one of the firſt of the Romans who reſted his conſideration intirely on civil accompliſhments, and who became great by the ſervices he was qualified to render his friends in a civil capacity, without any pretenſions to the merit of a ſoldier. The character of a pleader was become one of the moſt powerful recommendations to public notice, and one of the ſureſt roads to conſequence and civil preferments. Cicero, with a fine genius and great application, was ſuppoſed to excel all who had gone before him in this line of purſuit. His talents were powerful inſtruments in his own hands; they rendered him neceſſary to others, and procured him the courtſhip of every party in its turn. He was underſtood to favour the ariſtocracy, and was inclined to ſupport the Senate, as the great bulwark of the State, againſt the licence of the populace, and the violence of factious leaders. But being now Prætor, with a near proſpect of the Conſulate, he ſacrificed much to his ambition in the purſuit of preferments, which were new in his family, and which the antient nobility were diſpoſed to envy him. His ſpeech, upon the motion of Manilius, was the firſt he had ever made in a political character: it is ſtill extant, and does more honour to his talents as a pleader, than to his ſteadineſs in ſupport of the conſtitution and government of his country [17]. He turned aſide, by artful evaſions, the wiſe councils of Hortenſius and Catulus; and, under pretence of ſetting forth the merits of Pompey, and of ſtating precedents in his favour, dazzled his audience, by enumerating the irregular ho-

[17] Cicer. Orat. pro Lege Manilia.

nours

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nours which they themſelves had already conferred on this object of their favour.

With ſuch able advocates, in a cauſe to which the People were already ſo well diſpoſed, the intereſt of Pompey could not miſcarry; and an addition was accordingly made to his former commiſſion, by which he became in reality ſovereign of the faireſt part of the empire. Upon the arrival of this news in Cilicia, where he then was, he affected ſurpriſe and diſpleaſure. "Are my enemies," he ſaid, "never "to give me any reſpite from war and trouble?" He had talents, undoubtedly, ſufficient to ſupport him in the uſe of means leſs indirect; but a diſpoſition to artifice, like every other ruling paſſion, will ſtifle the plaineſt ſuggeſtions of reaſon, and ſeems to have made him forget, on the preſent occaſion, that his own attendants at leaſt had common penetration. They turned away from the farce which he acted with ſhame and diſguſt[18]; and he himſelf made no delay in ſhowing the avidity with which he received what he thus affected to diſlike; laid aſide all thoughts of other buſineſs; immediately diſpatched his orders to all the provinces that were now ſubjected to his power; and, without paſſing his mandates through the hands of Lucullus, ſummoned Mithridates, then with an army of between thirty and forty thouſand men on the frontier of Pontus, to ſurrender himſelf at diſcretion. This prince, being then in treaty with Phraates, who had lately ſucceeded his father Arſaces in the kingdom of Parthia, and being in expectation of a powerful ſupport from that quarter, refuſed to liſten to this imperious meſſage: being diſappointed in his hopes of aſſiſtance from the Parthians, and finding that Phraates had joined in a league with his enemies, he at firſt endeavoured to pacify the Roman general; but finding that his advances for this purpoſe had no effect, he prepared for a vigorous reſiſtance.

[18] Plutarch. in Pompeio.

Pompey

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Pompey ſet out for Pontus, and in his way had an interview with Lucullus, who was then in Galatia. They accoſted each other at firſt with laboured expreſſions of reſpect and of compliment on their reſpective ſervices, but ended with diſputes and ſharp altercations. Pompey accuſed Lucullus of precipitation, in ſtating the kingdom of Pontus as a Roman province, while the king himſelf was alive and at liberty. Lucullus ſuſpected that the late mutiny had been fomented by the emiſſaries of Pompey, to make way for his own ſucceſſion to the command. He perſiſted in maintaining the propriety of the report which he had made to the Senate, and in which he had repreſented the kingdom of Pontus as conquered, and in which he had deſired that commiſſioners ſhould be ſent as uſual to ſecure the poſſeſſion; obſerved, that no province could be kept, if the troops ſtationed to preſerve it refuſed to obey their general; that if ſuch diſorders were made the engine of politics in the competition of candidates for office, the republic had worſe conſequences to fear than the loſs of any diſtant province; that although the fugitive king had taken advantage of the factions at Rome and in the army, to put himſelf again at the head of ſome forces, he had not yet recovered any conſiderable portion of his kingdom, nor been able to diſturb the commiſſioners of the Senate, who were employed in ſettling the province; that there was nothing left for a ſucceſſor, but the invidious taſk of ſnatching at the glory which had been won by another.

From this conference Pompey entered on the command with many indications of animoſity to Lucullus; he ſuſpended the execution of his orders; changed the plan of his operations; remitted the puniſhments, and recalled the rewards he had decreed to particular perſons, in a manner which ſeemed to juſtify the ſuſpicion of his having encouraged the late diſorders, ſuffering them to paſs with impunity; and treating with the uſual confidence even the legions which had refuſed to obey the orders of their general. His own

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authority, however, ſeemed to be ſecured by the animoſity of the army to their late commander, and by their deſire to contraſt their own conduct, and the ſucceſs of the war under their preſent leader, with that which had taken place under his predeceſſor. Finding himſelf, therefore, at the head of numerous and well-affected forces, both by ſea and by land, he lined the whole coaſt of the Egean and Euxine Sea with his galleys, and, at the head of a great army, advanced in ſearch of the enemy.

Mithridates, upon the approach of Pompey, continued retiring before him towards the Leſſer Armenia, laid waſte the country through which the Roman army was to paſs, and endeavoured to diſtreſs them by the want of proviſions and forage.

For ſeveral days ſucceſſively the armies encamped in ſight of each other. Mithridates choſe his ſtations, ſo that he could not be ſafely attacked; and as his object was to paſs the Euphrates without being forced to a battle, he generally decamped in the night, and, by his ſuperior knowledge of the country, paſſed through ways in which the Roman army could not haſtily follow without manifeſt danger of ſurprize. Pompey, ſenſible that, upon this plan of operations, the king of Pontus muſt effect his retreat, took a reſolution to paſs him by a forced march, not in the night, but in the heat of the day, when the troops of Aſia were moſt inclined to repoſe. If he ſhould ſucceed in this deſign, and get between their army and the Euphrates, he hoped to force them to a battle, or oblige them to change their route. He accordingly, on the day he had choſen for this attempt, doubled his march, paſſed the enemy's camp at noon-day unobſerved, and was actually poſted on their route, when they began to decamp, as uſual, on the following night. In the encounter which followed, having all the advantages of a ſurprize, and in the dark, againſt an army on its march, and little accuſtomed to order, he gained a deciſive victory,

tory, in which he cut off or diſperſed all the forces on which the king of Pontus relied for the defence of his kingdom [19].

Mithridates eſcaped with a few attendants; and, in this extremity, propoſed to throw himſelf again into the arms of Tigranes; but was refuſed by this prince, who was himſelf then attacked by a rebellion of his own ſon. Upon this diſappointment he fled to the northward, paſſing by the ſources of the Euphrates to the kingdom of Colchis, and from thence, by the eaſtern coaſts of the Euxine, to the Scythian Boſphorus, now the Straits of Coſſa, in order to take refuge in the Cherſoneſus, or Crim Tartary, at Panticapæa, the capital of a kingdom which he himſelf had acquired, and which he had beſtowed on Machares, one of his ſons. Upon his preſenting himſelf at this place, he found that Machares had long ſince abandoned his father's fortunes; and, upon hearing of the ill ſtate of his affairs on his firſt flight from Lucullus into Armenia, had ſent, as an offering of peace, a golden crown to that general, and ſued for the protection of the Romans. The father, highly provoked with this act of puſillanimity or treachery, aſſembled a force among his Scythian allies, and, deaf to all offers of ſubmiſſion or intreaties of this undutiful ſon, dragged him from the throne, and either ordered him to be put to death, or made his ſituation ſo painful, that he thought proper to put an end to his own life.

In this manner Mithridates entered anew on the poſſeſſion of a kingdom, in which he had not only a ſafe retreat, but likewiſe the means of executing new projects of war againſt his enemies. By the maxims of the Romans, no kingdom was ſuppoſed to be conquered, till the king was either killed, taken, or forced to ſurrender himſelf; and Pompey, by this flight of the king of Pontus, found himſelf under a neceſſity either of purſuing him into his preſent retreat, or of doing

[19] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvi. c. 32.

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what he had blamed in Lucullus, by making his report of a conqueſt before it was fully completed. While he was deliberating on the meaſures to be taken in theſe circumſtances, he was invited by Tigranes, ſon to the king of Armenia, then in rebellion againſt his father, to enter with his army into that kingdom, and to give judgment on the differences ſubſiſting between the father and the ſon.

In conſequence of this invitation, Pompey marched into Armenia, joined the rebel prince, and, under pretence of ſupporting the ſon, was about to ſtrip the father of his kingdom, when this monarch, with an exceſs of meanneſs, proportioned to the preſumption with which he had enjoyed his proſperity, now reſolved to caſt himſelf intirely upon the victor's mercy. For this purpoſe he deſired to be admitted into Pompey's preſence, and, with a few attendants, preſented himſelf for this purpoſe. Being told, at the entrance of the camp, that no ſtranger could paſs on horſeback, he diſmounted, and was conducted on foot to the general's tent. Sill bearing the diadem on his head, he took it from thence, and offered to lay it on the ground at Pompey's feet; but was told with great courteſy, that he might reſume it; that, by ſubmitting himſelf to the generoſity of the Romans, he had not loſt a kingdom, but gained a faithful ally [20]. At the ſame time, under pretence of reimburſing the expence of the war, a ſum of ſix thouſand talents, or about one million one hundred and twenty-eight thouſand pounds ſterling, was exacted from him; and he himſelf, to this great ſum which was paid to the State, added a gratuity to the army of a talent [21] to each of the Tribunes, ten minæ [22] to each of the Centurions, and half a mina [23] to each private man.

Pompey, in diſpoſing of the two Armenias, which were now in his power, allotted Sophene, or the Leſſer Armenia, on the right of the Euphrates, to Tigranes the ſon, reſerving Syria and Phœnicia, to

[20] Dio Caſſ. lib. xxxvi. c. 35. Plutarch. in Pompeio. [21] 931. 15s. [22] 32l. 5s. 10d. [23] 1l. 12s. 3½d. Vid. Arbuthnot of Antient Coins.

which

which Antiochus, the laſt repreſentative of the Macedonian line, had been reſtored by Lucullus, together with Cilicia and Galatia, to the diſpoſal of the Romans.

Tigranes the father with great ſubmiſſion acquieſced in this partition; but the ſon, who probably expected to have been put in poſſeſſion of the whole of his father's kingdom, was greatly diſcontented, and, while Pompey was yet in Armenia, entered into a correſpondence with the king of Parthia, and ſolicited his aſſiſtance to overturn this eſtabliſhment. On account of theſe practices, whether real or ſuppoſed, the ſon was taken into cuſtody, carried into Italy, and made a part in the ornaments of the victor's triumph [21].

The Roman general, having in this manner diſpoſed of the kingdom of Armenia, and ſecured the permanency of his ſettlement by the confinement of the rebel prince, reſumed the thoughts of purſuing Mithridates into his preſent retreat. For this purpoſe he left Afranius in Armenia, with a force ſufficient to ſecure his rear, and to prevent any diſturbance on this ſide of the Euphrates. He himſelf paſſed the Araxes, and wintered on the Cyrus, or the Cyrnus, on the confines of Albania and Iberia. In the following ſummer, having defeated the natives of thoſe countries in repeated encounters, he advanced to the mouth of the Phaſis, where he was joined by his fleet, then plying in the Euxine Sea, under the command of Servilius. Here he appears to have deliberated, whether he ſhould attempt to purſue Mithridates any farther; but upon conſidering the difficulties of the voyage, and of the march along a coaſt and a country intirely unknown, unfurniſhed with any ſafe harbour for his ſhips, or even with any means of ſubſiſtence to his army by land, he took his reſolution to return, and to avail himſelf, in the beſt manner he was able, of the poſſeſſions which had been abandoned to him by the flight of

[21] Plutarch. in Pompeio, ad p. 458.

the

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the king[22]. With this reſolution he directed his march, by the coaſt, back into the kingdom of Pontus; and, finding no reſiſtance, took all his meaſures as in a conquered province. At one place he found a conſiderable treaſure, which Stratonicé, one of the concubines of the king, by whom he had a ſon named Xiphares, diſcloſed to him, on condition that, if the chance of war ſhould throw Xiphares into the hands of the conqueror, his life ſhould be ſpared. But this unhappy ſon was expoſed to other dangers beſides thoſe the mother apprehended. Mithridates, upon hearing of the price which was paid for his life, ordered him to be ſlain. "That woman," he ſaid, "ſhould have likewiſe bargained with me in favour of her ſon." At other places the Roman army found the veſtiges of great magnificence, joined to monuments of ſuperſtition and of cruelty. They found ſome productions of an art, in which the king was ſuppoſed to be maſter, relating to the compoſition of poiſons, and of their antidotes, and ſome records of dreams, together with the interpretations[23], which had been given by his women.

From Pontus, Pompey, having made a proper diſpoſition of the fleet in the Euxine, to cover the coaſt from any attempts which Mithridates might make from the Boſphorus and oppoſite coaſts, ſet out for the kingdom of Syria, which he now determined to ſeize in behalf of the Romans. Lucullus had already, agreeably to the policy of his country, and under pretence of ſetting the Syrians free, ſeparated their kingdom from the other poſſeſſions of Tigranes: but the pretence upon which he acted in this matter being ſufficient to prevent his ſeizing upon Syria as a Roman province, he was content with reſtoring it to Antiochus, the laſt pretender of the Macedonian line, who had lived eighteen years in the greateſt obſcurity in Cilicia. Pompey now propoſed to complete the tranſaction, by ſeizing for the

[22] Dio. Caſſ. lib. 37. c. 3. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Appian. in Mithridat.
[23] Plutarch. in Pomp. p. 462.

Romans themſelves, what the other affected only to reſtore to the lawful owner [24]; and this intended owner now pleaded in vain againſt the Romans that right of deſcent from the Macedonian line, which Lucullus had employed with ſo much force to ſupplant Tigranes [25].

On the march into Syria Pompey, either in perſon or by his lieutenants, received the ſubmiſſion of all the principalities or diſtricts in his way, and made the following arrangements. The Leſſer Armenia, once intended for Tigranes the ſon, he gave to Dejotarus, king of Galatia [26], who afterwards was long continued on the frontier of the empire as a faithful dependant, and with poſſeſſions which ſerved as a barrier againſt hoſtile invaſions from that quarter. Paphlagonia was given to Attalus and Pylæmenus, who were likewiſe liberal tributaries to the Roman officers, and vigilant guards on the frontiers of the empire. Upon his arrival at Damaſcus, he had many applications from the late ſubjects or dependants of the Syrian monarchy; among others, from Hyrcanus and Ariſtobulus, two brothers contending for the ſovereignty of Judea, who now repaired to him for judgment, and requeſted the interpoſition of his power in behalf of the party he ſhould be pleaſed to favour.

Of theſe rivals, who were the ſons of Alexander, late high prieſt of the Jews, Hyrcanus the elder had ſucceeded to his mother Alexandra, whom the father had left his immediate ſucceſſor in the throne; but was diſpoſſeſſed by his younger brother Ariſtobulus, who, being of a more active ſpirit, had formed a powerful faction among the people.

Hyrcanus took refuge among the Arabs, and prevailed upon Aretas, the chieftain of ſome powerful tribe of that people, to ſupport him with an army, in recovering the ſovereignty of the Jews. In conjunction with this ally, he accordingly laid ſiege to Jeruſalem, but

[24] Juſtin. lib. xl. c. 1 & 2. [25] Appian. in Mithridat. p. 244. [26] Eutropius, lib. vi.

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was diſappointed of his object by Scaurus, one of Pompey's lieutenants, who being then in Syria at the requeſt of Ariſtobulus, from whom he received a preſent of three hundred talents, or about fifty-ſeven thouſand and nine hundred pounds ſterling, interpoſed, and obliged the Arabs to raiſe the ſiege. Upon the arrival of Gabinius, whom Pompey had ſent before him into Syria, Ariſtobulus thought proper to make him likewiſe a preſent of fifty talents, and by theſe means remained in poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty at the arrival of Pompey.

It is alleged that each of the contending parties made their preſents to the general himſelf; Hyrcanus in particular, that of a beautiful piece of plate, admired for its workmanſhip and weight, being the imitation of a ſpreading vine, with its leaves and fruit in maſſy gold [27]; and theſe circumſtances merit attention, as they furniſh ſome inſtances of the manner in which great riches, now in ſo much requeſt at Rome, were amaſſed by Roman generals in the courſe of their ſervices. Beſides what they gained in this manner, it is likely that every conqueſt they effected, every revolution they brought about, and every protection they granted were extremely profitable.

Pompey, on hearing the merits of the queſtion between the two brothers, declared for Hyrcanus, and advanced towards the city, to execute the decree he had paſſed. Upon his approach he was again met by Ariſtobulus, who made freſh offers of ſubmiſſion, and of a public contribution in money; and Pompey ſent forward Gabinius to take poſſeſſion of the place, in terms of this ſubmiſſion. But upon a report that the gates were ſtill kept ſhut by the party of Ariſtobulus, who yet remained in his camp, he ordered this prince into confinement, and advanced with his army.

The citizens being divided, thoſe who eſpouſed the cauſe of Hyrcanus were willing to receive the Romans; the others, who were

[27] Joſeph. Antiq. lib. xiv. c. 2.

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attached to Ariſtobulus, retired into the temple, and broke down the bridge by which this edifice was joined to the ſtreets, and made every other preparation to defend themſelves to the laſt extremity.

The gates of the city, in the mean time, were thrown open by the party of Hyrcanus; and the Romans being admitted, took poſſeſſion of all the principal ſtations within the walls, and prepared to attack the temple. This building had all the advantages of a citadel, built on a height, ſurrounded with natural precipices, or with a deep ditch, overhung with lofty battlements and towers. Pompey ſent for battering engines to Tyre, and cut down all the woods in the neighbourhood to furniſh materials for filling up the ditch, raiſing his mound of approach [23], and erecting his towers. All his works were with great obſtinacy counteracted by thoſe who had taken refuge in the Temple. He obſerved, however, in the courſe of his operations, that the people within, although they defended their perſons when attacked on the Sabbath-day, yet they did not labour, either in repairing any of their own defences, or in oppoſing or demoliſhing the works of the beſiegers. He accordingly took advantage of this circumſtance, made no aſſaults on that day, but carried on his attack in filling up the ditch, and carrying on his approach. In this manner his towers, without interruption, were raiſed to the level of the battlements, and his engines playing from thence, made great havock among the beſieged. The Jews, however, even under the diſcharge of the enemy's miſſiles, ſtill continued at the altar to perform their uſual rites. While they were engaged in theſe holy exerciſes they took ſo little precaution againſt the dangers to which they were expoſed, that numbers periſhed in offering up the ſacrifices, and mingled their blood with that of the victims.

In the third month after the ſiege began, one of the towers of the Temple was brought in ruin to the ground; and Fauſtus, the ſon of

[23] The Agger.

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Sylla, with two Centurions at the head of the diviſions they commanded, entered the breach, and putting all whom they met to the ſword, made way for more numerous parties to follow them, and covered the avenues and porches of the Temple with the ſlain. The prieſts, who were even then employed in the ſacrifices, waited for the enemy with great compoſure, and, without diſcontinuing their duties, were ſlain at the altars. Numbers of the people threw themſelves from the precipices; and others, ſetting fire to the booths in which they had lodged under the walls of the Temple, were conſumed in the flames. About twelve or thirteen thouſand periſhed on this occaſion, without any proportional loſs to the beſiegers, or to thoſe who conducted the ſtorm.

Pompey, being maſter of the Temple, and ſtruck with the obſtinate valour with which the people had devoted themſelves to its preſervation, was curious to ſee the interior receſs. This place, into which no one was ever admitted beſides the high prieſt, he ſuppoſed to contain the ſacred emblems of that power who inſpired his votaries with ſo ardent and ſo unconquerable a zeal. And he ventured, to the equal conſternation and horror of his own party among the Jews, as of thoſe who oppoſed him, to enter with his uſual attendance into the Holy of Holies. He found it adorned with lamps, candleſticks, cups, veſſels of incenſe, with their ſupports all of ſolid gold, with a great collection of the richeſt perfumes and a ſacred treaſure of two thouſand talents, or about three hundred and eighty-ſix thouſand pounds ſterling.

Having ſatisfied his curioſity, it is mentioned that he reſpected the religion of the place ſo much as to have left every part of this treaſure untouched, and to have given directions that the Temple itſelf ſhould be purified, in order to expiate the profanation of which he himſelf had been guilty. He reſtored Hyrcanus to the prieſthood or ſovereignty of the kingdom, but charged him with a conſiderable

tribute

tribute to the Romans, and at the ſame time ſtript the nation of all thoſe poſſeſſions or dependencies in Paleſtine and Celeſyria, which had been acquired or held in ſubjection by their anceſtors. Such were Gadara, Scythopolis, Hyppus, Pella, Samaria, Mariſſa, Azotus, Jamana, Arethuſa, Gaza, Joppa, and Dora, with what was then called Strato's Tower, and afterwards Ceſarea. Under pretence of reſtoring theſe ſeveral places to their liberties, they were detached from the principality of the Jews, but in reality annexed to the Roman province of Syria [29].

Pompey now recollecting that he had formerly carried his arms to the ſhores of the Atlantic, and to the boundaries of Numidia and of Spain; that he had recently penetrated to the coaſts of the Euxine, and to the neighbourhood of the Caſpian Sea; to the end that he might not leave any part of the known world unexplored by his arms, now formed a project to finiſh this round of exploits, by viſiting the ſhores of the Aſiatic or Eaſtern Ocean: a circumſtance which was to complete the glory of his approaching triumph, and raiſe him, as his flatterers were pleaſed to obſerve, to a rank above every conqueror of the preſent or any preceding age [30].

But while Pompey was employed in the ſettlement of Syria, in the reduction of Jeruſalem, and meditating theſe farther conqueſts, Mithridates was buſy in making preparations to renew the war. Having heard of the extremities to which the citizens of Rome had been frequently reduced by the invaſion of the Gauls and of Hannibal, and by the inſurrections of their own ſubjects and ſlaves, he concluded that they were weakeſt at home, or might be attacked with the greateſt advantage in Italy. He again, therefore, reſumed the project of marching an army of Scythians by the Danube and the

[29] Joſeph. de Bell. Jud. lib. i. & vii. & Ant. lib. xiv. c. 6.
[30] Plutarch. in Pom. p. 463.

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Alps. He viſited all the princes in his neighbourhood, made alliances with them, which he confirmed by giving to ſome of them his daughters in marriage, and perſuaded them, by the hopes of a plentiful ſpoil, to join with him in the project of invading Europe. He even diſpatched his agents into Gaul, to ſecure the co-operations of nations on that ſide of the world, and truſted that, on his appearance in Italy, many of the diſcontented inhabitants would join him as they had joined Hannibal; and that the ſlaves, ſo lately at open war with their maſters, would likewiſe be a plentiful ſupply of recruits to his army.

Theſe projects, however, appeared to his own nation too hazardous and vaſt. They were ſuited to the ſtate of a king who wiſhed to periſh with ſplendor; but not to that of ſubjects and followers who had humbler hopes, and who choſe to be governed by more reaſonable proſpects of ſucceſs. The king himſelf, while he meditated ſuch extenſive deſigns, being confined by an ulcer in his face, had been for a conſiderable time concealed from public view, and had not admitted any perſon to his preſence beſides ſome favourite Eunuchs. The minds of his ſubjects, and of his own family in particular, were much alienated from him by ſome late acts of barbarous ſeverity againſt Machares and Xiphares, two of his children, who, with ſome others as we have mentioned, had incurred his reſentment.

Pharnaces, another ſon, attended the father; and, though diſpoſed to betray him, was ſtill much in his confidence. The people of Phanagoria, a town on the ſhore of the Boſphorus, oppoſite to the fortreſs at which the king now reſided, together with the inhabitants of the country, pretending a variety of provocations, revolted againſt him; and the army, during his confinement, loſing the uſual awe of his perſon, mutinied, and acknowledged Pharnaces for king. They aſſembled round the fort in which Mithridates was lodged, and which he had garriſoned with a choſen body of men. When he appeared

peared on the battlements, and desired to know their demands: "To "exchange you," they said, "for Pharnaces; an old king for a young "one." Even while he received this answer, and while many of his guards deserted him, he still hoped that, if he were at liberty, he might retrieve his affairs. He desired, therefore, by repeated messages, to know whether he might have leave to depart in safety? But none of the messengers he sent with this question being suffered to return, he apprehended that there was a design to deliver him up into the hands of the Romans. Under this apprehension he had recourse to his last resort, a dose of poison, which, it is said, he always carried in the scabbard of his sword. Being to employ this sovereign remedy of all his evils, he dismissed, with expressions of kindness and gratitude, such of his attendants as still continued faithful to him; and being left with two of his daughters, who earnestly desired to die with their father, he allowed them to share in the draught, and saw them expire. But the portion which he had reserved for himself not being likely to overcome the vigour of his constitution, or, as was believed in those credulous times, being too powerfully counteracted by the effect of many antidotes he had taken against poison, he ordered a faithful slave who attended him, to perform with his sword what was in those times accounted the highest proof, as it was the last act, of fidelity in a servant to his master.

Accounts of this event were brought to Pompey, while his army was encamped at the distance of some days march from the capital of Judea, in his way to Arabia. The messengers appeared carrying wreaths of laurel on the points of their spears; and the army, crowding around their general to learn the tidings, were informed of the death of Mithridates. This they received with acclamations, and immediately proceeded to make all the ordinary demonstrations of joy. Pompey, having now accomplished the principal object of the war, dropped his design on Arabia, and directed the march of his army towards

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wards Pontus. Here he received the ſubmiſſion of Pharnaces, and, with many other gifts, was preſented with the embalmed corpſe of the king. The whole army crowded to ſee it, examined the features and the ſcars, teſtifying, by theſe laſt effects of their curioſity, the reſpect which they entertained for this extraordinary man. He had, with ſhort intervals, occupied the arms of the Romans during forty years; and, though he could not bring the natives of Aſia to match with the Roman legions, yet he frequently, by the ſuperiority of his own genius, ſtood firm in diſtreſs, or roſe from misfortune with new and unexpected reſources. He was tall, and of a vigorous conſtitution, addicted to women, and, though ſuperior to every other ſort of ſeduction, to this his ardent and impetuous ſpirit made him a frequent and an eaſy prey. He appears to have loved and truſted many of that ſex with a boundleſs paſſion. By ſome of them he was followed in the field; others he diſtributed in his different palaces; had many children, and entertained more parental affection than commonly attends the polygamy of Aſiatic princes; yet even towards his own ſons, as well as towards every one elſe, on occaſions which alarmed the jealouſy of his crown, he was ſanguinary and inexorable.

Pompey proceeded to ſettle the remainder of his conqueſts; and, beſides the arrangements already mentioned, annexed the kingdom of Pontus to the province of Bithynia, gave the Boſphorus to Pharnaces, and put the province of Syria, extending to the frontier of Egypt, under the government of Scaurus. He had now, from the time of his appointment to ſucceed Lucullus, for about three years, had the ſole direction of the affairs of the Romans in Aſia[31]; and had exchanged with the king of Parthia provoking meſſages, which, in a different conjuncture, might have led to immediate war. But

[31] Dion. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 6.

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the circumſtances were not yet ripe for ſuch a meaſure, and Pompey had provided ſufficient materials for a triumph, without attempting to break through thoſe boundaries on which ſo many Roman generals were doomed to diſappointments, and on which the progreſs of the empire itſelf was deſtined to ſtop.

Without entertaining any farther projects for the preſent, he ſet out with two legions on the route of Cilicia towards Italy, having Tigranes, ſon to the king of Armenia, together with Ariſtobulus, late uſurper of the Jewiſh throne, with his family, two ſons and two daughters, as captives to adorn his triumph [21].

[21] Joſeph. de Bell. Jud. lib. i. c. 7.

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Growing Corruption of the Roman Officers of State.——The love of Conſideration changed for Avarice, Rapacity, and Prodigality.——Laws againſt Extortion.——Cataline a Candidate for the Conſulſhip.——Conſpiracy with Autronius.——Competition for the Conſulate.——Election of Cicero and Antonius.——Condition of the Times.——Agrarian Law of Rullus.——Trial of Rabirius.——Cabals of the Tribunes.——Of Cataline.——His Flight from the City.——Diſcovery of his Accomplices.——Their Execution.

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U. C. 686. C. Calpurnius Piſo, M. Aul. Glabrio.

ABOUT the time that Pompey obtained his commiſſion to command with ſo extenſive a power in the ſuppreſſion of the pirates, the tide began to run high againſt the ariſtocratical party. The populace, led by ſome of the Tribunes, were ever ready to inſult the authority of the Senate; and the vices of particular men gave frequent advantages againſt the whole order of Nobility. Corruption and dangerous faction prevailed at elections, and the preferments of State were generally coveted, as ſteps to the government of provinces, where fortunes were amaſſed by every ſpecies of abuſe, oppreſſion, and violence. Envy and indignation concurred in rouſing the People againſt theſe abuſes. Cornelius, one of the Tribunes, propoſed a ſevere law againſt bribery, by which perſons convicted of this crime ſhould be diſqualified for any office of State. The Senate wiſhed to ſoften the rigour of this law, by limiting the penalty to a pecuniary fine; and the Conſul, Calpurnius Piſo, moved for an edict to this purpoſe, in order to anticipate and to preclude the more violent law of Cornelius. But the Tribune prevailed, and obtained an act impoſing the ſeverer penalty. He likewiſe, by another decree of the People,

Lex Cornelia de Ambitu.

People, attacked the diſcretionary juriſdiction of the Prætors[1], obliged them to be more explicit in the edicts they publiſhed, and to obſerve them more exactly. CHAP. III.

The crime of extortion in the provinces, however, was the great diſgrace of the Romans. To have found an effectual remedy for this evil, would have done more honour to the commonwealth than they had derived from all their conqueſts. Severe laws were accordingly enacted, complaints were willingly received, and proſecutions encouraged. Candidates for popularity and public favour generally began with endeavouring to bring ſome offender under this title to public juſtice; but the example of this State, after all, has left only this piece of inſtruction to mankind: That juſt government over conquered provinces is ſcarcely to be hoped for, and leaſt of all where republics are the conquerors.

Manilius, one of the Tribunes of the People, in order to ſtrengthen the inferior claſs of his conſtituents, had obtained by ſurprize an act[2], by which the citizens of ſlaviſh extraction were to be promiſcuouſly inrolled in all the Tribes. This act, having drawn upon him the reſentment of the Senate, compelled him to ſeek for ſecurity under the protection of Gabinius and Pompey. With this view he moved his famous act, in which Cicero concurred, to veſt Pompey with the command in Aſia. This motion procured him a powerful ſupport, and, on ſome occaſions, the general voice of the People in his favour. Soon after this tranſaction, being proſecuted for ſome offence at the tribunal of Cicero, who was then Prætor, and being refuſed the uſual delays, the Prætor was obliged to explain this ſtep in a ſpeech to the People; in which he told them, that he meant to favour Manilius, and that, his own term in office being about to expire, he could not favour him more effectually, than by haſtening his trial, and by not Lex Manilia.

[1] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvi. c. 23. [2] Ibid. lib. xxxvi.

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leaving him in the power of a ſucceſſor, who might not be equally diſpoſed in his favour. Such were the looſe and popular notions of juſtice then prevailing at Rome [3].

At the election of Conſuls for the following year, there occurred an opportunity to apply the law againſt bribery. Of four candidates, Publius Autronius Pætus, Publius Cornelius Sylla, L. Aurelius Cotta, and L. Manlius Torquatus, the majority had declared for the former two; but theſe being convicted of bribery, were ſet aſide, and their competitors declared duly elected.

About the ſame time L. Sergius Catalina, who has been already mentioned as one of the moſt violent executioners of Sylla's proſcriptions, having returned from Africa, where he had ſerved in the capacity of Prætor, and intending to ſtand for the Conſulate, was accuſed of extortion in his province, and ſtopped in his canvas by a proſecution raiſed on this account. In his rage for this diſappointment, he was ripe for any diſorder; and, being readily joined by Autronius and Piſo, formed a conſpiracy to aſſaſſinate their rivals [4], to maſſacre the Senate, to ſeize the enſigns of power, and, with the aid of their faction, to lay hold of the government [5]. Julius Cæſar and Craſſus are mentioned by Suetonius as accomplices in this plot. Craſſus was to have been named Dictator, and Cæſar his general of the horſe [6]. Cæſar was to have given the ſignal for the execution of the maſſacre, by uncovering his ſhoulders of his gown; but Craſſus having relented, abſented himſelf from the Senate on the day appointed, and Cæſar, though preſent, omitted to give the ſignal, by which means the whole was diſconcerted. Sylla was tried ſome years after as an acceſſory, and was defended by Cicero.

Many of thoſe who, by their birth and diſtinction, were deſtined to run the career of political honours, found their fortunes, by the

[3] Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer.
[4] Cic. in Catal. i. c. 6.
[5] Dion. lib. xxxvi. &c.
[6] Sueton. in Cæſar.

extravagant

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extravagant expence of public ſhows, and of gratuities to the People, by bribes to private perſons, as well as by their own debauchery and prodigality, ruined before they attained their end. They ſought to repair their ruin by any unwarrantable means [7], and were ready to engage in any dangerous deſign. The State appears to have apprehended an increaſe of this danger from the number of foreigners, who, from every quarter, crowded to Rome as to the general reſort of perſons who wiſhed to gratify their own extravagance, or to prey upon that of others. Under this apprehenſion, an edict was obtained, upon the motion of C. Papius, Tribune of the People, to oblige all ſtrangers to leave the city: but it is likely, that the ſtate was in greater danger from natives than foreigners. Cataline, having prevailed upon Clodius, by the conſideration of a ſum of money, to drop the proſecution, which had been intended againſt him, was left to offer himſelf a candidate for the Conſulate of the following year [8].

Lex Papia de Perigrinis.

The office of Cenſor had been revived in the perſons of Catulus and Craſſus; but theſe officers found that its authority, ſo powerful in former times, was now of little effect. They ſcarcely ventured to give it a trial within the city; and, having differed about the enrolment of citizens reſiding beyond the Po, and about ſome other particulars, they reſigned their power [9]. Cenſors were again named in the following year, but with no greater effect; ſome of the Tribunes, fearing to be degraded from the Senate, forbade them to proceed in making up the roll [10].

In the next Conſulate, Caius Julius Cæſar, at this time thirty-five years of age, entered on his career of popularity and ambition. Being Edile, together with Marcus Bibulus, he not only concurred with his colleague in all the expenſive ſhews that were given to the

U. C. 689. C. J. Cæſar, C. Mar. Figulus.

[7] Plutarch. in Vit. Ciceronis.
[8] Cicero de Auruſpicum Reſponſis.
[9] Dion. lib. xxxvi. Plutarch. in Craſſo.
[10] Ibid. Plut.

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People, but gave ſeparate entertainments on his own account. The multitudes of gladiators he had aſſembled on this occaſion gave an alarm to the magiſtracy, and he was ordered not to exceed a certain number. In the adminiſtration of his office as Prætor, he took ſome ſteps that were likely to revive the animoſity of the late parties of Marius and Sylla; and, notwithſtanding the act of indemnity which had paſſed, raiſed proſecutions on a charge of aſſaſſination, againſt all thoſe who had put any citizen to death in execution of Sylla's proſcription [11]. From this time Suetonius obſerves, that Cicero dated the beginning of Cæſar's project to ſubvert the republic, and to make himſelf maſter of the State [12].

What has moſt diſtinguiſhed this Conſulate, however, is the competition of candidates for the ſucceſſion to that office on the following year, and the conſequences of the election which followed. The candidates were M. Tullius Cicero, C. Antonius, ſon of the late celebrated orator, L. Sergius Catalina, P. Sulpitius Galba, and L. Caſſius Longinus, Quintus Cornificius, and Licinius Sacerdos.

Cicero was the firſt of his family who had ever reſided, or enjoyed any honours, at Rome. He was a native of Arpinum, a country-town of Italy, and was conſidered as an obſcure perſon by thoſe who were deſcended of antient families, but had great conſideration on account of his eloquence and the conſequences of it, to all ſuch as had any intereſts at ſtake before the tribunals of juſtice. Being ſolicited by Cataline to undertake his defence on a trial for malverſation in Sicily, he did not at once reject the requeſt, nor always deny his aid to the factious Tribunes in ſupport of their meaſures. He was undoubtedly, like other ambitious men at Rome, diſpoſed

[11] Sueton. in Vit. C. J. Cæſaris.

[12] Ibid. c. ix. Suetonius ſuppoſes, that Cicero alluded to the conſpiracy of Autronius and Sylla, in which Craſſus, as well as Cæſar, was ſaid to be engaged.

to

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to court every party, and willing to gain individuals [14]; and had of late, in particular, conſiderably ſtrengthened his intereſt, by having ſupported the pretenſions of Pompey, and by having joined the popular Tribunes, in what they propoſed in behalf of that officer. He was, notwithſtanding, probably by his averſion to appear for ſo bad a client as Cataline, ſaved from the reproach of having eſpouſed his cauſe; and by his known inclination in general to ſupport the authority of the Senate, he diſpoſed the ariſtocratical party to forgive the occaſional part which he took with the Tribunes in particular queſtions, not immediately ſuppoſed to affect their government.

In the courſe of this competition for the Conſulſhip, Antonius and Cataline joined intereſts together, and ſpared no kind or degree of corruption. Cicero complained of their practices in the Senate, and moved to revive the law of Calpurnius againſt bribery, with an additional penalty of ten years baniſhment [15]. Cataline conſidered this meaſure as levelled againſt himſelf; and incited by this provocation, as well as by the animoſity of a rival, was then ſuppoſed to have formed a deſign againſt Cicero's life, and to have expreſſed himſelf to this purpoſe, in terms that gave a general alarm to the electors, and determined great numbers againſt himſelf. He had drawn to his intereſts many perſons of infamous character and deſperate fortune, many youths of good family, whom he debauched or encouraged in their profligacy. His language, at their meetings, was full of indignation at the unequal and ſuppoſed unjuſt diſtribution of fortune and power. "All the wealth of the State, all autho-"rity," he ſaid, "is engroſſed by a few, while others of more "merit are kept in poverty and obſcurity, and oppreſſed with "debts." He profeſſed his intention, when in office, to remove theſe grievances, to cancel the debts of his friends, to enrich them by

[14] Ep. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 2. [15] Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 39.

plentifull

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plentiful diviſions of land, and to place them in the higheſt ſtations.

Theſe declarations, being made to a numerous meeting, were ill concealed. Curius, one of the faction, boaſted to Fulvia, a woman of rank, with whom he had a criminal correſpondence, that a revolution muſt ſoon take place, and ſpecified the particular hopes and deſigns of their party. This woman mentioned the ſubject to her own confidents, but concealed the author of her information. In the mean time, Cataline was conſidered as a perſon of the moſt dangerous deſigns, and was oppoſed in his election by all who had any regard to public order, or to the ſafety of the commonwealth. Cicero, at the ſame time, being ſupported by the Senate, was elected, together with Caius Antonius. The latter ſtood candidate upon the ſame intereſt with Cataline, and was preferred to him only by a ſmall majority.

U. C. 690. M. Tullius Cicero, C. Antonius.

By this event the deſigns of Cataline were ſuppoſed to be fruſtrated; but the Conſuls were not likely to enter on a quiet adminiſtration. The Tribunitian power, from the time of its reſtoration, was gradually recovering its force, and extending its operations. Every perſon that could give any public diſturbance, that could annoy the Senate, or mortify any of its leading members; every one that had views of ambition adverſe to the laws, or who wiſhed to take part in ſcenes of confuſion and tumult; every perſon oppreſſed with debt, who wiſhed to defraud his creditors; every perſon who, by his profligacy or crimes, was at variance with the tribunals of juſtice, was comprehended under the general denomination of the popular party. The Roman People had once been divided into Patrician and Plebeian, next into Noblemen and Commoners; but now they took ſides with little regard to former diſtinctions againſt or for the preſervation of public order. In the aſſembly of the centuries, as well as in that of the Tribes, the diſorderly and the profligate began to prevail; and

as

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as it was impoſſible that the collective body of the People could meet, the comitia, for the moſt part, was but another name for ſuch riotous aſſemblies, as were made up of the perſons who haunted the ſtreets of Rome. The minds of ſober men were full of fear and diſtruſt, alarmed with ſurmiſes of plots, and various combinations of deſperate perſons, who united their influence, not to carry elections or attain to preferments, but to overturn the government, or to ſhare in its ſpoils [16].

Lex Servilia Agraria.

One of the Tribunes of the preſent year, Servilius Rullus, ſoon after his admiſſion into office, under pretence of providing ſettlements for many of the citizens, promulgated the heads of an Agrarian Law, which he carried to the Senate and the People. The ſubject of former grants was now in a great meaſure exhauſted, and all Italy was inhabited by Roman citizens. This Tribune propoſed a new expedient to open ſettlements for the indigent, not by conqueſt, but by purchaſe. It was propoſed, that all eſtates, territories, or poſſeſſions of any ſort, which belonged to the republic, ſhould be ſold; that all acquiſitions of territory recently made, and the ſpoils taken from any enemy, ſhould be diſpoſed of in the ſame manner; that the money ariſing from ſuch ſales ſhould be employed in purchaſing arable and cultivable lands, to be aſſigned in lots to the needy citizens; and that, to carry this law into execution, ten commiſſioners ſhould be named in the ſame manner in which the Pontiffs were named, not by the whole People, but by ſeventeen of the Tribes ſelected by lot: that theſe commiſſioners ſhould be judges, without appeal, of what was or was not public property; of what was to be ſold, of what was to be bought, and at what price; that they were to receive and judge of the accounts of every Conſul, or other officer, except Pompey, commanding in any

[16] Cicero de Lege Agraria.

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province, where any capture was made, or new territory acquired: and in ſhort, that they ſhould, during five years, which was the intended term of their commiſſion, be the ſole maſters of all property within the empire, whether public or private.

On the day that the new Conſuls entered on their office, when they returned in proceſſion from the Capitol, and gave the firſt meeting to the Senate, Rullus had the preſumption to propoſe this law, and to move the Conſcript Fathers, that they would be pleaſed to give it the ſanction of their approbation and authority in being carried to the People. Upon this occaſion, Cicero made his firſt ſpeech in the character of Conſul. The former part of it is loſt; the remainder may be reckoned among the higheſt ſpecimens of his eloquence. In this and the two ſpeeches he delivered to the People, on the ſame ſubject, he endeavoured to demonſtrate (if we may venture to imitate his own expreſſions) that, from the firſt clauſe of this law to the laſt, there was nothing thought of, nothing propoſed, nothing done but the erecting, in ten perſons, under the pretence of an Agrarian Law, an abſolute ſovereignty over the treaſury, the revenue, the provinces, the empire, the neighbouring kingdoms and ſtates; and, in ſhort, over all the world as far as it was known to the Romans. He painted in ſuch lively colours the abuſes which might be committed by Rullus, and by his aſſociates in judging what was private and what public property, in making ſales, in making purchaſes, in planting the colonies; and ſo expoſed the impudence of the cheat, by which it was propoſed to ſurpriſe the People into the granting of ſuch powers, the abſurdity and the ruinous tendency of the whole meaſure, that it was inſtantly rejected, and its author hiſſed from the aſſembly, and treated as an object of ridicule and ſcorn.

The ſplendour of the Conſul's eloquence, on this occaſion, appeared with great diſtinction, and the ſpirit of the times continued to furniſh

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niſh him with opportunities to diſplay it [16]. Roſcius Amerinus, having been Tribune of the People a few years before, had, by the authority of his office, ſet apart ſome benches in the theatre for the Equeſtrian order. This gave offence to the People, ſo that Roſcius was commonly hiſſed when he appeared at any of the public aſſemblies. On ſome one of theſe occaſions the Conſul interpoſed; and, in a popular harangue, ſecured the attachment of the Knights to himſelf, and reconciled the People to the diſtinction which had been made in favour of that body.

There happened under the ſame Conſulate a buſineſs of greater difficulty, being a motion to reſtore the ſons of the proſcribed to the privilege of being choſen into the offices of State, of which they had been deprived by an ordinance of Sylla. Their fate was undoubtedly calamitous and ſevere. Many of them who had been too young to have incurred the guilt of their party, were now come of age, and found themſelves ſtript of their birthright, and ſtigmatized with this mark of diſhonour. It was propoſed, in their behalf, to take away this cruel excluſion. But Cicero, apprehending that this propoſal tended to arm and to ſtrengthen perſons, who, from long uſe, had contracted an habitual diſaffection to the eſtabliſhed government, powerfully oppoſed the motion, and ſucceeded in having it rejected [17].

Though the orations on the two ſubjects laſt mentioned have periſhed, great part of that which he ſpoke on the trial of C. Rabirius ſtill remains. This man, of a great age, a reſpectable Senator, at the diſtance of ſix-and-thirty years, was brought to trial as an accomplice in the death of Apuleius Saturninus, the factious Tribune, who, as has been related, having ſeized the Capitol, was, by the

[16] It is probable that Cicero did not write in order to ſpeak, but wrote after he had ſpoken, for the uſe of his friends. Epiſt. ad Atticum, lib. ii. c. 1.

[17] Plin. lib. vii. c. 30.

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Conſuls Marius and Valerius Flaccus, acting under the authority of the Senate, and attended by all the moſt reſpectable citizens in arms, forced from his ſtrong-hold, and put to death as a public enemy.

Titus Atius Labienus, one of the Tribunes, was the declared proſecutor of C. Rabirius; but hiſtorians agree, that this Tribune acted at the inſtigation, and under the direction, of C. Julius Cæſar. The intention of the popular party was, by making an example of this reſpectable perſon in ſo ſtrong a caſe where the authority of the Senate, and the commands of the moſt popular Conſul, where even the preſcription of ſo old a date ſhould have repelled every danger, effectually, for the future, to deter every perſon from acting in ſupport of the Senate, or from oppoſing force to the deſigns of factious Tribunes, however turbulent or dangerous.

The Senate, and all the friends of government, were greatly alarmed, and united in defence of Rabirius. The popular party, as already deſcribed, the ambitious, the profligate, the bankrupt, who were earneſt to weaken the hands of government, and in haſte to bring on ſcenes of confuſion and trouble, took the oppoſite ſide.

The proſecutor laid his charge for treaſon of the moſt heinous kind, and deſtined the accuſed to die on the croſs, the ordinary manner of executing the ſentence of death on ſlaves. "The execu-" tioner ſtalks in the Forum," ſaid Cicero, "and the croſs is erected " for a Roman citizen in the field of Mars." The accuſation was firſt brought before the Prætor, who poſſeſſed the ordinary juriſdiction in ſuch caſes. This magiſtrate empannelled two judges, who were to determine in this mighty cauſe. Theſe were Caius Julius and Lucius Cæſar. At this court the defendant was condemned; and with appearances of animoſity, on the part of Caius Cæſar, that greatly encreaſed the alarm. This riſing citizen had always courted the populace, and was ſtrongly ſupported by them. That he ſhould aim at honours and power, it was ſaid, is common; but that he wiſhed to

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provide impunity for the diſturbers of the commonwealth, was alarming. The crime of Rabirius, even if he could be convicted of it, had been committed the year before Cæſar was born. In the perſon of the accuſed every circumſtance, even on the ſuppoſition of a true charge, pleaded for compaſſion, and even for reſpect: the fact, at the ſame time, was denied, and a poſitive evidence was brought, that another had received a reward for killing Saturninus: but the policy of the faction required this victim; and the ſentence muſt have been executed, if the condemned had not fled, by appeal, to the judgment of the People, where indeed his cauſe might be reckoned more deſperate than if it had been before a ſelect court. The parties attended this trial with great ardour. Hortenſius conducted the appeal and defence. Cicero pleaded in behalf of juſtice and government; painted the age, the infirmities, the forlorn ſtate of the defendant, who had ſurvived his relations and his friends. He pointed out the danger to government and to order from this precedent, in terms that muſt have melted every heart, not callous from ambition, faction, or profligacy of manners: but in vain. Even in the aſſembly of the Centuries, the majority was haſtening to affirm the ſentence, when Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer, then Prætor, and one of the Augurs, haſtened to the Janiculum, and tore down the enſign which was planted there as a ſign of peace. A ſilly piece of ſuperſtition ſtopt the proceedings of thoſe whom neither juſtice nor compaſſion, nor regard to government, could reſtrain.

It was eſtabliſhed, as has been formerly noticed [18], that the aſſembly of the Centuries could not proceed without this ſignal in view. In the firſt ages of Rome, the enemy were always at the gate. While the People were aſſembled in the field on one ſide of the city, they were in danger of being aſſailed on the other. When they aſſembled,

[18] See book i. c. 1.

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therefore, in the field of Mars, a guard was always poſted on the Janiculum, and an enſign diſplayed. If any enemy appeared, the enſign was taken down, the aſſembly diſmiſſed, and the People took to their arms. This ceremony, like many other cuſtoms both of ſuperſtition and law, remained after the occaſion had ceaſed; and it was held illegal or impious in the People to proceed in any affair without the enſign in view. By this means the trial was put off, and the proſecutors, deſpairing of being able to work up the People again into an equal degree of violence, dropt the proſecution. The cauſe ſtill remained undecided, and the power of the Senate, to defend its own authority, continued in a ſtate of ſuſpence.

The Tribune Labienus laid aſide thoughts of renewing the proſecution, in order to purſue the object of ſome other popular acts; one in particular, to repeal the almoſt only remaining ordinance of Sylla; that which related to the election of prieſts. The right of election was again taken from the college, and, according to the law of Domitius, given to ſeventeen of the Tribes that were to be drawn by lot. This change was intended to open the way of Caius Julius Cæſar into that office; and he was accordingly promoted to it in the following year.

Others of the Tribunes likewiſe endeavoured to diſtinguiſh themſelves by acts of turbulence and ſedition. Metellus Nepos endeavoured to repeal that clauſe of the act againſt bribery and corruption, which declared the party convicted to be diſqualified for any of the offices of State. This Tribune, though ſufficiently diſpoſed to diſorderly courſes, had many connections among the moſt reſpectable citizens, and was perſuaded, in this inſtance, to drop his deſign.

But among the ſeveral confederacies into which the popular party was divided, none was more deſperate, nor ſuppoſed more dangerous, than that of Cataline, the late diſappointed candidate for the Conſulſhip. His rival Cicero had intimation, before the elections, of a deſign formed by this deſperate faction againſt his own perſon, and

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ſtill continued to obſerve them. He entered into a correſpondence with Fulvia, who had given the firſt hints of a dangerous conſpiracy; and, by means of this woman, procured the confidence of Curius, who gave him minute information of all the proceedings of the party.

In public, Cataline again profeſſed himſelf a candidate for the office of Conſul, in competition with Servius Sulpicius, P. Muræna, and J. Silanus. He boaſted of ſupport from Antonius; but Cicero, to divert his colleague from this dangerous connection, made him every conceſſion. Having, in drawing lots for the provinces of Gaul and Macedonia, drawn the latter, which was thought to be preferable, he yielded it up to Antonius; and by this, and every other means in his power, perſuaded him to value the ſecure poſſeſſion of dignities and honours, lawfully obtained, in preference to expectations formed on the projects of a few deſperate men.

In ſecret, Cataline encouraged his adherents by profeſſing to have many reſources, and to be ſupported by numbers who were ready to take arms at his command. In a numerous meeting of his party in October, a few days before the Conſular elections, he opened the whole of his deſign; and in the ſpeech which he made on that occaſion, is ſaid to have uſed expreſſions to the following purpoſe: "The "diſtreſſed can rely for relief only on thoſe who have a common "cauſe with themſelves. Whoever, in his own fortune, is at eaſe, "will not regard the miſery of others. If you would know how I "ſtand affected to the parties which now divide the commonwealth, "*rich creditors*, and *needy debtors*, recollect what every one knows, "that I have no ſafety but in the deſtruction of the one, and in "the relief of the other: that my intereſt is the ſame with yours, "and that I have courage to attempt what may be neceſſary for "your benefit."

From the ſtrain of this paſſage, the deſcription of a party to whom it was with propriety addreſſed, may be eaſily collected. Cicero, who

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who had frequently taxed Cataline with dangerous deſigns, now determined to lay the whole of his intelligence before the Senate; and for this purpoſe deferred the Conſular elections, which were to have been held on the eighteenth of October, to a future day, and aſſembled the Senate. Cataline having, with the other members, attended, and hearing the charge, did not pretend to deny or to palliate his words. "There are," he ſaid, "in this republic two parties; "one weak both in its members and head; the other ſtrong in its "members, but wanting a head: while I have the honour of be-"ing ſupported by this party, it ſhall have a head." Upon theſe words, a general cry of indignation aroſe in the Senate; but no reſolution was taken. Many, who were there preſent as members, were pleaſed to ſee the Senate itſelf inſulted; and Cataline, as if in condition to brave all his enemies, was, in all his expreſſions, equally unguarded in the ſtreets and in the Senate. To Cato, who, in the public Forum, ſome days before this meeting, had threatened him with a proſecution: "Do," he ſaid; "but if you light a flame in "my fortunes, I will extinguiſh it under the ruins of the common-"wealth [19]."

A proſecution was actually raiſed againſt him in the name of Lucius Paulus, a young man of diſtinction, for carrying arms againſt the public peace. On this occaſion, however, he thought proper to diſſemble his thoughts, and offered to commit his perſon to cuſtody till his innocence ſhould appear. "No one," he ſaid, "who knows "my rank, my pretenſions, and the intereſt I have in the preſervation "of the commonwealth, will believe, that its deſtruction is to be "apprehended from me, and that its ſafety is to come from a native "of Arpinum [20]." He offered to commit himſelf to the cuſtody of Cicero, of Metellus, or of any other magiſtrate, till this injurious

[19] Cicero Orat. pro Muræna.

[20] The town of which Cicero was native.

aſperſion

aſperſion were removed. To this offer the Conſul replied, That he who did not think himſelf ſafe within the ſame ramparts with Cataline, would not receive him into his houſe [21].

By one effect of the unparalleled freedom now enjoyed by Roman citizens, perſons accuſed of the moſt dangerous crimes were at liberty, during the dependence of their trial, either to proceed in perpetrating their crime, or to withdraw from juſtice. This effect was derived from the laws of Valerius and Porcius, which ſecured againſt violence, or the power of the magiſtrate, the perſon of every citizen, until he were finally condemned by the People. In ſupport of this privilege, which was ſalutary, when the abuſe of power in the magiſtrate was to be dreaded more than the licence of crimes in the ſubject, the Romans perſiſted even after vice was become too ſtrong for the laws, and when exemption from every juſt reſtraint was fatally miſtaken for liberty. The State had now been thrown, on many occaſions, into the moſt violent convulſions, becauſe there was no ordinary or regular method of preventing diſorders, or of ſuppreſſing them on their firſt appearance.

Cataline, ſoon after the elections, at which, by the preference given to Muræna and Silanus, he received a freſh diſappointment in his hopes of the Conſulſhip, ſent Mallius, or Manlius, an experienced ſoldier, who had ſerved with himſelf under Sylla, to prepare for an inſurrection in the diſtrict of Etruria. This officer, in the end of October, under pretence of giving refuge to debtors from the oppreſſion of their creditors, had actually aſſembled a conſiderable body of men [22]. Accounts at the ſame time were received, that Publius Sylla was making a large purchaſe of gladiators at Capua, and inſurrections were accordingly apprehended on the ſide of Campania and Apulia. In this ſtate of affairs continual informations being brought of

[21] Cicero in Catalinam, i. c. 8. [22] Ibid. in Catalinam, i. c. 3.

Cataline's

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Cataline's deſigns, the Senate gave in charge to the Conſuls to watch over the ſafety of the State; and theſe officers accordingly put choſen bodies of men under arms, and ſecured all the poſts of conſequence in the city. Metellus, the conqueror of Crete, who ſtill remained without the walls in hopes of a triumph, was appointed to command on the ſide of Apulia. The Prætor Metellus Celer was ſent into Ciſalpine Gaul, in order to ſecure the peace of that province [23]; and the Conſul Antonius was deſtined to ſuppreſs the inſurrection of Mallius at Fæſulæ [24].

Cataline mean while remained in the city, and had frequent conſultations for the preparation and the execution of his plot. At a meeting of the party, held in the beginning of November, in the houſe of M. Porcius Lecca [25], a general maſſacre of the principal Senators was projected. The conſpirators ſeverally choſe their ſtations, and undertook their ſeveral parts. Two in particular, who were familiar in Cicero's houſe, undertook next morning, under pretence of a viſit, to ſurpriſe and aſſaſſinate the Conſul. But he being the ſame night appriſed of his danger by Fulvia, gave the proper orders, and the intended murderers, upon their appearance at his door, were refuſed admittance. He immediately after aſſembled the Senate in the temple of Jupiter. Cataline preſented himſelf with his uſual preſumption; and Cicero, as appears from an oration which he then delivered, inſtead of laying the matter in form before the Senate, accoſted Cataline in a vehement invective, urging him to be gone from the city, where all his ſteps were minutely obſerved, where his meaning was underſtood, and precautions taken againſt all his deſigns. "I told you," ſaid the Conſul, "that your emiſſary Mal-
"lius would be in arms by the firſt of November; that you in-
"tended a maſſacre of the Senators about the ſame time. I now

[23] Cicero in Cat. i. c. 12. [24] Now Florence. [25] Cicero pro Pub. Sylla, c. 16.

"repeat

"repeat the memorable words you made uſe of when you were told, "that many of the Senators had withdrawn from the city. You "ſhould be ſatisfied, you ſaid, with the blood of thoſe who re- "mained. Were you not ſurrounded, hemmed in, and beſet on "every ſide by the guards poſted to watch you? Did your intention "to ſurpriſe Prænesté, on the night of the firſt of November, eſcape "me? Did you not find precautions taken that argued a knowledge "of your deſign? There is nothing, in ſhort, that you do, that you "prepare, that you meditate, which is not heard, which is not ſeen, "which is not felt by me in every circumſtance. What of laſt "night? Were you not at the houſe of Porcius Lecca? Deny it! "I have evidence. There are here preſent perſons who were of your "company. But where are we? What manner of government or "republic is this? The enemies and deſtroyers of the commonwealth "make a part in its higheſt councils! We know them, and yet they "are ſuffered to live! But, be gone. The time of enduring you "is paſt. The world is convinced of your guilt. Stay only till "there is not a ſingle perſon that can pretend to doubt of it; till "your own partizans muſt be ſilent, and till the clamour, which they "would willingly raiſe againſt every neceſſary act of government, be "ſuppreſſed."

This being the general tendency of the Conſul's ſpeech, fraught with ſuch alarming matter, and urged with ſo much confidence, the audience was ſeized with terror, and numbers, who happened to be on the ſame bench with Cataline, withdrew from his ſide. He himſelf aroſe, and attempted to vindicate his character, but was ſilenced with a general cry of indignation; upon which he left the Senate; and, after concerting farther meaſures with thoſe of his party, not thinking that a longer ſtay in the city could be of any uſe to his affairs, he withdrew in the night, leaving letters behind him to ſome of the Senators, in which he complained, that, by a combination of

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his enemies, he was driven into exile; and that, rather than be the occaſion of any diſturbance in the commonwealth, he was willing to retire. While theſe letters were handed about in the city, he took his way, preceded by the uſhers and enſigns of a Roman Proconſul, ſtreight for the camp of Mallius, and entered into a ſtate of open war. The features of this man's portrait are probably exaggerated by the vehement pencils and lively colourings of Cicero and of Salluſt. He is repreſented as able to endure hardſhips of any kind, and as fearleſs in any danger; as, from his youth, fond of diſcord, aſſaſſinations, and bloodſhed; as having, under pretence of Sylla's proſcription, murdered his own brother to poſſeſs his eſtate; as having murdered his own child, to remove the objection made to him by a woman who refuſed to marry him with the proſpect of being a ſtep-mother. He is repreſented as rapacious, prodigal, gloomy, impetuous, unquiet, diſſembling, and perfidious; a deſcription, of which the horrors are probably amplified: but for which it cannot be doubted there was much foundation, as he far exceeded in profligacy and deſperation all thoſe who, either in this or the former age, were, by their ambition or their vices, haſtening the ruin of the commonwealth.

Cicero always profeſſed to have particular intelligence of the progreſs of Cataline. This, according to Salluſt, he owed to Fulvia, by whoſe means he obtained a correſpondence with Curius; but he himſelf, in none of his orations, gives any intimation of the manner in which he obtained his information. It is probable that Curius inſiſted on being concealed, that he might not be expoſed to the rage of the conſpirators as an informer and a traitor. On this account the Conſul, although he was minutely appriſed of particulars, was obliged to adopt the plan he hitherto followed, to urge the conſpirators into open hoſtilities, and into a full declaration of their purpoſe. He had ſucceeded with reſpect to Cataline; but his accomplices were yet very

very numerous in the city, and were taking their meaſures to co-operate with thoſe who were in arms.

In this ſtate of affairs Fabius Sanga, a Roman citizen of diſtinction, came to the Conſul, and informed him, that the ambaſſadors of the Allobroges, a people then inhabiting what is now called the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy, whoſe patron he was, had made him privy to a very momentous affair; that, upon being diſappointed in a ſuit, on which they had been employed to the Senate, they had been carried by P. Umbrenus to Publius Cornelius Lentulus the Prætor, who condoled with them on the ſubject of the wrong they had received, aſſured them of redreſs if they would merit the favour of a party that was ſoon to have the aſcendant at Rome; and propoſed, that they ſhould immediately, upon their return to their own country, prevail on their nation to march an army, for this purpoſe, into Italy. Cicero immediately laid hold of this intelligence, as affording means to bring the plot to light, and furniſh a ſufficient evidence to convict the conſpirators. He deſired Sanga to encourage the correſpondence, to adviſe the ambaſſadors to inſiſt on proper credentials to be ſhown to their countrymen, to procure a liſt of the Roman citizens who, in caſe they ſhould riſe in rebellion againſt the Romans, were to become bound to protect them; and when they ſhould be thus provided, and about to depart, he inſtructed Sanga to bring him intimation of their motions, that they might be ſecured, with their writings, and other evidence of the facts to be aſcertained. Sanga, having inſtructed the ambaſſadors accordingly, gave notice of their motions to the Conſul. In the evening before they were to depart, Cicero ordered the Prætors, L. Flaccus and C. Pontinus, to march by different ways, and in ſmall parties, after it was dark, a ſufficient armed force to intercept the ambaſſadors of the Allobroges. The parties were ſtationed on different ſides of the river, at the bridge called Milvius, without knowing of each other,

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and without having any ſuſpicion of the purpoſe for which they were placed, farther than aroſe from their having been told, that they were to ſeize any perſon who ſhould attempt to paſs. About three o'clock in the morning the ambaſſadors entered on the bridge with a numerous retinue; and being challenged, and commanded to ſtop by the party that was placed to intercept them, they endeavoured to force their way; and ſome blood was ſhed. But on the appearance of the Prætors, with their enſigns of office, the ambaſſadors ceaſed to reſiſt. Their diſpatches were ſecured. Volturcius, a Roman citizen, who was found in their company, was taken and ſearched. Letters were found upon him, in different hands, and under different ſeals, addreſſed to Cataline. Theſe, together with the priſoners, were immediately carried back to the city.

The Conſul being appriſed of the ſucceſs which attended this part of his deſign, ſent, before any alarm could be taken by the party, meſſages to Gabinius, Statilius, Cethegus, and Lentulus, deſiring to ſee them at his own houſe. The three former came with the meſſenger; but Lentulus was newly gone to bed, and, by his delay, gave ſome cauſe to ſuſpect that he was aware of his danger. He too, however, came; and the houſe of Cicero was preſently crowded, not only with numbers of the Equeſtrian order that were in arms for the defence of his perſon, but likewiſe with many ſenators whom he deſired to be preſent. The ambaſſadors of the Allobroges, now priſoners, were likewiſe conducted thither and the letters found upon them were produced unopened. Cicero declared his intention to aſſemble the Senate without delay, in order to lay the whole matter before them. Many of the company were of opinion, that the letters ſhould be firſt opened, in order to ſee, whether they contained any matter of ſo much moment, as to require aſſembling the Senate, at a time when ſo great an alarm was likely to be taken. Cicero, however, having no doubt of the contents of the letters, and of the im-

portance of the matter, over-ruled thoſe ſcruples, and the Senate was accordingly called. Mean time the Allobroges dropt ſome expreſſions which implied, that arms were concealed in the houſe of Cethegus. This occaſioned a ſearch being then made, and a conſiderable quantity of daggers and ſwords were accordingly found. CHAP. III.

At the meeting of the Senate, Volturcius was firſt examined; he denied his knowledge of any treaſonable deſigns, but appeared diſconcerted; and, upon being reminded of the reward that had been offered for the diſcovery of any plot againſt the State, and of the danger to which he himſelf would be expoſed in prevaricating, he confeſſed, that the letters ſeized in his cuſtody were ſent by the Prætor Lentulus and others: that he had beſides a verbal meſſage to Cataline, informing him, that the plan was now ready for execution; that the ſtation of every perſon was aſſigned; that ſome were appointed to ſet fire to the city in different places, and ſome to maſſacre their enemies in the midſt of the confuſion that was likely to be occaſioned by the fire; and deſiring that Cataline, in order to ſupport his friends, and to profit by the diverſion they were to make in his favour within the walls, ſhould iſſue a proclamation to arm the ſlaves, and that he himſelf ſhould march directly to Rome.

The deputies of the Allobroges being next introduced, acknowledged, that they had been charged by Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Caſſius, with aſſurances of ſupport to the council of their nation, confirmed by oath, accompanied with directions, without delay, to march a body of horſe into Italy, where they ſhould be joined by a numerous infantry, and receive proper directions in what manner they ſhould farther proceed: that, to encourage them, Lentulus quoted a prophecy, found in the collection of the Sybils, by which he himſelf was pointed out as the third of the Cornelii [26] deſtined to

[26] The former two were Cinna and Sylla.

arrive

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arrive at the ſovereignty of Rome: that the conſpirators had differed about the time of executing their deſign. Lentulus was of opinion it ſhould be deferred to the holy-days in December; that Cethegus, notwithſtanding, and the others, were impatient, and deſired a nearer day.

The ſuppoſed conſpirators were next called in their turns; and the letters, with the ſeals unbroken, were exhibited before them. Cethegus, being the firſt examined, perſiſted in denying his knowledge of any conſpiracy; accounted for the arms that were found in his houſe, by ſaying, He was curious of workmanſhip of that nature, and always bought what he liked. He maintained his countenance well, till his letter was produced, and then fell into great confuſion, as the ſeal was immediately known to be his.

Lentulus next, with great confidence, denied the charge; affected not to know either Volturcius or the ambaſſadors; aſked them upon what occaſion they ever could pretend to have been admitted into his houſe? He, however, owned the ſeal affixed to the letter that was now produced againſt him. It was the head of his grandfather. But the letter being opened, was found to be unſigned, and in the following general terms: "The bearer will inform you who I am. "Fear nothing. Remember where you ſtand; and neglect no-"thing. Call in every aid, even the meaneſt." While he perſiſted in his denial, ſome one aſked him, If he had never quoted the Sybilline oracles to theſe Gauls? Confounded with this queſtion, he forgot his diſguiſe, and confeſſed.

Gabinius too was at laſt brought to own his guilt; and in this manner the conſpiracy was fully laid open. L. Julius Cæſar, the Conſul of the former year, in the preſence of Lentulus, who was married to his ſiſter, gave his opinion, that this unhappy man ſhould be immediately put to death. "This," he ſaid, "is no unprece-"dented meaſure. My grandfather, Fulvius Flaccus, was ſlain by

"order of the Conſul Gabinius. His ſon was taken into cuſtody and "put to death in priſon." In the mean time Lentulus was ordered to diveſt himſelf of the office of Prætor, and, together with his accomplices, was committed to cloſe impriſonment. This Cornelius Lentulus was diſtinguiſhed by the name of Sura. He had been Conſul about eight years before, and was afterwards, for his debaucheries, ſtruck off the rolls of the Senate. He had now again condeſcended to accept of the office of Prætor, in order to recover, in the capacity of a magiſtrate, his ſeat in the Senate.

A proclamation was iſſued to apprehend M. Cæparius, who had been ſent to raiſe an inſurrection in Apulia, together with P. Furius, Magius Chilo, and P. Umbrenus, who had firſt introduced the Gauliſh ambaſſadors to Gabinius. The Senate voted thanks to the Conſul Cicero for his great vigilance, and for the conſummate ability he had ſhewn in the diſcovery and ſuppreſſion of this treaſonable deſign; to the Prætors, for the faithful execution of the Conſul's orders; and to Antonius, his colleague, for having detached himſelf from men with whom he was known to have been formerly connected. A public thankſgiving to the gods was likewiſe decreed in honour of the Conſul, and in conſideration of this deliverance of the city from fire, of the People from maſſacre, and of Italy from devaſtation and war.

An aſſembly of the People being called, Cicero gave this account of the proceedings in a ſpeech which is ſtill extant [27], and early on the following day aſſembled the Senate to deliberate on the farther reſolutions to be taken with reſpect to the priſoners. An agent had been buſy in the night to raiſe ſome diſturbance in favour of Lentulus; but the deſign of ſetting fire to the city ſtruck the people in general with ſo much horror, that not only ſuch as were poſſeſſed of

[27] In Cat. 3.

property,

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property, but every inhabitant, trembled for his own perſon, and for the ſafety of his houſe. The avenues to the Senate, the Capitol, the Forum, all the Temples in the neighbourhood, by break of day, were crowded with armed men. The Conſul had ſummoned the equeſtrian order in arms to protect the Senate, and citizens of every rank came forth to ſtrengthen the hands of the magiſtrates.

When the Senate met, the members differed in their judgment. Junius Silanus, one of the Conſuls-elect, being called up firſt in order, declared himſelf for a ſentence of death. Tiberius Nero differed from him, and propoſed perpetual impriſonment. The majority, however, joined Silanus, until Caius Julius Cæſar ſpoke. This able advocate declared againſt the opinion of Silanus, not as too ſevere, but as contrary to law; and inſiſted on the danger of a precedent which might ſet the life of every citizen at the mercy of a vote in the Senate. Death, he ſaid, was the common deſtination of all men; what no one could avoid, and what the wiſe frequently coveted. It was not, therefore, a puniſhment; and he did not propoſe to mitigate, but to increaſe, the ſeverity of the ſentence in this caſe. He propoſed, therefore, that the eſtates of the priſoners ſhould be confiſcated; that their perſons ſhould be committed for life to the keeping of the moſt ſecure and beſt affected towns in Italy; and that it ſhould be declared treaſon for any one hereafter to move the Senate or the People for any mitigation of their puniſhment.

Cæſar might be conſidered as uttering what the popular faction were to urge, and as laying the ground upon which the proceedings of the Senate, and the conduct of each particular member, might be afterwards arraigned before the People. The terrors of the Porcian and Sempronian laws, when likely to be urged by ſo powerful an advocate, alarmed the greater part of the Senate. Silanus is ſaid to have retracted his opinion. The Conſul ſubmitted the queſtion to the judgment of the Senate, and declared his willingneſs to execute

any

any decree they ſhould form. He treated Cæſar with great reſpect, and laid hold of the ſevere terms in which he ſpoke of the conſpiracy, as a pledge of his future conduct, in caſe the proceedings of government, with reſpect to the matter now before them, ſhould hereafter be queſtioned or brought under review. "The Senate," he obſerved, "had no cauſe to dread the imputation of cruelty. It "was mercy to prevent, in the moſt effectual manner, a crime to "be perpetrated in ſo much blood. If this crime were not pre-"vented, they were to ſee that city, the reſort of nations, and the "light and ornament of empire, periſh at one blow. They were to "ſee heaps of her citizens unburied, and lying in their blood: to "ſee the fury of Cethegus let looſe in murder; to ſee Lentulus be-"come a king, Cataline commanding an army, and every where to "hear the cries of mothers, to ſee the flight of children, and the rape "of virgins.—If the father of a family," he continued, "ſhould "ſpare a ſlave who had ſhed the blood of his children, who had "murdered his wife, and ſet fire to his dwelling, how ſhould ſuch "a father be conſidered—as cruel, or as void of affection?

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"He deſired them not to regard what was given out, of their not "being in condition to attempt any thing vigorous againſt theſe "men. He himſelf, as firſt magiſtrate, had not neglected the ne-"ceſſary precautions; and the general ardour with which all ranks "of men concurred in the defence of their families, their properties, "and the ſeat of empire, rendered every reſolution they could take "ſecure of the utmoſt effect. The forum is full, all the temples in "its neighbourhood are full, all the ſtreets and avenues to this place "of aſſembly are full of citizens of every denomination, armed "for the defence of their country. He requeſted that the Senate "would iſſue their orders before the ſun went down, and ſeemed to "apprehend dangerous conſequences, if theſe matters were left un-

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" determined, and the city expoſed to the accidents of the following " night. For himſelf, he profeſſed to have taken his reſolution. Al- " though he felt the occaſion full of perſonal danger, he would exe- " cute the orders of the conſcript fathers," he ſaid; " but, if he fell " in the attempt, implored their protection for his wife and his " children [23]."

All this appears to have paſſed in debate before Cato ſpoke. This virtuous citizen, then about thirty-three years of age, had, in the former part of his life, taken a very different courſe from the youths of his own time, and, both by his temper and education, was averſe to the libertine principles which had crept into the politics and the manners of the age. He ſpoke chiefly in anſwer to Caius Cæſar, who, he obſerved, ſeemed to miſtake the queſtion. " We are not " enquiring," he ſaid, " what is the proper puniſhment of a crime " already committed, but how we may defend the republic from an " imminent danger with which it is threatened. It is propoſed to " ſend the priſoners to ſafe keeping in the country. Why into the " country? Becauſe perhaps the faction of profligate citizens is more " numerous in Rome, and may reſcue them. Is Rome the only " place to which profligate men may reſort, or are priſoners of State " moſt ſecure where the force of government is leaſt? This pro- " poſal is ſurely an idle one, if the author of it profeſſes to en- " tertain any fear of theſe men. But if, in this general alarm of all " the city, he and ſuch perſons be not afraid, ſo much the more " cauſe have we to be on our guard. We are beſet with enemies, " both within and without the walls. While Cataline with fire and " ſword is haſtening to your gates, you heſitate, whether you will " cut off or ſpare his aſſociates, that are taken with the torch in their " hands and the dagger at your breaſt! You muſt ſtrike thoſe who

[23] Cicero in Catalinam, orat. iv.

are

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" are now in your power, if you mean to intimidate thoſe who are " coming to ſupport their deſigns. The remiſſneſs or the vigour " which you now ſhow will be felt in the camp of Cataline, and " will be attended with ſuitable effects. I am therefore of opinion, " that we order theſe men, agreeably to the practice which our an- " ceſtors followed in all caſes of treaſon and of open war againſt the " commonwealth, to immediate death."

Such is ſaid to have been the ſpeech of Cato, by which the Senate was determined in the very momentous reſolution which was taken on the preſent occaſion; and however little we may be inclined to conſider ſuch compoſitions in many parts of antient hiſtory as records of fact, much credit is due to this repreſentation, as it is given by a perſon who himſelf became a partizan of Cæſar, and as the ſpeech itſelf muſt have been offered to the peruſal of many who were preſent at the delivery of it [35]. The execution of the priſoners was accordingly determined, and Cornelius Lentulus, in the beginning of the following night, was, by order of the Conſul, committed to a vaulted dungeon under ground, and ſtrangled. His accomplices had the ſame fate; and the minds of men, though ſomewhat quieted of their fears, were nevertheleſs ſtunned with the ſcene, and beheld with amazement a Patrician of the Cornelian family, of the firſt rank in the commonwealth, who himſelf had been Conſul, ſuffering, without any formal trial, by the hands of the common executioner of juſtice [36].

While theſe things were in agitation at Rome, Cataline was endeavouring to augment his force in the field. He found about two

[35] The more credit is due to this account of Cato's ſpeech, that the ſpeech which is aſcribed to Cicero by the ſame hiſtorian, is a faithful extract from the oration which ſtill remains.

[36] Saluſt. Bell. Catal. Cur ergo in ſententiam Catonis? quia verbis luculentioribus et pluribus, rem eandem comprehenderat. Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. xii, epiſt. 21.

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thouſand men under Mallius. Theſe he formed into two legions, and as his party increaſed he completed their numbers. He refuſed for ſome time to inrol the fugitive ſlaves, of whom many took refuge in his camp; thinking it would diſcredit and weaken his cauſe to reſt any part of it on this ſupport. But the freemen that joined him being ill armed, he was obliged to keep in the neighbourhood of the mountains, and frequently to change his ground, to avoid an engagement with the Conſul; and he endeavoured to gain time, in hopes that, the intended blow being ſtruck at Rome, a general defection of the oppoſite party would enſue. But when accounts came that his deſign had failed in the city, and that his principal aſſociates were no more, thoſe who were inclined to his cauſe were diſcouraged, and numbers who had already joined him began to fall off, he determined to remove to a diſtance from his enemies; and for this purpoſe directed his march to a paſs in the Apennines, by which he might eſcape into Gaul. This deſign the Prætor Metellus had foreſeen, made a forced march to prevent the effect of it, and Cataline at laſt, finding himſelf beſet on every quarter, determined to hazard a battle. Of the armies that were in the field againſt him he choſe to face that of Antonius; either becauſe it lay on his route to Rome, and, if defeated or removed, might open his way to the city, or becauſe he hoped to meet in the commander of it ſome remains of inclination in his favour. In whatever degree theſe hopes were at firſt reaſonably conceived, they ceaſed to have any foundation; as Antonius, being taken ill, had left the army under the command of Petreius. With this commander Cataline engaged in battle, and, after many efforts of valour and of conduct, fell, with the greater part of his followers, and thus delivered the State from a deſperate enemy, whoſe power was happily not equal to his deſigns, and who has owed much of his celebrity to the orator and the hiſtorian, who have made him the ſubject of their eloquent

compoſitions. Salluſt appears to have been ſo intent on raiſing and finiſhing particular parts of his work, that he neglected the general order of his narrative. I have, therefore, in moſt parts of the relation, preferred the authority of Cicero to his. This great man was undoubtedly beſt informed, and he reſted ſo much of his reputation on this tranſaction, that he loſes no opportunity of returning to it, and in different parts of his writings, when collected, has furniſhed a pretty full narration of circumſtances reſpecting the origin and termination of this wild and profligate attempt to ſubvert the government of the republic.

CHAP. IV.

Character of the Times.——Philoſophy.——Oppoſite Tenets and Votaries.——Proceedings of the Senate.——Tribunate of Metellus, Nepos, and of Cato.——Propoſal to recal Pompey at the head of his army fruſtrated.——His arrival in Italy——And Triumph.

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IT may appear ſtrange, that any age or nation ſhould have furniſhed the example of a project conceived in ſo much guilt, or of characters ſo atrocious as thoſe under which the accomplices of Cataline are deſcribed by the eloquent orator and hiſtorian [a], from whoſe writings the circumſtances of the late conſpiracy are collected. The ſcene, however, in this republic was ſuch as to have no parallel, either in the paſt or in the ſubſequent hiſtory of mankind. There was leſs government, and more to be governed, than has been exhibited in any other inſtance. The people of Italy were become maſters of the known world; it was impoſſible they could ever meet in a fair and adequate convention. They were repreſented by partial meetings or occaſional tumults in the city of Rome; and to take the ſenſe of the People on any ſubject was to raiſe a riot. Individuals were veſted with powers almoſt diſcretionary in the provinces, or continually aſpired to ſuch ſituations. The nominal aſſemblies of the People were often led by profligate perſons, impatient of government, in haſte to govern. Ruined in their fortunes by private prodigality, or by the public expence in ſoliciting honours; tempted to repair their ruins by oppreſſion and extortion where they were entruſted with command, or by deſperate attempts againſt the govern-

[a] Cicero in Salluſt.

ment

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ment of their country if diſappointed in their hopes. Not only were many of the prevailing practices diſorderly, but the law itſelf was erroneous [a]; adopted indeed at firſt by a virtuous people, becauſe it ſecured the perſons and the rights of individuals, but now anxiouſly preſerved by their poſterity, becauſe it gave a licence to their crimes.

The provinces were to be retained by the forces of Italy; the Italians themſelves by the aſcendant of the capital; and in this capital all was confuſion and anarchy, except where the Senate, by its authority and the wiſdom of its councils, prevailed. It was expedient for the People to reſtrain the abuſes of the ariſtocratical power; but when the ſovereignty was exerciſed in the name of the collective body of the Roman People, the anarchy and confuſion that prevailed at Rome ſpread from one extremity of her dominion to the other. The provinces were oppreſſed, not upon a regular plan to aggrandize the State, but at the pleaſure of individuals, to enrich a few of the moſt outrageous and profligate citizens. The People were often aſſembled to erect arbitrary powers, under the pretence of popular government. The public intereſts and the order of the State were in perpetual ſtruggle with the pretenſions of ſingle and of profligate men. In ſuch a ſituation there were many temptations to be wicked; and in ſuch a ſituation likewiſe, minds that were turned to integrity and honour had a proportionate ſpring to their exertions and purſuits. The range of the human character was great and extenſive, and men were not likely to trifle within narrow bounds; they were deſtined to be good or to be wicked in the higheſt meaſure, and, by their ſtruggles, to exhibit a ſcene intereſting and inſtructive beyond any other in the hiſtory of mankind.

[a] Lex Valeria & Porcia de tergo Civium lata. Liv. lib. ii. c. 8. lib. iii. c. 55. lib. x. c. 9. By theſe laws a Roman citizen could not be impriſoned, any more than ſuffer puniſhment, before conviction; he might ſtop any proceeding againſt him by an appeal to the People at large; and, being at liberty during trial, might withdraw whenever he perceived the ſentence likely to be given againſt him.

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Among the cauſes that helped to carry the characters of men in this age to ſuch diſtant extremes, may be reckoned the philoſophy of the Greeks, which was lately come into faſhion, and which was much affected by the higher ranks of men in the State[3]. Literature being, by the difficulty and expence of multiplying copies of books[4], confined to perſons having wealth and power, it was conſidered as a diſtinction of rank, and was received not only as an uſeful, but as a faſhionable accompliſhment[4]. The leſſons of the ſchool were conſidered as the elements of every liberal and active profeſſion, and they were practiſed at the bar, in the field, in the Senate, and every where in the conduct of real affairs. Philoſophy was conſidered as an ornament, as well as a real foundation of ſtrength, ability, and wiſdom in the practice of life. Men of the world, inſtead of being aſhamed of their ſect, affected to employ its language on every important occaſion, and to be governed by its rules ſo much as to aſſume, in compliance with particular ſyſtems, diſtinctions of manners, and even of dreſs. They embraced their forms in philoſophy, as the ſectaries in modern times have embraced theirs in religion; and probably in the one caſe honoured their choice by the ſincerity of their faith and the regularity of their practice, much in the ſame degree as they have done in the other.

In theſe latter times of the Roman republic the ſect of Epicurus appears to have prevailed; and what Fabricius wiſhed, on hearing the tenets of this philoſophy, for the enemies of Rome, had now befallen her citizens[5]. Men were glutted with national proſperity; they thought that they were born to enjoy what their fathers had won,

[3] Vid. Cicero's Philoſophical Works.

[4] The grandees had their ſlaves ſometimes educated to ſerve as ſecretaries to themſelves, or as preceptors to their children.

[5] See Plutarch. in Pyrr. The philoſopher Cyneas, in the hearing of Fabricius, entertained his prince with an argument, to prove that pleaſure was the chief good. Fabricius wiſhed that the enemies of Rome might long entertain ſuch tenets.

and

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and ſaw not the uſe of thoſe auſtere and arduous virtues by which the State had increaſed to its preſent greatneſs. The votaries of this ſect aſcribed the formation of the world to chance, and denied the exiſtence of Providence. They reſolved the diſtinctions of right and wrong, of honour and diſhonour, into mere appellations of pleaſure and pain. Every man's pleaſure was to himſelf the ſupreme rule of eſtimation and of action. All good was private. The public was a mere impoſture, that might be ſucceſsfully employed, perhaps to defraud the ignorant of their private enjoyments, while it furniſhed the conveniences of the wiſe[e]. To perſons ſo inſtructed, the care of families and of ſtates, with whatever elſe broke in upon the enjoyments of pleaſure and eaſe, muſt appear among the follies of human life. And a ſect under theſe imputations might be conſidered as patrons of licentiouſneſs, both in morality and religion, and declared enemies to mankind. Yet the Epicureans, when urged in argument by their opponents, made ſome conceſſions in religion, and many more in morality. They admitted the exiſtence of gods, but ſuppoſed thoſe beings of too exalted a nature to have any concern in human affairs. They owned that, although the value of virtue was to be meaſured by the pleaſure it gave, yet true pleaſure was to be found in virtue alone; and that it might be enjoyed in the higheſt degree even in the midſt of bodily pain. Notwithſtanding this deciſion on the ſide of morality, the ordinary language of this ſect, repreſenting virtue as a mere prudent choice among the pleaſures to which men are variouſly addicted, ſerved to ſuppreſs the ſpecific ſentiments of conſcience and elevation of mind, and to change the reproaches of criminality, profligacy, or vileneſs, by which even bad men are reſtrained from iniquity, into mere imputations of miſtake, or variations of taſte.

[e] Cicero in Piſonem.

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Other ſects, particularly that of the Stoicks, maintained, almoſt in every particular, the reverſe of theſe tenets. They maintained the reality of Providence, and of a common intereſt of goodneſs and of juſtice, for which Providence was exerted, and in which all rational creatures were deeply concerned. They allowed, that in the nature of things there are many grounds upon which we prefer or reject the objects that preſent themſelves to us, but that the choice which we make, not the event of our efforts, decides our happineſs or our miſery; that right and wrong are the moſt important and the only grounds upon which we can at all times ſafely proceed in our choice, and that, in compariſon to this difference, every thing elſe is of no account; that a juſt man will ever act as if there was nothing good but what is right, and nothing evil but what is wrong; that the Epicureans miſtook human nature when they ſuppoſed all its principles reſolveable into appetites for pleaſure, or averſions to pain; that honour and diſhonour, excellence and defect, were conſideratons which not only led to much nobler ends, but which were of much greater power in commanding the human will; the love of pleaſure was groveling and vile, was the ſource of diſſipation and of ſloth; the love of excellence and honour was aſpiring and noble, and led to the greateſt exertions and the higheſt attainments of our nature. They maintained that there is no private good ſeparate from the public good; that the ſame qualities of the underſtanding and the heart, wiſdom, benevolence, and courage, which are good for the individual, are ſo likewiſe for the public; that theſe bleſſings every man may poſſeſs, independent of fortune or the will of other men; and that whoever does poſſeſs them has nothing to hope, and nothing to fear, and can have but one ſort of emotion, that of ſatiſfaction and joy; that his affections, and the maxims of his ſtation, as a creature of God, and as a member of ſociety, lead him to act for the good of mankind; and that for himſelf he has nothing more to

deſire, than the happineſs of acting this part. Theſe, they ſaid, were the tenets of reaſon leading to perfection, which ought to be the aim of every perſon who means to preſerve his integrity, or to conſult his happineſs, and towards which every one may advance, although no one has actually reached it.

Other ſects affected to find a middle way between theſe extremes, and attempted, in ſpeculation, to render their doctrines more plauſible; that is, more agreeable to common opinions than either; but were, in fact, of no farther moment in human life than as they approached to the one or to the other of theſe oppoſite ſyſtems.

Cæſar is ſaid to have embraced the doctrines of Epicurus; Cato thoſe of Zeno. The firſt, in compliance with faſhion, or from the bias of an original temper. The other, from the force of conviction, as well as from the predilection of a warm and ingenuous mind. When ſuch characters occur together, it is impoſſible not to ſee them in contraſt. When Saluſt writes of the proceedings of the Senate, in the caſe of the Cataline conſpiracy, he ſeems to overlook every other character, to dwell upon theſe alone. Cæſar, at the time when this hiſtorian flouriſhed, had many claims to his notice[7]; but Cato could owe it to nothing but the force of truth. He was diſtinguiſhed from his infancy by an ardent and affectionate diſpoſition. This part of his character is mentioned on occaſion of his attachment to his brother Cæpio, and the vehement ſorrow with which he was ſeized at his death. It is mentioned, on occaſion of his viſit to the dictator Sylla, when he was with difficulty reſtrained by the diſcretion of his tutor from ſome act or expreſſion of indignation againſt this real or apparent violator of public juſtice. He had from his infancy, according to Plutarch, a reſolution, a ſteadineſs, and a compoſure of mind not to be moved by flattery, nor to be ſhaken by threats. Without

[7] Salluſt attached himſelf to Cæſar, and was employed by him in the civil wars.

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fawning or inſinuation, he was the favourite of his companions, and had, by his unaffected generoſity and courage, the principal place in their confidence. Though in appearance ſtern and inflexible, he was warm in his affections, and zealous in the cauſe of innocence and juſtice. Such are the marks of an original temper, affixed by hiſtorians as the characters of his infancy and early youth. So fitted by nature, he imbibed with eaſe an opinion, that profligacy, cowardice, and malice, were the only evils to be feared; courage, integrity, and benevolence, the only good to be coveted; and that the proper care of a man on every occaſion is, not what is to happen to him, but what he himſelf is to do. With this profeſſion he became a ſtriking contraſt to many of his contemporaries; and to Cæſar in particular, not only a contraſt, but a reſolute opponent; and though he could not furniſh a ſufficient counterpoiſe, yet he afforded always much weight to be thrown into the oppoſite ſcale. They were both of undaunted courage, and of great penetration; the one to diſtinguiſh what was beſt; the other to diſtinguiſh the moſt effectual means for the attainment of any end on which he was bent. It were to miſtake intirely the ſcene in which they were engaged, to judge of their abilities from the event of their different purſuits. Thoſe of Cato were by their nature a ſeries of ſtruggles with almoſt inſurmountable difficulties: thoſe of Cæſar, a conſtant endeavour to ſeize the advantages of which the vices and weakneſſes of the age, except when he was reſiſted by perſons bent on the ſame purpoſe with himſelf, gave him an eaſy poſſeſſion. Cato endeavoured to preſerve the order of civil government, however deſperate, becauſe this was the part it became him to act, and in which he choſe to live and to die. Cæſar propoſed to overturn it; becauſe he wiſhed to diſpoſe of all the wealth and honours of the State at his own pleaſure.

Cæſar, as verſatile in his genius, as Cato was ſteady and inflexible, could perſonate any character, and ſupport any cauſe; in debate

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debate, he could derive his arguments from any topic; from topics of pity, of which he was inſenſible; from topics of juſtice and public good, for which he had no regard. His vigour in reſiſting perſonal inſults and wrongs appeared in his early youth, when he withſtood the imperious commands of Sylla to part with his wife, the daughter of Cinna, and when he revenged the inſults offered by the pirates to himſelf; but while his temper might be ſuppoſed the moſt animated and warm, he was not involved in buſineſs by a predilection for any of the intereſts on which the State was divided. So long as the appetites of youth were ſufficient to occupy him, he ſaw every object of State, or of faction, with indifference, and took no part in public affairs. But even in this period, by his application and genius, in both of which he was eminent, he made a diſtinguiſhed progreſs in letters and eloquence. When he turned his mind to objects of ambition, the ſame perſonal vigour which appeared in his youth, became ſtill more conſpicuous; but, unfortunately, his paſſions were ill directed, and he ſeemed to conſider the authority that was exerciſed by the Senate, and the reſtraints of law on himſelf, as an inſult and a wrong.

Cæſar had attained to ſeven-and-thirty years of age before he took any part as a member of the commonwealth. He then courted the populace in preference to the Senate or better ſort of the People, and made his firſt appearance in ſupport of the profligate, againſt the order and authority of government. With perſons of deſperate fortune and abandoned manners, he early bore the character of liberality and friendſhip. They received him as a generous patron come to reſcue them from the moroſe ſeverity of thoſe who judged of public merits by the ſtandard of public virtue, and who declared againſt practices, however faſhionable, which were inconſiſtent with public ſafety. Himſelf, a perſon of the greateſt abilities, and the moſt accompliſhed talents, having an opportunity to live on terms of equality

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equality with the greateſt men that have yet appeared in the world, he choſe to ſtart up as the chief among thoſe who, being abandoned to every vice, ſaw the remains of virtue in their country with diſtaſte and averſion. When he emerged from the avocations of pleaſure, or from the ſloth which accompanies the languor of diſſipation, his ambition or deſire to counteract the eſtabliſhed government of his country, and to make himſelf maſter of the commonwealth, became extreme. To this paſſion he ſacrificed every ſentiment of friendſhip or animoſity, of honour, intereſt, reſentment, or hatred. The philoſophy which taught men to look for enjoyment indiſcriminately wherever it pleaſed them moſt, found a ready acceptance in ſuch a diſpoſition. But while he poſſibly availed himſelf of the ſpeculations of Epicurus to juſtify his choice of an object, he was not inferior to the followers of Zeno, in vigorous efforts and active exertions for the attainment of his ends. Being about ſeven years younger than Pompey, and three years older than Cato; the firſt he occaſionally employed as a prop to his ambition, but probably never ceaſed to conſider him as a rival; the other, from a fixed animoſity of oppoſite natures, and from having felt him as a continual opponent in all his deſigns, he ſincerely hated.

Cato began his military ſervice in the army that was formed againſt the gladiators, and concluded it as a legionary Tribune, under the Prætor Rubrius in Macedonia, while Pompey remained in Syria. He was about three-and-thirty years of age when he made his ſpeech relating to the accomplices of Cataline; and by the deciſive and reſolute ſpirit he had ſhown on this occaſion, came to be conſidered as a principal ſupport of the ariſtocracy, or of the authority of the Senate[s]. To this body, as uſual, every flagrant diſorder repreſſed was a victory. The diſcovery of a deſign, ſo odious as that of Cata-

[s] Plutarch. in Caton. edit. Londin. p. 238.

line,

line, covered under popular pretences, greatly weakened their antagoniſts. One of the firſt uſes they propoſed to make of their advantage, was to have Cato elected among the Tribunes of the ſubſequent year. His ſervices were likely to be wanted in oppoſition to Metellus Nepos, then arrived from the army of Pompey, with recommendations from his general to offer himſelf a candidate for the ſame office; and, as was expected, to ſtart ſome new gratification to the ambition or vanity of this inſatiable ſuitor for perſonal conſideration.

It had not yet appeared what part Pompey was to take in the diſputes that were likely to ariſe on the legality or expedience of the late meaſures; but it is not to be doubted, that he wiſhed to hold the balance of parties, and that he would come prepared for the part that was moſt likely to promote his own importance. Metellus was ſent on before him to be ſupported by his friends in the canvaſs for the office of Tribune, and with his inſtructions to take ſuch meaſures as were likely to favour the pretenſions of his general. The leading men of the Senate were now, for ſome time, aware of the intrigues of Pompey, and bore, with indignation, the perſonal ſuperiority which he affected even to the firſt and moſt reſpected of their order. They took occaſion, in the preſent criſis, to mortify him by admitting Lucullus and Metellus Creticus to the triumphs to which, by their victories in Pontus and in Crete, they were long intitled. Hitherto their claims had been over-ruled by the popular faction, either to annoy the Senatorian party, to which they were attached, or to flatter Pompey, who was ſuppoſed to be equally averſe to the honours of both. They had waited in Italy about three years, and, in the manner of thoſe who ſue for a triumph, had abſtained from entering the city, and ſtill retained the faſces or enſigns of their late command [a].

[a] Cicero in Lucullo.

Lucullus,

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Lucullus, having obtained the honour that was due to him, ſeemed to be ſatisfied with the acknowledgment of his right; and, as if merely to ſhow with what ſort of enemy he had fought, he entered the city with a few of the Armenian horſemen caſed in armour, a few of the armed chariots winged with ſcythes, and about ſixty of the officers and courtiers of Mithridates, who were his captives. He ordered the ſpoils he had gained, the arms and enſigns of war, the prows of the gallies he had taken, to be diſplayed to public view in the great circus, and concluded the ſolemnity with giving a feaſt to the People. The Senate hoped for his ſupport againſt the ambition of Pompey, and the factious deſigns of the popular leaders; but he was diſguſted, and ſcarcely ever after took any part in the affairs of State.

The triumph of Metellus Creticus did not take place till after the acceſſion of the following Conſuls, P. Junius Silanus and Lucius Muræna, after whoſe election, Cicero, before he had vacated his own office of Conſul, had occaſion to defend his intended ſucceſſor Muræna, againſt a charge of corruption brought upon the ſtatute of Calpurnius, by Servius Sulpicius, one of his late competitors, ſupported by Cato and others. The oration of Cicero on this occaſion is ſtill extant, and is a curious example of the topics, which, under popular governments, enter even into judicial pleadings. Great part of it conſiſts in a ridicule of law terms; becauſe Sulpicius, one of the proſecutors, was accuſtomed to give counſel to his friends who conſulted him in matters of law; and in a ridicule of the Stoic philoſophy, becauſe Cato, another proſecutor, was ſuppoſed to have embraced the doctrines of that ſect. Cato made no other remark on this pleading, but That the republic was provided with a merry Conſul. The argument appeared ſufficiently ſtrong on the ſide of Muræna, and he was acquitted.

At the cloſe of this trial, Cicero, about to reſign his power with the uſual aſſeveration, upon oath, That he had faithfully, and to the

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beſt of his abilities, diſcharged his truſt; he propoſed, at the ſame time, to harangue the People, but was ordered by Metellus, already elected, and acting in capacity of Tribune, to confine himſelf to the terms of his oath. He accordingly refrained from ſpeaking; but inſtead of ſwearing ſimply, That he had been faithful to his truſt, he took an oath, That he had preſerved the republic [10]. It was on this occaſion, probably, that Cato, now another of the Tribunes, in a ſpeech to the People, alluding to the ſuppreſſion of the late conſpiracy, called Cicero the Father of his Country [11]; and from this time entered upon an oppoſition to his colleague Metellus, which was not likely to drop while they continued in office.

U. C. 691. D. Junius Silanus, L. Muræna.

Soon after the acceſſion of the new magiſtrates, a ſtorm began to gather, which, though ſtill aimed at the party of the Senate, burſt at laſt in a perſonal attack upon the late Conſul, who had been the author or inſtrument of the Senate in the ſummary proceedings againſt the accomplices of Cataline. Metellus Nepos ſeems to have come from Aſia, and to have entered on the office of Tribune, with a particular deſign to bring about the introduction of Pompey with his army into Rome; and he was joined in this project by Caius Julius Cæſar [12], now in the office of Prætor, who choſe to ſupport the Tribune, as an act of hoſtility to the Senate, if not as the means of diſembaraſſing himſelf from the preſent forms of the commonwealth.

In conſequence of a plan concerted with Cæſar, the Tribune Metellus moved in the Senate, as had been uſual in the times of its higheſt authority, for leave to propoſe a decree in the aſſembly of the People recalling Pompey from Aſia at the head of his forces, in order to reſtore the conſtitution of the commonwealth, which, in the terms he afterwards employed to the People, had been violated by the arbitrary adminiſtration of Cicero. This was the firſt attempt of the

[10] Plutarch. in Cicerone. [11] Cicer. in Piſonem. c. 3. [12] Sueton. in Jul. Cæſ. c. 16.

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party to inflame the minds of the People on the ſubject of the late executions; and Pompey was, in this manner, offered to the popular party as their leader to avenge the ſuppoſed wrongs they had received. Cato, when the matter was propoſed in the Senate, endeavoured to perſuade Metellus to drop it, reminded him of the dignity of his family, which had been always a principal ornament and ſupport of the State. This treatment ſerved only to raiſe the preſumption of Metellus, and brought on a violent altercation between the Tribunes. The Senate applauded Cato, but had not authority enough to prevent the motion which was propoſed from being made to the People.

Metellus, apprehending an obſtinate reſiſtance from his colleague, endeavoured to fill the place of aſſembly with his own partizans; and, on the evening before the meeting, in order to intimidate his opponents, paraded in the ſtreets with a numerous attendance of men in arms. The friends and relations of the other Tribunes earneſtly beſeeched them not to expoſe themſelves to the danger with which they were threatened. But, on the following day, the other party being already aſſembled by Metellus, at the temple of Caſtor, and the place having been in the night occupied by perſons under his direction, armed with ſticks, ſwords, and other offenſive weapons [13], Cato went forth attended only by Minucius Thermus, another of the Tribunes, and a few friends. They were joined by numbers in the ſtreets, who could not accompany them to their place, being prevented by the multitude of armed men that already crowded the avenues and the ſteps of the temple. But they themſelves, from reſpect to their office, being ſuffered to paſs, dragged along with them through the crowd, as an aid, in caſe any violence were offered, Munatius, a citizen much attached to

[13] Plutarch. in Catone, edit. Londin. p. 241, &c.

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Cato. When they came to the bench of Tribunes, they found that Metellus, with the Prætor Julius Cæsar, had taken their places there; and that, in order to concert their operations in the conduct of this affair, they were closely seated together. Cato, to disappoint this intention, forced himself in betwixt them, and, when the ordinary officer began to read the intended decree, interposed his negative, and forbade him to proceed. Metellus himself seized the writing, and began to read; but Cato snatched it out of his hands. Metellus endeavoured to repeat the substance of it from his memory. Thermus clapt his hand to his mouth. A general silence remained in the assembly, till Metellus, having made a signal for his party to clear the comitium of their enemies, a great tumult and confusion arose; and the Tribunes who opposed Metellus were in imminent danger. The Senators had met in mourning, to mark their sense of the evils which threatened the commonwealth; and now, under the apprehension of some signal calamity, gave a charge to the Consuls to watch over the safety of the State, and impowered them to take such measures as might be necessary to preserve or to restore the public peace [14].

In consequence of this charge, the Consul Muræna appeared with a body of men in arms, had the good fortune to rescue Cato and Minucius Thermus; and probably by this seasonable interposition effaced any remains of misunderstanding which might have subsisted between Cato and himself, on account of the prosecution for bribery which followed the late elections [15].

Metellus, after the tumult was composed, having again obtained silence, began to read the proposed decree; but the Senatorian party, headed by the Consuls, being then in the comitium, he found it impossible to proceed; and, together with the Prætor Caius Julius

[14] Plutarch. in Catone, edit. Londin. p. 247, &c. [15] Plutarch. ibid.

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Cæſar, retired from the aſſembly. From this time, theſe officers made no attempt to reſume their motion, but complained that the government was uſurped by a violent faction, under whom even the perſons of the Tribunes were unſafe; and Metellus, as if forced to break through the rules which obliged the Tribunes to conſtant reſidence at Rome, abandoned the city, even left Italy, and fled to the camp of Pompey in Aſia, from which he was lately arrived [16]. He had already threatened his opponents at Rome with the reſentment and military power of his general, and now endeavoured to excite the army and their commander to follow the example which had been ſet to them by Sylla and his legions, when oppreſſed citizens, a deſcription in which he now comprehended himſelf, fled to them for protection and revenge.

It may well be ſuppoſed, that Cæſar, remembering his own eſcape from the ruin of the Marian faction, and conſidering Pompey as the head of an oppoſite intereſt, and a principal obſtacle to his own ambition, muſt look upon him with ſome degree of perſonal diſlike and animoſity; but his conduct on this occaſion ſufficiently ſhowed how little he was the dupe of any paſſion or ſentiment which had a tendency to check his purſuits. Meaning for the preſent only to weaken the Senate, and to ſtep in before them in the favour of Pompey; he undertook the cauſe even of a rival, and would have joined the populace, in delivering the commonwealth into his hands, rather than remain under a government which he hated. But if he really meant to overthrow the Senate by force, he miſtook his inſtrument. Pompey, no doubt, aſpired to the ſovereignty of the empire, and wiſhed to reign in the city with a military power; but even this he deſired to receive as the fruit of conſideration and perſonal reſpect, and he ever hoped to make the People beſtow it, and even force him to accept

[16] Dio Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 43.

of

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of it as their gift. For this purpoſe he encouraged ſo many agents and retainers to ſound his praiſe; and for this purpoſe he had recently ſent Metellus Nepos from his camp to take upon him the functions of a popular Tribune; but having failed of his object, he by no means could think of extorting it by force. No one ever courted diſtinction with a more inceſſant emulation to his rivals; but he was intirely dependent on the public opinion for any ſatisfaction he enjoyed in the poſſeſſion of power. Truſting to this laſt part of his character, Cæſar, though himſelf of unbounded ambition, was not yet alarmed at the elevation of Pompey, and thought that he was ſafe even in offering him the dominion of the State. Pompey was, at this conjuncture, with his army moving towards Italy, and his coming was matter of great ſolicitude to the friends of the commonwealth, who feared that, in return to the affront of his not being invited to come with his army, upon the motion of Metellus, he would employ it in perſon to enforce his commands. Upon his arrival at Brundiſium, however, as formerly upon his return from Africa, he diſpelled thoſe fears by an immediate diſmiſſion of the troops, with inſtructions, merely that they would attend at his triumph. He himſelf came forward to Rome with the ſingle equipage of his Proconſular rank. Multitudes of every condition went forth to receive him, and with ſhouts and acclamations recompenſed the moderation with which he acquieſced in the condition of a citizen.

Cæſar, from whatever motive he acted in regard to Pompey, gave every other ſign of diſaffection to the Senate, and employed the name of this riſing favourite of the People, to mortify ſuch of the members in particular as were objects of perſonal animoſity to himſelf. The repairs or rebuilding of the Capitol being finiſhed about this time, the honour of dedicating the edifice, and of being named in the inſcription it was to bear, had, by a reſolution of the Senate,

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been conferred on Catulus, under whoſe inſpection the work was executed. But Cæſar, affecting to procure this honour for Pompey, alleged that Catulus had embezzled the money allotted for this ſervice; that much yet remained to be done; and moved, that the inſcription of Catulus ſhould be eraſed; that the completion of the work being left to Pompey, ſhould carry an inſcription with his name [47]. Here he probably acted as much from antipathy to one, as from an intention to flatter the other. But the deſign being extremely odious to the whole body of the Nobles, who ſaw, with indignation, in that propoſal an attempt to affront a moſt reſpectable citizen, in order to flatter the vanity of one perſon, and to gratify the profligate reſentments of another, Cæſar was obliged to withdraw his motion [48].

It was probably during this year in which Cæſar was Prætor, and before the arrival of Pompey from Aſia (although hiſtorians refer it to an earlier date), that Cæſar promoted, as has been already mentioned, proſecutions upon a charge of aſſaſſination againſt ſome perſons concerned in the execution of Sylla's proſcriptions. The Prætors were appointed by lot to carry particular laws into execution. The law reſpecting aſſaſſination appears to have been the lot of Cæſar; and he was intitled in virtue of his office, the juriſdiction of which was ſtill very arbitrary, to extend, by his edict or plan of proceeding for the year, the deſcription of the crime under his cognizance to any ſpecial caſe.

While he ſeemed to have formed ſo many deſigns againſt the peace of the commonwealth, and in the capacity of Prætor ſupported them with the authority of a magiſtrate, the Senatorian party made a powerful exertion of their influence to have him ſuſpended, and actually obtained a decree for this purpoſe. He affected at firſt to ſlight their authority; but finding that a power was preparing to enforce it, perhaps at the hazard of his life, he laid aſide for ſome time

[47] Sueton. in Jul. Cæſare, c. 15.

[48] Dio Caſſ. lib. xlvii. c. 44.

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the robes and badges of magiſtracy, diſmiſſed his lictors, and abſtained from the functions of Prætor, until, having rejected an offer of the People to reſtore him by force, he was, with proper marks of regard, for this inſtance of moderation, reinſtated by an act of the Senate [19].

The ariſtocratical party, at the ſame time, to confirm and perpetuate the evidence on which they proceeded againſt the accomplices of Cataline, continued their proſecutions on this ſubject, and obtained ſentence of condemnation, in particular, againſt a citizen of the name of Vergunteius, and againſt Autronius, who, about two years before, having been elected Conſul, was ſet aſide upon a charge of bribery; and who, from the diſguſt which he took to the Senate upon that occaſion, had connected himſelf with the more deſperate party. Publius Sylla, in the ſame predicament with Autronius, was tried; but, being defended by Cicero, in an eloquent harangue which is ſtill extant, was acquitted.

Cæſar likewiſe was accuſed by Vectius as acceſſary to the conſpiracy of Cataline; but it is not likely that he was concerned farther than by the general encouragement he gave to every party at variance with the Senate. Oppoſition to this body was called the intereſt of the People, and was adopted by every perſon who had any paſſions to gratify by crimes of State, or who wiſhed to weaken the government, to which they themſelves were accountable. Among the ſupporters of this intereſt, Craſſus alſo was accuſed, but probably on no better grounds than Cæſar.

The whole of theſe proceedings, however, were ſuſpended by the approach of Pompey. This leader had now drawn the attention of all men upon himſelf, was quoted in every harangue as the great ſupport of the empire, and courted by multitudes, who, without in-

[19] Sueton. in Jul. Cæſare, c. 16.

quiry,

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quiry, affected to be claſſed with his admirers and friends. The contagion ſpread like a faſhion among the vulgar of every deſcription. He himſelf affected indifference to this mighty tide of renown, though not without much dignity and ſtate, which he tempered with affability, employing the greatneſs he poſſeſſed to give the more value to his condeſcenſions. His manner, though acceptable to the People and the army, was diſagreeable to the Senate. Having previouſly ſent Piſo, one of his lieutenants, before him to ſtand for the Conſulate, he had the preſumption to deſire that the Senate would defer the elections until he himſelf could be preſent to canvaſs for his friend. The Senate, according to Dio, complied with his deſire; but, according to Plutarch, rejected the propoſal with diſdain. This author imputes the reſolution, which they took upon this occaſion, to Cato, and ſubjoins, that Pompey endeavoured to gain this opponent by a propoſed marriage with one of his near relations; and that Cato declined the connexion, ſaying, That he ſhould not be caught in a female ſnare. Piſo, however, was elected together with Valerius Meſſala, and entered on his office before the triumph of Pompey.

U. C. 692. M. Pub. Piſo Calpurnius, M. Val. Maſſala Niger.

This ſolemnity followed ſoon after; and, though continued for two days, could not make place for all the magnificent ſhews that had been provided for it. The liſt of conqueſts exceeded that which had ever been produced at any other triumph. Aſia, Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Medea, Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Syria, Cilicia, Meſopotamia, Phænicia, Judæa, Arabia, Scythia, Crete [20], with the ſea in all its coaſts. Among the people or potentates ſubdued, were the Baſterni, Mithridates, and Tigranes. Among the captures, a thouſand fortreſſes, nine hundred cities reduced, eight hundred galleys taken, above two millions of men

[20] Plin. Nat. Hiſt. lib. vii. c. 26.

in

in captivity. Towns repeopled, not leſs than three hundred and ninety-nine. To this pompous liſt, it was ſubjoined by his friends, that, this being his third triumph, he had been round the known world, and had triumphed over all the three parts of the earth, Africa, Europe, and Aſia.

After rewarding the ſoldiers, of whom none received leſs than fifteen hundred denarii [21], he carried to the treaſury twenty thouſand talents [22]. He led, among his principal captives, beſides the chief pirates, Tigranes, ſon to the king of Armenia, with his wife and his daughter,—Zozimé, the queen of Tigranes,—the father Ariſtobulus, king of the Jews,—a ſiſter of Mithridates with five ſons, and ſome Scythian women;—the hoſtages of the Iberii, and the Commageni, together with trophies for every battle he had fought, making in all a more ſplendid exhibition than any that was to be found on the records of the State.

The triumphal proceſſions of Pompey merit more attention than thoſe of any other perſon, becauſe they contained a public evidence of his character. Others took the benefit of an eſtabliſhed practice to publiſh and to ratify the honours they had acquired; but Pompey, it is likely, would have invented the triumph, even if it had not been formerly thought of; and it is not to be doubted, that he over-ran ſome provinces in which the enemy were ſubdued, or in which they were ſo weak, as not to be able to make any reſiſtance, merely to place them in the liſt of his conqueſts; and that he made ſome part of his progreſs in Aſia to collect curioſities and ornaments for this pompous ſcene.

The triumph, in its ordinary form, contained only ſuch exhibitions as had a reference to the ſervice in which it was obtained; the captives and ſpoils of the enemy, with effigies and repreſent-

[21] About 50 l. [22] About 3,860,000 l.

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ations where the originals, by any accident, could not be diſplayed. But in theſe ſolemnities, executed for the honour of Pompey, were admitted whatever could diſtinguiſh or ſignalize the occaſion. Among theſe, according to the record tranſcribed by Pliny [23], there were many coſtly ornaments of gold and of precious ſtones, which were fabricated on purpoſe to be ſhown. Tables or plates, uſed for ſome ſpecies of play, made of one intire chryſtal; a repreſentation of the moon in gold, weighing thirty pondo; tables, utenſils, ſtatues, crowns, models of different ſorts in gold and precious ſtones, with the repreſentation of a mountain in gold, having lions, deer, and other animals upon it: and what ſerves as an evidence that theſe exhibitions were not limited to the ſpoils actually taken in war, there is mentioned an image of Pompey himſelf incruſted with pearls. The whole conducted with more arrangement and order, than were neceſſary, perhaps, in the diſpoſition of any of the battles which the triumph was intended to celebrate.

Among the images, repreſentations, and memorials which were carried before the victor on this occaſion, there was held up to view a ſtate of the public revenue, from which it appeared, that, before Pompey's time it amounted to no more than fifty millions [24]; and that the addition which he alone brought to it amounted to eighty-five millions [25].

Soon after this pomp was over, an aſſembly of the People was called in the Circus Flaminius to receive the addreſs of this victorious general; but, from an extreme caution not to offend any party, the ſpeech which he made, upon this occaſion, was acceptable to none. "It gave no hopes," ſays Cicero [26], "to the poor;

[23] Nat. Hiſt. lib. xxxvii. c. 2.
[24] 416,666 l.
[25] 708,333 l. Plutarch. in Pompeio, edit. Lond. p. 470.
[26] Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 14.

"no

"no flattery to the rich; no satisfaction to the good; no encou-
"ragement to the profligate." Pompey was suffered to possess the highest place in the consideration of the public, merely because he assumed it; and he preserved his dignity, by never committing his reputation without being prepared, and having concerted a variety of arts by which it might be supported.

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Tranſactions at Rome, and in the Provinces.——Julius Cæſar appointed in the Quality of Proprætor to his firſt Province of Luſitania.——Trial of Clodius.——Propoſed Adoption into a Plebeian Family to qualify him for the Office of Tribune.——Cæſar, a Candidate for the Conſulſhip.——The Triumvirate of Cæſar, Pompey, and Craſſus.——Conſulſhip of Cæſar.——Motion of Vatinius, to confer on Cæſar, for five Years, the Command in Gaul.——Marriage of Pompey to Julia.——Of Cæſar to Calpurnia.——Plot of Vettius.——Conſulate of Lucius Calpurnius and A. Gabinius.——Attack made upon Cicero.——His Exile.

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POMPEY, at his departure from Syria, left that province with two legions under the command of M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of his lieutenants. This officer occupied the country from the Euphrates to the frontier of Egypt, and continued the war which his predeceſſor had begun with the Arabs.

Caius Antonius, the late colleague of Cicero in the Conſulate, ſoon after the defeat of Cataline, proceeded to the province of Macedonia, of which, by the arrangements of the year, he had been appointed governor. He entered his province with the enſigns of victory, which had been obtained by the defeat of Cataline; but theſe he ſoon forfeited by his miſconduct in a war againſt the Thracians, and by the diſgrace which he otherwiſe incurred for the mal-adminiſtration of his province. Complaints were exhibited againſt him for extortion. On this occaſion it had been reported by himſelf, or by ſome of his family, that, having agreed to divide the profits of his government with Cicero, part only was exacted on his own account.

This allegation, Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, mentions with indignation; and, being aſked to undertake his defence, queſtions whether he can decently do ſo under this imputation [1]. But as he ſoon afterwards undertook the cauſe of Antony, and employed his intereſt to have him continued in his command, it is probable that this imputation either gained no credit, or was entirely removed [2].

The Allobroges, though deprived of the ſupport they were made to expect from the party of Cataline, nevertheleſs took arms, and invaded the Roman province of Gaul. After a variety of events, they were repulſed by Pontinius, who then commanded the Roman forces in that quarter, and forced to retire into their own country [3].

About the ſame time, Caius Julius Cæſar, upon the expiration of his term in the office of Prætor, obtained his firſt military command; being appointed by lot to the government of Luſitania, where, under different pretences, he found an opportunity to quarrel with the natives, to ſhew his capacity for war, and to lay ſome ground for his claim to a triumph [4]. In puſhing his way to the preferments which he now held in the State, he had ruined his fortune by largeſſes, public ſhews, and entertainments to the People, by his laviſh bounty in private to needy and profligate citizens, and in ſupporting every deſperate cauſe againſt the Senate and the government; and is reported to have ſaid of himſelf, that he needed one hundred and fifty millions Roman money, or one million two hundred thouſand pounds ſterling, to be worth nothing [5]. When about to depart from the city, he was preſſed by his creditors, and had recourſe to Craſſus, who became his ſurety for great ſums [6].

[1] Vid. Cicero at Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12.
[2] Ad Familiar. lib. v. ep. 5.
[3] Dio, lib. xxxvii.
[4] Dio, c. 52, &c.
[5] Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. p. 715.
[6] Ibid. About 160,000 l. Plutarch. in Cæſare.

A perſon,

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A perſon, who, in any other ſtate than that of Rome, could ſuppoſe ſuch a fortune reparable, muſt have thought of means alarming to the State itſelf; but Cæſar had now quitted the paths of pleaſure for thoſe of ambition; and, in an empire which extended over ſo many opulent provinces, could eaſily proportion his wealth to the extent of his power. Although the province into which he was then ſent was none of the richeſt, and was only a ſtep to ſomewhat farther, more conſiderable, and more likely to ſupply him with the means of purſuing the objects of his ambition, he was nevertheleſs reported to have ſupplied his own wants, and to have enriched his army [7].

In paſſing the Alps, on his way into Spain, at a village on the way, one of his company obſerved, that "*Here too there were probably parties and conteſts for power.*" "Ay," ſaid Cæſar, "and "I would rather be the firſt man in this place than the ſecond at "Rome [8]." Upon his arrival in Luſitania, he made the neceſſary augmentation of the army, and ſoon over-ran all the diſtricts that were diſpoſed to reſiſt his authority. With the ſame ability with which he conducted his military operations, he ſupported the dignity of a Roman governor, no leſs in the civil than in the military department. Hiſtorians, upon an idea which occurred to them, that the diſorder in his own affairs might have rendered him partial to inſolvent debtors, are at pains to acquit him of any ſuch charge, and obſerve that he gave proofs of the contrary, and for the moſt part ordered two thirds of the debtor's effects to be ſequeſtered for the uſe of his creditors [9].

While theſe things paſſed in the provinces, the city was occupied with ordinary affairs, and ſuffered an increaſe of the political diſ-

[7] Plutarch. in Cæſare, edit. Lond. p. 111. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid. p. 112.

tempers

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tempers with which the public had been for ſome time infected. The expence and diſſipation attending the public ſhews, in particular, were augmented to a great degree. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus exhibited the baiting of an hundred bears by African huntſmen [10]; and whereas ſuch entertainments had formerly ended at one meeting, they were now continued through many acts [11], and were intermitted only while the People retired to their meals.

The office of Cenſor, as appears from the tranſactions which are mentioned relating to the farms of the revenue and the rolls of the Senate, was in being at this time, although the names of the perſons by whom it was exerciſed are not recorded. The Cenſors are ſaid to have let the revenues of Aſia at a rate, of which the farmers afterwards complained, alleging, that their own avidity in graſping at the profits to be made in this new province had miſled them [12]. They likewiſe put upon the rolls of the Senate all who had ever held any office of magiſtracy, and by this addition increaſed the number of members beyond the former and ordinary rate [13].

About the ſame time happened the memorable trial of Publius Clodius, for the ſcandal he had given by profaning the ſacred rites in Cæſar's houſe. This debauchee was ſuppoſed, for ſome time, to have ſought for an opportunity of a criminal correſpondence with Pompeia, Cæſar's wife; but to have been prevented, if not by her own diſcretion, at leaſt by the attention and vigilance of her family [14]. In theſe circumſtances, in the preceding year, it fell to the lot of Pompeia, as being wife to one of the Prætors in office, to celebrate, at her houſe, the feſtival of a certain female deity [15] worſhipped by the Romans; and at whoſe rites women alone were admitted. Every male domeſtic, even the huſband, was obliged to abſent himſelf from

[10] Plin. Nat. Hiſt. lib. viii. c. 36.
[11] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 47.
[12] Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 17.
[13] Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 46.
[14] Plutarch. in Cæſare, edit. Lond. p. 109.
[15] Called the Bona & Dea.

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home while the rites were adminiſtered. Clodius took this opportunity to carry on his intrigue; he put himſelf in a female dreſs, and, being young and of an effeminate aſpect, expected to paſs for a woman [16]. Pompeia was ſuppoſed to be appriſed of the deſign, and to have ſtationed a female ſlave to receive and conduct her paramour through the apartments. Being met, however, by another ſlave who was not in the ſecret, his voice betrayed him. A cry of amazement and horror was immediately raiſed, communicated through all the apartments, and the occaſion of it diſcovered to the matrons, who were met to celebrate the rites. Clodius eſcaped, but not without being known. The college of Pontiffs made a report, that the ſacred rites had been profaned. The Senate reſolved, that inquiry ſhould be made into the grounds of the ſcandal; and that the People ſhould be moved to authoriſe the Prætor to ſelect, without drawing lots, proper judges for the trial of the accuſed.

Clodius, by the ſuſpicion of an inceſtuous commerce with his own ſiſter, the wife of Lucullus; by his perfidy in ſeducing the troops of that general to mutiny, and by his profligacy on every occaſion, had incurred a general deteſtation; and many of the Senators combined, as the likelieſt way of removing him from the commonwealth, in urging the proſecution againſt him.

He himſelf, foreſeeing this ſtorm, had taken refuge in the popular party, and endeavoured to ſilence the voice of infamy, by profeſſing extraordinary zeal for the People, and vehement oppoſition to the Senate. Theſe parties accordingly became intereſted in the iſſue of his cauſe. The popular leaders endeavoured to preſerve him as an uſeful inſtrument, and the Senate to remove him as a vile and dangerous tool from the hands of their enemies. Even Cæſar, though perſonally inſulted, and ſo far moved by the ſcandal which had been

[16] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12, 13.

given

given in his own houſe as to part with his wife, ſtill affected to conſider as groundleſs the charge that was brought againſt the accuſed; and being aſked, why he had parted with a woman who, upon this ſuppoſition, muſt appear to be innocent, ſaid, that his wife muſt not only be innocent, but above imputation. Pompey, to avoid giving offence, declined to favour either party; but being called upon in the aſſembly of the People to declare his opinion, whether this trial ſhould proceed according to the decree of the Senate; made a long ſpeech, full of reſpect to the Nobles, and of ſubmiſſion to the Senate, whoſe authority, in all queſtions of this ſort, he ſaid, ſhould ever with him have the greateſt weight. He afterwards, in the Senate itſelf, being called upon by Meſſala the Conſul, delivered himſelf to the ſame purpoſe; and when he had done, whiſpered Cicero, who ſat by him, that he thought he had now ſufficiently explained himſelf; intimating probably, that he meant to comprehend, in this declaration, his judgment with reſpect to all the acts of the Senate which had paſſed relating to the accomplices of Cataline[16].

The Conſul Piſo was inſtructed to carry to the People, for their aſſent, an act for the better conduct of the trial of Clodius, diſpenſing with the uſual mode of draughting judges by lot, and authoriſing the Prætor to ſelect them, that he might name the more reſpectable perſons. On the day on which this motion was to be made, a numerous party of young Nobility appeared for the defendant. His hirelings and retainers crowded the Comitium. Even Piſo, who moved the queſtion, diſſuaded the People from paſſing the law, and allowed the friends of Clodius to put a ridiculous trick on the aſſembly, by diſtributing to the People, as they came forward to vote, two ballots, which, inſtead of being, as uſual, one negative and the other affirmative, were both negative. This trick being obſerved, Cato ſuſ-

[16] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. epiſt. 13, 14. 16.

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pended the ballot, and ſtrongly remonſtrated againſt the proceeding of the Conſul [17]. He was ſupported by Hortenſius and Favonius. The aſſembly broke up, and the affair again returned to the Senate. The members were importuned by Clodius, who caſt himſelf at their feet as they entered; they, nevertheleſs, confirmed their former reſolution by a majority of four hundred to fifteen [18].

Hortenſius, however, having propoſed that, inſtead of the motion which the Conſuls had been inſtructed to make for the ſelection of the judges, the Tribune Fufius ſhould move the People to grant commiſſion for the trial, leaving the judges, as uſual, to be drawn by lot; an edict was framed and paſſed to this effect. Hortenſius, who conducted the trial, was confident that no jury could acquit the accuſed. The court accordingly, in all their proceedings, ſeemed at firſt inclined to ſeverity. They even applied for a guard to protect their perſons againſt the partizans of the criminal; but the majority, nevertheleſs, ſuffered themſelves to be corrupted, and took money in the courſe of the trial. Of fifty-ſix judges that were incloſed, twenty-five gave their voice to condemn, and thirty-one to acquit. Catulus, on this occaſion, aſked the majority to what purpoſe they had deſired a guard? "Was it," he ſaid, "to ſecure the money "you expected to receive for your votes [19]?"

Soon after this judgment the Senate reſolved that enquiry ſhould be made concerning thoſe judges who had been corrupted in the trial. And by this reſolution gave a general offence to the equeſtrian order, who conſidered it as an imputation on their whole body [20].

Pompey, in the courſe of this tranſaction, had been obliged to declare himſelf for the Senate; but his object was to be on good

[17] Cicer. ad Att. lib. i. epiſt. 13, 14, 16.

[18] Ibid. ep. 14.

[19] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 46. Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16.

[20] Ibid. ep. 17.

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terms with all parties, and to manage his intereſt, by having ſome of his creatures always choſen into the higheſt offices of State. He offered, as candidate for the Conſulate of the following year, Afranius, one of his dependants, who is repreſented by Cicero as a perſon of mean character, and who, having no perſonal dignity, nor any credit with the People, was to be ſupported in his canvaſs by money alone. Pompey himſelf, and the Conſul Piſo, openly employed bribery in obtaining votes in his favour [18].

A variety of reſolutions were obtained in the Senate to reſtrain theſe practices. Two of them were propoſed by Cato and Domitius. The firſt was levelled againſt the Conſul Piſo, and gave permiſſion, on the ſuſpicion of illicit practices reſpecting elections, to viſit the houſe even of a magiſtrate. By the other it was declared, that all thoſe who were found diſtributing money to the People ſhould be conſidered as enemies to their country [19].

The Senate, at the ſame time, encouraged Lurco, one of the Tribunes, to propoſe a new clauſe to corroborate the laws againſt bribery. By this clauſe promiſes of money made to the People, if not performed, did not infer guilt; but, if performed, ſubjected the guilty perſon from thenceforward to pay to each of the Tribes an annual tax of three thouſand Roman money, or about twenty-four pounds ſterling; and there being thirty-five Tribes, this tax amounted in all to about eight hundred and forty pounds of our money. That the Tribune might not be interrupted in carrying this law, the Senate farther reſolved, that the formalities or reſtrictions of the Lex Ælia and Fufia [20] ſhould not be oppoſed to him [21]. It appears, however, that the liberality of Pompey prevailed againſt theſe precautions, as Afranius was elected, together with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer.

[18] Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Theſe were formalities and reſtrictions provided to check the precipitate paſſing of laws.

[21] Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 16.

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Soon after the election of these officers the farmers of the revenue of Asia, supported by the whole equestrian order, complained, as has been mentioned, of the terms of their contract, in which they alleged that they had greatly exceeded what the funds of that province could afford, and made application to the Senate for relief. Their plea was contested for some months with great animosity on both sides [22].

Upon the accession of the new Consuls, several other matters, tending to innovation and public disturbance, were introduced. Metellus Nepos, late Tribune, being now in the office of Prætor, procured a law to abolish the customs payable at any of the ports of Italy. The Romans, as has been observed, upon the accession of wealth derived from Macedonia, had exempted themselves from all the antient assessments, and they now completed the exemption of all the Italians from every tax besides that of quit-rents for public lands, and the twentieth penny on the value of slaves when sold or emancipated. They were become the sovereigns of a great empire, and as such, thought themselves intitled to receive, not obliged to pay, contributions [23].

The Tribune Herennius, at the same time, made a motion for an act to enable Publius Clodius to be adopted into a plebeian family, which, though an act of a more private nature than any of the former, tended still more to embroil the parties of the Senate and the People. This factious and profligate person had entertained great resentments against many of the Senators on account of the prosecution he had lately incurred, and against Cicero in particular, who, having been called as an evidence on his trial, gave a very unfavourable account of his character. The summary proceedings against the accomplices of Cataline, in which Cicero presided as Consul, exposed

[22] Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 17, 18. Dio. Cass. lib. xxvii. c. 51.

[23] Ibid. lib. ii. ep. 16.

him

him to the reſentment of the popular faction; and Clodius now propoſed to qualify himſelf to be elected Tribune of the People, in order to wreck his vengeance on that magiſtrate in particular, as well as on the other abettors of the ſenatorian party. The motion, however, for the preſent was rejected, though not finally dropt, by Clodius himſelf, nor by the popular faction, whoſe cauſe he profeſſed to eſpouſe[34].

Two other motions were made in which Pompey was deeply intereſted: one, to ratify and confirm all his acts in the province of Aſia: another, to procure ſettlements for the veterans who had ſerved under his command. The firſt, as it implied a reflection on Lucullus, many of whoſe judgments Pompey had reverſed, rouſed this ſtateſman from the care of his houſehold and his table, to that of the republic[35]. He oppoſed this motion with vigour, and inſiſted that the acts of Pompey ſhould be ſeparately examined, and not confirmed in a ſingle vote. In this he was ſupported by Catulus, by Cato, by the Conſul Metellus, and by the Senate in general. Afranius, though veſted with the Conſulate, and acting almoſt as the agent of Pompey, had neither dignity nor force to ſupport ſuch a meaſure; and Pompey, finding it rejected by the Senate, declined carrying it to the People[36].

The other propoſal, relating to the proviſion to be made for the ſoldiers of Pompey, was, by L. Flavius, one of the Tribunes, moved in the aſſembly of the People, under the title of an Agrarian Law. In this act, to prevent the imputation of partiality to any particular deſcription of men, certain gratuities were projected for the indigent citizens in general[37]; and, to enable the commonwealth to extend its bounty, it was propoſed firſt of all to revoke the conveyance of certain lands, which, having belonged to the public in the Conſulate

[34] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii c. 51.
[35] Plutarch. in Lucullo, edit. Lond. p. 197.
[36] Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 49.
[37] Ibid. lib. 50.

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of P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius, were ſold by the Senate; and that the price ſhould be reſtored to the purchaſers. It was propoſed likewiſe to ſeize certain lands which had been confiſcated by Sylla, but not appropriated; and to allot, during five years, the revenues of the late conqueſts in Aſia to purchaſe lands, which ſhould be diſtributed in terms of this act [28].

The Conſul Metellus Celer, ſupported by the Senate, ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the paſſing of this law. The Tribune perſiſted with great obſtinacy, and, to remove the obſtruction he met with, committed the Conſul to priſon. The whole Senate would have attended him thither, and numbers accordingly crowded to the place, when the Tribune, veſted with the ſacred defences of his perſon, to bar their way, planted his ſtool or chair of office in the door of the priſon; and, having ſeated himſelf upon it, "This way," he ſaid, "you cannot paſs; "if you mean to enter, you muſt pierce through the walls [29]." He declared his reſolution to remain all night where he ſat. The parties were collecting their ſtrength, and matters were likely to end in greater extremities than ſuited the indirect and cautious conduct of Pompey. This politician, although he engaged all his friends to ſupport the motion of Flavius, affected to have no part in the meaſure, and now probably inſtructed the Tribune to remove from the doors of the priſon. Flavius accordingly withdrew of a ſudden, ſaying, he had done ſo at the requeſt of the priſoner, who begged for his liberty [30].

It is ſuppoſed that Pompey, on this occaſion, ſeverely felt the checks which his ambition received from the ſenate; that he regretted for a moment the diſmiſſion of his army, and wiſhed himſelf in condition to enforce what his craft or his artifice had not been able to obtain. The error he had committed in reſigning the ſword, if he conceived it as ſuch, might have ſtill been corrected by recovering

[28] Cicer. ad Att. lib. i. ep. 19. [29] Dio. lib. xxxvii. p. 50. [30] Ibid.

the

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the poſſeſſion of ſome conſiderable province, which would have given him the command of an army and of proper reſources to ſupport his power. He, nevertheleſs, appears to have preferred the ſcene of intrigue in the city and the capital of the empire; a choice in which he was probably confirmed by Cæſar, who profeſſed great attachment to him, and who was about this time returned from the government which he held as Proprætor in Luſitania.

This officer, according to Dio, had found ſome pretence for a war with the nations on the frontier of the Roman province; had obliged them to take refuge in ſome of the iſlands on the coaſt, and afterwards reduced them in that retreat. His object was to return to Rome with the reputation of victory, to obtain a triumph, and to offer himſelf as a canditate for the Conſulſhip of the following year. For this purpoſe he quitted his province without waiting for a ſucceſſor, and, upon his arrival at Rome, halted, as uſual, with the enſigns of his military command at the gates of the city, applied for a triumph, and at the ſame time made intereſt for votes at the approaching election [31]. The Senate, and the friends of the republic in general, were become extremely jealous of his deſigns, and of his credit with the People. From a libertine he was become an ardent politician, ſeemed to have no paſſion but ambition or animoſity to the Senate; without committing himſelf, he had abetted every factious leader againſt them, and ſeemed to be indifferent to conſideration or honours, except ſo far as they led to power. Cicero and Cato were at this time the principal, or moſt conſpicuous, members of the Senate. The firſt was poſſeſſed of conſular rank, great ingenuity, wit, and accompliſhed talents: the other, poſſeſſed of great abilities and an inflexible reſolution, embraced the cauſe of the republic with the ſame ardour that others engaged in purſuing the object of their own ambition, their

[31] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 50, &c.

pleaſures,

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pleaſures, or perſonal intereſts. He had penetration enough to perceive in Cæſar, long before the Senate in general was alarmed, a diſpoſition to vilify the ariſtocracy, and, in conjunction with needy and profligate citizens, to make a prey of the republic. Under this apprehenſion he oppoſed him with a degree of keenneſs which Cæſar endeavoured to repreſent as a perſonal animoſity.

The Senators in general, now aware of their danger from Cæſar, were diſpoſed to reſiſt his applications, whether made for honours or for public truſt. They, on the preſent occaſion, diſputed his pretenſions to a triumph; and, while he remained without the city in expectation of this honour, refuſed to admit him on the liſt of candidates for the office of Conſul. But the day of election being fixed, Cæſar, without heſitation, preferred the conſulate to the triumph, laid down the enſigns of his late military command, aſſumed the gown, and entered the city as a candidate for the Conſulſhip [32].

The People were at this time divided into a variety of factions. Pompey and Craſſus diſtruſted each other, and both were jealous of Cæſar. Their diviſions ſtrengthened the party of the Senate, and furniſhed that body with the means of thwarting ſeparately many of their ambitious deſigns. This Cæſar had long perceived, and had paid his court both to Pompey and Craſſus, in order to hinder their joining the Senate againſt him. The expedience of this precaution now appeared more clearly than ever, and he is ſuppoſed to have ſeparately repreſented to theſe rivals the advantage which their enemies derived from their miſunderſtanding, and the eaſe with which, if united, they might concert among themſelves all the affairs of the republic, gratify every friend, and diſappoint every enemy. Upon this repreſentation Pompey and Craſſus were reconciled, and agreed

[32] Sueton. in Cæſare, c. 18. Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 54.

to

to act in concert with Cæſar, and to ſupport him in his pretenſions at the approaching elections [33].

This private combination, which remained ſome time a ſecret, was afterwards, by a kind of mockery, alluding to the ordinary names of public office, taken from the number of thoſe who were joined in them [34], called the Triumvirate. In the mean time, theſe ſuppoſed leaders of oppoſite factions, in abating their violence againſt each other, took a favourable appearance of moderation and candour. They paid their court ſeparately to perſons whom they wiſhed to gain, and flattered them with hopes of being able to heal the diviſions of their country. This ſort of court they paid in particular to Cicero; and by their flatteries, and real or pretended admiration of his talents, ſeem to have got intire poſſeſſion of his mind. Pompey affected to place the merits of Cicero greatly above his own. "I, indeed," he ſaid, "have ſerved my country, but this man has preſerved it" [35]. The Senators, with whom Cicero had hitherto acted, were alarmed; and it appears that Atticus, about this time, had taxed him with leaving his party, to commit himſelf into the hands of their enemies. In his anſwer to this imputation, he ſeems to have flattered himſelf that he had made an acquiſition of Pompey, not ſurrendered himſelf into his power; at leaſt, that he had reclaimed or diverted him from the dangerous projects in which he had been lately engaged, and that he thought himſelf likely to ſucceed in the ſame manner with Cæſar: ſo much, that he triumphed in the ſuperiority of his own conduct to that of Cato, who, by his auſterity and vehemence, had alienated the minds of men otherwiſe well diſpoſed to the republic [36].

[33] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 54, 55. Plutarch. in Pompeio, Cæſare, & Craſſo.

[34] As the Decemvirs, Septemvirs, &c.

[35] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. epiſt. 1.

[36] Alluding to the oppoſition which Cato gave to the farmers of the revenue, in their petition for an abatement of their rent. But Cato followed his judgment in this matter; and there is no reaſon to prefer the judgment of Cicero to his.

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"While I," he ſaid, "by a little diſcretion, reclaim, or even diſ-"arm its enemies[37]."

Few perſons were naturally poſſeſſed of more penetration than Cicero, although it will afterwards appear how egregiouſly he was miſtaken on this occaſion; but he choſe not to ſee what checked his vanity, or prevented his enjoying the court which was paid to him by Pompey and Cæſar. His own glory intercepted every other object from his view, and made him the dupe of every perſon who profeſſed to admire him, and ſecretly diſpleaſed with every one who did not pay him, on every occaſion, the expected tribute of praiſe; a deſcription under which Cato, though his moſt ſincere well-wiſher and friend, appears at this time to have fallen.

Cæſar, to the other arts which he employed to ſecure his election, added the uſe of money, which he obtained by joining his intereſt, in oppoſition to Bibulus with that of Lucceius, another of the candidates poſſeſſed of great wealth. He himſelf having ſquandered his fortune, as has been obſerved, was ſtill greatly in debt, and Lucceius willingly furniſhed the money that was given to the People in the name of both. This illegal proceeding, together with the menacing concerts of which he began to be ſuſpected with Pompey and Craſſus, greatly alarmed the friends of the republic. They determined to ſupport Bibulus againſt Lucceius; and, in order to give Cæſar a colleague who might occaſionally oppoſe his dangerous intentions, they even went ſo far as to contribute ſums of money, and to bid for votes as high as their opponents. In this criſis, even Cato owned it was meritorious to bribe[38].

During the dependence of this conteſt, the Senate, by the death of Lutatius Catulus, was deprived of an able member, and the People of a fellow-citizen of great integrity, moderation, fortitude, and

[37] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. epiſt. i.

[38] Sueton. in Caio Cæſare, c. xix. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

ability;

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ability; a model of what the Romans in this age ſhould have been, in order to have preſerved their republic. He partook with Cato in the averſion which Cæſar bore to the moſt reſpectable members and beſt ſupports of the Senate, and would probably have taken part with him likewiſe in the continual efforts he made to preſerve its authority. The ariſtocratical party, notwithſtanding this loſs, prevailed in carrying the election of Bibulus againſt Lucceius; and though they could not exclude Cæſar from the office of Conſul, they hoped, by means of his colleague, to oppoſe and to fruſtrate his deſigns [39].

Cæſar, well aware of their purpoſe, opened his adminiſtration with a ſpeech praiſing unanimity, and recommending good agreement between thoſe who are joined in any public truſt. While he meant to vilify the Senate, and to foſter every diſorderly party againſt them, he guarded his own behaviour, at leaſt in the firſt period of his Conſulſhip, with every appearance of moderation and candour, paid his court not only to leaders of faction, but to perſons of every deſcription, and while he took care to eſpouſe the popular ſide in every queſtion, was active likewiſe in deviſing regulations for the better government of the Empire: ſo that the Senate, however inclined to counteract his deſigns, as calculated to raiſe himſelf on the ruins of the commonwealth, could ſcarcely, with a good grace, oppoſe him in any particular meaſure. He ſet out with a project for the relief of indigent citizens having numerous families, including the veterans and diſbanded ſoldiers of Pompey; propoſing to ſettle them on ſome of the public lands in Italy. He gave out that he expected the concurrence of Cicero in this meaſure, ſent him a meſſage by Balbus [40], with aſſurances *that he meant to conſult with Pompey and himſelf in all*

[39] Plutarch. Appian. Dio. Sueton. &c.

[40] Dio. Caſſ. lib. viii. initio. Plutarch. in Cæſare. In Pompeio, Lucullo, Catone, &c. &c. Sueton. in Cæſare. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

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matters of importance, and *that he had hopes of bringing Craſſus into the ſame mind:* words, from which it is manifeſt that the coalition of theſe perſons was not yet publicly known. "What a fine proſpect "I have before me," ſays Cicero to Atticus; "a perfect union with "Pompey, even with Cæſar if I pleaſe; peace with my enemies, "and tranquillity in my old age." But his heart miſgave him; the honours of his former life recurred to his mind. With his great talents, he was deſtined to tranſmit a more honeſt fame to poſterity, and to become the lamented victim of his country's betrayers, not the deteſted aſſociate of their crimes[41].

This Conſulate is diſtinguiſhed by the paſſing of many laws, particularly this, which was deviſed for the ſettlement of citizens on certain public lands; and therefore known by the title of the Agrarian Law. On this act Cæſar was to reſt his popularity, and his triumph over the Senate. He gave out that he was to make a proviſion for twenty thouſand citizens, without any burden to the revenue. But he well knew that his antagoniſts would perceive the tendency of the law, and not ſuffer it to paſs without oppoſition; and he affected great moderation in the general purpoſe, and in framing every part of his plan; affecting ſolicitude to obtain the conſent of the Senate; but, in reality, to make their oppoſition appear the more unreaſonable and the more odious to the People. He declared, that he did not mean to ſtrip the revenue of any branch that was known to carry profit to the public, nor to make any partial diſtribution in favour of his friends; that he only meant to plant with inhabitants certain unprofitable waſtes, and to provide for a number of citizens, who, being indigent and uneaſy in their circumſtances, filled the city itſelf with frequent diſorders and tumults; and that he would not proceed a ſtep without conſulting the Senate, and perſons of credit and authority in the State.

[41] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. ep. 3.

In

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In a way to ſave theſe appearances, and with theſe profeſſions, Cæſar formed the firſt draught of an act which he brought to the Senate for their approbation, and the ſupport of their authority in propoſing it to the People. It was difficult to find topics on which to oppoſe a meaſure ſo plauſible, and conducted with ſo much appearance of moderation and candour. But the tendency of the act itſelf was evidently not to promote the peace of the commonwealth, but to conſtitute a merit in the party that procured it, and to give power to thoſe who were to be entruſted with its execution.

In great and populous cities indigent citizens are ever likely to be numerous, and would be more ſo, if the idle and profligate were taught to hope for bounties and gratuitous proviſions, to quiet their clamours and to ſuppreſs their diſorders. If men were to have eſtates in the country becauſe they are factious and turbulent in the city, it is evident that public lands, and all the reſources of the moſt proſperous ſtate, would not be ſufficient to ſatisfy their claims.

The commiſſioners appointed for the diſtribution of ſuch public favours would be raiſed above the ordinary magiſtrates, and above the laws of their country. They might reward their own creatures, and keep the citizens in general in a ſtate of dependence on their will. The authors of ſuch propoſals, while they were urging the State and the People to ruin, would be conſidered as their only patrons and friends. "It is not this law I dread," ſaid Cato; "it is "the reward expected for obtaining it."

Odious as the taſk of oppoſition on ſuch difficult ground might appear to the People, this Senator did not decline it. Being aſked his opinion in his turn, he anſwered, That he ſaw no occaſion for the change that was now propoſed in the ſtate of the public lands; and entered on an argument with which he meant to exhauſt the whole time of the ſitting of the Senate, and to prevent their coming to a queſtion. He was intitled, by his privilege as a member in that aſſembly,

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aſſembly, to ſpeak without interruption, and might, if he choſe to continue ſpeaking, perſiſt until all the members had left the houſe. Cæſar ſuſpecting his deſign, and finding it impoſſible otherwiſe to ſilence him, ordered him into cuſtody. The whole Senate inſtantly roſe in a tumult. "Whither go you before the meeting is adjourned?" ſaid Cæſar to Petreius, who was moving from his ſide. "I go," ſaid the other, "into confinement with Cato. With him a priſon is "preferable to a place in the Senate with you." The greater part of the members were actually moving away with Cato, and Cæſar felt himſelf at once ſtript of the diſguiſe of moderation he had aſſumed, and dreaded the ſpirit which he ſaw riſing in ſo numerous a body of men, who, on former occaſions, had maintained their authority with becoming vigour. He had relied on their want of deciſion, and on their ignorance of their own ſtrength. But his raſhneſs broke the charm. He wiſhed that the priſoner would procure ſome friend among the Tribunes to interpoſe; but Cato, ſeeing him embarraſſed, and the Senate engaged in the cauſe, went off in the cuſtody of the Lictor without any ſigns of reluctance. Cæſar immediately recollecting himſelf, and never hurried too far by any paſſion, diſpatched a Tribune of his own party with ſecret directions to reſcue the priſoner; and this being done, the Senators again returned to their places. "I meant," ſaid Cæſar, "to have ſubmitted this law to "your judgment and correction; but if you throw it aſide, the "People ſhall take it up[42]."

Cæſar, upon this occaſion, encreaſed his own popularity, and diminiſhed that of his enemies in the Senate, who were ſuppoſed in this, as in ſome other inſtances, to withſtand with keenneſs every meaſure that was deviſed for the comfort of the People. The imputations caſt out againſt him by Cato and others, were ſuppoſed

[42] Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 1, 2, 3. Plutarch. Sueton. Appian, &c.

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to proceed from malice or cynical prejudices. He found himſelf ſtrong enough to extend his bounty to the People, ſo as to comprehend the lands of Campania, which were hitherto conſidered as unalienable, and the richeſt demeſne of the public, together with a valuable diſtrict near the confluence of the Vulturnus and the Sabbatus, formerly conſecrated to pious uſes. In theſe valuable tracts of land there was ſufficient ſubject for an ample proviſion for the ſoldiers of Pompey, and for the retainers of thoſe who, together with Craſſus and Cæſar himſelf, were propoſed to be commiſſioners for carrying this act into execution.

At the firſt aſſembly of the People, Cæſar propoſed his ſcheme to impropriate the lands of Campania, with the above additions; and firſt of all called on his colleague Bibulus to declare his mind on the ſubject. Bibulus ſpoke his diſſent; and in vehement terms declared, that no ſuch alienation of the public demeſne ſhould be made in his Conſulate. Cæſar next called upon Pompey, though in a private ſtation; and the audience, ignorant of the concert into which theſe leaders had entered, were impatient to hear him on the ſubject of a meaſure which was likely to elevate a ſuppoſed rival ſo high in the favour of the People. To the ſurprize of all who were preſent, Pompey applauded the general deſign, and, in a ſpeech of conſiderable length, diſcuſſed all the clauſes of the act, and with great approbation of each. When he had done ſpeaking, Cæſar, alluding to what had dropt from his colleague, and affecting to fear the interpoſition of force; "Will you ſupport us," he ſaid to Pompey, "in caſe we are attacked?"—"If any one," ſaid the other, "ſhall "lift up a ſword againſt you, I ſhall lift up both ſword and ſhield [43]." Craſſus being called upon, ſpoke to the ſame purpoſe. The concurrence of theſe leaders portended the unanimous conſent of all parties;

[43] Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxviii. c. 5.

and

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and a day being fixed for putting the queſtion, the aſſembly for the preſent adjourned.

To oppoſe a meaſure ſo popular, and from which ſuch numbers had great expectations, no means remained ſo likely to ſucceed as ſuperſtition. To this aid Bibulus accordingly had recourſe, and, by virtue of the authority with which he was veſted, proclaimed a general faſt, and a ſuſpenſion for the preſent year of all the affairs of State. The deſign of this ſuſpenſion, and the extravagant length of time to which it was extended, probably enabled his colleague to treat it with contempt, and to proceed in the deſign of putting his queſtion, as if no ſuch proclamation had been iſſued. The aſſembly was accordingly ſummoned in the temple of Concord. Cæſar, early in the morning, ſecured all the avenues and the ſteps of the portico with an armed force; had Vatinius, one of the Tribunes of the People, who was intirely devoted to his intereſt, and even in his pay [44], ſtationed with this party, in order to take the odium of all violent meaſures on himſelf. Bibulus, however, attended by numbers of the Senate, and three of the Tribunes, who were prepared, by their negative, to put a ſtop to every proceeding, came into the place of aſſembly with a firm countenance; he proteſted againſt the legality of any meeting to be formed in a time of general faſt: but the oppoſite party being in poſſeſſion of the temple, forced him from the ſteps, broke the enſigns of the Lictors, wounded the Tribunes that interpoſed in his defence, and effectually removed all farther obſtruction to their own deſigns. The queſtion then being put, the law paſſed without oppoſition, including a clauſe to oblige every Senator, under pain of exile or death, to ſwear to the obſervance of it.

[44] Cicero in Vatinium. Cæſar was reported to have ſaid at Acquileia, ſome time after this date, when Vatinius was diſappointed of the Edileſhip, that he had no buſineſs with honours, being intent on money only; and that he was paid for all his ſervices in the Tribunate.

This

This oath was probably a ſnare laid by Cæſar for the moſt reſolute of his opponents, like that which was formerly laid by Marius, on a like occaſion, for Metellus Numidicus, and by which that virtuous citizen was actually for ſome time removed from the commonwealth [45].

Metellus Celer, the late Conſul, together with Cato and Favonius, were likely to have fallen into this ſnare. They at firſt declared their reſolution not to ſwear to the obſervance of any ſuch ruinous law; but, on mature conſideration, they became ſenſible that in this they were ſerving the cauſe of their enemies. "You may have "no need of Rome," ſaid Cicero to Cato, "and may go into exile "with pleaſure; but Rome has need of you. Give not ſuch a "victory to her enemies and your own." Upon theſe conſiderations it was determined to comply [46].

Bibulus, on the day following that of his violent expulſion from the aſſembly of the People, aſſembled the Senate, complained of the outrage he had received, and ſubmitted the ſtate of the republic to their conſideration. But even this aſſembly, though conſiſting of above ſix hundred of the moſt powerful citizens of Rome, not deſtitute even of courage, were declined in their ſpirit, and became averſe to exertions of vigour. They were occupied with their villas, their equipages, and the other appurtenances of wealth and of high rank. "They appear," ſays Cicero upon this occaſion, "to think "that even if the republic ſhould periſh, they will be able to pre-"ſerve their fiſh-ponds."

The Conſul Bibulus, even Cato, though far removed from any ambiguity of conduct, ſaw no poſſibility of reſiſting the torrent. The firſt retired to his own houſe, and from thence forward, during

[45] See b. ii. c. 6.

[46] Plutarch. in Catone. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

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the remainder of the year, did not appear in any public place. Cato abſented himſelf from the Senate[47].

While Cæſar engroſſed the full exerciſe of the conſular power, Bibulus was content with iſſuing his edicts or manifeſtos in writing, containing proteſts, by which he endeavoured to ſtop all proceedings in public affairs on account of the religious faſt, or continuation of holidays, which he had inſtituted to reſtrain his colleague. In theſe writings he publiſhed violent invectives againſt Cæſar, in which, among other articles, he charged him with having had a part in the conſpiracy of Cataline[48]. The Tribune Vatinius, in return, iſſued a warrant to commit the Conſul Bibulus to priſon; and, in order to ſeize him, attempted to break into his own houſe; but in this he was foiled, and the parties continued, during the remainder of this Conſulate, in the ſame ſituation with reſpect to each other.

In dating the year, inſtead of the Conſulate of Cæſar and Bibulus, it was called by ſome wag the Conſulate of Julius and Cæſar[49]. This able adventurer, though ſuſpected of the deepeſt deſigns, went ſtill deeper in laying his meaſures for the execution of them than his keeneſt opponents ſuppoſed. He found means to tie up every hand that was likely to be lifted up againſt himſelf; as thoſe of Pompey and Craſſus, by their ſecret agreement, of which the articles were gradually diſcloſed in the effect. He confirmed to Pompey all the acts of his adminiſtration in Aſia, and, by putting him on the commiſſion for dividing the lands of Campania, and for ſettling a colony at Capua, gave him an opportunity, which the other earneſtly deſired, of providing for many neceſſitous citizens of his party. He flattered Craſſus ſufficiently, by placing him on the ſame commiſſion, and by admitting him to a ſuppoſed equal participation of that political conſequence which the Triumvirs propoſed to ſecure by

[47] Cicero pro Sextio. Plutarch. in Catone.
[48] Sueton. in C. Cæſare.
[49] Ibid. c. 20. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxvii. c. 6. 8.

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their union. He gained the Equeſtrian order, by granting a ſuit which they had long in dependence, for a diminution of the rents payable by the revenue farmers in Aſia [49]. Theſe he reduced a third; and with that order of men acquired the character of great liberality and candour. He himſelf was the only perſon who in appearance was not to profit by theſe arrangements. He was occupied, as his retainers pretended, in ſerving the republic and in promoting his friends; was the general patron of the diſtreſſed and the indigent, and had nothing to propoſe for himſelf.

With his conſent, and under his authority, Fufius, one of the Prætors, and Vatinius, one of the Tribunes, obtained two laws, both of them equitable and ſalutary: the firſt, relating to the uſe of the ballot in the Comitia, or aſſembly of the People: the other, relating to the challenge of parties in the nomination of judges or juries. The introduction of the ballot in political queſtions had greatly weakened the influence of the ariſtocracy over the determinations of the People; and reſolutions were frequently carried in this manner, which no party, nor any particular order of men, were willing to acknowledge as their meaſure. The Nobles imputed the abſurd determinations to the majority that was formed by the People, and theſe ſometimes retorted the imputation. To leave no doubt in ſuch matters for the future, Fufius propoſed that the orders of Patrician, Equeſtrian, and Plebeian, ſhould ballot apart [50]. This regulation had ſome tendency to reſtore the influence of the ſuperior claſſes.

Vatinius propoſed that in criminal actions, when the judges were drawn by lot, the defendant and proſecutors might, in their turns, challenge, or ſtrike off from the liſt, perſons to whom they took a particular exception [51].

[49] Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 1. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. p. 435.

[50] Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 8.

[51] Ibid. Appian.

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Cæſar himſelf was buſy in deviſing new regulations to reform the mode of elections, and to improve the forms of buſineſs in ſome of the public departments. By one of his acts the prieſts were to be elected agreeably to the former laws of Atius and Domitius, with this difference, that candidates might be admitted even in abſence. By another of his acts, regular journals were to be kept in the Senate and in the aſſemblies of the People, and all their proceedings recorded for the inſpection of the public. By a third, perſons convicted of treaſon were ſubjected to new penalties, and governors of provinces to additional reſtraints in the exerciſe of their power. Such officers were not allowed to receive any honorary gift from their provinces, until their ſervices being conſidered at Rome, were found to have intitled them to a triumph [52]. They were reſtrained from encroaching on the right of any State or principality beyond the limits of their province. They were obliged to leave copies of their books and of their acts at two of the principal towns in their government [53], and, immediately upon their arrival at Rome, to give in a copy of the ſame accounts to the treaſury. They were doomed to make reſtitution of all ſubjects received in extortion, not only by themſelves, but by any of their attendants [54].

With theſe acts Cæſar adorned his Conſulate, and in ſome meaſure diſcountenanced the party which was diſpoſed to traduce him. He is, nevertheleſs, accuſed of having ſtolen from the treaſury, to which he had acceſs in the capacity of Conſul, bars of gold weighing three thouſand pondo, and of having concealed the theft by ſubſtituting braſs gilt, and of the ſame form, in its place [55].

[52] Cicero ad Att. lib. v. ep. 16. & lib. vi. ep. 7.

[53] Cicero ad Famil. lib. ii. ep. 17. & lib. v. ep. 20.

[54] Ibid. in Vatinium pro Sext.

[55] Sueton. in Jul. c. 54. Cæſar is ſaid to have ſold the gold bullion he brought from Spain at 3000 H. S. or about 25l. of our money. This will make his ſuppoſed theft about 75,000l.

Whatever

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Whatever foundation there may have been for this report, it ſoon appeared that Cæſar had objects of a more ſerious nature, could copy, on occaſion, the example of Pompey, and, in his manner, cauſe what was perſonal to himſelf to be propoſed by others, whom he might be free to ſupport or diſavow according to the reception which his propoſal met from the public. It cannot be doubted that he now conceived the deſign of bringing a military force to ſupport his pretenſions in the city. Hitherto kingly power being odious at Rome, whoever had aſpired to it had always periſhed in the attempt, and the mere imputation, however ſupported, was fatal. The moſt profligate party among the populace were unable or unwilling to ſupport their demagogues to this extent; and the People in general became jealous of their moſt reſpectable citizens, when it appeared that merit itſelf approached to monarchical elevation. Marius, by the continued poſſeſſion of the higheſt offices, and by the ſupreme command of armies, had acquired a ſpecies of ſovereignty which he knew not how to reſign. Cinna came into partnerſhip with Marius, and wiſhed to govern after his deceaſe. Sylla, to avenge his own wrongs and thoſe of his friends, to cut off a profligate faction, and reſtore the republic, took poſſeſſion of the government. He led his army againſt uſurpers, and had the power to become himſelf the moſt ſucceſsful uſurper, as he was put in poſſeſſion of a ſovereignty which he no doubt might have retained. So far he was a model to every ambitious adventurer, and pointed out the only means which could inſure to a ſingle perſon the ſovereignty of Rome. Cataline, with his accomplices Lentulus and Cethegus, had vainly attempted to overturn the State, or to uſurp its government, by means of a profligate party among the populace or citizens of deſperate fortune [56]. Cæſar

[56] Speaking of the imaginary danger to a State of being overturned by the rabble; we might as much fear, ſaid a witty writer of the preſent age, that a city would be drowned by the overflowing of its own kennels.

was

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was become head of the ſame party; but an army like that of Sylla, a convenient ſtation, and the reſources of a great province, were neceſſary to ſupport the conteſt, and to carry it againſt his rivals, as well as againſt the republic itſelf, to a favourable iſſue.

The republic had taken many precautions to prevent the introduction of military power at Rome. Although the functions of State and of war were entruſted to the ſame perſons, yet the civil and military characters, except in the caſe of a Dictator, were never united at once in the ſame perſon. The officer of State reſigned his civil power before he became a ſoldier, and the ſoldier was obliged to lay aſide his military enſigns and character before he could enter the city; and if he ſued for a triumph in his military capacity, muſt remain without the walls till that ſuit was diſcuſſed. The command of armies and of provinces in the perſon of any officer was limited to a ſingle year at a time, at the end of which, if it were not expreſsly prolonged, it was underſtood to expire, and to devolve on a ſucceſſor named by the Senate.

That no leader of a party might have an army at hand to overawe the republic, no military ſtation was ſuppoſed to exiſt within the limits of Italy. The purpoſe, however, of this precaution was in ſome meaſure fruſtrated by the near ſituation of a province in which an army was kept within the Alps. Italy was underſtood to extend only from the ſea of Tarentum to the Arnus and the Rubicon: beyond theſe boundaries, on the northweſt, all thoſe extenſive and rich tracts on both ſides of the Apennines, and within the Alps, which now make the dutchies of Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, Milan, the States of Piedmont and Venice, with the dutchy of Carniola, and the whole of Lombardy, were conſidered, not as a part of Italy, but as a province termed the Ciſalpine Gaul, and, like the other Roman provinces, was to be held by a military officer, ſupported by an army.

This

This then was the moſt commodious ſtation at which a political adventurer might unite the greateſt advantages, that of having an army at his command, and that of being ſo near the capital as to be able, by ſurpriſe, to occupy the ſeats of government whenever his deſigns were ripe for ſuch an attempt.

Sylla had an army devoted to his pleaſure; but, having the ſeas of Aſia and Ionia to paſs in his way to Italy, could not, without giving an alarm from a great diſtance, and without putting his enemies on their guard, approach to the city. He therefore, when he had this object in his view, made no ſecret of his purpoſe.

Cæſar had formed a deſign on the commonwealth, and acted from his original diſpoſition, and a deliberate intention to make himſelf maſter of it; not urged, like Sylla, by great provocations, and the ſuggeſtion of ſingular circumſtances. He arranged his meaſures like the plan of a campaign, which he had the ability to digeſt, and the patience to execute with the greateſt deliberation. He propoſed to make himſelf maſter of an army at the gates of Rome, and to have the reſources of a province contiguous to the capital. He ſecured the poſſeſſion of theſe advantages by an unprecedented prolongation of the uſual appointments for five years; ſo that the People themſelves could not, without a breach of faith, recal their grant upon any ſudden alarm of the improper uſe he might propoſe to make of their favours.

The Ciſalpine Gaul, or that part of Italy which lay from the Rubicon to the Alps, was peculiarly ſuited to the purpoſe of Cæſar. But the diſtribution of the provinces was ſtill within the prerogative of the Senate; and the provincial governments were filled by their appointment, in purſuance of an expreſs regulation aſcribed to Caius Gracchus, and known, from his name, by the title of the Sempronian Law[34]. Cæſar had ever been at variance with the greater part of

[34] Lex Sempronia, Vid. b. ii. c. 3.

the

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the Senate. In the office of Prætor he had been ſuſpended by their authority. In his preſent office of Conſul he had ſet them at open defiance. He had no proſpect of being able to obtain from them the choice he had made of a province; and the propoſal to put him in poſſeſſion of the Ciſalpine Gaul for a term of years, joined to the preceding parts of his conduct, would have given a general alarm, and opened at once the whole extent of his deſign.

It was neceſſary, therefore, in order to obtain this object, to ſet aſide the authority of the Senate, and to pocure his nomination by ſome degree of ſurprize. The Tribune Vatinius accordingly, upon a rumour that the Helvetii, or the nations inhabiting from Mount Jura to the Alps, were likely to cauſe ſome commotion on the frontier of Gaul, moved the People to ſet aſide the law of Sempronius, and, by virtue of their own ſupreme power, to name Cæſar as Proconſul of the Ciſalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years, with an army of three legions. The ſenatorian party, as might have been expected, were greatly alarmed at this propoſal. They vainly, however, hoped to evade it by ſubſtituting another appointment for Cæſar in place of this province. It was propoſed to make him ſuperintendant of the public foreſts throughout the empire; a charge which, though not, in our acceptation of the word, a province, was however, like every other public department in that empire, known by this name. This ſubſtitute for the government of the Ciſalpine Gaul was thought to be the better choſen, that it neither implied nor required the command of an army, and was to withhold the engine of military power from a perſon ſo likely to abuſe it. This weak attempt, however, againſt ſo able an adverſary, only tended to expoſe the meaning of thoſe by whom it was made, and by ſhewing to the Senate their own weakneſs, hurried them into conceſſions which perhaps might have been otherwiſe avoided. In order that Cæſar might not owe every thing to the People and nothing to them, they extended his command at once

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to both ſides of the Alps. On the one ſide of theſe mountains he had a ſtation from which to overawe the city: on the other, he had a great extent of territory, and a theatre of war on which he might form an army and inure them to ſervice. The Senate, ſeeing he had already, by a vote of the People, obtained the firſt with an army of three legions for five years; and imagining that it was no longer of any uſe to oppoſe him; or hoping to occupy his attention, or to wear out the five years of his command in wars that might ariſe beyond the Alps, they joined to his province on the Po that of the Tranſalpine Gaul, with an additional legion. In this manner, whether from theſe or any ſimilar reaſons, it is affirmed by ſome of the hiſtorians [55], that the Senate even outran the People in conceſſions to Cæſar; and to this occaſion is referred the memorable ſaying of Cato: "Now you have taken to yourſelves a king, and have placed "him with his guards in your Citadel [56]."

Cæſar, at the ſame time, on the motion of the Tribune Vatinius, was empowered to ſettle a Roman colony on the Lake Larius at Novum Comum, with full authority to confer the privilege of Roman citizens on thoſe he ſhould ſettle in this place. Having obtained the great object of his Conſulate, in his appointment for a term of years to the command of an army within the Alps, he no longer kept any meaſures with the Senate, nor allowed them any merit in the advantages he had gained. He was aware of their malice, he ſaid, and had prevailed in every ſuit, not by their conceſſion, but in direct oppoſition to their will. Though capable of great command of temper, and of the deepeſt diſſimulation when in purſuit of his object, he appears, on this and other occaſions to have had a vanity which he indulged, in braving the world when his end was obtained [57]. As he inſulted the Senate when no longer depending on

[55] Sueton. in Jul. Cæſare, c. 22.
[56] Plutarch. in Catone. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxviii. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.
[57] Sueton. in Cæſare, lib. ii. c. 22.

their concurrence for any of his objects, ſo he no longer diſguiſed his connection with Pompey and Craſſus, or the means by which, in his late meaſures, the concurrence of theſe rivals had been obtained.

As ſuch combinations and cabals generally have an invidious aſpect to thoſe who are excluded from them, the Triumvirate, for ſo it began to be called in deteſtation and irony [56], notwithſtanding the popularity or influence enjoyed by thoſe who had formed it, became an object of averſion and general abuſe [57]. They were received at all public places with groans and expreſſions of hatred. An actor, performing on the public theatre, applied to Pompey a ſentence of reproach, which occurred in the part he was acting. The application was received with peals of applauſe, and called for again and again [58].

The edicts that were publiſhed by Bibulus in oppoſition to Cæſar were extolled, and received with avidity. The places of the ſtreets at which they were poſted up were ſo crowded with multitudes aſſembled to read them, that the ways were obſtructed. Cæſar and Pompey endeavoured to leſſen the effect of theſe edicts in ſpeeches to the People, but were ill heard. Pompey loſt his temper and his ſpirit, and ſunk in his conſideration as much as Cæſar advanced in power. It became manifeſt, even to the People, that Cæſar had procured their conjunction for his own conveniency [59]; but Pompey himſelf probably felt that he was too far advanced to recede.

[56] The titles of Duumvirs, Triumvirs, and ſo on, were the deſignations of legal commiſſions at Rome acting under public authority; ſuch title was given to the private coalition of theſe adventurers in mere irony.

[57] Cicer. ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 16.

[58] "To our misfortune thou art great." He was called upon to repeat theſe words again and again innumerable times. "The time will come when thou ſhalt rue this "State;" likewiſe repeated with peals of applauſe, &c. Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epiſt. 19. Val. Max. lib. vi. c. 2.

[59] One of the ſentences, ſo much applauded in its application to him at the theatre, was, "Eandem virtutem tempus veniet cum "graviter gemes."

The Senate, and all the moſt reſpectable citizens of Rome, though unanimous in their deteſtation of the deſign that was formed by Cæſar, Pompey, and Craſſus, to diſpoſe of the republic at their pleaſure, yet either were, or believed themſelves, unable to cope with the power of ſo many factions united. Cæſar, in order to hold by force what he gained by artifice, and by ſome degree of ſurpriſe, filled the ſtreets with his retainers in arms, and ſhowed, that, in caſe of any attempt to recal what had been ſo weakly given up to him, he was in condition to reſiſt, and to lay the city in blood. If he were driven from Rome, he had provided within the Alps an army of two or three complete legions, with which he could maintain his province, or even recover his poſſeſſion of the city. Every one cenſured, complained, and lamented; but there was little concert, and leſs vigour, even among the members of the Senate.

Cato, with his declared diſapprobation of the late meaſures, was reduced to the ſingle expedient of aſſiſting Bibulus in drawing up the edicts or manifeſtos againſt the proceedings of Cæſar, which were, at this time, received with ſo much avidity by the People.

Cicero now declined taking part in any affair of State; but being known for an advocate, was courted in this capacity by many citizens, who had affairs in dependence before the courts of juſtice; and apprehending an attack which was likely to be made upon himſelf, on account of the tranſactions of his Conſulate, he avoided, as much as poſſible, giving offence to any of the parties which divided the commonwealth. The ſtorm was to be directed againſt him by Publius Clodius, under whoſe animoſity to the government of the Nobles, and to Cicero in particular, it was perceived for ſome time to be gathering [61].

This buſtling profligate having, in the former year, in order that he might be qualified for Tribune of the People, got himſelf

[61] Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epiſt. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

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adopted into a Plebeian family, could not obtain the neceſſary ratification of the deed of adoption in the aſſembly of the Curiæ, until his cauſe was eſpouſed by Cæſar, who ſeems to have taken his part, in reſentment of ſome inſinuations thrown out againſt himſelf by Cicero in pleading for M. Antonius, his late colleague in the Conſulate. Antonius being, as has been mentioned, on account of his adminiſtration in Macedonia, accuſed of extortion, was defended by Cicero, who took that occaſion to lament the ſtate of the republic, brought under ſubjection as it was by a cabal which ruled by violence, and in contempt of the law. Cæſar was greatly provoked: "This perſon," he ſaid, "takes the ſame liberty to vilify the reputation of others, "that he takes to extol his own;" and upon thoſe expreſſions, conſidered as a warning of the part which Cicero was likely to take in his abſence, he determined not to leave him at the head of the Senatorian party to operate againſt him. His deſtruction might be effected merely by expediting the formality of Clodius's adoption into a Plebeian family, to qualify him for Tribune of the People[**]; and Cæſar, on the very day in which he received this provocation from Cicero, permitted the act of adoption to paſs in the aſſembly of the Curiæ.

Pompey likewiſe concurred in executing this deed of adoption for Clodius, and aſſiſted in the quality of Augur to carry it through the religious forms. Clodius, in the mean time, gave out, that he had no deſign on the Tribunate, but was ſoliciting an embaſſy to Tigranes king of Armenia. Cicero was ſo much blinded by this pretence, that he was merry in his letter to Atticus on the abſurdity of Clodius, in having himſelf degraded into a Plebeian, merely to qualify him to appear at the court of Tigranes. He was merry likewiſe with his not being put on the commiſſion of twenty for the execution of Cæſar's Agrarian Law. "Strange!" he ſaid, "that he who was

[**] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xxxviii. c. 10. &c. Plutarch. in Cicerone. Cicero pro domo ſua. de Provinciis Conſularibus, &c.

"once

"once the only male creature in Cæsar's house, cannot now find one "place among twenty in this list of his friends[63]."

The more effectually to impose upon Cicero and his friends, Cæsar affected to believe, that the intention of Clodius was against himself, and taken up with the animosity of a person who had already attempted to dishonour his house[64]; and he pretended to dispute the validity of his adoption, and of consequence, his qualification to be elected a Tribune. Pompey joined in the same vile artifice. "Nay," says Cicero, upon hearing of their pretended opposition to Clodius, "this is perfect tyranny. Only send the proper officers to "me, and I will give my affidavit, that Pompey told me himself he "had assisted as Augur in passing that decree"."

With these transactions the year of Cæsar's Consulate drew to a close. He ratified his treaty with Pompey, by giving him his daugther Julia in marriage. During the former part of the year, this lady had been promised to Servilius Cæpio, and had been of great use to her father, by securing the services of Cæpio against Bibulus. Servilius, on his disappointment, was pacified by the promise of Pompey's daughter. Cæsar himself married the daughter of Calpurnius Piso, who, together with Gabinius, the creature of Pompey, was destined to succeed in the Consulate, and who was, by this alliance, secured in the interest of Cæsar. "Provinces, armies, and king-"doms," said Cato on this occasion, "are made the dowries of wo-"men[65], and the empire itself an appendage of female prostitu-"tion."

In this situation of affairs, and among parties who dealt in impositions and artifices, as well as in open and daring measures, some particulars are recorded, which, to gain our belief, require some acquaintance with the manners of the times. Vettius, a citizen of some

[63] Cicer. ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 7.
[64] In the intrigue with Cæsar's wife.
[65] Cic. ad Att. epist. 10. Vul. 12.
[66] Plutarch. in Catone.

note,

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note, who had been employed by Cicero in the time of his Conſulſhip to gain intelligence of the Cataline conſpiracy, now himſelf appeared as the author of a plot, of which the origin and the iſſue were matter of various conjecture. Knowing that Curio, a young man of high rank, and a declared enemy of Cæſar, was on bad terms likewiſe with Pompey, he told him in confidence, that he himſelf had determined to aſſaſſinate Pompey, and propoſed to Curio to join with him in that deſign. The young man communicated the matter to his father, and the father to Pompey, who laid it before the Senate. Vettius being examined in the Senate, at firſt denied any intercourſe with Curio, but afterwards confeſſed, that he had been drawn into a conſpiracy with this young man, with Lucullus, Brutus, Bibulus, and ſome others, who had formed a deſign on Pompey's life.

It was ſtrongly ſuſpected, that Cæſar had employed Vettius to frame this impoſture, in order that he might engage ſome of thoſe perſons in a criminal correſpondence; and that it was intended, as ſoon as he had laid ſome foundation for an imputation of guilt againſt them, that he ſhould, with a party of ſlaves, armed with daggers, put himſelf in the way of being taken; that he ſhould at firſt deny the plot, but afterwards ſuffer himſelf to be forced, by degrees, to confeſs, and to declare his pretended accomplices; that this plan was diſconcerted by the early intimation which Curio gave to his father, before all the circumſtances intended to give it an air of probability were in readineſs.

It was ſcarcely poſſible, however, that Cæſar ſhould have committed his reputation to the hazard of detection in ſo infamous a project. He laid hold of it indeed with ſome avidity, and endeavoured to turn it againſt his opponents. After Vettius had been examined before the Senate, and was committed to priſon for farther examination, Cæſar preſented him to the People, and brought him into the roſtra, to declare what he knew of this pretended bloody deſign. The priſoner

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priſoner repeated his confeſſion, but varied in the account of his accomplices, particularly in leaving Brutus out of the liſt; a circumſtance likewiſe, in the ſcandal of the times, imputed to the partiality of Cæſar, and conſidered as proof of his clandeſtine relation to this young man. Vettius was remanded to priſon, and a proceſs commenced againſt him on the ſtatute of intended aſſaſſination. A trial muſt have probably diſcloſed the whole ſcene, and for this reaſon was ſaid to have been prevented, by the ſudden death of Vettius, who was ſuppoſed to have been ſtrangled by order of Cæſar in priſon [67].

U. C. 695. L. Calpurnius Piſo Ceſonianus, A. Gabinius Nepos.

By the influence of Pompey and Cæſar, Gabinius and Piſo were elected Conſuls; and, by their connivance, Clodius became Tribune of the People. The aſcendant they had gained, however, was extremely diſagreeable to many of the other officers of State, and even to ſome of the Tribunes. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Memmius Gemellus joined in an accuſation againſt Cæſar, late Conſul, for proceedings in office contrary to law and religion. Cæſar, for ſome time, affected to join iſſue with him on theſe queſtions, and to ſubmit his cauſe to judgment; but apprehending delay and trouble, without any advantage from ſuch an inquiry, he pleaded his privilege as a perſon deſtined for public ſervice; and accordingly, without ſtaying to anſwer this charge, withdrew from the city, and continued to make his levies, and to aſſemble his army in the ſuburbs of Rome.

In this poſture of affairs, one of the Quæſtors, who had ſerved under Cæſar in his Conſulſhip, was convicted of ſome miſdemeanor [68]; and the oppoſite party, as if they had of a ſudden broke the chains in which they were held, commenced ſuits againſt all the tools that had been employed by him in his late violent meaſures. Gabinius had been charged with bribery by Caius Cato, then a young man.

[67] Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epiſt. 24. Sueton. in Cæſare, c. 20.
[68] Sueton. in Nerone, c. ii. & in Cæſare, c. 23.

But

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But the Prætor, whoſe lot it was to exerciſe the juriſdiction in ſuch caſes, being under the influence of Pompey, evaded the queſtion. Caius Cato complained to the People, and, having ſaid that Pompey uſurped a Dictatorial power, narrowly eſcaped with his life[69].

Vatinius was accuſed before the Prætor Memmius, who willingly received the accuſation; but all proceedings were ſuddenly ſtopped by the interpoſition of Clodius in the capacity of Tribune; and the attention of the People and of the Senate ſoon came to be more intirely occupied with the deſigns of this factious adventurer.

The ruin of Cicero appears to have been the principal object which Clodius propoſed to himſelf in entering on the office of Tribune; and this, though affecting to be of the popular party, he purſued chiefly from motives of perſonal animoſity and reſentment. Cicero had given evidence againſt him on his trial, and afterwards in the Senate made him the object of his wit and invective[70]. He is generally repreſented by Cicero as effeminate and profligate, void of diſcretion or prudence. On the preſent occaſion, however, he ſeems to have managed with conſiderable ſteadineſs and addreſs. He acted evidently in concert with Cæſar, Pompey, and Craſſus; but probably had not from them any particular direction in what manner he was to proceed.

Ever ſince the ſummary proceedings which were employed againſt the accomplices of Cataline, the danger of this precedent was a favourite topic with the popular faction. Clodius profeſſed that the object of his Tribunate was to provide a guard againſt this danger. He began with paying his court to different parties and different orders of men in the republic, by propoſing acts favourable to each; and he ſtated his motion for the better ſecuring of the People againſt arbitrary executions, which he meant in the end to apply to Cicero, as but one of many regulations intended by him for the benefit of the public, and which he joined with ſome acts of gratification to

[69] Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. i. epiſt. 2.

[70] Cicer. ad Att. lib. 1.

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private perſons. He gained the preſent Conſuls by procuring them lucrative appointments, at the expiration of their year in office; to Piſo, Macedonia including Achaia; to Gabinius, Syria with a conſiderable addition beyond the uſual bounds of the province[71]. He gained the indigent part of the People by an act to remit all the debts which were due for corn at the public granaries; and by ordering, for the future, the diſtributions from thence to be made gratuitouſly[72]. He, at the ſame time, procured another act extremely agreeable to many of the citizens, for reſtoring and increaſing the number of corporations which had been aboliſhed about nine years before, on account of the troubles to which they gave riſe.

The meeting of corporate bodies, in a city ſo much addicted to faction and tumult, had been the cauſe of frequent diſorders. As perſons, affecting to govern the State, endeavoured to gain the People by indulging their paſſions for idleneſs and pleaſure, with games, theatrical entertainments, combats of gladiators, and the baiting of wild beaſts; ſo the head of every corporate body, though upon a ſmaller ſcale, had his feaſts, his entertainments, and ſhews, forming his party of retainers, on occaſion, to maintain his pretenſions by force. The renewal, therefore, of ſuch eſtabliſhments, a meaſure which carried to every tradeſman in his ſtall the feeling and conſequence of a Craſſus, a Pompey, and a Cæſar, affecting to govern the world in their reſpective ways, was greedily adopted by the lower People. And Clodius took the opportunity of the firſt popular meetings to awaken and to direct their zeal to his own purpoſe[73]. He even gained a conſiderable party in the Senate by affecting to circumſcribe the diſcretionary power of the Cenſors over this body. Many of the members had reaſon to dread the Cenſorial animadverſions, and were pleaſed with an act which he obtained to provide, that, for the future, no one could be ſtruck off

[71] Plutarch. in Cicerone.

[72] Pædianus in Piſoniana. Dio. lib. xxxviii. Cicer. pro Domo ſua.

[73] Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 13. Cicero in Piſonem, c. 4. & Aſcanius, ibid.

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the rolls of the Senate without a formal trial, and the concurrence of both the Cenſors [74].

Joined to ſo many arts practiſed to reconcile different parties to the meaſures he affected to take for the ſecurity of the People's liberties, Clodius promulgated his law of proviſion againſt arbitrary executions, and gave it a retroſpect which was undoubtedly meant to comprehend the ſummary proceedings which had been held againſt Cethegus and Lentulus in the Conſulate of Cicero. While the ſubject was in dependence, he thought of two circumſtances that might operate againſt him, and which he was therefore determined to prevent. One was, the practice of recurring to the celeſtial auſpices by which the proceedings of the People were ſometimes ſuſpended; and the other was, the oppoſition which he might expect from Cato, who was likely to conſider the cauſe of the Senate and the republic as involved in that of the magiſtrate, who had preſerved the State by executing their decrees. To ſecure himſelf againſt the firſt, he procured an edict to prohibit all perſons from obſerving the heavens while the People were deliberating on any affair of State; and to obviate the ſecond, he thought of a pretence for a temporary removal of Cato from Rome.

In the preceding Conſulate, Cato, though armed as he was ſolely with the reputation of integrity, unable to prevent the progreſs of a ruinous faction affecting popular meaſures, yet, by his unremitted oppoſition, he forced them, on occaſion, to ſhow what Pompey in particular was extremely deſirous to conceal, that they prevailed by corruption and force, not by what they pretended, the free choice of their fellow-citizens. Clodius, foreſeeing a like oppoſition, and poſſibly a diſappointment in his deſign againſt Cicero, if Cato continued at Rome, deviſed a commiſſion to employ him in foreign ſervice. Ptolomy, king of Cyprus, had put a perſonal affront on Clodius, by refuſing to pay his ranſom when taken by pirates on the coaſt of Aſia near to that iſland. He now took an opportunity to be revenged

[74] Ibid. See a ſummary of theſe acts. Cicero pro Sextio, from c. 15 to c. 28.

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on him, by procuring an act to forfeit his kingdom and his treasure; and by making Cato the instrument of his revenge, he proposed to free himself at the same time from the interruption which this citizen was likely to give to his projects at Rome[75].

At an interview with Cato, Clodius had the impudence to pretend great admiration of his virtue; told him, that the commission to reduce Cyprus into the form of a province was solicited by many; but that he knew of none who, by his faithfulness and integrity, was so well qualified for the trust as Cato, and that he meant to propose him to the People. "That," said Cato, "I know is a "mere artifice; not an honour, but an indignity intended to me." "Nay," said Clodius, "if you do not go willingly, you shall go "by force;" and on that very day moved and obtained his nomination from the People. Lest the affair of Cyprus should not detain him a sufficient time, he was farther charged in his commission to repair to Byzantium to restore some exiles, and to quiet some troubles which had arisen at that place.

Cæsar and Pompey likewise concurred in procuring this commission to Cato, in order to remove a powerful support from the Prætors Memmius and Domitius, whose proposal to repeal all the acts of Cæsar was yet in dependence.

The storm was now prepared to fall upon the magistrate who had presided in the suppression of Cataline's party, and no man had any doubt of its direction. Cato, before he left Rome, seeing Cæsar in possession of the gates with an army, and ready, in the event of any tumult, under pretence of quieting disorders, to enter the city by force, and to seize on the government; and apprehending, that the cause in dependence, however just, was altogether desperate, earnestly exhorted Cicero, rather to yield and to withdraw from the city, than to bring matters to extremities in the present state of the republic[76].

[75] Cicero pro Sextio. [76] Plutarch. in Catone.

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Cicero, however, was for ſome time undecided. Having ſecured the ſupport of L. Ninius Quadratus, one of the Tribunes, he propoſed to obſtruct the proceedings of his enemy, and to give a negative to all his motions. Afterwards, upon aſſurances from Clodius, that the purpoſe of the act was altogether general, and had no ſpecial relation to himſelf; he was prevailed on not to divide the college of Tribunes, or to engage his friends in the invidious taſk of giving a negative to a law, that was intended merely to guard the People againſt arbitrary proceedings[77].

Clodius, having obtained this advantage, no longer made any ſecret of his deſign againſt Cicero, and boaſted of the concurrence of Cæſar and Pompey. In this neither of theſe profeſſed friends of Cicero denied the imputation[78]; but excuſed themſelves in private by pleading, that while their own acts of the preceding year were ſtill queſtioned by the Prætor, it was neceſſary for them to keep terms with ſo violent a Tribune[79]; but Pompey, together with this apology for his preſent conduct, gave Cicero the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of future protection. "This Tribune," he ſaid, "ſhall kill me before "he injure you." It is not credible that Pompey then meant to betray him; it was ſufficiently baſe that, in the ſequel, he did not keep his word. On the contrary, when his aid came to be moſt wanted by his injured friend, he retired to the country, under pretence of buſineſs; and being at his villa near Alba, where Lentulus, Lucullus, and many of the moſt reſpectable Senators repaired to him with the warmeſt intreaties in behalf of a perſon to whoſe eloquence and panegyric he owed ſo many of his honours, he coldly referred them to the ordinary officers of State for protection, ſaying, That as a private citizen he could not contend with a furious Tribune at the head of an armed People[80].

[77] Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 14.
[78] Cicero poſt Reditum in Senatum.
[79] Ibid. pro Sextio, c. 17 & 18.
[80] Cicero in Piſonem.

In

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In the mean time, the Conſul Gabinius, though under the abſolute direction of Pompey, promoted the attack againſt Cicero, and checked every attempt that was made in his favour. When the Equeſtrian order, together with numbers of the moſt reſpectable citizens from every quarter of Italy, crowded in mourning to Rome, and preſented a memorial to the Senate in his behalf; and when the members propoſed to take mourning, and to intercede with the People, Gabinius ſuddenly left the chair, broke up the meeting, went directly from thence to the aſſembly of the People, where he threw out injurious inſinuations againſt the Senate, and mentioned the meetings which had been held by the Equeſtrian order, as riotous and ſeditious tumults; ſaid, that the Knights ought to be cautious how they revived the memory of that part which they themſelves had acted in the violent meaſures which were now coming under review, and which were ſo likely to meet with a juſt retribution from the People.

In this extremity Cicero attempted to ſee Pompey in perſon at his country-houſe; but while the ſuppliant was entering at one door, this treacherous friend withdrew at another[80]. No longer doubting that he was betrayed by a perſon on whom he had ſo fully relied, he began to be agitated by a variety of counſels and projects. He was invited by Cæſar to place himſelf in the ſtation of lieutenant in his province of Gaul; and, in that public character abroad, to take refuge from the ſtorm that was gathering againſt him in Italy. But this, from a perſon who had ſo much contributed to raiſe the ſtorm, was ſuppoſed to proceed from a deſign to inſult or betray him; or at beſt to reduce him to a ſtate of dependence on himſelf. Being attended by a numerous body of citizens, chiefly of the Equeſtrian order, who had taken arms in his cauſe, he ſometimes had thoughts

[80] Plutarch, in Cicerone.

of

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of defending himſelf by force; at other times, he deſpaired of his fortunes, and, as appears from his letters, propoſed to kill himſelf; and was diverted from this intention only by the entreaties and anxious care of his friends.

Such was the ſtate of affairs, when Clodius aſſembled the People to paſs the act he had framed againſt arbitrary executions. He had ſummoned them to meet in the ſuburbs, that Cæſar, who on account of his military command was then excluded from the city, might be preſent. This artful politician being called upon among the firſt to deliver his opinion; with an appearance of moderation, and unwillingneſs to bear hard on any perſon to whom the law might apply, referred the People to his former declarations; ſaid, that every one knew his mind on the ſubject of arbitrary executions; that he approved the act which was now propoſed, as far as it provided againſt ſuch offences for the future; but could not approve of its having a retroſpect to any tranſaction already paſſed.

While Cæſar thus, in delivering his own opinion, affected to go no farther than conſiſtency and a regard to his former conduct ſeemed to require, he permitted or directed his party to go every length with Clodius, and meant either to ruin Cicero, or force him to accept of protection on the terms that ſhould be preſcribed to him.

When the general law had paſſed, there was yet no mention of Cicero; and his enemies might have ſtill found it a difficult matter to carry the application to him; but he himſelf, in the anguiſh of his mind, anticipated the accuſation, went forth in mourning to the ſtreets, and implored mercy of every citizen with an aſpect of dejection, which probably did not encourage any party to eſpouſe his cauſe. He was frequently met in this condition, and inſulted by Clodius, who walked in the ſtreets, attended by an armed rabble; and he determined at laſt to abandon the city. Being eſcorted by a company of his friends, he paſſed through the gates in the middle of the

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the night on the first of April, took the road of Lucania, and intended to have made his retreat into Sicily, where the memory of his administration in the capacity of Quæstor, and the continued effects of his patronage at Rome, were likely to procure him a favourable reception [81]. But Clodius, immediately upon his departure, having carried a special attainder, by which, in the language of such acts, he was interdicted the use of fire and water; and by which every person within five hundred miles of Italy was forbid, under severe penalties, to harbour him; Virgilius, the Prætor of Sicily, though his friend, declined to receive him. He turned from thence to Brundisium, passed into Macedonia, and would have fixed his residence at Athens; but apprehending that this place was within the distance prescribed to him by the act of banishment, he went to Thessalonica in his way to Cyzicum. Here he had letters, that gave him intimation of some change in his favour, entertained some prospect of being speedily recalled, and accordingly determined to wait the issue of these hopes.

We have better means of knowing the frailties of Cicero, than perhaps is safe for the reputation of any one labouring under the ordinary defects of human nature. He was open and undisguised to his friends, and has left an extensive correspondence behind him. Expressions of vanity in some passages of his life, of pusillanimity in others, escape him with uncommon facility. Being at least of a querulous and impatient temper, he gives it full scope in his exile, perhaps not more from weakness, than from design to excite his friends to redouble their efforts to have him restored. He knew the value of fortitude as a topic of praise, and might have aspired to it; but would it not, he may have questioned, encourage his party to sleep over his wrongs? In any other view, his complaints resemble more the wailings of an

[81] Vid. Actionem in Verrem.

infant,

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infant, or the ſtrains of a tragedy compoſed to draw tears, than the language of a man ſupporting the cauſe of integrity in the midſt of undeſerved trouble. "I wiſh I may ſee the day," he writes to Atticus, "in which I ſhall be diſpoſed to thank you for having "prevailed upon me not to lay violent hands on myſelf; for it "is certainly now matter of bitter regret to me that I yielded to "you in that matter[82]."

In anſwer to the ſame friend who had chid him for want of fortitude, "What ſpecies of evil," he ſays, "do I not endure? Did "ever any perſon fall from ſo high a ſtate? in ſo good a cauſe? with "ſuch abilities and knowledge? with ſo much public eſteem? with "the ſupport of ſuch a reſpectable order of citizens? Can I re-"member what I was, and not feel what I am? Stript of ſo many "honours, cut off in the career of ſo much glory, deprived of ſuch "a fortune, tore from the arms of ſuch children, debarred the view "of ſuch a brother, dearer to me than I was to myſelf, yet now "debarred from my preſence, that I may ſpare him what he muſt "ſuffer from ſuch a ſight, and myſelf what I muſt feel in being "the cauſe of ſo much miſery to him. I could ſay more of a load "of evils which is too heavy for me to bear; but I am ſtopped by "my tears[83]."

From the whole of this correſpondence of Cicero in his exile, we may collect to what degree the unjuſt reproaches which he had ſuffered, the deſertion of thoſe on whom he relied for ſupport, the dangers to which he left his family expoſed, affected his mind. The conſciouſneſs of his integrity, even his vanity forſook him; and his fine genius, no longer employed in the Forum or in the Senate, or buſied in the literary ſtudies which amuſed him afterwards[84] in a more calamitous time of the republic, now, by exaggerating the diſ-

[82] Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. epiſt. 3.
[83] Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. epiſt. 10.
[84] See the Book of Tuſcular Queſtions.

treſs

treſs of his fortunes, preyed upon himſelf. It appeared from this, and many other ſcenes of his life, that although he loved virtuous actions, yet his virtue was accompanied with ſo unſatiable a thirſt of the praiſe to which it intitled him, that his mind was unable to ſuſtain itſelf without this foreign aſſiſtance; and when the praiſe which was due to his Conſulate was changed into obloquy and ſcorn, he ſeems to have loſt the ſenſe of good or of evil in his own conduct or character; and at Theſſalonica, where he fixed the ſcene of his exile, ſunk or roſe in his own eſteem, as he ſeemed to be valued or neglected at Rome[ss].

[ss] Vid. Cicero ad Att. lib. iii.

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Cæſar takes Poſſeſſion of his Province.——Migration of the Helvetii.——Their Defeat.——War with Arioviſtus.——Return of Cæſar for the Winter into Italy.——Great Concourſe of Citizens to his Quarters.——Motion to recal Cicero.——Diſorders that followed upon it.——Conſultations of Pompey and Cæſar.——Augmentation of the Army in Gaul.——Second Campaign of Cæſar.——Operations on the Aiſne.——On the Meuſe and Sambre.——Battle with the Nervii.——Succeſsful Attempt for the Reſtoration of Cicero.——Controverſy relating to his Houſe.——Repeated Riots of Clodius.——Trial of Milo.

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WHILE the tranſaction which terminated in the exile of Cicero was ſtill in dependance, Cæſar, although, by aſſuming the military character, he had diſqualifiſed himſelf to take any part in civil affairs, had actually gone from the city and embodied his legions, yet he ſtill remained in the ſuburbs of Rome to obſerve the iſſue of that buſineſs, and to direct the conduct of his party. He thought himſelf too much intereſted in the event to leave it intirely under the direction of Pompey, with whom his own connection was precarious, and might be of ſhort duration. He was inclined to ruin, if he could, not gain, a perſon whoſe talents and character made him of ſo much conſequence to the parties who contended for power in the State. Having failed in his attempt to gain him as a dependant, and to carry him as part of his own retinue into Gaul, he ſecretly promoted the deſings of Clodius, and employed his own retainers and friends againſt him, until he ſaw the purpoſe accompliſhed.

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The provinces of which Cæſar had obtained the command, comprehended, as has been obſerved, under the denomination of the two Gauls, conſiderable territories on both ſides of the Alps. The Ciſalpine Gaul, which was joined to Italy, extended to Lucca, not far from Piſa on one ſide of the Apennines, and to the Rubicon, not far from Ariminum on the other. Beyond the Alps, the whole territory from the Mediterranean to the Rhine and the Meuſe, was known by the name of Gaul. A part of this tract, which was bounded by the Rhône, the mountains of Auvergne, the Garonne, and the Pyrenees, was already a Roman province, including, together with Languedoc and Dauphiné, what, from its early ſubjection to the Romans, is ſtill named Provence.

The remainder of the country was divided into three principal parts, occupied by the Aquitani, the Celtes, and the Belgæ, nations differing in language, eſtabliſhments, and cuſtoms. The firſt diviſion extended from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; the ſecond from the Garonne to the Seine; and the third from thence to the Meuſe and the Scheld.

In each of theſe tracts there was a multiplicity of ſeparate cantons and independent communities, of which Cæſar had occaſion to enumerate no leſs than four hundred. Even the ſmalleſt of theſe communities, by his account, was broken into parties and factions, who had ſeparate objects, and were engaged in oppoſition to each other. The People, in general, were held in a ſtate of dependance by two ſeparate orders of men, whoſe condition and character may account for the manifold diviſions and animoſities that took place in their country. One order was eccleſiaſtical, compoſed of the Druids, who, by their profeſſion, had the keeping of ſuch myſteries, and the performance of ſuch rites as were then in uſe; and, having over their fellow-citizens the claim to a hierarchy, had, among themſelves, in

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the various pretenſions to preferment and rank in their own order, continual ſubjects of competition, jealouſy, and quarrels.

The other order was intirely military, and conſiſted of perſons whoſe principal diſtinction aroſe from the number of their armed adherents; and who, therefore, vied with each other in the multitude of their retainers, or in the force of their parties [1].

The country, we learn, in general, was interſperſed with what are called towns, and what were, in reality, ſafe retreats, or places of ſtrength. It abounded in corn and cattle, the reſources of a numerous people; armies were collected, and political aſſemblies were ſtatedly, or occaſionally called: but how the people were accommodated, or in what degree they were ſupplied with the ordinary productions of mechanic or commercial arts, is no where deſcribed.

In theſe particulars however, as they were probably leſs ſkilful than the Italians, ſo they ſurpaſſed the Germans, to whom they yielded in the reputation of valour; and they were now in reality on the eve of becoming a prey to the rapacity and ferocity of the one, or to the ambition, refined policy, and ſuperior arts of the other.

Among parties, who were already ſo numerous, and likely to be divided indefinitely by family or perſonal jealouſies, Cæſar was about to find the occaſions, which he undoubtedly ſought for, of raiſing his reputation in war, of enriching himſelf and his dependants, and of forming an army inured to ſervice, and attached to himſelf. While he was yet in Italy, he had intimation of a wonderful project formed by the Helvetii, natives of the tract which extends from the Jura to the Alps, and of the vallies which divide thoſe mountains, to quit their own country in order to exchange it for a better ſettlement, in a leſs inclement region, on the lower and more fertile plains of Gaul.

[1] Cæſar de Bell. Gall. lib. vi. c. 10—20.

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They had taken, for this purpoſe, an exact account of their own numbers in every canton, and muſtered no leſs than three hundred and fifty-eight thouſand ſouls, of whom ninety-two thouſand were warriors, or men fit to bear arms. To put this multitude in motion, a great apparatus of proviſions, of horſes, and of carriages was neceſſary; and they allotted two years for the neceſſary preparations. This time was now elapſed, and the ſwarm began to diſlodge on the twenty-fifth of March of the year in which Cæſar was to take poſſeſſion of his province. On receiving the alarm, he ſet out from Italy, and with haſty journies arrived at Geneva, where, to prevent ſurpriſe, he broke down the bridge of the Rhône, and took other meaſures to preclude the acceſs of ſtrangers to his province.

In the mean time the Helvetians ſent a pacific meſſage, deſiring, that they might be allowed to paſs the Rhône, and giving aſſurances that they would abſtain from every ſort of hoſtility on their march through the Roman province. Cæſar, in order to gain time, affected to take their requeſt into conſideration, promiſed to give them an anſwer by the middle of April; and in this manner amuſed them, while he aſſembled the legion, that was diſperſed in different parts of the province, and ordered new levies to be made with the greateſt diſpatch. At the ſame time, he fortified the banks of the river, from the Lake of Geneva, to the narrow paſs[1] at which the Rhône enters between the Jura and the Vuache, and from thence running under cliffs and ſteep mountains, renders the acceſs from Helvetia to Gaul either impracticable or eaſily obſtructed.

Being thus prepared for his defence, he, on the return of the Helvetian deputies, gave them for anſwer, That the Romans never allowed ſtrangers to paſs through their country; and that if any attempt were made on his province, he ſhould repel it by force. Upon receiving this anſwer, the Helvetians, though too late, endeavoured

[1] Fort l'Ecluſe.

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to effect the paſſage of the Rhône, and made repeated attacks, either where the river was fordable, or where it admitted the uſe of rafts or of boats, but were repulſed in every attempt, and were at laſt obliged to turn to the right, where, by the conſent of the Sequani, their neighbours in that part of the country, they paſſed over the Jura into Gaul.

Cæſar, probably not more alarmed for the ſafety of his province, than deſirous to render it a ſcene of action, determined to obſerve the migrations of this enemy, and to ſeize the occaſion they furniſhed him of forming his troops to ſervice. For this purpoſe he himſelf, in perſon, repaſſed the Alps, and without any regard to the limitations of his commiſſion, which reſtricted his military eſtabliſhment to three legions, ordered additional levies, and with the forces aſſembled near Aquileia, returned to his northern province. In this march he met with oppoſition from the inhabitants of the mountains, who endeavoured to obſtruct his way: but he had traverſed the country of the Allobroges, and paſſed the Rhône above its confluence with the Soane[a], when he had intelligence that the Helvetii, having cleared the paſſes of Jura, and marched through the country of the Sequani, were arrived on the Soane; and although they had hitherto, agreeably to their ſtipulations with the natives, abſtained from hoſtilities, that they threatened the nations inhabiting beyond this river with fire and ſword.

Upon application made to him for protection from the natives inhabiting between the Soane and the Loire, this willing auxiliary continued his march; and being informed, that of the Helvetii, who had moved in four diviſions (this being the number of their cantons), the three firſt had already paſſed the Soane; and that the fourth diviſion being to follow, yet remained on the nearer bank of the river, he marched in the night with three legions, ſurpriſed

[a] Then the Arar.

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this rear-diviſion; and, having put many of them to the ſword, forced the remainder to take refuge in the neighbouring woods. CHAP. VI.

As ſoon as the main body of Cæſar's army arrived on the Soane, he conſtructed a bridge, and paſſed that river in his way to the enemy. The Helvetians, ſenſible of their loſs in the late action, and alarmed at the rapidity of his motions, he having executed in one day the paſſage of a river which had detained them above ninety days, ſent a deputation to treat with the Roman Proconſul, and to obtain, if poſſible, his permiſſion to execute their project of a new ſettlement on amicable terms. They offered, in caſe they were allowed to ſit down in quiet, to leave the choice of the place to himſelf; bidding him remember, at the ſame time, that "the arms of the Helvetii had, "on former occaſions, been felt by the Romans. That the recent "fate of a ſingle canton taken by ſurpriſe ought not to flatter him "too much: that the Helvetians had learned from their fathers to "rely more on valour than on artifice or on negociation; but that they "did not wiſh to have their preſent migration ſignalized with any "maſſacres, nor their new ſettlement ſtained with Roman blood."

To this meſſage, Cæſar replied, "That he could recollect to have "heard of inſults which had been offered to the Romans by their "nation, and to which they now probably alluded: that he likewiſe "had more recent provocations which he knew how to reſent: "nevertheleſs, if they meant to comply with his demand, to repair "the injuries they had done to the Allobroges[3] and to the Edui[4], "and to give hoſtages for their future behaviour, that he was will-"ing to grant them peace."

Upon this reply the Helvetian deputies withdrew, ſaying, That it was the practice of their countrymen to receive, not to give hoſtages; and both armies moved on the following day: the Helvetians, in

[3] Inhabitants of what is now the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy.

[4] Occupying the country between the Soane and the Loire.

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ſearch of ſome quarter where they might ſettle without interruption; and Cæſar, to obſerve their motions, and to reſtrain them from plundering the country of his allies. Both continued on the ſame route during fifteen days, with no more than an interval of five or ſix miles between the front of one army and the rear of the other.

On this march Cæſar's cavalry, having raſhly engaged themſelves on unfavourable ground, received a check; and he himſelf, being obliged to follow the courſe of the Soane, by which he received his proviſions, was likely to loſe ſight of the enemy, when he had intelligence, that they had taken poſt at the foot of a hill, about eight miles in his front, and ſeemed to have formed a reſolution to receive him, in that poſition, if he ſhould chuſe to attack them. Having examined the ground on which they were poſted, and obſerving, that the height in their rear was not by nature inacceſſible, nor ſufficiently ſecured againſt him, he diſpatched Labienus in the night at the head of two legions, with orders to poſſeſs himſelf of the eminence, and to fall down from thence on the enemy's rear whenever he ſaw them attacked by himſelf in front. Labienus accordingly got poſſeſſion of the hill, and Cæſar advanced towards the foot of it to occupy the attention of the enemy, and to attack them in front. But the purpoſe of this diſpoſition was fruſtrated by the miſinformation of an officer of horſe, who, being advanced before the army, reported, that the enemy ſtill appeared on the height, and that Labienus probably had failed in his attempt to ſeize it. Cæſar, diſconcerted by this information, made a halt, in which he loſt ſo much time as to give the enemy an opportunity to decamp, and to retire in ſafety. He nevertheleſs continued his purſuit for one day longer, and at night encamped about three miles in their rear. But being obliged, on the following day, to alter his route in order to receive a ſupply of proviſions, the enemy believed that he was retreating, and began to purſue in their turn. He halted on a riſing ground to receive them,

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placed his new levies with the baggage on the higher ground, and the choice of his army on the declivity towards the plain. Here the enemy advancing to attack him, after an obſtinate engagement which laſted from one in the afternoon till night, were defeated with the ſlaughter of about two hundred thouſand of their people; and the remainder, amounting to no more than one hundred and thirty thouſand ſouls, reduced to deſpair by the ſenſe of their loſſes, and the want of ſubſiſtence, ſurrendered at diſcretion. Cæſar ordered them back into their own country, charging the Allobroges to find them ſubſiſtence, until they ſhould be able to provide for themſelves. The Boii however, a part of this unfortunate migration, were received by the Edui, who, to gain this acceſſion of people, allotted part of their own lands to accommodate theſe ſtrangers[s].

At the end of this firſt operation of Cæſar, while great part of the ſummer yet remained, another ſervice on which to employ his army ſoon preſented itſelf. The nations who inhabited the banks of the Soane and the Loire, being ſenſible of the deliverance they had received from a ſtorm, which, by the uncertainty of its direction, alarmed every quarter of Gaul, ſent deputies to congratulate the Roman general on his late victory, and to propoſe that they might hold, under his protection, a general convention of all their ſtates. The object of their meeting, as it ſoon appeared, was to obtain ſome relief from the common oppreſſion they underwent from the tyranny of Arioviſtus, a German chief, who, when the Gauls were at war among themſelves, had been invited as an auxiliary to one of the parties, and had obtained the victory for his allies; but took for the reward of his ſervices poſſeſſion of one third of their territory, which he beſtowed on his own people, and aſſumed for himſelf the ſovereignty of the whole. His force was daily augmented by the

[s] Cæſ. de Bell. Gal. lib. i. c. 28, 29.

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continual arrival of more emigrants from Germany; ſo that, from fifteen thouſand men, with whom the Chief had arrived, his followers had multiplied to an hundred and twenty thouſand. To accommodate this numerous people, he had recently made a demand of another third of the territory of the Sequani, and was extending his poſſeſſions from the neighbourhood of the Rhine to the Soane. Moſt of the nations on this tract had been obliged to ſubmit to a contribution levied by theſe ſtrangers, and to give hoſtages for the regular payment of it.

The unfortunate nations, who, by truſting to the protection of a barbarous prince, had expoſed themſelves to this calamity, now applied for relief to another power, whoſe pretenſions in the end were likely to be equally dangerous to their freedom. Senſible of the hazard to which they expoſed their hoſtages by entering into any open concert againſt the Germans, they made their application to Cæſar in ſecret, and found him ſufficiently willing to embrace every opportunity of rendering his province a theatre of action to his army, and of renown to himſelf. He ſent without delay a meſſage to Arioviſtus, deſiring to have a conference with him on affairs that concerned the general intereſts of Gaul. This haughty chieftain replied with diſdain, "That if the Roman general meant to have "an interview with him, his place of reſidence was known; that "he neither could truſt himſelf in the quarters of Cæſar, without an "army, nor would be at the expence of aſſembling one, merely for "the ſatisfaction of a conference with him."

Cæſar renewed the meſſage with an expreſs requiſition that the hoſtages of the Edui ſhould be reſtored; that Arioviſtus ſhould abſtain from hoſtilities againſt this People, or againſt any other ally of the Romans; and that he ſhould not ſuffer any more of his countrymen to paſs the Rhine.

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To this meſſage Arioviſtus replied, That he had conquered the poſſeſſions which he held in Gaul, and that he knew of no power who had a right to direct him in the uſe of his conqueſts; that whoever attacked him ſhould do ſo at his peril; and that Cæſar, if he thought proper, might try the ſpirit of his people; they were ready to receive him, and had not for fourteen years ſlept under any cover.

Cæſar, not to ſeem backward in accepting this challenge, and in compliance with a maxim which he often obſerved with ſucceſs, *That his blows ſhould anticipate his threats, and outrun the expectations of his enemy*, advanced upon the Germans before they could think him in condition to act againſt them. For this purpoſe, without communicating his deſign to any perſon of his own army, he repaſſed the Soane, and aſcended by the courſe of the Douſe to Veſontio, now Beſançon, a place of ſtrength, which he underſtood Arioviſtus meant to ſeize, as the principal reſort of his forces.

Here, for the firſt time, his intention of making war on the Germans began to be ſuſpected in his own army; and the legions, taking their account of the ſtrength and ferocity of that enemy from the report of the Gauliſh auxiliaries, were greatly alarmed. Many citizens of diſtinction who had crowded to the ſtandard of Cæſar, as to a place of victory and honour, now, under various pretences, applied for leave to retire. Their example ſpread a kind of panic in the army, and both officers and men muttered their reſolution not to obey, if they ſhould be ordered upon what they were pleaſed to conſider as a ſervice ſo unreaſonable and wild.

Cæſar, being thus called upon to exert that undaunted courage and maſterly eloquence by which he was diſtinguiſhed on many occaſions, aſſembled all the officers of his army, and reprimanded them for attempting to penetrate the deſigns of their general, or for pretending to queſtion the propriety of his motions. The matter in diſpute with Arioviſtus, he ſaid, might be terminated in an

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amicable manner. This chieftain had very lately made advances of friendſhip to the Romans, had been favourably received, and there was no reaſon to believe that he would now wantonly provoke their reſentment. "But if he ſhould, of whom are you afraid? Of a "wretched remnant of the Cimbri or Teutones, already vanquiſhed "by Marius? Of a people confeſſedly inferior to the Helvetians, "whom you have ſubdued? But ſome of you, I am told, in or-"der to diſguiſe your own fears under the affectation of wiſdom, "talk of difficulties in the ways by which you are to paſs, and of "the want of proviſions which you are likely to ſuffer. I am not "now to learn from ſuch perſons as you what I owe to my truſt, "nor to be told that an army muſt be ſupplied with proviſions. "But our allies are ready to ſupply us in greater quantities than we "can conſume, and the very country we are to paſs is covered with "ripe corn. As for the roads, you ſhall ſpeedily ſee and judge of "them. I am little affected with what I hear of a deſign to aban-"don me in caſe I perſiſt in this expedition. Such inſults, I know, "have been offered to commanders, who, by their avarice or by their "miſcarriages, had forfeited the regard or the confidence of their "troops; what will happen to me a little time will diſcover. I "meant to have made a longer halt at this place, but ſhall not defer "giving you an opportunity to ſhow, whether regard to your duty, or "the fear of a ſuppoſed enemy, is to have the greateſt effect on your "minds. I mean to-morrow, at two in the morning, to decamp, "and ſhall proceed, if no other part of the army follows me, with "the tenth legion alone."

This ſpeech had a very ſudden effect. The tenth legion, having been formerly diſtinguiſhed by their general, felt this expreſſion of confidence as an additional motive to deſerve it, and ſent a deputation of their officers to return their thanks. The whole army ſoon vied in excuſes for their late miſbehaviour, and in aſſurances of their reſolution

reſolution to ſupport their general in any ſervice on which he might be pleaſed to employ them. He accordingly decamped at the hour appointed; and making a circuit of forty miles, to avoid ſome difficulties which lay on the direct road, after a continual march of ſeven days, in which he was conducted by Divitiacus, a native of Gaul, he arrived within twenty-four miles of the German quarters.

Upon this unexpected arrival, Arioviſtus, in his turn, thought proper to deſire a conference with Cæſar. He propoſed that they ſhould meet on horſeback, and be attended only by cavalry. In this part of his army, which was compoſed chiefly of Gauliſh horſe, Cæſar was weak. But, not to decline the propoſal that was made to him, he mounted his ſuppoſed favourite legion on the horſes of the Gauls, and with this eſcort came to the place appointed for the conference.

It was an eminence in the midſt of a ſpacious plain, about halfway between the two armies. The leaders, each attended by ten of his officers, met at the top of the hill. Their eſcorts drew up at the diſtance of two hundred yards on each ſide.

Cæſar began the conference, by reminding Arioviſtus of the honours recently beſtowed upon him by the Roman Senate, who ordered him the uſual preſents, and gave him the title of king. "The "Edui," he ſaid, "were the allies of the Roman People; they had "formed this connection in the height of their proſperity, and when "they were ſuppoſed to be at the head of the Gauliſh nations; "that it was not the cuſtom of the Romans to let nations ſuffer by "their alliance, but to render it in every inſtance, to the party who "embraced it, a ſource of proſperity and honour. He therefore "renewed his former requiſition, that Arioviſtus ſhould not make "war on the Edui, or on any nation in alliance with Rome; that he "ſhould remit their tribute, and releaſe their hoſtages; and, if he "could not ſend back into their own country ſuch of the Germans

"as

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" as were already on this ſide of the Rhine, that he ſhould at leaſt " prevent the arrival of any more from that quarter."

In anſwer to theſe propoſitions, Arioviſtus replied, That he had been invited into Gaul by the natives of this country; that he had done them ſervices, and had exacted no more than a juſt reward; that, in the late quarrel betwixt them and himſelf, the Gauls had been the aggreſſors, and had ſuffered no more than the uſual conſequences of a defeat; that to indemnify him for his loſſes, they had ſubjected themſelves to a tribute, and had given hoſtages for the regular payment of it. " Am not I too," he ſaid, " by your own account, " in alliance with the Romans? Why ſhould that alliance, which is " a ſafeguard and an honour to every one elſe, be a loſs and a miſ- " fortune to me? Muſt I alone, to preſerve this alliance, reſign the " advantage of treaties, and remit the payments that are due to me? " No; let me rather be conſidered as an enemy than as an ally upon " theſe conditions. My countrymen have paſſed the Rhine, not to " oppreſs the Gauls, but to defend their leader. If ſtrangers are to " be admitted here, the Germans, as the firſt occupiers, have a right " prior to that of the Romans. But we have each of us our pro- " vince. What do Roman armies on my territory? I diſturb no " poſſeſſion of yours. Muſt I account to you likewiſe for the uſe " which I make of my own?"

To this pointed reply Arioviſtus ſubjoined a reflection, which ſhowed that he was not unacquainted with the ſtate of parties at Rome. " I know," he ſaid, " that the Romans are not intereſted " in this quarrel, and that, by cutting you off, I ſhould perform an " acceptable ſervice to many of your countrymen. But I ſhall take " no part in your internal diviſions. Leave me; make war where " you pleaſe; I ſhall not interpoſe in any matter which does not con- " cern myſelf."

Cæſar

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Cæſar continued to plead the engagements which the Romans had contracted with many of the nations who now claimed their protection. "If conqueſt could give any right to poſſeſſion," he ſaid, "we are the firſt conquerors. We have long ſince ſubdued the Arverni; but it is not our practice to enſlave every nation we vanquiſh, much leſs to forſake thoſe we have once patronized." While he yet ſpoke the German horſe had advanced, and even began to throw darts, which made it expedient for Cæſar to break up the conference. He accordingly withdrew, giving ſtrict orders to his people not to return the inſults of the enemy.

In a few days after this conference, the German chieftain propoſed another perſonal interview, or, if that were declined, deſired that ſome perſon of confidence ſhould be ſent with whom he might treat. Being gratified in the ſecond part of this alternative, but intending no more by this requeſt than a mere feint to lull the enemy into ſome degree of ſecurity, he pretended to take offence at the quality of the perſons who were ſent to him, ordered them into cuſtody, and on the ſame day put his army in motion upon a real deſign, which ſhowed that, barbarian as he was, he underſtood the plan, as well as the execution, of military operations. Obſerving that the Romans derived their ſubſiſtence from the country behind them, he made a movement, by which he paſſed their camp, took a ſtrong poſt about eleven miles in their rear, and by this means intercepted their ordinary ſupply of proviſions.

Cæſar for many days ſucceſſively endeavoured, by forming on the plain between the two armies, to provoke the enemy to a battle; but having failed in this purpoſe, he was obliged to divide his army, and to place it in ſeparate poſts, which he fortified, in order to recover a communication with the country behind him. He learned that the Germans had borne with great impatience the defiances he had given them; but that they were reſtrained from fighting by the predictions

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of their women, who foretold that their own people would be defeated, if they ſhould hazard a battle before the change of the moon.

The Germans, notwithſtanding the awe in which they ſtood of this prediction, endeavoured to diſlodge one of the diviſions of Cæſar's army, and, having failed in that attempt, were afterwards attacked by the Romans in their camp, and defeated with great ſlaughter. Arioviſtus himſelf, with the remains of his followers, fled to the Rhine, about fifty miles from the field of battle, paſſed that river in a ſmall canoe; numbers of his people periſhed in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of thoſe who remained were overtaken, and put to the ſword by Cæſar's cavalry.

In this manner Cæſar concluded his firſt campaign in Gaul. And laid the foundation of his future conqueſts in that country, by ſtating himſelf as the protector of its native inhabitants againſt the Helvetii and the Germans, two powerful invaders who were likely to ſubdue it. He placed his army for the winter among the nations whom he had thus taken under his protection, and ſet out for Italy, under pretence of attending to the affairs of his province on that ſide of the Alps; but more probably to be near to Rome, where he had many political intereſts at ſtake, friends to ſupport, and enemies to oppoſe, in their canvas for the offices of State. His head quarters were fixed at Lucca, the neareſt part of his province to Rome; and that place began to be frequented by numbers who were already of his party, or who deſired to be admitted into it, and with whom he had previouſly made his own terms in ſtipulating the returns they were to make for the ſeveral preferments in which he undertook to aſſiſt them.

At the election of Conſuls for this year, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was joined with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, of whom the latter had, in the capacity of Tribune, diſtinguiſhed himſelf as an inſtrument of the moſt dangerous factions. Lentulus had lately attached

tached himself intirely to Pompey, and, by the influence of this patron, probably now prevailed in his election. He had been Edile in the Conſulate of Cicero, and had taken a vigorous part in thoſe very meaſures for which Cicero was now ſuffering in exile [6]. He was likely to favour the reſtoration of that injured citizen, and upon this account was now the more acceptable to Pompey, who, having an open rupture with Clodius, was diſpoſed to mortify him by eſpouſing the cauſe of his enemies.

Clodius, ſoon after his late victory over Cicero, greatly roſe in his preſumption, and, forgetting that he had prevailed more by the connivance of Pompey and Cæſar, and by the ſupport of their friends, than by any influence of his own, ventured to ſet Pompey himſelf at defiance, to queſtion the validity of his acts in the late ſettlement of Aſia, to ſet the young Tigranes, ſtill the priſoner of Pompey, at liberty [7], and propoſed to reſtore him again to his kingdom. In the debates which aroſe on theſe meaſures in the aſſembly of the People, Pompey had the mortification to find that the ſarcaſms of Clodius were received by the audience in general with applauſe, as well as by the partizans of the Senate, in particular, with marks of ſatisfaction. Chiefly governed by vanity and impatient of obloquy, he abſented himſelf from the public aſſemblies during the remainder of Clodius' term in office, and was ready to embrace every meaſure by which he might be revenged of that factious Tribune, or regain his own credit with the more reſpectable claſs of the citizens [8].

Encouraged by this diviſion among their enemies, the majority of the Senate, who juſtly conſidered the cauſe of Cicero as their own, had ventured, on the twenty-ninth of October, while Clodius was yet in office, to move for his recal. Eight of the Tribunes concurred

[6] Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 22.
[7] Vid. Aſcon. Padian. in Orat. pro Milone.
[8] Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer. p. 475 & 476.

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in urging this motion, and it was rejected only in conſequence of the negative of Ælius Ligur, one of the college whom Clodius had prepared to act this part, and whom he was ready to ſupport by force, if the oppoſite party ſhould perſiſt in their motion [9].

Upon the election of the new Conſuls and Tribunes for the following year, better hopes of ſucceſs were entertained by the friends of Cicero. Lentulus declared that the reſtoration of this exile ſhould be the firſt object of his adminiſtration; and that he would not fail to move it on the day that he entered on office. Metellus too, the brother-in-law of Clodius, though always inclined to favour the popular faction, could not in this matter ſet himſelf in oppoſition to Pompey, and declared his intention to concur with the Conſul [10]. Milo, Sextius, and ſix more of the Tribunes, with all the Prætors except Appius Claudius, the brother of Publius, declared their intention to take an active part in forwarding this meaſure.

Encouraged by theſe appearances, Cicero left his retreat at Theſſalonica, and arrived at Dirrachium, before the twenty-fifth of November, to be at hand to conſult with his friends on the ſteps that were to be previouſly taken. Mean time the Conſuls-elect had their provinces aſſigned. Lentulus was deſtined to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, and Metellus in the farther province of Spain. Both were amply gratified in every article of their appointments, in order to confirm them in the intereſt of the Senate: but Cicero expreſſed great anxiety leſt theſe conceſſions ſhould be found premature; and, being made before the new Tribunes entered on office, or could have their voice in theſe deſtinations, was afraid leſt it might alienate their affections from his party, and render them leſs zealous to move for his recal. The Conſul Lentulus, notwithſtanding, kept his word; and, on the firſt of January, the day of his entering on office, moved the Senate

U. C. 696. P. Corn. Lentulus Spinther, Q. Cæcil. Metell. Nepos.

[9] Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 23.

[10] Ibid. ep. 24.

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to reſolve that Cicero ſhould be immediately recalled from baniſhment; that all perſons oppoſing his return ſhould be declared enemies to their country; and that if the People ſhould be diſturbed by violence in paſſing this decree, it ſhould, nevertheleſs, be lawful for the exile to avail himſelf of it [11].

This motion was received in the Senate with general applauſe. Eight of the Tribunes were zealous in ſupport of it. On the contrary, two members of the college, Numerius and Serranus, were gained by Clodius to oppoſe it. Serranus, however, could venture no farther at this meeting than to plead for a delay. But he was prevailed upon, during the intervening night, to interpoſe his negative, and the motion accordingly could proceed no farther in the Senate.

It was reſolved, notwithſtanding, to propoſe a law to the People for Cicero's reſtoration; and a day was fixed for this purpoſe. Early in the morning of that day Fabricius, one of the Tribunes in the intereſt of the exile, endeavoured to occupy the place of aſſembly with an armed force, but found that Clodius, with a numerous troop of gladiators, was there before him. A conflict enſued, in which Fabricius, together with Ciſpius, another of the Tribunes who came to his aſſiſtance, with all the party of the Senate, were driven from the Forum.

Clodius, at the head of his gladiators, with ſwords already ſtained in blood, purſued his victory through the ſtreets. The temple of the Nymphs, in which were kept ſome public records which he wiſhed to deſtroy, was ſet on fire [12]; the houſes of Milo and Cæcilius the Prætor were attacked. "The ſtreets, the common ſewers, "the river," ſays Cicero, "were filled with dead bodies, and all "the pavements were ſtained with blood." No ſuch ſcene had been

[11] Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 26. & in Orat. poſt reditum.
[12] Cicero pro Milone, 27 Parad. 4 d. Haruſpicum Reſponſio 27.

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acted ſince the times of Octavius and Cinna, when armies fought in the city for the dominion of empire [14].

Quintus Cicero eſcaped by hiding himſelf under the dead bodies of his own ſervants, who were ſlain in defending his houſe. The Tribune Publius Sextius actually fell into the hands of his enemies, received many wounds, and was left for dead among the ſlain. This circumſtance, however, alarmed the party of Clodius not leſs than it alarmed his opponents. The odium of having murdered, or even violated the perſon of a Tribune, was likely to ruin their intereſt with the People; and they propoſed to balance this outrage by putting to death Numerius, another Tribune, who, being of their own ſide, ſhould appear to be killed by the oppoſite party; but the intended victim of this ridiculous and ſanguinary artifice, receiving information of their deſign, avoided being made the tool of a party at the expence of his life, and made his eſcape [15].

After ſo ſtrange a diſorder, parties for ſome months, mutually afraid of each other, abſtained from violence. The Tribune Milo commenced a proſecution againſt Clodius for his crimes; but it was for ſome time eluded by the authority of Appius Claudius, brother of the accuſed, who was now in the office of Prætor; and the courts, when actually called, were repeatedly diſperſed by the armed party of gladiators, with which Publius Clodius himſelf infeſted every public place. It was vain to oppoſe him without being prepared to employ a ſimilar force, and Milo accordingly had recourſe to this method. He purchaſed a troop of gladiators, and of Beſtiarii, or baiters of wild beaſts, the remainder of thoſe who had been employed by the Ediles Pomponius and Coſconius, and who were now in the market for ſale. He ordered the bargain to be ſecretly ſtruck, concealing the name of the buyer, leſt the oppoſite party, ſuſpecting the deſign, ſhould interpoſe to prevent him.

[14] Orat. pro Sext. c. 35, 36. 38. [15] Cicero pro Sextio.

So

So provided, Milo ventured to encounter with Clodius. Their parties frequently engaged in the ſtreets, and the populace, fond of ſuch ſhews, enjoyed the ſpectacle which was preſented to them in every corner of the city [16].

While the diſorders which thus aroſe from the diſputes relating to Cicero's reſtoration were daily augmenting, he himſelf fell from the height of his hopes to his former pitch of dejection and ſorrow. The attempt which had been made in his favour might have ſucceeded, if Pompey had been fully prepared to concur in it. But all the meaſures of the Triumvirate being concerted at the quarters of Cæſar, Pompey was obliged, after declaring his own inclinations on the ſubject, to conſult his aſſociate, and found him by no means inclined to reſtore a citizen who was likely to be of ſo much conſequence, and who was to owe the favour of his reſtoration to any other than himſelf. The Tribune Sextius, before the late diſſolution, had made a journey into Gaul, to obtain the conſent of Cæſar to this meaſure, but could not prevail; and it is probable that this artful politician was unwilling to reſtore an exile who was likely to aſcribe the principal merit of that ſervice to Pompey, and, by his own inclinations in favour the Senate, to become an acceſſion to a party which Cæſar wiſhed to degrade and to weaken by every means in his power. It was to ſtrengthen himſelf againſt the Senate that Cæſar made his coalition with Pompey and Craſſus; and from animoſity to this body, he wiſhed to cruſh every perſon of conſequence to their party, and to favour the pretenſions of every ambitious citizen who ventured to act in open defiance of their government.

Pompey, in the mean time, though committing himſelf as a tool into the hands of Cæſar, was flattered with the appearance of ſovereignty which he enjoyed in the city, and willingly ſupported.

[16] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 2.

Cæſar

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Cæſar in every meaſure that ſeemed to fix his attention abroad, conſented to the repeated augmentations of the army in Gaul, and approved of every enterprize in which their leader was pleaſed to employ them.

In this year, which was the ſecond of Cæſar's command, two more additional legions were by his orders levied in Italy; and, under pretence of an approaching war with the Belgæ, a nation conſiſting of many cantons in the northern extremities of Gaul, this reinforcement was made to paſs the Alps to the northward in the ſpring. As ſoon as the forage was up, he himſelf followed in perſon, took the field, and, in the uſual ſpirit of his conduct, endeavoured, by the rapidity of his motions, to fruſtrate or to prevent the deſigns of his enemies.

His force now conſiſted of eight Roman legions, beſides numerous bodies of horſe and foot from different cantons in Gaul, archers from Crete and Numidia, and ſlingers from the Balearian iſlands; ſo that it is likely the whole may have amounted to about ſixty thouſand men. The greater part of his army had wintered on the Soane [27] and the Douſe [28], as protectors, not as maſters, of the country, being received only in the character of allies. Cæſar having now taken numbers of their people into his army as auxiliaries or as hoſtages, and having ſpent twelve days in preparing for his march, took his route to the northward, under pretence of carrying the war into the enemy's country, or of preventing them from gaining, to their ſuppoſed confederacy againſt the Romans, any of the nations in the ſouthern parts of Gaul.

His way lay through the high, though level, countries, now termed Burgundy and Champagne, in which the Soane, the Moſelle, the Meuſe, and the Seine, with ſo many other conſiderable rivers

[27] Antiently named the Arar. [28] The Dubis.

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that run in different directions, have their ſource. After a march of fifteen days, he arrived in the Canton of the Remi [19], where he found a people, though of the Belgic extraction, diſpoſed to receive him as a friend, and to place themſelves under his protection.

From this people he had a confirmation of his former intelligence relating to the deſigns of the Belgic nations, and an account of the forces which they had already aſſembled. From the track of country that is watered by the rivers, which are now called the Oiſe, the Scheld, and the Meuſe, he underſtood that no leſs than three hundred and fifty thouſand men could be muſtered, and were actually aſſembled, or preparing to aſſemble, againſt him. To prevent the junction of this formidable power, or to diſtract part of its force, he detached his Gauliſh auxiliaries to make a diverſion on the Oiſe [20], while he himſelf advanced to the Aiſne [21], paſſed this river, and fortified a ſtation on its northern bank. Having a bridge in his rear, he left ſix cohorts properly intrenched before it, to ſecure his communication with the country behind him.

While he remained in this poſt, the Belgæ advanced with a great army, attacked Bibrax, a place of ſtrength about eight miles in his front; and having ſpent many hours in endeavouring to reduce it, were about to renew their aſſault on the following day. But Cæſar having in the night thrown into the garriſon a conſiderable reinforcement of archers and ſlingers, the appearance of this additional ſtrength on the battlements induced the enemy to deſiſt.

They nevertheleſs continued to advance, laid waſte the country, and came within two miles of his camp. They had a front, as appeared from their fires, extending about eight miles.

Cæſar, conſidering the numbers and reputation of this enemy, thought proper to proceed with caution. He obſerved them for

[19] Now the diſtrict of Rheims. [20] Jaſara and Axona.

ſome

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ſome days from his entrenchments, and made ſeveral trials of their ſkill in partial encounters before he ventured to offer them battle. But being encouraged by the event of theſe trials, he choſe a piece of ſloping ground that lay before his camp, and was fit to receive his army. As the enemies front was likely to extend farther than his, he threw up intrenchments on the right and left to cover his flanks; and with this ſecurity, to prevent his being ſurrounded, drew forth his army. The Belgæ too were formed on their part; but the ground between the two armies being marſhy, neither thought proper to paſs that impediment in preſence of the other; and after a few ſkirmiſhes of the horſe and irregular troops, the Romans re-entered their camp. The enemy, upon this event, diſappointed in their expectations of a battle, took their way to the fords of the Aiſne[21], in order to paſs the river, and get poſſeſſion of the bridge in the rear of the Romans. Cæſar had intelligence of this movement from the officer who was ſtationed to guard that poſt; and marching inſtantly with all the cavalry, archers, and ſlingers of the army, he arrived in time to overtake them, while yet entangled in the fords, and obliged them to retire.

The Belgæ, having made theſe ſucceſſive attempts with much impetuoſity, but without proper foreſight, ſoon appeared to be ill qualified to maintain a permanent war with ſuch an enemy. They were diſheartened by their diſappointments, and alarmed by the rumour of a diverſion which Cæſar had cauſed to be made in a part of their own country. They had exhauſted their proviſions, and found themſelves under a neceſſity to break up their camp. It was therefore reſolved in their general council, that their forces, for the preſent, ſhould ſeparate; and if any of their cantons ſhould be afterwards attacked by Cæſar, that the whole ſhould aſſemble again for their common defence.

[21] Axona.

With

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With this reſolution they decamped in the night, but with ſo much noiſe and diſorder that Cæſar ſuſpected a feint, or an intention to draw him into a ſnare. He therefore remained in his lines till the morning, when it appeared that they were actually gone, and were ſeen at a diſtance on the plain moving in the greateſt diſorder, and as in a total rout, ſtriving who ſhould ſooneſt get beyond the reach of their enemies. He purſued them with his cavalry ſo long as it was day, and, though with great bravery reſiſted in his attacks on their rear, made conſiderable havock. At the approach of night he diſcontinued the purſuit, and withdrew again to the camp he left in the morning. On the following day he moved with his whole army, and, that the enemy might not have time to re-aſſemble their forces, determined to penetrate into the heart of their country. In the beginning of his march he followed the courſe of the Aiſne, and in his way reduced the Sueſſones and Bellovaci, two cantons that lay on the right and the left, near the confluence of this river with the Oyſe. From thence, being himſelf to march to the northward, to viſit the banks of the Sambre and the Meuſe, he detached the young Craſſus, with a conſiderable force, towards the ſea coaſts, to occupy thoſe cantons which now form the provinces of Normandy and Bretanny.

Part of the country through which the Meuſe and the Sambre paſſed, now forming the dutchy of Hainault, was then occupied by the Nervii, one of the fierceſt of the Belgic nations, who, having heard with indignation of the ſurrender of the Bellovaci and Sueſſones, their neighbours, prepared for reſiſtance, ſent ſuch of their people as, by their ſex or age, were unfit to carry arms into a place of ſecurity, aſſembled all their warriors, and ſummoned their allies to a place of general reſort. They took poſt on the Sambre, where the heights on both ſides of the river being covered with woods, enabled them to conceal their numbers and their diſpoſitions. They

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had intelligence that Cæſar, except in preſence of an enemy, uſually moved his legions with intervals between them, which were occupied by their baggage; and they made a diſpoſition to ſurpriſe him on the march, and under this diſadvantage. For this purpoſe they choſe their ground on the Sambre, and agreed that the van of the Roman army ſhould be ſuffered to paſs unmoleſted, but that the appearance of the firſt column of baggage ſhould be the ſignal for a general attack to be made at once from all the different ſtations in which their parties were poſted.

Cæſar, in the mean time, about three days after he had marched from Samarobriva, now ſuppoſed to be Amiens, being appriſed that he was come within ten miles of the river, on the banks of which the enemy was poſted, altered the form of his march, placed ſix legions, clear of incumbrance, in the van of his army, next to theſe the whole of his baggage, and in the rear the two legions that were laſt levied in Italy. When he entered the open grounds on the Sambre, a few parties of horſe appeared, but were ſoon driven into the woods by his cavalry. The legions that came firſt to their ground began, as uſual, to intrench, and received no diſturbance till the column of baggage came in ſight. At this ſignal multitudes of the enemy preſented themſelves on every ſide, drove in the cavalry that were poſted to cover the working parties, and in many places were cloſe in with the main body of the army before the infantry had time to uncover their ſhields, or to put on their helmets. The Roman ſoldier, nevertheleſs, ran to his colours, and, without waiting for the orders of his general, from whoſe abilities, on this occaſion, he could derive no advantage, endeavoured to join his companions in the order to which they were accuſtomed.

The event of this tumultuary action was various in different places. The Nervii, in one part of the action, forced the imperfect works of the Roman camp; but in another part of it were themſelves forced

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forced from their ground, and driven in great numbers into the river. Some of the Roman legions were broken, loſt the greater part of their officers, and when Cæſar arrived to rally them, were huddled together in confuſion. He was reduced to act the part of a mere legionary ſoldier, and, with a ſhield which he took from one of his men, joined in the battle, and in this manner, by his preſence and by his example, kept the enemy at bay, until he was relieved by the arrival of two legions of the rear-guard, and of two others, that were ſent by Labienus to ſupport him.

This ſeaſonable relief, where the Romans were moſt diſtreſſed, changed the fortune of the day; and the confuſion, which in the beginning of the action had been turned to ſo good account by the Nervii, now became fatal to themſelves. The greater part of them fell in heaps on the ground where they firſt began the attack. The few who attempted to fly were met at every opening of the woods by parties of the enemy, by whom they were forced into the thickets or put to the ſword; and as they fell in the end with little reſiſtance, many became a prey to the followers of the legions, who put themſelves in arms and bore a part in the maſſacre. Of four hundred chiefs only three eſcaped; and of an army of ſixty thouſand men, no more than five hundred left the field of battle. The piteous remains of this nation, conſiſting of ſuperannuated men, of women, and of children, ſent, from the marſhes in which they had been concealed, a meſſage to implore the victor's mercy; but it does not appear in what manner he diſpoſed of them.

Another enemy yet remained in the field. The Attuatici, deſcendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the late terrors of Gaul, of Spain, and of Italy, being ſettled below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuſe, had been on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; and then withdrew to their own country. Being purſued by Cæſar, they ſhut themſelves up in their principal fortreſs.

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Here they made a voluntary ſubmiſſion; and being commanded to lay down their arms, threw ſuch a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almoſt filled up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. But Cæſar, having delayed taking poſſeſſion of the place till the following day, the beſieged, whether they only meant to deceive him, or repented of their ſurrender, took arms again in the night, and in a ſally endeavoured to ſurpriſe the Roman army. But four thouſand of them being killed in this deſperate attempt, and the remainder being forced into the town, were, in conſequence of their former breach of faith, to the amount of fifty thouſand perſons, ſold for ſlaves.

Thus Cæſar having, in the ſecond year of his command, penetrated to the Meuſe and the Scheld, and being maſter of the eaſtern frontier of Gaul as far as the Rhine, and even from beyond that river having received ſome offers of ſubmiſſion; being maſter too of ſeveral Cantons in Normandy and Bretanny, which had ſubmitted to the young Craſſus, placed his army for the winter in the midſt of theſe conqueſts, and himſelf, as at the end of the former campaign, ſet out for Italy and the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here the principal point which he left in conteſt between the parties, relating to the reſtoration of Cicero, had been for ſome time determined. Clodius had found a proper antagoniſt in Milo, and, as often as he himſelf, or any of his party, appeared in the aſſemblies of the People, or in the ſtreets, was every where attacked with his own weapons.

Every one agreed, that if the laws could not give protection to the citizens who were moſt willing to be governed by them, they ſhould not by their formalities ſcreen the diſorderly and profligate in the practice of every ſpecies of crime.

Clodius had now for ſome months lain under an impeachment from Milo, and had declared himſelf candidate for the office of Ædile, endeavouring

endeavouring by violence, and by the artifices of his brother, to put off the trial till after the elections, when, if he ſhould be veſted with any public character, he might be able to ſcreen himſelf under the privilege of his office. His own credit, however, and the fear which citizens entertained of his armed banditti, who were now in a great meaſure reſtrained by Milo, had abated ſo much, that the party of the Senate determined to make another vigorous effort for the reſtoration of their exiled member.

This buſineſs was accordingly again moved in the Senate; and about the beginning of June a decree was paſſed in the fulleſt terms for the reſtoration of Cicero. The Conſul was charged with the farther conduct of this meaſure as of the utmoſt conſequence to the commonwealth. This officer accordingly iſſued a proclamation, in terms employed only on the greateſt occaſions, requiring all who had the ſafety of the republic at heart to ſupport him in the execution of this decree. There was, in conſequence of this proclamation, a great concourſe of citizens from all parts of Italy. The enemies of the meaſure ſhrunk and withdrew their oppoſition. The act paſſed in the aſſembly of the People on the fourth of Auguſt. Cicero had been ſo confident of this event, that he on the ſame day ſailed from Dyrrachium, and on the following arrived at Brundiſium. On the eighth day, being ſtill at this place, he had intimation of the act being paſſed, ſet out for Rome, and continued his journey through multitudes of people, who were aſſembled on the roads to teſtify their joy upon his return: he entered the city on the fourth of September.

Next day he addreſſed the Senate in a harangue, which is ſtill extant, compoſed of laviſh panegyric or vehement invective, correſponding to the demerit or merit of parties in his late diſgrace and reſtoration. The multitudes that were aſſembled on this occaſion, their impatience to ſee him, their acclamations and wonderful unanimity,

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raiſed him once more to his former pitch of glory, and appeared to repay all the ſervices he had rendered to the public, and to compenſate all the ſorrows of his late diſgrace. The whole matter was, to perſons of reflection, an evidence of that weakneſs with which this ingenious man ſuffered himſelf to be affected by popular opinion, and of the levity with which multitudes run into different extremes.

During theſe tranſactions Cæſar was at a great diſtance, in the northern extremities of Gaul, engaged with fierce and numerous enemies, and involved in difficulties, concerning which there were various reports, and of which the iſſue, with reſpect to himſelf and his army, was ſuppoſed to be uncertain. In theſe circumſtances, however willing Pompey may have been to perſevere in the meaſures concerted with Cæſar, it is probable that he found himſelf unable to reſiſt the force of the Senate, which was now exerted to obtain the reſtoration of a perſon who had taken ſo diſtinguiſhed a part in their meaſures.

It is poſſible likewiſe, that in theſe circumſtances Pompey may have taken upon him to act independently of Cæſar, though he afterwards, in trying to gain Cicero to the party of the triumvirate, affected to give Cæſar equal merit with himſelf in procuring his recal, and he appealed to Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, for the truth of this aſſertion [22]. Cicero himſelf, however, was not diſpoſed to give Cæſar any credit upon this account; and, though both Cæſar and Craſſus, after the matter was decided, affected to concur in it, yet he does not ſeem to have believed them ſincere. He imputes to Cæſar an active part in the injury he had received, but none in the reparation that was done to him [23].

Pompey, not the leſs jealous of Cæſar for their pretended union, and ſenſible of the advantage he had gained in a military command of

[22] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. i. ep. 9.

[23] Orat. in Senat. poſt Reditum, c. 15.

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ſo long a duration at the gates of Rome, now wiſhed to propoſe for himſelf ſome appointment of equal importance. The moment of cordiality in the Senate on their recovering a favourite member, and the firſt emotions of gratitude in the breaſt of Cicero, whom he had obliged, appeared to form a conjuncture favourable for ſuch a propoſition; and he laid, with his uſual addreſs and appearance of unconcern, the plan of a motion to be made for this purpoſe.

The importation of corn into Italy had lately miſcarried, and a great ſcarcity and dearth had followed. The populace being riotous upon this complaint, had in the theatre attacked with menaces and violence numbers of the wealthy citizens who were preſent, and even inſulted the Senate itſelf in the Capitol. A report induſtriouſly raiſed by the enemies of Cicero was propagated, to make it be believed that the diſtreſs aroſe from his engroſſing for ſome time the attention of the State; and it was repreſented, in oppoſition to this clamour, that the late corn act of Clodius, and the miſconduct of one of his relations, intruſted by him with the care of the public granaries, was the cauſe of this diſtreſs. It was inſinuated by the adherents of Pompey, that no man was fit to relieve the People beſides himſelf; that the buſineſs ſhould be committed to him alone; and Cicero was called upon, as he entered the Senate, to make a motion to this purpoſe, as bound to procure ſome relief to the People, in return to their late cordiality in his cauſe.

Cicero had probably owed his recal to the declarations of Pompey in his favour; and, however little reaſon he had to rely on his friendſhip, it was convenient to appear on good terms with him. He ſuffered himſelf, therefore, to be carried by the ſtream that ſeemed to run in favour of this faſhionable leader. As if the neceſſity of the caſe had ſuggeſted the meaſure, he moved the Senate that a commiſſion, with proconſular power over all the provinces, ſhould be granted:

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granted to Pompey to ſuperintend the ſupplies of corn for the city. The Senate, either of themſelves diſpoſed to grant this requeſt, or won by the eloquence of their newly recovered member, inſtructed the Conſuls to frame a reſolution to this purpoſe, and carry it to the aſſembly of the People for their aſſent.

Here C. Meſſius, one of the Tribunes, propoſed to enlarge the commiſſion, and to comprehend the ſuperintendency of the revenue, with an allotment of fleets and armies ſuited to the extent of this unprecedented truſt. Pompey, obſerving that this additional clauſe was ill received, denied his having any ſhare in propoſing it, and affected to prefer the appointment intended for him in terms of the act which had been propoſed to be drawn up by the Conſuls. His partizans, however, ſtill pleaded for the extenſion of the commiſſion as propoſed by Meſſius, but in vain. The extravagance of the propoſal gave a general alarm, not only to the Senate, but even to the party of Cæſar, who wiſhed to employ Pompey againſt the Senate; but not to arm him with a military force, or to give him in reality that ſovereignty of which he ſo much affected the appearances.

The extraordinary commiſſion, now actually granted to Pompey, although it was exorbitant in reſpect to the influence it gave him over all the producers, venders, buyers, and conſumers of corn throughout the whole empire; yet, as it did not beſtow the command of an army, fell ſhort of the conſequences which Cæſar principally dreaded in his rival; and though probably the cauſe of ſome jealouſy, did not produce any immediate breach between them.

Pompey, being intitled by this commiſſion to appoint fifteen lieutenants, put Cicero at the head of the liſt; and this place was accepted of by him, on this expreſs condition, that it ſhould not prevent his ſtanding for the office of Cenſor, in caſe an election took place on the following year[24]. He was now in the way of recovering his

[24] Cicero Orat. in Senat. poſt Redit. c. 13. ad Att.

conſideration

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conſideration and his dignity, but was likely to meet with more difficulty in reſpect to his property, which Clodius had taken care to have forfeited, having even demoliſhed his houſe, and conſecrated the ground to pious uſes. This laſt circumſtance had placed a bar in his way, which could not be removed without a formal decree of the pontiffs.

The college met on the laſt of September to hear parties in this cauſe. A violent invective having been pronounced by Clodius againſt his antagoniſt, Cicero replied in that oration, which is ſtill extant among his works on the ſubject of his houſe [35]. The queſtion was, Whether the ground on which Cicero's houſe had formerly ſtood, being formally conſecrated, could be again reſtored to a profane or common uſe? The Pontiffs appear to have been unwilling to give any explicit deciſion. They gave a conditional judgment, declaring, that the conſecration of Cicero's ground was void, unleſs it ſhould be found that this act had been properly authoriſed by the People. Both parties interpreted this judgment in their own favour; and the Senate was to determine, whether, in the act of conſecration, the conſent of the People had been properly obtained.

The Senate being met on the firſt of October, and all the parties who were members of it being preſent, Lucullus, in the name of the Pontiffs, his colleagues, reported, That they had been unanimous in their judgment to revoke the act of conſecration, unleſs it ſhould be found, that the magiſtrate, who had performed that ceremony, had been properly authoriſed by the People; but that this was a queſtion of law now before the Senate. A debate enſued, in which Lentulus Marcellinus, Conſul-elect for the following year, gave his opinion againſt the legality of the conſecration: he was followed by numbers, and the judgment of the Senate was likely to be on that ſide.

[35] Pro Domo ſua.

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Clodius, to put off the queſtion, ſpoke for three hours, and would have prevented the Senate's coming to any reſolution, if the members, becoming impatient, had not ſilenced him by their interruptions and clamours. A reſolution being moved for in the terms that had been propoſed by Marcellinus: the Tribune Serranus, who had formerly ſuſpended the decree for the recal of Cicero, now again interpoſed with his negative. The Senate, nevertheleſs, proceeded to engroſs the decree, in which it was reſolved, that the ground on which Cicero's houſe had formerly ſtood, ſhould be again reſtored to him in property; that no magiſtrate ſhould preſume to conteſt the authority of the Senate in this matter; and if any interruption were given in the execution of this decree, that the Tribune, who now interpoſed with his negative, ſhould be accountable for the conſequences. Serranus was alarmed. His relation, Cornicinus, to give him the appearance of greater importance, and an opportunity to recede with dignity, laid himſelf on the ground at his feet, and beſought him, by his intreaties, to ſay, that he would not inſiſt for the preſent on the negative he had given; but he begged the delay of a night to conſider of the matter. The Senate, recollecting the uſe which he formerly made of ſuch a delay on the firſt of January, was diſpoſed to refuſe it, when, upon the interpoſition of Cicero himſelf, it was granted; and he having thought proper to withdraw his negative intirely, the act accordingly paſſed on the ſecond of October. Cicero was allowed two millions Roman money [26] to rebuild his houſe in town; five hundred thouſand [27] to rebuild his villa at Tuſculum, and two hundred and fifty thouſand [28] to rebuild that at Formiæ. The firſt ſum he ſeems to have conſidered as adequate to his loſs, but complains of the other two [29]. He proceeded, without delay, to take poſſeſſion of his ground, and to employ workmen in

[26] About 16,145l. 16s. 8d.
[27] About 4,036l. 5s.
[28] About 2,018l. 4s. 6d.
[29] Ad Atticum, lib. iv. epiſt. 2.

rebuilding

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rebuilding his houſe. He had made ſome progreſs, when Clodius, on the the third of November, came with an armed force, diſperſed the workmen, and attacked the houſe of Quintus Cicero that was adjoining, ſet it on fire, and kept a guard of his retainers in the ſtreets till it was burnt to the ground.

By this act of violence, Clodius had rendered his cauſe, in the criminal proſecution which ſtill hung over him, in a great meaſure deſperate. His ſafety required the actual deſtruction of his enemies, and he had no ſcruple to reſtrain him from the moſt violent extremes. He accordingly attacked Cicero as he paſſed in the ſtreets on the eleventh of November, attended by a company of his friends, forced them into a walled court, where they with difficulty defended themſelves. Clodius, in this attack, had frequently expoſed his own perſon, and might have been killed; but Cicero was now become too cautious for ſo bold a meaſure. "I have put my affairs," he writes to Atticus, "under a gentle regimen; and, in all the cures I am to "apply for the future, have renounced the uſe of the ſurgeon's "knife."

Clodius, upon this occaſion, being diſappointed of his deſign upon Cicero's life, came into the ſtreets on the following day, which was the twelfth of November, with a number of ſlaves provided with lighted torches, and eſcorted by a party armed in form with ſhields and ſwords. They made directly for a houſe belonging to Milo, with intention to ſet it on fire; took poſſeſſion of that of P. Sylla, in its neighbourhood, as a fortreſs in which to defend themſelves, and to keep off all aſſiſtance, till the houſe they were to ſet on fire ſhould be burnt to the ground.

While they were about to execute this purpoſe, a number of Milo's ſervants, led by one Flaccus, ſallied forth againſt the incendiaries, killed ſeveral of the moſt forward, put the reſt to flight, and would not have ſpared Clodius himſelf, if he had not availed himſelf of the

retreat, which, in entering on this deſign, he had prepared for his party.

On the following day, Sylla made his appearance in the Senate, in order to exculpate himſelf; but Clodius ſtill remained ſhut up in his own houſe. It appears ſcarcely credible, that a ſtate could ſubſiſt under ſuch extreme diſorders; yet the author of them had been long under proſecution for crimes of the ſame nature; and it was ſtill a queſtion, whether the charge againſt him ſhould be heard, or whether he ſhould not be allowed to take refuge in one of the offices of State, to which he was ſure of being named by the People, provided the elections were allowed to precede his trial.

Marcellinus, the intended Conſul of next year, moved the Senate to haſten the proſecution, and to join the late diſorders committed by the criminal to the former articles of the charge which lay againſt him. But Metellus Nepos, one of the preſent Conſuls, and the relation of Clodius, having formerly found means to put off the trial, was now determined to prevent it altogether, by haſtening the election of Ædiles, in which Clodius was candidate. He endeavoured to prevent any immediate determination of the Senate by prolonging the debate. But the majority of the members were greatly exaſperated, and reſolved, that the trial of Clodius for theſe repeated acts of violence and outrage ſhould precede the elections. The Conſul Metellus, notwithſtanding, was determined to give him a chance to have refuge from this proſecution in the public office to which he aſpired, and would have brought on the elections on the nineteenth of November, if he had not been prevented by Milo, who, in the middle of the preceding night, had, with an armed force, occupied the place of aſſembly, and was prepared to obſerve the heavens, and to announce ſome of the celeſtial preſages of unfavourable events, in caſe other methods to ſuſpend the elections ſhould not have prevailed.

* Metellus,

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Metellus, and the two brothers, Appius the Prætor, and Publius Clodius, being appriſed of this intention, and of the power with which it was ſupported, did not make their appearance in the field, and Milo kept his ſtation till noon, when he withdrew with the general applauſe of the Senate, and of the more orderly citizens.

The meeting, or aſſembly of the People, being adjourned to next day, Metellus, in order to lull the vigilance of Milo, aſſured him, that there was no occaſion to occupy poſts in the dead of the night; that he meant to do nothing before it was day; that if any one meant to ſuſpend the election, he ſhould, in the morning, be found in the market-place, and there ſubmit to the forms which any one was legally intitled to plead againſt his proceeding. Milo, accordingly, at break of day, repaired to the market-place, where he expected to be joined by the Conſul; but ſoon afterwards was told, that Metellus had deceived him, was haſtening to the field of Mars, where the elections were commonly held, and would inſtantly begin to call the votes, when it would be too late to interpoſe even under the pretence of religion. Upon this information, he immediately purſued and overtook him before the election began; and, by declaring his intention to obſerve the heavens, once more fruſtrated the deſigns of the faction.

On the twenty-firſt, the People could not aſſemble by reaſon of the public market; and their meeting being called for the twenty-third, Milo again took poſſeſſion of the field with an armed force; and Cicero, who concludes a letter to Atticus with deſcribing this ſtate of affairs, made no doubt of Milo's ſucceſs[39]. What paſſed on this day is uncertain; but it is known, that Clodius at laſt prevailed; that, being elected Ædile, he was, by the privilege of his office, ſcreened from the proſecution that was intended againſt him; and being him-

[39] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. epiſt. 3.

ſelf

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U. C. 697. Cn. Corn. Lentulus Marcellinus, L. Marc. Philippus.

ſelf ſafe, did not fail, upon the expiration of Milo's Tribunate, to retort the charge upon his proſecutor; and accordingly brought him to trial on the ſecond of February, for acts of violence and breach of the peace.

Pompey, as well as Cicero, appeared in defence of Milo; and they ſucceeded in having him acquitted, while they incurred a torrent of reproach and invective on the part of the proſecutor. The market-place was crowded with the partizans and retainers of Clodius: he had inſtructed them to reply to his interrogations, and to direct all their abuſe on Pompey. "Who ſtarves the People for want of corn? "Pompey. Who wants to be ſent to Alexandria? Pompey." This farce greatly diſturbed the concerted dignity of this politician. His principal object was conſideration, and he could not endure contempt. He was on bad terms with the Senate; and they liſtened to the invective of his perſonal enemies with apparent ſatisfaction. He complained to Cicero that the People were alienated from him; that the Nobility were his enemies; that the Senate was adverſe, and the youth in general ill diſpoſed to him [31]. He had indeed ſubmitted to become the agent of Cæſar at Rome; and, with the friends of the republic, incurred the odium of their joint meaſures, while the other was riſing every day in military reputation, and was forming an army almoſt at the gates of Rome, with which he held every party in the republic in awe. Pompey, on this occaſion, really did, or affected to believe, that a deſign was formed againſt his own life; he aſſembled a numerous party of his retainers from the country, and abſented himſelf, during ſome time, from the Senate and from the aſſemblies of the People.

[31] Cicer. ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. epiſt. 3.

CHAP. VII.

Return of Cato from Cyprus.——His Repulſe at the Election of Prætors.——Arrival of Ptolomy Auletes at Rome.——Viſit of Pompey and Craſſus to Cæſar's Quarters at Lucca.——Renewal of their Aſſociation.——Military Operations in Cæſar's Province.——Violent Election of Craſſus and Pompey.——Provinces.——Of Craſſus in Syria.——Of Pompey in Spain for five Years.——Craſſus departs for Syria.

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THE particulars we have related in the laſt chapter have led us on to the middle of February, in the Conſulate of Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The firſt was attached to the forms of the republic, and was a ſtremuous partizan of the Senate. His election was probably a continuation of the victory which this party had obtained in the reſtoration of Cicero. Philippus was now nearly related to Cæſar, having married his niece, the widow of Octavius; and poſſibly owed his preferment in part to that connection. He was, by this alliance, become the ſtep-father of young Octavius, now a boy of ten years of age, brought up by his mother in the houſe of her ſecond huſband. This appears to have been a man of great moderation, no way qualified to be a party in the deſigns or uſurpations of the family with which he was now connected.

Some time before theſe Conſuls entered on office, in the end of the preceding year, Marcus Cato arrived from having executed his commiſſion to Byzantium and Cyprus. The buſineſs upon which he had been ſent to the firſt of theſe places, was to reſtore ſome exiles who had been driven from their country in the violence of faction.

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At the ſecond he was to ſeize the treaſure and the other effects of Ptolomy, and to reduce his kingdom to the form of a Roman province. This meaſure, by all accounts, was unjuſt, and the office highly diſagreeable to Cato; but he was determined to perform it with the punctuality and reſpect due to all the orders of the State. While he himſelf went to Byzantium, he ſent forward Canidius to Cyprus, to intimate the commands of the Roman People, and to exhort the king to ſubmiſſion. Upon his return to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, he had intelligence, that this prince, unable to bear the ruin of his fortunes, had, in deſpair, killed himſelf. His treaſure was ſeized, and his effects ſold: the whole yielded to the treaſury about ſeven thouſand talents of ſilver. Upon the approach of Cato to Rome, the magiſtrates, the Senate, and multitudes of the People went forth to receive him. The Senate thought proper in this manner to diſtinguiſh their friends, and to favour them with ſome marks of conſideration, in order to balance, if poſſible, the public honours that were frequently laviſhed on their enemies. For the ſame purpoſe likewiſe they reſolved to inſert the name of Cato among the Prætors of this year; but this honour he himſelf rejected as unprecedented and illegal. The year following, however, when he ſtood candidate for this office in the ordinary form, he was rejected; and Vatinius, the well-known tool of Cæſar, who had been employed by him in all meaſures that were too mean for himſelf to acknowledge, was choſen [1].

Cæſar, as has been obſerved on different occaſions, had a ſerious antipathy to Cato, conſidered him as a determined and reſolute opponent; and accordingly employed all his influence to exclude him from the offices of State, and probably had a particular pleaſure in procuring him a repulſe, by the preference of ſo mean an antagoniſt

[1] Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, & Cicero in Vatinium.

as

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as Vatinius, who had the preſent majority of votes againſt him. But, in mentioning this event, Valerius Maximus is pleaſed to reverſe the form of expreſſion, uſual in ſpeaking of diſappointed candidates, ſaying, "That the liſt of Prætors for this year had not the "honour of Cato's name[a]."

Cato, in the execution of his late commiſſion, had taken exact inventories of all the effects ſold at Cyprus; but his books being loſt, or burnt in a veſſel that took fire on the voyage, Clodius frequently threatened him with a proſecution to account for the ſums he had received; and in this he was ſeriouſly inſtigated by Cæſar, who, from his winter quarters at Lucca, watched all the proceedings at Rome.

From this ſtation, the Proconſul of Gaul, although he could not attend in perſon, ſent his agents to the city, took part in every tranſaction of moment that related to his adherents or to his enemies. It appeared to be his maxim, that no man ſhould be his friend or his enemy without feeling the ſuitable effects. Memmius, who had been Prætor with Domitius Ahenobarbus, and who had joined his colleague in the proſecution that was commenced againſt Cæſar at the expiration of his Conſulate, having ſince been Prætor of Bithynia, and accuſed of miſconduct in his province, was attacked by him in a memorial which he drew up to be employed in ſupport of the charge. Memmius, in defending himſelf, recriminated, and ſpared no kind of invective; and in the iſſue of this matter had the good fortune to eſcape from the reſentment of his enemy.

The power of Cæſar, aided by his influence in ſo important a ſtation, was daily increaſing; and as he ſpared no pains to cruſh thoſe whom he deſpaired of gaining, ſo he declined no artifice to gain every one elſe. All the ſpoils of his province were diſtributed in gratuities at Rome. He knew the ſtate of every man's family, and where he could not reach the maſter, paid his court to the

[a] Val. Max. lib. vii. c. 5.

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miſtreſs, or to the favourite ſlave. While in his winter quarters at Lucca, many Senators reſorted from Rome to pay their court, of theſe no leſs than two hundred were ſaid to have been preſent at one time; and ſo many of them in public characters, that the Lictors, who paraded at the entrance of his quarters with the badges of office, amounted to one hundred and twenty [3].

During this winter, a queſtion relating to the reſtoration of Ptolomy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, gave riſe to warm debates in the Senate. This prince had been dethroned by his ſubjects; and, conceiving that he had ſufficient credit with many perſons at Rome, who had experienced his bounty, he repaired thither to ſolicit his own reſtoration. In his way he had an interview with Marcus Cato at Cyprus, and was adviſed by him to return to Egypt, and to accept of any terms from his own People, rather than to enter on ſuch a ſcene of anxiety and mortification, as he ſhould find every ſuitor for public favour engaged in at Rome. The giddineſs of the multitude, the violence of the parties of which one was ſure to oppoſe what the other embraced, the avarice of thoſe who might pretend to be his friends, and whoſe rapacity the treaſures of his kingdom could not aſſwage, were ſufficient to deter the king from proceeding on his voyage. But the importunity of his attendants, who wiſhed to have him reſtored without any conceſſions to his ſubjects, confirmed him in his former reſolution. He accordingly proceeded to Rome; and, to the great encouragement of his hopes, was favourably received by Pompey, who was then poſſeſſed of the reigning influence in the city, and who conſidered this as a proper opportunity to have a military commiſſion joined to the civil one of which he was already poſſeſſed.

In the mean while the people of Alexandria, not knowing to what place their king had withdrawn, imagined that he was dead, and

[3] Plutarch. in Cæſare.

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put his daughter Berenice in poſſeſſion of the kingdom. Being afterwards informed, that he had ſteered for Italy, and was likely to engage the Romans againſt them, they ſent a deputation to counteract his ſolicitations in the Roman Senate. But theſe deputies being intercepted, and murdered by his order, he proceeded, without oppoſition, in his application at Rome, and obtained a decree for his reſtoration to the crown.

The king of Egypt, by having procured an act in his own favour, yet made but a ſmall progreſs in the buſineſs on which he was come. New difficulties aroſe in the choice of a perſon to carry the decree of the Senate into execution, which greatly retarded its effect.

Soon after this decree had paſſed, Lentulus Spinther, Conſul of the preſent year, being deſtined at the expiration of his magiſtracy in the city to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, had inſerted the buſineſs of reſtoring the king of Egypt as a part of his own commiſſion. But after Lentulus was gone for his province, this part of the commiſſion, probably by the influence of Pompey, who had views on that expedition, as the object of a military command for himſelf, was recalled. A ſtrong party of the Nobles, however, being jealous of the ſtate which Pompey affected, and of his continual aim at extraordinary powers, conceived an expedient to diſappoint him on this occaſion, or to render the commiſſion unworthy of his acceptance. In viſiting the books of the Sybils, verſes were ſaid to be found, containing an injunction to the Romans, not indeed to withhold their friendſhip from a king of Egypt ſoliciting their protection, but "to "beware how they attempted to reſtore him with a military force." The authenticity of this oracle was acknowledged, or declared by the Augurs; and the Tribune Caius Cato, who was averſe to the cauſe of Ptolomy, availed himſelf of it, to ſuſpend the effect of the reſolution which had been already taken in favour of that prince.

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The Senate and People were divided in their opinions. One party urged, that Pompey ſhould be appointed to reſtore the king of Egypt to his throne; others agreed, that he might be appointed, provided that he undertook the commiſſion, as Proconſul, attended by two Lictors, and, in the terms of the oracle, without any military force [4]. Pompey himſelf affected to think, that the buſineſs ſhould have been left as it was in the department of Lentulus the Proconſul of Cilicia and Cyprus; but his retainers, ſo long as they had any hopes of rendering this a military commiſſion, or of making it a pretence for placing their patron again at the head of an army, never ceaſed to urge that he ſhould be employed in it.

Ptolomy himſelf likewiſe wiſhed to have this buſineſs devolve upon Pompey, as the moſt likely perſon to command the force of the commonwealth, and to employ it effectually in his favour. But both deſpairing at laſt of ſucceſs, Ptolomy retired to Epheſus; and, fearing the reſentments he had provoked in the conteſt with his own people, and in the late murder of their deputies, he took refuge in the temple of Diana; a retreat from which he was conducted, about two years afterwards, by Gabinius, and replaced on his throne [5].

Pompey was diſguſted with his diſappointment in not being named to this ſervice, and probably more by the little reſpect that was paid to him by all parties while he lay under the laſh of continual invectives from Clodius, and from Caius Cato. Having obtained, on the fifth of April, a grant of ſome money towards executing his office of general purveyor of corn for the People; and having heard his own and Cæſar's embezzlement of the public treaſure, eſpecially in the alienation of the revenues of Campania, ſeverely cenſured in the Senate [6]; he left Rome on pretence of applying the ſums with which he was now entruſted for the purchaſe of corn in Sar-

[4] Dio, lib. xxxix. c. 12—16. Cicero ad Lentulum. Epiſt. ad Familiares, lib. vii.

[5] Liv. Epitom. Decad. xi. lib. 5.

[6] Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 5 & 6.

dinia and Sicily. In his way he paſſed by Lucca, and, together with Craſſus, augmented the number of attendants who paid their court at the quarters of Cæſar. CHAP. VII.

At an interview of theſe three leaders they renewed their former confederacy; and it being known, that Domitius Ahenobarbus was to ſtand for the next election of Conſuls, Cæſar, conſidering how much a citizen ſo determined in oppoſition to himſelf, inſtigated by Cato, and ſupported by the party of the Senate, might attempt or execute againſt him in his abſence, propoſed, that the oppoſition to this candidate ſhould not be committed to any perſon of inferior conſideration in their party; but that Pompey and Craſſus ſhould themſelves enter the liſts, in order to exclude Domitius from the Conſulate [7].

It was agreed likewiſe, at this conference, that, upon the expiration of the term for which they were to hold this office, Pompey ſhould have the province of Spain, Craſſus that of Syria, each with a great army: that Cæſar ſhould be continued in his preſent command, and have ſuch additions to the eſtabliſhment of his province as might enable him to ſupport an army of eight Roman legions, with the uſual accompaniments of auxiliaries and irregular troops. Such was already the ſtate of his forces [8], including a legion of native Gauls; he having, contrary to the expreſs limitations of his commiſſion, by which he was reſtricted to three legions, made this enormous augmentation. This convention, like the former, was, for ſome time, kept a ſecret, and only began to be ſurmiſed about the uſual time of the elections.

Soon after theſe matters were ſettled, Craſſus being to remain in Italy, Pompey proceeded on his voyage to Sardinia, and Cæſar repaired to his army in Gaul, where the war in different places had

[7] Suet. in Cæſare, c. 24. [8] Ibid.

been

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been renewed in his abſence. Among the diſpoſitions he had made for the winter, the young Craſſus was left to command on the coaſts of the Britiſh Channel; and Galba, another of his lieutenants, was poſted among the Alps to protect the traders of Italy at a principal paſs of theſe mountains. This officer had diſlodged the natives from many of their ſtrong holds, whence they were accuſtomed to infeſt the highways, and to lay ſuch as paſſed into Italy under contributions; and he took hoſtages for their good behaviour for the future. He fixed his quarters, during the winter, at Octodurus, now ſuppoſed to be the village of Martinach in the Vallé, ſituated at the foot of the mountains over which travellers paſs in the route of the greater abbey of St. Bernard. Here he remained for ſome time in quiet poſſeſſion of his poſt; but the natives obſerving, that the legions under his command had been greatly reduced by the ſervices of the preceding campaign, and by the detachments which he had recently made from his quarters, formed a deſign to ſurpriſe and to cut him off. For this purpoſe, the inhabitants of the village in which he was quartered, ſuddenly withdrew from him, and ſoon after appeared with multitudes of their countrymen on the neighbouring mountains. From thence they made a furious attack on the Roman entrenchment, continually ſending freſh numbers to relieve thoſe who became fatigued, or who had exhauſted their weapons.

The Romans, on the firſt proſpect of this attack, had deliberated, whether they ſhould not abandon their poſt; but had reſolved to maintain it, and were now become ſenſible that they muſt periſh, if they could not, by ſome impetuous ſally, diſperſe the numbers that were aſſembled againſt them. For this purpoſe, they determined to break from their lines, and to mix with the enemy ſword in hand; a manner of fighting, in which, by the ſuperiority of the Roman ſhield and ſword, they always had a great advantage. They accordingly ſallied from their entrenchment, and, with the ſlaughter of

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ten thouſand of the enemy, who began the attack with thirty thouſand, obliged them to retire. Galba, nevertheleſs, not thinking it prudent to remain in a ſituation in which he had been expoſed to ſo much danger, retired, for the remainder of the winter, to the neighbourhood of Geneva.

The war had broke out at the ſame time in the quarters of Craſſus, at the other extremity of the province. Some nations, who had made their ſubmiſſion, and given hoſtages at the end of the preceding compaign, repented of this ſtep, and entered into a concert to recover their liberties. They began with ſeizing the Roman officers who had been ſtationed among them as commiſſaries to provide for the ſubſiſtence of the army, and they detained them as pledges for the recovery of their own hoſtages.

The principal authors of this revolt were the inhabitants of what is now termed the coaſt of Britanny, between the rivers Vilaine and Blavet. They truſted to the ſtrength of their ſituation on ſmall iſlands, or peninſulas, that were joined to the continent only by ſome narrow beach or iſthmus, which the ſea, at high water, overflowed. They depended likewiſe on the ſtrength of their ſhipping, in the uſe of which, by the practice of navigation on that ſtormy ſea, and by their frequent voyages even to Britain, they were extremely expert. They ſupplied the want of canvas and hempen cordage with hides and thongs of leather, and the want of cables with iron chains, to which they faſtened their anchors.

Cæſar, having received intellignce of this enemy while he remained in his quarters at Lucca, ſent orders to build as many ſhips as poſſible upon the Loire, and to aſſemble mariners from the neighbouring coaſts. Apprehending, at the ſame time, a general defection of the province, and perhaps a deſcent from the Germans, that were ever ready to profit by the diſtreſs or diviſions of their neighbours, he ſent Labienus with a large body of horſe to the

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Moſelle, at once to awe the Belgic nations, and to guard the paſſage of the Rhine. He ſent alſo Titurius Sabinus with a proper force into Normandy, where the natives were already in arms; and the young Craſſus to the Garonne, to give the natives of Gaſcony ſufficient occupation in their own country, and to prevent their junction with the authors of this revolt.

He himſelf made haſte to join the troops that were ſtationed in Britanny, and ordered Decimus Brutus to aſſemble his fleet, and to make ſail without loſs of time for the bay of Vannes. After his arrival on the coaſt, he met with all the difficulties which he had reaſon to expect from the nature of the country, and from the diſpoſition and ſkill of its inhabitants. The enemy had retired from the continent to their ſtrong holds on the promontories or head-lands, in which they were periodically ſurrounded by the ſea. Being attacked at one ſtation, they withdrew in their boats to another; and by their ſituation ſeemed to be ſecure from any enemy, who was not in a condition to make his attack, at once, both by ſea and by land. They eluded a land attack by embarking on board of their veſſels; and an attack from the ſea, by landing from their boats, which they drew up on the beach.

Cæſar, to decide the event of this ſingular conteſt, was obliged to wait the arrival of his ſhipping. As ſoon as it appeared, the natives, ſenſible that their fate depended on the event of a ſea-fight, embarked the moſt expert of their warriors, got under ſail with all their force, amounting to two hundred and twenty veſſels, and ſteered directly for their enemy. While the fleets drew near to each other, the ſhores were crowded with ſpectators; and the army with Cæſar himſelf came forth on the heights, from which they could behold the ſcene.

The Romans being inferior to their enemy in the uſe of their ſails, as well as in the ſtrength of their veſſels, endeavoured to ſupply their defect, as uſual, by an effort of addreſs and unexpected contrivance. They

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They had provided themſelves with ſcythes, faſtened to ſhafts of a proper length, in order to cut the enemy's rigging, and let looſe or diſcompoſe their ſails; and having thus, in the firſt encounter, diſabled many of their ſhips, they grappled with them, and boarded them ſword in hand.

The Gauls, ſeeing a great part of their fleet thus irrecoverably loſt, would have eſcaped with the remainder; but were ſuddenly becalmed, and being, from ten in the morning till night, continually expoſed to the attack of the Romans, were all either taken or deſtroyed; and the nation, thus bereft of its principal ſtrength and the flower of its people, ſurrendered again at diſcretion.

Under pretence that they had violated the law of nations, in ſeizing the perſons of officers who were ſtationed among them in a public character, their leaders were put to death, and their people ſold for ſlaves.

The inhabitants of the lower banks of the Seine, at the ſame time, having been defeated by Titurius, returned, agreeably to what was ſaid to be the character of Gauliſh nations, to their former ſubmiſſion, with the ſame levity with which they had thrown it aſide.

The nations inhabiting the banks of the Garonne were ſtill inclined to reſiſt the approaches of Craſſus to their country. To the advantage of numbers, they joined a lively courage, of which the Romans themſelves had frequently felt the effects. Every chief was attended by a number of followers, whom he called his Soldurii, and who had devoted themſelves to his ſervice. While the chieftain lived, the Soldurii fared in every thing alike with himſelf; but if he periſhed by violence, they too muſt die, and there was no inſtance of their failing in this part of their engagement.

Craſſus being arrived on the Garonne, and warned by the example of other Roman officers, who had fallen or miſcarried in this ſervice, deferred paſſing the river till he had augmented his force by the

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junction of ſome troops from Toulouſe, and other parts of the Roman province. Being thus reinforced, he proceeded againſt the natives who were divided into many little hordes, of which Cæſar has, on this occaſion, enumerated twelve, jealous of each other, and unwilling to join even in their common defence. They accordingly, notwithſtanding their valour, fell ſeparately into the hands of the Romans, and in the end were vanquiſhed, or made their ſubmiſſion.

By theſe conqueſts, the former acquiſitions of Cæſar on the Seine and the Marne, had a direct communication with the diſtricts of Toulouſe and Narbonne, or what was already called the Roman province of Gaul. Cæſar himſelf, having re-eſtabliſhed peace in thoſe tracts which are now termed Britanny and Normandy, cloſed the campaign with a march to the northward, where he penetrated through the marſhes and woods into Brabant; but being ſtopped by heavy rains, and the approach of winter, he returned on his route, without making any ſettlement; and having put his army into winter quarters among the nations who had lately revolted, he ſet out as uſual for Italy. There his preſence was greatly wanted by Pompey and Craſſus, who, on the approach of the elections, were likely to meet with unexpected difficulties in executing the plan lately concerted between them.

At Rome, the ſpring and part of the ſummer had paſſed in diſputes between perſons connected with the oppoſite parties. Clodius had attacked Cicero in his own perſon, in his effects, and in the perſons of his friends. P. Sextius, who, in the character of Tribune, had been ſo active in the recal of this injured exile, and who had expoſed his life in the riots to which that queſtion gave riſe, was now accuſed, and brought to trial for ſuppoſed acts of violence committed by him in the courſe of thoſe conteſts. He was defended with great zeal by Hortenſius, and with a proper gratitude by Cicero; and by their

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joint endeavours was, on the twelfth of March, acquitted by the unanimous verdict of his judges [9].

After this trial was over, a piece of ſuperſtition, curious as it forms a picture of the age, gave occaſion to a freſh diſpute between Cicero and his enemy Clodius. Upon a report, that horrid noiſes and claſhing of arms had been heard under ground in one of the ſuburbs, the Senate thought proper to take the ſubject under conſideration, and they referred it for interpretation to the college of Aruſpices. This body delivered in judgment, that the gods were offended, among other things, by the neglect and profanation of the holy rites, and by the proſtitution of ſacred places to profane uſes. This reſponſe Clodius endeavoured to apply to the caſe of Cicero's houſe, once conſecrated and ſet apart for religion, and now again profaned by being reſtored to its former owner. Cicero endeavoured to remove the charge of profanation from himſelf to Clodius, by reviving the memory of his famous adventure in Cæſar's houſe. "If I quote "any more recent act of impiety," ſays he, "this citizen will recal "me to the former inſtance, in which he intended no more than "adultery." He proceeded, however, to apply the reſponſe of the Augurs to a late intruſion of Clodius in ruſhing into the theatre with an armed rabble, while the games were celebrating in honour of the great Goddeſs.

The Senate for two days together liſtened to the mutual invectives of both parties, and were entertained with their endeavours to ſurpaſs each other in declarations of zeal for religion. Cicero, however, by the goodneſs of his cauſe, the force of his admirable talents, and perhaps ſtill more by the aid of the Triumvirate, whoſe favour he earneſtly cultivated, prevailed in the conteſt.

[9] Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. epiſt. 4. Orat. pro Sext.

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This martyr in the cauſe of the Senate, ever ſince his return from baniſhment, courted the formidable parties, whoſe power, at leaſt to hurt, he had experienced. He committed, or affected to commit, himſelf intirely into the hands of Pompey; and, with a declaration of much attachment alſo to Cæſar, compoſed a flattering panegyric, which this leader received with great pleaſure [10], probably more on account of the breach it was likely to make among his opponents in the Senate, than on account of the ſatisfaction he received from it, or of any real acceſſion of ſtrength it gave him in the purſuit of his deſigns. By this conduct Cicero diſguſted his former friends, and felt his ſituation in the city ſo painful, that he abſented himſelf, during great part of the ſummer, from Rome; a circumſtance which interrupted the courſe, or changed the ſubject of thoſe letters to which we are indebted for the beſt record of the times.

We have indeed great reaſon to regret any interruption of materials from which the hiſtory of this Conſulate might be collected. The republic ſeems in part to have recovered its dignity by the able and reſolute conduct of Marcellinus, and by the tacit concurrence of his colleague Philippus, who, though connected with Cæſar, did not co-operate in the execution of his deſigns [11]. By the influence of theſe Conſuls the applications made to the Senate by Gabinius, now commanding in Syria, for certain cuſtomary honours were rejected [12]. This refuſal was intended to mortify Pompey, who protected Gabinius, and who himſelf was commonly treated by Marcellinus with great freedom and ſeverity. The ariſtocratical party recovered their courage, and Domitius Ahenobarbus, by their influence, was in a fair way to ſucceed in his election for Conſul of the following year.

[10] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 5.
[11] Cic. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 6. [12] Ibid. ep. 7.

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The Tribunes, excited chiefly by Caius Cato, eſpouſed the oppoſite intereſt, and propoſed many reſolutions to the People, in order to favour their deſigns. The Conſul Marcellinus endeavoured to interrupt them by the appointment of faſts and holidays, in which it was not lawful to tranſact affairs in the aſſembly of the People. The Tribunes, in their turn, ſuſpended the election of Conſuls, and in this were encouraged by Pompey and Craſſus, who feared the effect of a choice to be made under the direction of Marcellinus, and had not even openly declared their own intentions to offer themſelves. Their late interview with Cæſar, and the part they ſince took, had created ſuſpicion of their views. Marcellinus put the queſtion to Pompey in the Senate, whether he deſired the Conſulate for himſelf? And this politician, long unaccuſtomed to make plain declarations, anſwered indirectly, That if there were no ill-diſpoſed citizens in the commonwealth, he ſhould have no ſuch deſire. Craſſus, to the ſame queſtion, made a like evaſive reply, That he ſhould be governed by what he judged beſt for the State. Both appear to have perceived that they were to rely for ſucceſs chiefly on popular tumults; and as theſe would come to be employed with great diſadvantage againſt ſuch an able and reſolute magiſtrate as Marcellinus, they took meaſures to defer the elections until the term of the preſent Conſuls in office ſhould expire [13].

They found the Tribune Caius Cato a proper inſtrument for their purpoſe, ſecured his negative, and employed it repeatedly to ſuſpend the elections. The republic, upon the approach of the new year, being to loſe its former magiſtrates, without any ſucceſſion of new ones, was likely to fall into a ſtate of great confuſion. The Senate went into mourning, and diſcharged every member from aſſiſting at any of the public diverſions. In this ſtate of ſuſpence and

[13] Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 37.

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public alarm, Publius Clodius, who had for ſome time been at variance with Pompey, as if gained by the ſympathy of meaſures on this occaſion, was reconciled to him, and attacked Marcellinus with continual invectives.

In this manner the year was ſuffered to elapſe without any election of Conſuls. The faſces dropped from the hands of Marcellinus and Philippus, and an interregnum enſued. Pompey and Craſſus then openly appeared as candidates for the vacant offices of State. Young Craſſus came from the army in Gaul, attended by a numerous body of citizens then ſerving under Cæſar: they brought a conſiderable acceſſion of votes to the party of their general, and were themſelves not likely to be outſtripped by their opponents in acts of ſedition and the uſe of force. Domitius Ahenobarbus alone, ſupported by the councils of his kinſman Marcus Cato, had the courage to perſiſt in a conteſt with theſe powerful and dangerous antagoniſts. The time of election being fixed, he went before break of day to occupy his place in the field of Mars, but found his way already obſtructed by a diſorderly populace, and even by men in arms. The ſlave who carried a light before him was killed. Some of his friends, particularly Marcus Cato, was wounded*; and his adherents, not being in condition to diſpute the ground with the force that was aſſembled againſt them, retired to their own houſes, leaving Pompey and Craſſus to be named without oppoſition.

In the ſame manner the faction of the Triumvirate over-ruled every other election, procured the preference, which has already been mentioned, of Vatinius to Cato, and filled every office with their own creatures. They carried the appointment of Ædiles by actual force, and at the expence of the lives of ſome of thoſe who oppoſed them. Pompey himſelf having been entangled in one of theſe tumults,

* Plutarch. in Craſſ. Pompeio, &c.

retired

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retired to change his clothes, which were ſtained with blood. They were diſappointed in the nomination only of two of the Tribunes, Publius Acquilius Gallus and Ateius Capito, who were of the oppoſite party.

U. C. 698. Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 2do; M. Licinius Craſſus.

Theſe events however were, by the conteſt which aroſe on every queſtion, deferred for all the months of winter and ſpring. The offices of Prætor were not filled up by the middle of May [15]. The elections had begun for this purpoſe ſome time before; but it being obſerved that Marcus Cato had the firſt Centuries, Pompey, under a pretence, allowed by the Roman ſuperſtition, that he was to obſerve the heavens, interpoſed to ſuſpend the ballot. The faction employed the time which they obtained by this delay in procuring votes, and were ſo unguarded in giving money, that they laid themſelves open to a criminal proſecution, and had reaſon to apprehend that whatever election they made would be diſputed at law. To prevent this conſequence, Afranius, a perſon intirely under the directon of Pompey, moved in the aſſembly of the People for a diſpenſation from the ſtatute of bribery in the caſe of elections then depending for the office of Prætor; and having obtained this extraordinary indulgence, ſecured to the party the fruits of their influence and of their money [16].

Among the acts of Pompey and Craſſus, in their ſecond Conſulate, are mentioned ſome regulations reſpecting the courts of juſtice by which the juries, though taken in equal numbers from the Senate, the Equeſtrian order, and the maſs of the People, were nevertheleſs limited to perſons of conſiderable property. There are likewiſe mentioned ſome reſolutions then paſſed to enforce the laws againſt murder, and to amend thoſe againſt bribery by additional penalties, together with a ſumptuary law to check the extravagance and prodigality of the age. "So willing were theſe magiſtrates," ſaid Hor-

[15] Cicer. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 9.

[16] Cicero ad Quint. Frat.

tenſius,

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tenſius, " to compenſate by their acts for the defects of their practice, " that they made laws even to limit the expence of the table." Such profeſſions to reform the age were probably intended to retrieve the character which the popular leaders had loſt by the violence and barefaced corruption of their recent canvaſs, and to mark their adminiſtration with ſome meaſures that might ſeem to diſprove the imputations commonly laid to their charge.

Pompey, at the ſame time, had an opportunity to ſignalize his Conſulate, by opening, during the preſent year, the magnificent theatre which he himſelf, or his freedman Demetrius, had erected for the accommodation of the People at their public ſhows. At this ſolemnity were exhibited many dramatic performances and entertainments of every ſort. Among theſe, in the courſe of five days, no leſs than five hundred lions were let looſe and killed by African huntſmen; and the whole concluded with the baiting of eighteen elephants, animals that ſeemed to have ſagacity enough to be conſcious of the indignity and the wrong which they ſuffered. By their piteous cries they moved compaſſion in the breaſts even of that barbarous rabble, for whoſe entertaiment they were ſlain [17].

The allotment of provinces, which was the principal object of this Conſulate, was for ſome time kept from the view of the People. Pompey continued to profeſs that he did not intend to accept of any province whatever. But the public gave no credit to ſuch declarations on his part; and his own partizans were accuſtomed to preſs upon him what he affected to decline [18]. Every one, therefore, in all converſations, endeavoured to accommodate him in a province, ſome with Syria, others with Spain and Africa; to all which ſuggeſtions, or officious projects, he affected indifference, or even averſion. Trebonius, however, at this time Tribune of the People,

[17] Dio. lib. xxxix. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. vii. Plin. lib. viii. c. 7.
[18] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 9.

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made a motion, which was ſoon underſtood to be the real mind of Pompey, and the actual reſult of his counſels: that the province of Syria ſhould be aſſigned to Craſſus; that of Spain, together with Africa, to himſelf; each in imitation of Cæſar's appointment in Gaul, to continue for five years, with ſuch eſtabliſhments of men and of money as the neceſſity of the ſervice during that period might require. This motion was made in execution of the original plan concerted with Cæſar, and it ſerved to bring to light the object of their late conference at Lucca, which had ſo much alarmed the friends of the republic.

On the day that this motion was made in the aſſembly, Marcus Cato, by means of the Tribunes Atteius Capito and Acquilius Gallus, obtained leave to addreſs the People. He endeavoured to diſappoint the purpoſe of the meeting, by occupying ſo much of their time as to prevent their coming to any deciſion. Being commanded ſilence, and perſiſting to ſpeak, he was ordered by Trebonius into cuſtody. In this manner, however, the firſt day was ſpent, and the aſſembly adjourned to the next morning.

The Tribunes Atteius and Gallus, ſuſpecting that means might be uſed to exclude them from the aſſembly which was then to be held, took meaſures to ſecure their admiſſion. For this purpoſe Gallus remained all night in the ſenate-houſe, which fronted the Comitia or place of aſſembly. But this device was turned againſt himſelf; the oppoſite party having placed a guard to confine him in that place during the greater part of the following day. His colleague Atteius, with Cato, Favonius, and ſome others, eluded the parties that were placed to intercept them, and found their way to the place of aſſembly. When the queſtion was put, Cato, being lifted up into view by thoſe of his friends who were about him, gave an alarm that it thundered; an intimation ever held by the religious cuſtoms of the Romans to

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be ominous, and ſufficient to ſuſpend their procedure in any buſineſs of State. He was, however, on this occaſion forced from the Comitium with the ſlaughter of ſome of his friends, who reſiſted the force that was employed againſt them. About the ſame time the Tribune Acquilius was wounded in forcing his way from the Senate-houſe, and a great concourſe of people was forming round him as he ſtood bleeding in the ſtreets. Violence to the perſon of a Tribune was ſtill conſidered with religious horror, and the Conſuls, in whoſe behalf this tumult had been raiſed, fearing the conſequence of ſuffering ſuch a ſpectacle to remain in the view of the People, ordered the multitude to withdraw, and removed the Tribune, ſtill bleeding of his wounds, from the public view.

In the ſequel of theſe operations, Pompey and Craſſus obtained the provinces in queſtion, and in the terms propoſed; they proceeded to fulfil their part of the late engagement to Cæſar, by moving that his command ſhould be continued during an additional term of five years more. "Now, indeed," ſaid Cato (addreſſing himſelf to Pompey), "the burden is preparing for your own ſhoulders. It will "one day fall on the republic, but not till after it has cruſhed you "to the ground."

Theſe arrangements being made, the officers thus appointed proceeded to take charge of their truſt. Pompey, the newly named Proconſul of Spain, under pretence of a war ſubſiſting with the Vaccei, raiſed the eſtabliſhment of his province to four legions, two of which Cæſar ſoon after, under pretence of more urgent ſervice in Gaul, had the addreſs to borrow from him.

Pompey either had not yet begun to perceive what Cato ſuggeſted to him, That the greateſt difficulty he had to fear, in preſerving the eminence to which he aſpired, was the emulation of Cæſar; and that the ſword muſt determine the conteſt between them; or he flattered himſelf

himſelf that, like the perſon who ſtays at the helm, he was to command the veſſel; and by remaining at the ſeat of government, while his aſſociates and rivals accepted of appointments at a diſtance, that he continued to preſide as ſovereign, and ſupreme dictator of the whole. Under the influence of theſe conceptions, although his proper ſtation was Spain, he either procured, or at leaſt availed himſelf of, a motion that was made by ſome of the Tribunes to detain him in Italy; and fancied, while he ſent his own lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, as private agents for himſelf into that province, that even Cæſar and Craſſus, though in a more publick character, were however to act in a ſubordinate ſtation to himſelf. CHAP. VII.

Craſſus ever conſidered riches as the chief conſtituents of power, and he expected, with the ſpoils of Aſia, to equal the military or political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. From the levies and other preparations which he made for his province, it ſoon appeared that he intended a war with the Parthians, the only antagoniſts which the Romans had left on the frontier of Syria. Obſerving that he was likely to meet with an oppoſition to this deſign from the Senate and from the Tribunes, who exerted their powers to interrupt his preparations, and took meaſures to detain him at home, he became the more impatient to ſet out for his province, and left Rome before the expiration of the year for which he was elected into the office of Conſul. The Tribune Atteius endeavoured to ſtop him, firſt by his tribunitian negative, next by actual force, and laſt of all by ſolemn imprecations, devoting the Conſul himſelf, and all who ſhould follow him on that ſervice, to deſtruction.

While Craſſus paſſed through the gates of Rome, on his intended departure for Aſia, this Tribune, with a lighted fire, the uſual form of devoting a victim to the infernal gods, denounced a curſe, which greatly alarmed many of the followers of Craſſus. This piece of ſuperſtition he might, in his own mind, have juſtly contemned: but it

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was imprudent to slight the effects of it on the minds of the People, and on the minds of his own army. In the apprehension of both he was by this form doomed to destruction, and proceeded in the war at the head of troops ill prepared to ward off calamities, which they were thus made to believe hung over them, in consequence of imprecations of which they did not question the efficacy.

THE HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

State of the Commonwealth.——Adminiſtration of the Provinces.——Operations of Cæſar in Gaul, Germany, and Britain.——State of Pompey at Rome.——Progreſs of Craſſus into Syria.——Kingdom of Parthia.——Invaſion of Craſſus beyond the Euphrates.——Second Invaſion of Cæſar in Britain.

CHAP. I.

THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Craſſus, with that which was at the ſame time prolonged to Cæſar, ſeemed to diſmember the empire, if not to expoſe the republic itſelf to great danger.

Of theſe three adventurers, Pompey and Cæſar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of their meaſures, were in themſelves

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ſelves ſubjects of a very dangerous character: neither poſſeſſed that dignity of mind which fits the citizen for the equality of perſons in a republican State; neither could acquieſce in the ſame meaſures of conſideration or power which other Senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at eaſe where he did not command as maſter, or appear at leaſt as the principal object in every ſcene in which he was employed.

This paltry ambition, ſome ages before, might have been held in contempt by the meaneſt of the People, or muſt have ſhrunk before that noble elevation of mind by which the ſtateſman conceived no eminence beſides that of high perſonal qualities employed in public ſervices, or before that auſtere virtue which confined the public eſteem to acts of public utility, ſupported by unblemiſhed reputation in private life. But in the preſent age, there was a faſhion which ſet ſuch antiquated notions at defiance, controuled the authority of the State itſelf, and beſtowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due to its legal head.

In the progreſs of this republic the character of parties has already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the firſt periods of its hiſtory, citizens were divided on the ſuppoſed diſtinctions of birth; and, in the capacities of Patrician or Plebeian, ſtrove for prerogative or privilege with much emulation, as ſeparate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealouſy of perſonal intereſts.

In a ſubſequent period, when the invidious part of the former diſtinction was removed, citizens having no longer the ſame ſubject of animoſity, as being born to different pretenſions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of ſeparate factions. They ſtrove for the aſcendant of ariſtocratical or

democratical government, according to the intereſt they had formed to themſelves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to ſacrifice the peace and honour of the Public to their own paſſions, and entered into diſputes accordingly, which were in the higheſt degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They thought perſonal provocations were ſufficient to juſtify public diſorders; or, actuated by vehement animoſities, they ſignalized their victories with the blood of their antagoniſts. But, though ſanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of uſurpation to enſlave their country, nor formed a ſyſtem of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themſelves were led by their ſuppoſed perſonal wrongs or factious reſentments.

We are now again once more to change the ſcene, and to have under our conſideration the conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any intereſt of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of State; who had no reſentments to gratify; or who eaſily ſacrificed thoſe which they felt to the purpoſes of a cool and deliberate deſign on the ſovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occaſionally enter into combinations for mutual ſupport, frequently changed their partizans, and had no permanent quarrel but with thoſe who uniformly wiſhed to preſerve the republic. They were ſurrounded by perſons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power which were gained at the expence of their country, and who indeed were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who led a numerous liſt of retainers to ſhare in the ſpoils of the commonwealth.

Peace had now, for ſome years, except in that part where Cæſar commanded, been eſtabliſhed throughout the empire. Inſtead of military operations, the State was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppreſſion from the provinces, and in appointing the ſucceſſion of military governors. Beſides the diſputes

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diſputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Craſſus and Cæſar, there aroſe a queſtion on the ſubject of provinces to be aſſigned to their immediate predeceſſors in the Conſulate, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was ſtrongly urged that Piſo, Gabinius, and even Cæſar, ſhould be recalled to make way for officers who were intitled to ſimilar command in their turns. This meaſure was ſupported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piſo and Gabinius ſhould be ſuperſeded; but urged the continuance of Cæſar in his ſtation, a circumſtance for which this able adventurer had taken ſufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the iſſue of this debate.

Piſo, the near relation of Cæſar, in the event of theſe deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the Senate, in terms of great aſperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piſo and Gabinius, though in reality but the inſtruments of Pompey and Cæſar, as the principal authors of his late calamities; and, upon the preſent occaſion, had pronounced againſt Piſo that violent invective which ſtill remains among his works, and which the ſubſequent conduct of the perſon againſt whom it was directed in a great meaſure diſproved.

Gabinius had for ſome years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner, which, together with ſome other offences, drew upon him, at his return to Rome, the animadverſion of the Senate.

It has been mentioned that Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown; that his ſuit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid to a ſuppoſed oracle, which forbade his being reinſtated with a military force; that he had withdrawn to Epheſus, and taken ſanctuary in the temple, where he waited for ſome change of fortune in his favour. Lentulus, the

governor of Cilicia, to whom the buſineſs of reſtoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the Senate, deliberated whether he ſhould not venture to diſregard the reſtriction impoſed upon him; march with an army to reſtore the king of Egypt; poſſeſs himſelf of the wealth which was to be found in effecting ſuch a revolution, and truſt to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the Senate, and even their approbation of what he ſhould have done. CHAP. I.

Upon this queſtion Cicero adviſed Lentulus, if he had a force ſufficient to undertake the enterprize, not to loſe an opportunity of performing a ſervice which, though not authoriſed, could be afterwards vindicated. But the buſineſs ſtill remained in ſuſpence, when Gabinius arrived in Syria, and probably, by an advice from Pompey to the ſame purpoſe with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in oppoſition to a decree of the Senate and of the Augurs, the reſtoration of this exile to his throne. Having received or bargained for a great ſum of money in return for this ſervice, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, paſſed through Paleſtine, and on his way raiſed a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolomy, now in poſſeſſion of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to ſtrengthen her hands againſt her father, had aſſumed her huſband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of theſe aſſociated ſovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolomy was reſtored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treaſure amaſſed on this occaſion, hoped to be ſecure againſt the attacks which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the Senate, and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accuſed at the ſame time in Paleſtine, a part of his own province.

In this buſy time of Cæſar's faction at Rome, he himſelf, upon an alarm of an invaſion from Germany, had been called to defend

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the northern extremity of Gaul. Two ſeparate hordes, the *Tenchteri* and *Uſipetes*, pretending to be driven by ſuperior force from the uſual tract of their migrations, had united together, and preſented themſelves on the banks of the Rhine. The native inhabitants of the right of that river inſtantly abandoned their habitations, and collecting all the boats that could be found on it to the oppoſite ſide, made a diſpoſition to ſtop the paſſage of theſe invaders.

The Germans, obſerving the precautions which were taking againſt them, affected to lay aſide the deſign of paſſing the Rhine; and, by changing their courſe, made a feint to divert the attention of their antagoniſts. In execution of this purpoſe, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, ſuppoſing that their opponents would be off their guard, and returned to their ordinary way of life, they ſuddenly turned their whole cavalry, and in one night repaſſed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding days, ſurpriſed a ſufficient number of boats with which to accompliſh their paſſage, diſlodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuſe, over what is now called the dutchies of Juliers, of Limburg and Luxemburgh.

Theſe invaders amounted, by Cæſar's account, to upwards of four hundred thouſand ſouls [1]; a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, beſides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raiſe ſome ſuſpicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itſelf intended to raiſe the character of Cæſar at Rome. On the queſtion relating to the probability of ſo great a number, it may be obſerved, that thoſe migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practiſed to ſupply and accommodate populous cities, were

[1] Cæſar de Bell. Gall. lib. iv. c. 15.

likewiſe exempt from the want of ſuch ſupplies, and acquieſced in what was neceſſary to mere ſubſiſtence. Such nations have leſs ſkill and induſtry than the manufacturer and the trader in a ſettled and well regulated city; but they have leſs waſte and leſs miſapplication of labour to ſuperfluous and unprofitable purpoſes than take place in great cities.

The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to obſerve among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture ſupported by ſkill and induſtry, yet frequently preferred the ſtate of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent ſettlement, leſt the care of property, and the ſtudy of unneceſſary accommodation, ſhould corrupt or enervate their people. Their favourite occupation was hunting, which they conſidered as a preparation for war. They traverſed the woods and paſture lands, with numerous herds, and ſubſiſted chiefly by milk, fleſh, and game. They likewiſe knew the uſe of corn, of which they ſometimes took a crop from favourable lands; but without remaining any longer than one ſeaſon to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, that muſt to a great extent have covered the face of the country over which they paſſed; but the body thus moving together were diſtinguiſhed into ſeparate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their ſeveral diviſions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own country, and to chuſe their leaders for this purpoſe. In peace, the ſeparate clans had no band of connection. If they had at any time a general government which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourſe in war, and on other preſſing occaſions.

Under ſuch equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labour for himſelf, and to ſubſiſt by

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what he procured; and he employed his labour only in procuring what was neceſſary. In theſe circumſtances, it was not likely that commodities ſhould accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the teſtimony of Cæſar in this place, or on the evidence of ancient hiſtory in general, was certainly great [a].

The Suevi, before whom the preſent invaders of Gaul had retired, were ſaid to conſiſt of a hundred cantons, each furniſhing annually a thouſand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domeſtic concerns. Such clouds gathering on the frontier of Cæſar's province, required his preſence. He accordingly aſſembled his army, and advanced between the Rhine and the Meuſe.

The Germans, in general, were accuſtomed to deſpiſe the Gauls, and the preſent invaders expected no formidable oppoſition on this ſide of the Rhine; they had ventured to divide their forces, and had ſent the great body of their horſe upon an excurſion beyond the Meuſe to ſcour the lower parts of the country, and upon Cæſar's approach, they offered to treat with him. "They neither ſought "(they ſaid) nor would they decline a war with the Romans. It "was their way to repel injuries with the ſword, not to elude them "by negociation. But in the preſent caſe, they ſhould nevertheleſs "condeſcend ſo far as to aſſure the Roman general, that they had "paſſed the Rhine from neceſſity, and not with any intention to in-"vade his province. That if he were pleaſed to receive them as "friends, they were in condition to merit this title, ſhould be con-"tent with the ground they had gained, or accept of any other "which he might chuſe to aſſign them." Cæſar replied, "That while "they remained in Gaul, he could not conſider them as friends. "That if they repaſſed the Rhine, he had allies in Germany, with "whom he ſhould endeavour to join them in a league of defence

[a] Cæſar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. vi.

"againſt

"againſt the common enemy, by whom they had been thus forced "to relinquiſh their uſual bounds."

Having received this anſwer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, deſired a ceſſation of arms for three days. But Cæſar, ſuſpecting that they only meant to amuſe him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refuſed to comply with this requeſt, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of their camp, he was again met by their deputies, with freſh intreaties that he would advance no farther, or at leaſt, that he would give to the cavalry, who made the vanguard of his army, orders to abſtain from hoſtilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an anſwer from the German nations mentioned in their laſt conference, and know whether ſuch a league could be formed, as was then propoſed, to give them ſome proſpect of ſafety in returning to their uſual haunts.

Cæſar, upon this occaſion, ſeems to have granted a ceſſation of arms; though on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminiſh the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies. He agreed to advance no farther than four miles for the convenience of water, and ſent an order to his van-guard to abſtain from hoſtilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced guard, conſiſting of five thouſand horſe, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horſe. They had earneſtly ſued for a ceſſation of hoſtilities; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæſar accuſed them of a deſign, with this ſmall party, to ſurpriſe the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this ſkirmiſh of the cavalry, the leaders and principal men of the Germans leaving their own camp, unfurniſhed

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unfurniſhed with officers, in perfect ſecurity, came in great numbers to that of Cæſar to exculpate themſelves, to convince him of their pacific diſpoſitions, and to prevent the farther progreſs of his army. This he thought a favourable opportunity to cut off, by a complete ſurprize, this enemy entirely, and to finiſh the war. Having accordingly ſecured the perſons of their leaders, who had thus put themſelves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, eaſily overcame the few that took arms to oppoſe him, and without diſtinction of ſex or age, put the whole to the ſword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to eſcape from the camp, at which the ſlaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuſe, was ſtrowed with the ſlain [3].

The Roman people, though ſeldom ſparing of the blood of their enemies, were ſhocked at the recital of this extraordinary maſſacre; and when Cæſar, on account of this victory, applied for a thankſgiving, and for the uſual honorary decrees of the ſenate, he was charged with having wantonly invaded the nations of Gaul, and of having diſhonoured, by an act of treachery, the arms of the Republic. It was propoſed to deliver up his perſon to thoſe injured nations, that he might expiate, by his own ſufferings, ſo many acts of injuſtice and impiety, which the Gods might otherwiſe avenge on his country.

The German horſe, that by their abſence had eſcaped this calamity which befel their countrymen, appear ſoon after to have repaſſed the Rhine, and to have taken refuge with ſome of the Hordes who lived near the ſources of the Roer and the Lippe. Thither Cæſar, to ſpread the terror of his arms, ſoon afterwards purſued them; and paſſed the river, not in boats and by ſurpriſe, as the Germans were accuſtomed to do, but in a manner which he ſeems to

[3] That branch of the Rhine which falls into the Meuſe, changes its name for that of Wall.

have

have choſen, as better ſuited to the dignity of the Roman ſtate; he projected a bridge, which was executed in ten days, with much ingenuity, and ſome oſtentation of his power and ſkill. This work being finiſhed, he placed proper guards at both its extremities, and advanced with the main body of his army into the contiguous parts of Germany, where, on account of the reception given in that quarter to the cavalry who had eſcaped the late maſſacre on the Meuſe, he laid the country under military execution.

Cæſar, from the place at which he had paſſed the Rhine, appears to have gone up the eaſtern ſide of the river, where he viſited the Ubii, a nation inhabiting over againſt what are now the cities of Bonne and Cologn. Here he had intelligence, that the Suevi, a nation conſiſting, as has been obſerved, of a hundred cantons, and muſtering two hundred thouſand warriors, who were divided into two ſquadrons that took the field, and conducted the domeſtic affairs of the nation by turns, were preparing to oppoſe him; that they had actually ſent their wives, children, and ſuperannuated men into places of ſafety, and had aſſembled their warriors to meet him. This nation having an aſcendant over all the cantons of Germany, conſidered it as a proof of their valour, that no nation could pretend to ſettle on the tract of their migrations, or within reach of their excurſions; and that the country, to a great diſtance around them, was accordingly waſte. In their own movements, they never halted above a year to raiſe a ſingle crop from fields, which, to keep up the martial ſpirit of their nation, and to preclude the deſire of property, with the other paſſions that accompany ſettlement, they ſucceſſively abandoned.

Cæſar, not being prepared to enter on a war with ſuch an enemy, and being ſenſible that a defeat might expoſe his army to ruin, while even a victory could procure him no adequate advantage, having remained eighteen days on that ſide of the Rhine, and employed no more than twenty-eight days in the whole ſervice, choſe, while he

ſtill

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ſtill had the reputation of victory unimpaired, to repaſs that river, and to break down his bridge.

This ſingular man, whoſe abilities were equal to any taſk, and who had no occaſion to court the publick admiration by meaſures concerted on purpoſe to obtain it, was, nevertheleſs, not above oſtentation, and gave way to it not only where it might contribute to impoſe on an enemy, but even where it would do no more than gratify his own vanity, or increaſe the fame of his actions at Rome. To this motive we may venture to impute the deſign, which, at an advanced ſeaſon of the year, and at the end of the ſame ſummer in which he had, between the Meuſe and the Rhine, vanquiſhed the numerous army of the Tenchteri and Uſepetes, in which he had paſſed the Rhine, and inſulted the warlike nations of Germany, even on their own ground, he now projected the invaſion of Britain, though ſurrounded by the ocean, and untouched by the arms of any foreign invader. To carry this deſign into immediate execution, as ſoon as he had repaſſed the Rhine, he continued his march through the low countries, and collected his forces in the neighbourhood of the Portus Itius and Geſoriacum [4]. While we perceive the features of vanity in the leader, we muſt admire the hardineſs and vigour of the troops who could accompliſh theſe ſervices.

The extent of this iſland, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæſar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in theſe particulars, ſent a galley with orders to explore the coaſt, and to obſerve the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his ſhipping, and even thoſe veſſels which he had employed the preceding year againſt the Veneti [5], to ſail round the Cape of Britanny into the Britiſh channel, and repair to the ſtraits which ſeparate this iſland from the continent.

[4] Calais and Boulogne.

[5] In the Bay of Biſcay, about Vannes.

On

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On the report of theſe preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, ſome of the natives, willing to avert by negociation the ſtorm which threatened them, ſent to the Roman Proconſul a ſubmiſſive meſſage, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæſar, founding a claim to the poſſeſſion of the iſland on theſe advances which were made to him, proceeded with more boldneſs to the execution of his enterpriſe. That the natives of the country he was leaving might not create any trouble in his abſence, he obliged them to give hoſtages, and made a proper diſpoſition of his army to keep them in awe. He had aſſembled at the moſt convenient haven on the Gauliſh ſide, now ſuppoſed to be the Wiſſan, between Calais and Boulogne [6], eighty tranſports or ſhips of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank, and their equipage. The remainder of his ſhipping was yet detained, by contrary winds, in a creek at ſome miles diſtance, ſuppoſed to be Boulogne; thither he ſent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ſhips where they lay. He himſelf went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former haven, and having found a favourable wind and moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coaſt of Britain, on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he firſt came near to the ſhore, were high and ſteep, and the hills were covered with numerous bodies of foot, of men on horſeback, and even in wheel carriages, from which the natives of this country were accuſtomed to make war. It being impoſſible to land under ſuch difficulties; and in the face of this oppoſition he bore away, as is probable, to the northward about eight miles, with a favourable wind to ſome part of the flat ſhore [7] which ſurrounds the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which

[6] See Danville's Geography of antient Gaul.

[7] Planum & apertum littus. See Cæſar's Commentaries.

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the ſhipping of thoſe times was built, ran his tranſports aground, and prepared to land.

In the mean time the Britons, who in their march on the hills had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the ſtrand, and advanced even ſome way into the water to oppoſe the deſcent. As the ſurf on that ſhore uſually runs high, and the Romans, from where their veſſels ſtruck, had ſome way to wade in water that was too deep to allow them the free uſe of their weapons, they remained on board, and durſt not meet the enemy under ſuch diſadvantages. Cæſar ſeeing his men unuſually backward, did not think proper in theſe circumſtances to urge them farther; but ordered ſome of the lighteſt veſſels, which were mounted with miſſile engines, or manned with archers and ſlingers, to row as near to the ſhore as they could on the right and the left of the landing place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This diſpoſition ſucceeded ſo well, that the beach cloſe to the water was preſently cleared, and the Romans were left to deſcend from their ſhips, and to wade undiſturbed to the land.

The Britons, ſeeing their enemy in poſſeſſion of the ſhore, offered to ſurrender, and were about to deliver their hoſtages, when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to take arms. On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a ſecond diviſion of ſhips, with the cavalry, appeared in ſight; but before they could reach the land, were diſperſed by a violent ſtorm; part was driven back on the coaſt of Gaul, part carried down the Britiſh channel, and caſt in diſtreſs on the contiguous ſhores. Even the ſhipping, from which the legions had diſembarked, lying aground in the ſurf, or at anchor in a high ſea and ſpring-tide, with which the Italians were unacquainted, were ſet adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly ſhattered, and rendered unſerviceable.

By

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By theſe misfortunes, Cæſar, although he had made no proviſion to ſubſiſt for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in it for want of ſhipping. The natives retracted their late ſubmiſſion, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waſte the country within reach of the Roman camp. They flattered themſelves that the enemy would be obliged to depart, or muſt periſh for want of proviſions; and that they would, by the example of ſo vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every ſtranger for the future from invading their iſland.

Cæſar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greateſt diligence in repairing his ſhips, endeavoured to collect ſome proviſions, and to form a magazine. The natives aſſembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover them with the whole force of his army. The legions were at firſt greatly diſconcerted by the unuſual effect of the Britiſh chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry; but as they prevailed in every cloſe fight, the Britons were ſoon obliged to renew their former ſubmiſſion, and became bound to deliver double the number of hoſtages they had formerly ſtipulated. But Cæſar not thinking it proper, with ſhattered veſſels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and ſtormy ſeas, to await the performance of this article, ordered the hoſtages to be ſent after him into Gaul, reimbarked with his army, and with the firſt favourable wind repaſſed to the continent. At his arrival, he found that the Gauls, upon the report of his late misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his tranſports, with three hundred men on board, having parted with the fleet, and landing at a ſeparate place, were attacked; and that it was neceſſary to ſend the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the diſtricts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the low countries, had taken arms againſt the officers he had ſtationed to keep them in awe. The campaign therefore concluded

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with the operations, which were neceſſary to quell this revolt. Labienus ſubdued the Morini. Quintus, Titurius, Sabinus, and Lucius Cotta having laid waſte great part of the low countries, fell back to the coaſt.

The Roman army was ſoon after put into winter quarters; and Cæſar, as if ſenſible that he had made his attempt on Britain with too ſmall a force, and whatever repreſentation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miſcarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ſhips as poſſible, built upon a conſtruction more fit for that ſervice, broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horſes, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was probably taken from the neighbouring foreſts; but the materials of his rigging, it is ſaid, were brought from Spain. Having taken theſe meaſures to enable him at a more convenient ſeaſon to renew his expedition into Britain, he ſet out as uſual for Italy, and for the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here he found Pompey and Craſſus employed, as has been already related, in obtaining for themſelves, and for him, the objects which they had ſeverally in view. Craſſus had fixed his thoughts on the treaſures of the eaſt, and projected the ſale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the diſpoſal in that part of the world. Pompey too was gratified in his wiſhes, had got the command of an army, and the patronage of a great province, while he continued at Rome to enjoy his conſideration, and was veſted with a ſpecies of monarchy, in wielding the united powers of the party. Cæſar had provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controverſy, a great army, inured to ſervice, and in a ſtation which gave an eaſy acceſs to Italy, and the command of Rome. As if ſecure of their intereſts, they permitted the election of Conſuls to proceed without diſturbance; and ſuffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a profeſſed

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U. C. 659. L. Dom. Ahenobarbus, App. Claud. Pulcher.

partizan of the ſenate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected conſuls; Marcus, Cato, and Milo, to be placed in the liſt of Prætors; and ſeveral citizens, well affected to the Senate, to be admitted into the college of Tribunes.

The winter and ſpring, however, were inactive on the part of the ariſtocracy. Cato, probably did not ſee any publick object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to reſtrain by his authority, and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to perſons, from whoſe ambition the republic had much to fear, no doubt greatly alarmed the ſenate; but this body, though led by Domitius, one of the Conſuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the Prætors, and ſupported by many of the Tribunes, did not think themſelves entitled to diſpute the validity of thoſe grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been ſo recently confirmed by the people.

Pompey, now maſter of Spain and part of Africa, with an adequate army, ſtill under the pretence, as has been mentioned, of his commiſſion to furniſh the public granaries with corn, remained in Italy, and paſſed the greater part of his time among his country villas, executing the duties of general purveyor with the aſſiſtance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who reſorted to him with the aſſiduity of real courtiers, and with a ſervility, which, in a republic, implied the utmoſt corruption of manners. He even maintained the appearances of royalty in the ſtate which he aſſumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he himſelf affected reſerve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented diſorders tending to ſhake the government of the Senate; to the end that the republic might

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might be forced to rely on him for ſupport, while he himſelf affected to decline the burden.

In the management of theſe intrigues, and in the full hopes of their ſucceſs, Pompey was now left by Craſſus, as well as by Cæſar. The firſt, in his impatience to take poſſeſſion of his government, had broken through all the impediments that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haſte to Brundiſium with his army, embarked, notwithſtanding the unfavourableneſs of the ſeaſon, and, with conſiderable loſs, both of men and of ſhipping in a ſtorm, made his paſſage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the Prætor ſtill ſounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the Senate or People to recal his commiſſion. It appears, that ſoon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for this purpoſe; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Craſſus, being taught by his late ſufferings to court the favour of thoſe who could either hurt or protect him, appeared on this queſtion in his favour, and claimed a ſhare in the merit of obtaining the deciſion that was given to confirm his commiſſion[s].

But without attending to the ſtate of theſe deliberations at Rome, Craſſus continued his march by Macedonia and the Helleſpont into Aſia. In paſſing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, ſovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, building a new city, and making a ſettlement for more people; he is ſaid to have obſerved to the prince, that it was ſomewhat too late, at his age, to form projects of new ſettlements; "nor are you very early," replied the other, "in "your undertaking the conqueſt in Parthia."

Craſſus was turned of ſixty, and having ever conſidered riches as the ſureſt means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon

[s] Cicero ad Famil. lib. v. ep. 8. ad Craſſum.

his

his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treaſure wherever elſe he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money; and afterwards, reſerving the money he had raiſed for his own uſe, neglected the levies. He required of the different diſtricts of his province, and of the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military ſtores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional ſums of money[9]. In the ſame ſpirit of avarice and rapacity, he invaded the Parthians without any authority from the State, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynaſties which before or ſince have ariſen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the preſent date, a ſwarm from the north had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, over-ran the country round Cteſiphon, continued to haraſs the neighbourhood by their depredations; and, at laſt, being commanded by Arſaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took poſſeſſion of an extenſive country, and though under a new name, in fact reſtored the monarchy of Perſia[10].

The Parthian, or new Perſian monarchy, being yet in its vigour, was the moſt formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces conſiſted almoſt intirely of horſe. Part intended for regular charges, caſed in heavy armour, and uſing the lance; part mounted in a lighter manner for expedition and ſwiftneſs, and uſing the bow. While in the field they were attended by herds of ſpare horſes, which they paſtured, or drove in the rear of their armies. With this ſupply, upon any occaſional loſs, they new-mounted their cavalry, or, having reliefs of freſh

[9] Plut. in Craſſo, 11. Dio. Caſſ. lib. iv. c. 13. [10] Juſtin. lib. lxi. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl, xli.

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horſes, performed amazing marches, and frequently preſented themſelves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their flights, they drew an enemy into ſtraits by haſty and unguarded purſuits [41], and often enjoyed the greateſt advantage when they ſeemed to be routed and to fly.

When Craſſus advanced to the Euphrates, Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazes, on the ſide of Armenia, ſent a deputation to expoſtulate with the Roman general on the cauſe of his hoſtile approach, Craſſus made anſwer, That he would give the reaſons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia, "Here," ſaid one of the Parthian meſſengers (ſhowing the palm of his hand) "hair will grow before you ſhall arrive at Seleucia." Craſſus proceeded in his march, paſſed the Euphrates, and ravaged Meſopotamia without any reſiſtance. Having continued his operations until the end of the ſeaſon, he returned for the winter into Syria [42]. Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his ſon Publius, who had ſerved ſome years in a conſiderable rank in the army in Gaul, and was now detached by Cæſar with a thouſand horſe, and many marks of honour, to act under his father in Syria.

This invaſion of Meſopotamia, after the ſeaſon had become far ſpent, ſerved only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hoſtilities were likely to proceed in the ſpring with great animoſity, when Craſſus was to proſecute the war which he had thus commenced on ſuch dangerous ground.

Cæſar, in the mean time, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himſelf,

[41] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. c. 15. [42] Dio. lib. xl. Plut. in Craſſo.

with

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with his uſual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the perſons with whom he entruſted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report, that this part of his province was infeſted by the incurſions of the Pyruſtæ, a warlike tribe on the frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders withdrew, and were diſowned by their nation. The State denied, that they had ever given a commiſſion to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to reſtrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hoſtages for the obſervance of this article.

Early in the ſpring, Cæſar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the Low Countries, and found, that in conſequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no leſs than ſix hundred tranſport veſſels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Oſtend to Bulogne, and in a few days might be ready for ſea. He accordingly ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to aſſemble at the ſame port from which he ſailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invaſion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moſelle were meditating a revolt, and were ſoliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their aſſiſtance, to the end that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he might ſecure the peace of Gaul in his abſence, he marched to the Moſelle with four legions and eight hundred horſe. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their ſubmiſſions ſeparately, and gave the neceſſary hoſtages as a pledge for their future behaviour.

With theſe ſecurities, Cæſar returned to the coaſt, found all his armed galleys and five hundred and ſixty of his tranſports actually aſſembled; the other forty tranſports had been put back by contrary

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winds, and were ſtill retained at the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain conſiſted of five legions, amounting poſſibly, on the probable ſuppoſition that they were not complete, to about twenty thouſand men [13], together with a body of Gauls, including many of their chiefs, whom Cæſar choſe to retain with his army, rather as hoſtages for the fidelity of their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in the war. The fleet conſiſted of five hundred and ſixty tranſport veſſels, twenty-eight armed gallies, with many tenders and ſmall craft, provided by officers for their own conveniency, and for the reception of their equipages; in all eight hundred ſail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty days [14] after the fleet was aſſembled, the troops ſtill remained on ſhore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were ſuddenly interrupted by the deſertion of a Gauliſh chief, who, being averſe to the ſervice, thought this a favourable opportunity to diſengage himſelf with his followers. Cæſar conſidered this deſertion as a declaration of war, and being ſenſible of the danger he might incur in caſe of any diſaſter by having ſuch enemies in his rear, ſuſpended the embarkation, and ſent a party of horſe in purſuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himſelf. His followers were brought back and obliged to embark for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this ſervice the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at ſunſet of the ſame day, the wind being ſtill fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the Channel; but the wind ſoon after having failed, or ſhifted more to the weſt, and the tide being ſet to the northward, they were carried a conſiderable way in that direction paſt the port for which they had

[13] The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced to 3,500 l.

[14] See Cæſar's Commentaries.

ſteered.

ſteered. At day-break, they ſaw the land of Britain on their left, and ſeemed to leave ſome conſpicuous part of the iſland, probably the South Foreland, aſtern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coaſt not far diſtant from the landing-place of the former year, but leſs expoſed to the ſea. This place we may ſuppoſe to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the Stour, or the entry to Sandwich Haven [15].

The Britons had aſſembled as formerly to oppoſe the deſcent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of ſo great a fleet, were intimidated, and withdrew from the coaſt.

Cæſar, flattering himſelf that he had found a ſafer road for his ſhips than that at which he had ſtationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded againſt any attempts of the natives by a body of ten cohorts and three hundred horſe, that were properly entrenched on the ſhore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces aſſembled on a ſmall river (probably the *Stour*), at the diſtance of ten or twelve miles from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and at break of day came up with them, diſlodged them from their poſt, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occaſion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a mote, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this ſtronghold, he erected ſome works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not inveſted the place, the only effect of his attack was, to force the enemy

[15] Mr. d'Anville, on a ſuppoſition that Cæſar muſt have paſſed into Britain by the ſhorteſt poſſible line, fixes upon Hith, about eight miles weſt of Dover, as the place of his landing in his firſt invaſion of Britain; and, conſequently, on ſome other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the ſecond invaſion: but this does not agree, either with the deſcription of the coaſt, being planum et apertum littus, or with the ſequel of the ſtory, which places ſome ſuch river as the Stour to be paſſed in his march, about twelve miles from the ſhore. The coaſt at Hith, though not altogether inacceſſible, is ſteep and hilly, and would have expoſed Cæſar to difficulties in his firſt operations on ſhore, which he could not poſſibly have omitted to mention.

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to abandon it, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his reſolution to purſue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three diviſions, when it appeared, that the element which is the ſafeguard of Britain, though not always ſufficient to keep its enemies at a diſtance, yet is ſubject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders very difficult, and their condition, even when on ſhore, ſufficiently hazardous. To this purpoſe a meſſenger overtook Cæſar on his march with tidings, that all his ſhips, in a ſtorm which aroſe in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of each other, that many of them were ſtranded and wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

Cæſar, on this report, ſuſpended his march, and, having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp; he himſelf, with a proper eſcort, returned to the coaſt. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ſhips were irrecoverably loſt; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpoſe he gave orders in the army, that all who had been inſtructed in the trade of a carpenter, ſhould repair to the ſea-port to be employed in refitting the fleet; he called many workmen likewiſe from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new veſſels on different parts of that coaſt; and to guard, for the future, againſt ſuch accidents as had lately befallen his ſhips, he ordered that they ſhould be drawn on ſhore. In this work the army was inceſſantly employed for ten days, and without intermiſſion even in the night. The fleet, at length, being in this manner ſecured from the dangers of the ſea, and covered by an entrenchment on the ſide of the land, he returned to his camp, and reſumed the operations of his army.

It appears that the natives of Britain, being divided into many ſmall cantons or ſeparate principalities, and, as uſual in ſuch caſes, frequently at war among themſelves, had been actually at variance when Cæſar arrived; but, during the ſhort reſpite which the diſaſter

diſaſter that had befallen his fleet had given them, that they had agreed to ſuſpend their own quarrels, and were aſſembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Caſſivelaunus, a chieftain of Middleſex, or, as Cæſar deſcribes him, a prince reſiding on the northern banks of the Thames, and at about ſeventy or eighty miles from the ſea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous army of infantry, of horſemen, and armed chariots. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to haraſs the Romans on their march, and, following the tracts that were clear of underwood, not only to gall them with miſſiles from the thickets, but to charge them likewiſe with his horſemen and chariots, even in places where the ground ſeemed leaſt fitted to the movement of ſuch bodies. Encouraged with his ſucceſs in this ſpecies of warfare, he ventured to attack the whole cavalry of the Roman army, which, being on a foraging party, were ſupported by an intire legion. But the Britons being, in this attempt, defeated with great ſlaughter, their chief loſt courage, or was deſerted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the Romans.

Cæſar, finding this enemy remit his ardour, advanced with a quicker pace. From his ſilence on the ſubject of any difficulty in paſſing the Medway, we muſt ſuppoſe him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Aſhford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidſtone, near to which place the river Medway is every where naturally fordable; and from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the ſea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may ſuppoſe him to have arrived on that river at the reach which runs from ſouth to north, ſomewhere between Kingſtone and Brentford. There he obſerves, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded; that a row of ſharp ſtakes was driven under water; that the oppoſite bank was lined with a paliſade, and manned by a numerous body of the natives. He nevertheleſs proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuoſity of his attack, drove the enemy

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from their poſt, and, without any loſs, effected his paſſage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Caſſivelaunus had, for ſome time, made no attempt to reſiſt the Roman army; he had contented himſelf with obſerving their motions, and with endeavouring to ſtrip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their march. Cæſar, on his part, advanced with the precautions neceſſary againſt ſuch an enemy, and, as they had deſtroyed what could be of immediate uſe to his army, he deſtroyed what was left, in order to force the natives to ſubmiſſion. In this ſtate of the war, having leiſure and opportunity to obſerve the condition of the country and the manners of the people, he gives the following account of both: "That on the "coaſt there were colonies from the neighbouring continent, ſtill "diſtinguiſhed by the names of the countries from whence they had "come; that theſe colonies, being poſſeſſed of agriculture, and well "ſtocked with cattle, were extremely populous; that they had money "made of iron or braſs; the firſt of which metals, with great quan-"tities of tin, were found in their own iſland; the other metal was "imported from abroad; that the winter was milder here than in Gaul; "that the woods of Britain furniſhed the ſame timber with thoſe of "Gaul, except the fir and the beech; and that the houſes were built "in the ſame manner in both countries." From this account of the coaſt he proceeds to obſerve, "That the inland parts were occupied by "the original natives, who, with little corn, ſubſiſted chiefly by milk "and the other produce of their herds; that, by a particular ſuperſti-"tion, although poſſeſſed of hares, of geeſe, and other fowls, they were "forbid to eat of theſe animals; that they were curious in the orna-"ments of the perſon, affected to have buſhy whiſkers, and long hair; "that they ſtained or painted their bodies of a blue colour, and had "no clothes beſides the ſkins of beaſts; that they aſſociated in ſmall "clubs or fraternities of ten or a dozen in number." And adds a cir-

cumſtance, in which, if he were not deceived, as is common enough to foreigners, by ſome appearances which were not ſufficiently explained to him, he gives a ſtriking example of the diverſity which takes place among mankind in ſettling the canon of external actions. The brothers, the father, and the ſon, though ſeparately married, and reputed the parents of children, brought forth by their reſpective wives, yet, without jealouſy or imputation of evil, lived with thoſe wives in common [15].

Cæſar, being on the left of the Thames, made an alliance with the Trinobantes, ſuppoſed to have been inhabitants of Eſſex and Suffolk. The ſovereign of this canton having, in ſome quarrel with his own people, been expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with Cæſar in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman arms, reſtored to his kingdom. Five other principalities made their ſubmiſſion at the ſame time. Caſſivelaunus retired to his principal fortreſs, which, conſiſting of a paliſade and a ditch ſituated in the leaſt acceſſible part of the woods, was by the natives, as Cæſar is pleaſed to expreſs himſelf, called a town, and was in reality, in caſe of alarm, a place of retreat for themſelves and their cattle. On the approach and attack of Cæſar on one ſide, Caſſivelaunus retired by an outlet on the other, leaving ſome herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the Britiſh prince endeavoured, as a laſt reſource, to give Cæſar ſome trouble in his rear; and for this purpoſe ſent an order to the four princes of Kent, to aſſemble their people, and endeavour to force the Roman ſtation, and deſtroy the Roman ſhipping, where they lay on the coaſt. They accordingly attacked the intrenchment, but were repulſed; and Caſſivelaunus himſelf, reduced to deſpair by the defection of ſo many of his countrymen, and by his

[15] See Cæſar's Commentaries on his laſt expedition to Britain.

repeated

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repeated defeats, determined to make his ſubmiſſion. The ſeaſon of the year being far advanced, and Cæſar, deſirous to retire with honour from a country in which he was not prepared to make any ſettlements, accepted this on eaſy terms.

A certain tribute was impoſed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hoſtages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous aſſemblage of priſoners, then the only or principal ſpoils of this iſland, retired to their ſhips, which, not being ſufficient to receive them at one embarkation, were obliged to return for a ſecond; and in this way ſucceſſively, without any material accident, tranſported the whole of the Roman army into Gaul.

CHAP. II.

Death of Julia the Daughter of Cæſar and the Wife of Pompey.——Trial of Gabinius.——Detection of an infamous Tranſaction of Memmius and Ahenobarbus.——Revolt of the Low Countries.——Military Execution againſt the Inhabitants of the Country between the Rhine and the Meuſe.——Operations of Craſſus in Meſopotamia.——His Death.——Competition for the Conſulate.——Death of Clodius.——Riot in the City.——Pompey ſole Conſul.——Trial of Milo.

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WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæſar and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the diſcontinuance of the relation which ſubſiſted between them, and in the ſeparation of their ſuppoſed political intereſts. The connection which then came to be diſſolved, had been deviſed as a bond of confederacy between parties whoſe interfering objects of ambition muſt have otherwiſe, on many occaſions, excited their mutual jealouſy. Neither the father-in-law, nor the ſon was likely to ſacrifice his ambition to mere affection, but each may have expected, that the other ſhould be, in ſome degree, the dupe of his relation, and ſhould abate a little of the jealouſy to which he was, by his ſituation and his objects, ſo naturally inclined. This paſſion, however, we may believe was far from having been extinguiſhed in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, probably proceeded from a deſire to retain his ſuperiority over Cæſar, and to have in his power, in caſe of a breach between them, a province, though leſs contiguous to Italy than that which was held by Cæſar,

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not leſs fitted to furniſh formidable armies and the reſources of war.

Notwithſtanding theſe effects of jealouſy, while the familiar relation of father-in-law and ſon ſubſiſted between Cæſar and Pompey, and while Craſſus continued to hold a ſpecies of balance in their councils, they ſeemed to acquieſce in a participation of conſequence and power. But the death of Julia, and that likewiſe of the child of which ſhe had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connection, but even to any ſemblance of friendſhip, and rendered them, from this time forward, mutually jealous of the advantages they ſeverally gained, whether in reſpect to force in the provinces, or to ſtate and popularity at Rome.

It is obſerved, that, from this date, Cæſar became more than formerly attentive to reports from the city, and more careful of his intelligence from thence[1]; and that he endeavoured to gain every perſon who might be of conſequence in deciding the conteſt which he perceived muſt ariſe. Among theſe he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was likely, about this time, to devote himſelf to Pompey, and whom he wiſhed, at leaſt, to keep in ſuſpence between them: for this purpoſe, as appears from their correſpondence, he applied, as uſual, to his vanity, and, while he was piercing the woods of Britain in purſuit of Caſſivelaunus and his painted followers[2], affected to read and to admire verſes which were ſent to him by a perſon much more eſteemed for his proſe than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of ſilver, but were diſappointed; for, beſides ſlaves, they found no booty in that iſland. Such probably likewiſe were the principal ſpoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in conſequence of

[1] Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. & lib. iii. ep. 1.
[2] Ibid. lib. ii. ep. ult. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

his

his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who made such works a part of their policy to gain the People. For this purpose Cæsar proposed to build a Basilica[3], and to enlarge the Forum, at an expence of six millions Roman money, or about fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars with marble ballisters, and to surround the whole with a colonade or portico extending a thousand paces, or about a mile.

In these several works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able also to direct his councils[4] in what related to matters of State.

In the mean time, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinius. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the Senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the Senate and People were affected towards him, he thought proper to make his entry in the night; and being arrived, on the eighteenth of September, did not even venture to appear in the Senate for ten days. No less than three prosecutions were preparing against him: for treason, for ex-

[3] What the Romans called a Basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticoes for merchants, and other public accommodations.

[4] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

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tortion in his province, and for other crimes. The firſt day on which he preſented himſelf in the Senate, the Conſuls, when he would have withdrawn, commanded him to ſtay. And, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from the province, bid them ſtate their charge.

An altercation enſued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinius, took a principal part againſt him, and pronounced an invective, which the other returned with the abuſive appellation of *fugitive*, in alluſion to his late exile [5]. Yet, ſoon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will afterwards be mentioned, undertook, at the ſolicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the Tribunes, on the ninth of October delivered to the People, with great force, a charge of treaſon againſt Gabinius [6]. The judgment of the Tribes being called, and ſentence of condemnation likely to paſs, while the Lictors were preparing to ſeize their priſoner, his ſon, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly eſteemed by the Romans, threw himſelf at the feet of the Tribune, and, being rudely ſpurned on the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the ſpectators were moved; Lelius Balbus, another of the Tribunes, interpoſed, and, with the general approbation of the People, commanded the proceſs to ſtop [7].

The other proſecutions nevertheleſs were continued againſt Gabinius. One before the Prætor Alfius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of ſeventy, who voted guilty [8]. Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions ſterling; in

[5] Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii.
[6] Ibid. lib. iii.
[7] Val. Max. lib. viii. c. 1.
[8] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

this laſt was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæſar continued to employ their influence in his favour. And Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæſar, no longer continued at variance with a perſon, who had been no more than their tool or inſtrument in procuring his misfortunes, and condeſcended, on this occaſion, though ineffectually, to plead his cauſe[9].

The approaching elections gave riſe to competitions and intrigues more connected with the ſtate of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens came to depend for their ſubſiſtence on the diſtributions of corn and other gratuities, which were made or procured by thoſe who courted popularity, or who aſpired to the offices of State. Corruption became every day more flagrant and leſs diſguiſed; and the laws againſt bribery were loſing their force for want of perſons to proſecute a crime, of which ſo many either wiſhed to reap the benefit, or which many were ſo ſtrongly tempted to commit. To ſupply this defect, Cato moved in the Senate, That every one elected into office ſhould be ſubjected to an inqueſt, even if no one ſhould proſecute[10]; and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges, that were named for trials within the year, to take cognizance of the means by which candidates ſucceeded to office; and to ſet thoſe aſide who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption[11]. The Tribunes interpoſed their negative, or ſuſpended the effect of this reſolution, until an act of the People ſhould be obtained to confirm it. The propoſal gave great offence to the parties concerned; and Cato, being attacked by the populace, narrowly eſcaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full aſſembly of the more reſpectable citizens, was favourably heard on this ſubject. But Terentius, one of the Tribunes,

[9] Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 63. Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 1 & 3.

[10] Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

[11] Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

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ſtill perſiſting in his negative, this attempt to reſtrain the corrupt practices of thoſe who canvaſſed for office had no effect.

The candidates themſelves, in the mean time, if each could have truſted the laws for reſtraining others, as well as himſelf, from the practice of giving money; or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themſelves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuſe which rendered their pretenſions ſo expenſive and ſo precarious. Moved by theſe conſiderations, candidates for the office of the Tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and depoſited each a ſum of money [10] in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any perſon who ſhould be found acting in contravention to their treaty [11]. One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the Conſulate, corruption was carried to the greateſt exceſs. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the People, who came in the order of their Tribes to receive it [12]. A gratuity of ten millions of ſeſterces [13], was offered to any perſon who ſhould ſecure the vote of the firſt Century, or, as it was called, the *Prerogativa*. The demand for money to be employed in this ſpecies of traffic became ſo great, that by the firſt of July intereſt roſe from four to eight per cent. [14]. All the four candidates, Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Meſſala, mutually raiſed proſecutions for bribery againſt each other; and in the courſe of theſe tranſactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partizan of the Senate, had made his peace with Cæſar, and was now ſupported by his party at Rome.

[10] Quingena, 500,000 Roman money about 4000 l.

[11] Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 15. ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. c. 12.

[12] Ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 17.

[13] About 80,000 l.

[14] Ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. Idibus quintilibus fœnus fuit beſſibus ex triente.

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Memmius, it may be remembered, having been Prætor at the expiration of Cæſar's Conſulate, brought a charge of high miſdemeanour in office againſt him. And Cæſar appeared for ſome time to reſent this attack; but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpoſe by reſentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to chooſe his friends from among thoſe who had the reſolution to provoke, as well as from among thoſe who inclined to ſerve him. Cæſar accordingly made uſe of this opportunity to ſeparate Memmius from the reſt of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a ſcene of corruption, in which Memmius himſelf, with other profeſſed ſupporters of the Senate, had been concerned, and which furniſhed Cæſar, and the ſuppoſed popular party, with a great triumph againſt theſe pretenders to purity and public virtue.

It appeared that, among other irregulatities at Rome in the adminiſtration of government, even laws, and ſuppoſed acts of the Senate or People, could be forged or ſurreptitiouſly obtained. The preſent Conſuls, Cn. Domitius, Ahenobarbus, and Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of thoſe who were candidates to ſucceed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two firſt, to ſecure their own nomination to lucrative provinces at the expiration of their Conſulſhip; the two others now ſtanding for this office, to ſecure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the Senate and of the People, fixing the conſular provinces. And a ſum of money was depoſited by the candidates in the hands of the Conſuls, to be forfeited, if they did not ſupport this forgery, with the evidence of three Augurs, who ſhould vouch for the paſſing of the law in the aſſembly of the People, and two Senators of conſular dignity, who ſhould ſwear they were preſent when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the Senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the Senate had been held for this purpoſe.

Memmius

Memmius being gained by the parties of Cæſar and Pompey, was perſuaded to ſacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus. He laid this ſtrange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the Senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, profeſſing himſelf to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much diſgrace and reproach.

From this tranſaction it ſhould appear, not only that the aſſemblies of the People were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of ſuch perſons as were by any party purpoſely brought to the Comitium; but that even the meetings of the Senate might be packed; that their proceedings were careleſly recorded, and might be eaſily forged. The numbers required to form a Comitium or aſſembly of the People not being fixed, any convention of perſons brought from any part of Italy, occupying the uſual place of aſſembly, might take upon them the deſignation and powers of the Roman People; and as the fluctuating ſovereignty of the People by this means paſſed from one party to another, its orders were often ſurreptitious and contradictory, and every law might be conſidered as the mandate of a party or faction, not as the will of the community [25]. Great as theſe diſorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an intereſt in the continuance of them; and the age, though ſuffering under the moſt grievous abuſes, was ſtill more averſe to the neceſſary reformations.

The infamy of this recent tranſaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the preſent Conſuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly enſued. The partizans of Pompey hinted the neceſſity of naming a Dictator. He himſelf

[25] Dion Caſſius, lib. xxxix. c. 65.

affected

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affected great reſerve, in expectation that when the preſent troubles came to their height, the powers neceſſary to ſuppreſs them would, by general conſent, be preſſed into his hands.

In the mean time Cæſar, whoſe councils had ſo great a ſhare in determining theſe events, was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, and was obliged, contrary to his uſual practice, to paſs the whole winter on this ſide of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harveſt in Gaul had been unfavourable, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the ſubſiſtence of his army, to extend his quarters much farther than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one diviſion, was ſent to the Moſelle; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuſe, near to what are now the diſtricts of Liege and Maeſtricht. Quintus Cicero was poſted on ſome of the branches of the Scheld or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this diſpoſition, extended from the Seine to the Meuſe about Maeſtricht, and from the ſea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The diſtance at which the poſts were placed from each other being obſerved by the natives, who ſtill bore with impatience the intruſion and uſurpation of theſe ſtrangers, tempted them to form a deſign againſt each of the quarters apart, and by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of theſe imperious and inſatiable gueſts, who acted as proprietors in every territory on which they were received, and branded every act of reſiſtance to their unjuſt uſurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this deſign, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were ſituated in the angle, above the confluence of the Meuſe and the Rhine, and round the quarters of Sabinus, which are ſuppoſed to have been at a place which is now called Tongres, ſuddenly preſented himſelf with a numerous body before the Roman ſtation, and endeavoured to force the intrenchment; but being repulſed, had recourſe to an artifice in which he ſucceeded. Affecting a great

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regard for the Romans, he desired that he might have an opportunity to communicate to their general a matter of the most serious importance. An officer being sent to him upon this request, he pretended to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design formed by the Gauls to cut off the Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine to join in the execution of this design; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not resist; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If they chose, while it was in their power, to withdraw, and to gain the nearest station of their own people, he had influence enough to hinder their being molested on the march: but if they should hesitate for any time, or wait till the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in his power to avert the storm with which they were threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He accordingly began a march of fifty miles towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero. And falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an intire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left, but finding no security in that place, killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the country as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the

Roman

Roman ſtation, as left Cicero ſcarcely time ſufficient to man his intrenchments. They renewed the artifice which they had practiſed with ſo much ſucceſs againſt Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which that officer had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and as ſoon as poſſible to give intimation of his danger to Cæſar. For this purpoſe he ſtrengthened his poſt with additional works, and publiſhed a reward to the firſt perſon who ſhould ſucceed in carrying intelligence to the neareſt quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy being about ſixty thouſand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and, the more effectually to cut off all communication of ſupplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, conſiſting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a breaſtwork eleven feet high, extending over a circumference of fifteen miles [15]. In this work, being unprovided with intrenching tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their ſwords. But having begun it by a ſufficient number of hands in all its parts at once, they, according to Cæſar's account, completed the whole in three hours.

From this line, which they formed by the direction of ſome Italian deſerters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchment; and having puſhed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their ſlings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the huts of the camp were covered; ſet them on fire; and, in the midſt of the confuſion which aroſe from this circumſtance, endeavoured to ſcale the paliſade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withſtand theſe attacks, the perſons who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his ſituation to Cæſar were repeatedly intercepted, and cruelly tortured, to deter others from renewing the ſame attempt. The in-

[15] Cæſar de Bell. Gallico, lib. v. c. 42.

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telligence, however, by means of a native Gaul, who, availing himſelf of the dreſs, manners, and language of his country, paſſed unobſerved through the lines of the enemy, was at laſt carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army.

Cæſar, as uſual, truſting more to diſpatch and rapid execution than to the numbers of his men, left a legion at Samarobriva [16] to guard his ſtores, magazines, and baggage, and with two other legions, not exceeding ſeven thouſand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could aſſemble, haſtened his march to the quarters of Cicero. He diſpatched two meſſengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if poſſible, to put the troops under his command in motion towards the Meuſe, and another to Quintus Cicero himſelf, with hopes or aſſurances of immediate relief. The firſt meſſenger found Labienus beſet with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, caſt the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the ſhaft of a dart, againſt one of the towers, where it ſtuck, and hung for ſome days unobſerved; but being found at laſt, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæſar's approach. At the ſame time the fire and the ſmoke of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming.

The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæſar. Cicero ſent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy. The armies arrived nearly at the ſame time on the oppoſite ſides of a brook running in a hollow tract between ſteep banks, which neither party in the preſence of the other could venture to paſs.

Cæſar, ſuppoſing that the great inequality of his numbers might inſpire the Gauls with contempt, endeavoured, by exceeding his uſual caution, to feed their preſumption. He affected to chuſe a ground

[16] Amiens.

that

that was fit to ſecure his camp; and contracting its limits, crowded both his legions within the dimenſions which were uſually occupied by one. In this poſture he meant to await the effects of the enemy's temerity, or, if they declined paſſing the brook, to avail himſelf of the ſecurity they were likely to feel, and to attack them in their own camp by ſurprize.

The event juſtified Cæſar in his firſt expectation. The Gauls, truſting to the ſuperiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the eſcape of their enemy; and they accordingly paſſed the rivulet, with intention to force his lines. Inſtead of defending his camp, he poured forth his army at once from all its avenues, and, with the advantage of a ſurprize upon thoſe who came to attack him, and by the great ſuperiority of the Romans, when mixed ſword in hand with an enemy, routed, diſperſed, or forced to lay down their arms, the greater part of this multitude which came to attack him with ſo much ferocity and confidence.

By this victory Cæſar not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the ſame evening, but likewiſe diſpelled the cloud which hung over the other quarters of his army, of which many had been at the ſame time inveſted by the natives. Theſe inſurrections, however, which kept all the inhabitants of the low countries in motion, even in the moſt unfavourable ſeaſon, gave him the proſpect of an early and a buſy campaign, and ſo much diſconcerted the plan which he had formed for the winter, that he was hindered from making his uſual journey acroſs the Alps.

During this neceſſary ſtay in Gaul, it does not appear that the intereſts which Cæſar commonly ſtudied were ſuffering in any conſiderable degree at Rome. The civil government in the city was haſtening faſt to its ruin, and the longeſt ſword was ſoon likely to decide the ſovereignty of the empire. The office of Conſul was unoccupied, and continued to be ſo from the beginning of January to the middle

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middle of July. In all this time there was no adminiſtration of juſtice[17], nor any exerciſe of magiſtracy, beſides that of the interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was ſuppoſed to have no other object beſides the elections of Conſuls. This object was vainly attempted by every ſucceſſive interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the Tribunes who were in the intereſt of Pompey; and ſome prodigy, or unfortunate preſage, was continually alleged, to prevent the elections. The Senate ſtriving to put an end to theſe diſorders, even ventured to commit to priſon Q. Pompeius Rufus, a Tribune, who ſeemed to be moſt active in diſturbing the public peace. The occaſion ſeemed ripe for the execution of Pompey's deſign; and accordingly another Tribune, Lucceius Hirrus, known to be in the ſecret of Pompey's intrigues, moved that he ſhould be named Dictator[18]. He himſelf, as uſual on ſuch occaſions, abſented himſelf from the aſſembly, and ſtill kept it in his power to avow or diſown the meaſures of his creatures.

This motion was ſtrongly oppoſed by Cato, and appeared to be extremely diſagreeable to all the principal members of the Senate[19]. Pompey therefore thought proper to diſclaim it, denied his having encouraged the Tribune to make it, and even refuſed to accept of the Dictatorſhip; adding, That he had been called to the exerciſe of great powers earlier than he himſelf had expected; and that he had always reſigned his powers earlier than had been expected by any one elſe[20]. In this was expreſſed the great object of Pompey's ambition; he preferred this point of eſtimation to the poſſeſſion of power. The odium of the propoſed meaſure fell upon Lucceius Hirrus, the Tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a depoſition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain

[17] Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 483.
[18] Plutarch. in Pompeio. D. Con. Cicero epiſt. ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Plutarch. in Vit. Pompeii.

Pompey,

Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue he aſſumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the reſolution he had taken, to prefer the eſteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of diſpoſing of their lives and fortunes at his pleaſure. Pompey from thenceforward joined with the Senate in bringing on the elections; and accordingly, after ſeven months interval of confuſion and anxiety, Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Meſſala were choſen and entered on office in the month of July.

U. C. 700. Cn. Dom. Calvinus, M. Val. Meſſala, Coſſ.

While Pompey was endeavouring, by his intrigues in the city, to make a ſpecies of monarchy in his own perſon appear to be neceſſary, Cæſar was in fact providing himſelf with the only means which, in ſo diſtracted a ſtate, can either acquire or preſerve ſuch a power. He was joining three additional legions to the eſtabliſhment of his province; and, under pretence of his late loſs on the Meuſe, or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul, he had the addreſs to bring into his own ſervice a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commiſſion of Pompey. Theſe he now borrowed, and either actually debauched, or rendered of doubtful fidelity, if ever it ſhould be propoſed to recall or employ them againſt himſelf.

While he took theſe meaſures for the augmentation of his forces, and before the end of winter, having intelligence that the Nervii, or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault, held frequent conſultations together, and were about to take arms, he determined to prevent them; and for this purpoſe, with four legions drawn from the neareſt quarters, he marched into their country, and, without meeting with any oppoſition, deſtroyed their habitations, moved away their cattle, and made many priſoners. He continued theſe ſeverities until the natives, reduced to great diſtreſs, implored his mercy, and gave hoſtages for their future ſubmiſſion.

Having,

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Having, in the courſe of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general convention at an iſland in the Seine [21], he began the operations of the following ſummer by puniſhing ſome of the cantons [22], who had abſented themſelves from that aſſembly, and who, by this act of diſreſpect, had incurred his reſentment, or given him ſuſpicion of hoſtile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the puniſhment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter.

As the Romans ſcarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withſtand their invaſions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquiſhed made to recover its liberties, Cæſar ſtates it as neceſſary for the credit of the Roman army, for the ſecurity of their quarters, and for preventing ſuch acts of ſuppoſed perfidy for the future, that the ſubjects of Ambiorix ſhould ſuffer an examplary puniſhment. To ſecure this effect, he projected two expeditions; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention to preclude them from any retreat or aſſiſtance on either ſide. He penetrated into the woods and marſhes of Brabant, or on the left of the Meuſe, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to aſſiſt or harbour his enemies.

From thence, ſtill avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of theſe operations, and having formerly ſent his baggage under an eſcort of two legions to the Moſelle, he now followed in the ſame direction with the whole army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory, vanquiſhed all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, conſtructed a bridge on that river a little way higher up than the place at which

[21] Now Paris. [22] The Senones and Carnutes.

he had formerly paſſed it, and once more ſet foot upon German ground.

The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of that continent, having moved to the eaſtward, leaving nothing behind them but deſarts, on which no army could ſubſiſt, he contented himſelf with exacting hoſtages from the Ubii and other contiguous nations, to ſecure their neutrality, or rather to make ſure of their concurrence in the future operations of the war. And with theſe pledges he repaſſed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts properly intrenched to ſecure the remainder.

From thence he ſent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and ſilent marches into the countries between the Rhine and the Meuſe, and himſelf followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all theſe operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed ſuch perfect ſecurity, that the leader himſelf, upon the arrival of Cæſar's horſe, narrowly eſcaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to conſult their own ſafety. They accordingly ſeparated, part hid themſelves in the contiguous marſhes, others endeavoured to find refuge with ſome neighbouring nations, or fled to the iſlands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuſe and the Rhine.

Cæſar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, ſeparated his army into three diviſions; ſent Labienus with one diviſion to purſue thoſe who fled to the confluence of the two rivers; Tribonius with the ſecond up the courſe of the Meuſe; and he himſelf, in purſuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheld. His orders were, that each diviſion ſhould put all they met to the ſword, and calculate their time ſo as to return to the place of general rendezvous in ſeven days.

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To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the ſpoils of a country that was doomed to deſtruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thouſand German horſe had paſſed the Rhine, and continued to ravage all before them in a body. Cæſar, in making a diſpoſition for his preſent march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the ſtation (ſuppoſed to be Tongres), which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works being ſtill intire, he left a guard with his baggage under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the preſent inſtance, knowing no diſtinction of friend or enemy, ceaſed to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on ſeizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was ſo little expected, that the traders and ſuttlers who had erected their ſtalls and diſplayed their merchandiſe, as uſual, without the intrenchment, had no time to ſave their effects. Numbers of Cicero's baggage-guard were abroad in ſearch of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their poſt, and muſt have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noiſe with which the Germans began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, miſtaking them for the vanguard of Cæſar's army, thought proper to conſult their own ſafety by an immediate flight.

Cæſar, upon his return to the poſt at which he had left his baggage, cenſured the officer commanding the guard for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the ſuppoſition of any degree of ſecurity whatever, any part of the precautions uſual upon ſuch a duty. He proceeded to complete the revenge he had projected againſt the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, with ſending parties in every direction to burn every houſe, and lay waſte every field that had been formerly ſpared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach

of

of winter, made the deſtruction complete, as the few who eſcaped the ſword were certain to periſh by famine, or by the aſperity of the ſeaſon.

Cæſar having in this manner made an example, which he ſuppoſed was to overawe all the nations of that neighbourhood, he withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impoſſible for any numbers of men to ſubſiſt; and having ſtationed two of his legions on the Moſelle, and the remainder on the Marne, on the Seine, and the Loire, he himſelf haſtened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The ſcene of political intrigue, in which Craſſus had hitherto bore a part with Pompey and himſelf, was now, in conſequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a great change, that was likely to affect the conduct of all the parties concerned.

In the ſpring, Craſſus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with ſeven legions, four thouſand horſe, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he paſſed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by hiſtorians under different names, of Acbarus [23] or Ariamnes, in whom, on account of his ſuppoſed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected likewiſe to have been joined by Artabazes, King of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in perſon, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Meſopotamia, to oppoſe the Romans.

Craſſus intended to have followed the courſe of the Euphrates to where it approaches neareſt to Seleucia and Cteſiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was diſſuaded by Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eaſtward on the plains to meet

[23] Plutarch & Dion Caſſ.

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Surena, as not in a condition to oppoſe him. Some parties too, that were advanced to examine the country, reported that they had been on the tract of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was any where to be ſeen. Thus Craſſus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ eaſtward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garriſon. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived in ſandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage, or water. While the army, though diſcouraged by theſe appearances, ſtill continued its march, a few horſemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with ſigns of terror, and brought an account that their diviſion had been ſurrounded by numerous bodies of horſe, and to a few cut off. That the enemy were advancing apace, and muſt ſoon appear. Craſſus at firſt fearing to be outlined by the enemy, extended his front as far as he poſſibly could; but recollecting that the Parthians were all on horſeback, and by the rapidity of their motions might eaſily gain either or both his flanks, ſo that it was proper to preſent a front in every direction, he changed his diſpoſition from a line to a ſquare, having his cavalry on the angles.

The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians appeared on every ſide, came within reach of an arrow ſhot, and galled them without intermiſſion. The weapons of the Romans, in this ſituation, availed them nothing; even the ſhield could not cover them from arrows, that ſhowered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They ſtood however in their place with ſome degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians muſt ſoon be exhauſted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in cloſe fight, or to retire. But they found themſelves deceived in this expectation, obſerving that the enemy had a herd of camels in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of thoſe in the front were continually repleniſhed from thence. At the ſame time Ariamnes,

amnes, the Arabian, deſerted, and was perceived to go over to the enemy. The deſertion of this traitor, by diſcovering that his pretended attachment, and his council, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery to draw the army into its preſent ſituation, completed the general diſcouragement which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in deſpair, and oppreſſed with heat and thirſt, or ſtifled with duſt, they continued for a while, like beaſts caught in a ſnare, to preſent an eaſy prey to their enemies.

In this extremity, Craſſus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy ſo far off, as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His ſon Publius accordingly formed the Roman horſe into one body, and made a general charge. The Parthians gave way in ſeeming diſorder. The young man advanced with great impetuoſity as againſt a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory: but the Parthians, under cover of the duſt which every where aroſe, inſtead of flying before him, as he ſuppoſed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him to encompaſs his rear. The legions at the ſame time, happy to be relieved from the attack of the enemy, quitted their ground, and for a little reſumed their march, which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to ſurround the horſe; but the father, recollecting the danger to which he expoſed his ſon, again prevailed on them to halt. In this ſituation, a few of the horſe arrived, with accounts that they had been ſurrounded, that Craſſus, the ſon, was ſlain, and the whole cavalry cut off, except a few who eſcaped to the father with theſe melancholy tidings.

Night, however, was faſt approaching, and the Parthians, on a ſudden, withdrew, ſenſible that their way of fighting would expoſe them to many diſadvantages in the dark. It was always their practice to retire at night to a conſiderable diſtance from the enemy whom

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whom they had haraſſed by day, and upon theſe occaſions they generally fled like an army defeated, until they had removed ſo far, as to make it ſafe for them to paſture their horſes, and to ſtore up their arms. Craſſus appriſed of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and abandoning the ſick and wounded of his army, made a conſiderable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained, was not ſufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the ſame enemy, and again involved in the ſame diſtreſs. Having his defeats and his flights renewed on every ſucceeding day, he arrived at laſt at the poſt which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found ſome reſpite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not poſſible to make any conſiderable ſtay, as the whole proviſions of the army were loſt or conſumed, and ſuch ſupplies as the country around might have furniſhed, were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almoſt as favourable to the Parthians as day. In theſe circumſtances, it was determined to wait for the wain of the moon, and then, if poſſible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied againſt Craſſus, and offered the command to Caius Caſſius; but he, although deſired even by Craſſus himſelf, declined to accept of it[24]. The troops of conſequence no longer obeyed any command, and ſeparated into two bodies. The firſt went off by the plains on the neareſt way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to eſcape into Cappadocia or Armenia. The firſt diviſion was accompanied or commanded by Caſſius, who, though with conſiderable loſs, led them back into Syria. The other, with Craſſus himſelf, was purſued by Surena, and haraſſed on every

[24] Dio. lib. iv. c. 28.

ground

ground where the Parthian horſe could ply on their flank or their rear. Being expoſed to frequent loſſes, they ſuffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any reſiſtance.

Surena, apprehending that theſe remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to ſurrender, ſent a deputation to Craſſus, propoſing at ſome intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which each ſhould bring a ſtipulated number of attendants. While this meſſage was delivering, Surena himſelf appeared at a little diſtance on an eminence, waved with his hand, and in token of peace, unbent his bow. Craſſus diſtruſting the faith of this barbarous enemy, who was ſuppoſed to hold perfidy lawful, as a ſtratagem of war, declined the conference; but his troops, weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themſelves that by an accommodation an end might be ſpeedily put to their ſufferings, expreſſed ſuch a deſire of the conference, as their general, in this ſituation, could not ſafely withſtand. He put himſelf therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's meſſengers, and ſubmitted to be led to their general; but on the way, finding himſelf treated as a priſoner, he refuſed to proceed, and having made ſome reſiſtance, was ſlain. The army ſeparated into ſundry diviſions, a few eſcaped into Armenia or Syria, the greater part fell into the enemy's hands [25].

Thus died Craſſus, commonly reputed a rare inſtance of ambition, joined with avarice, and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that in point of ambition he even rivaled Pompey and Cæſar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely ſubſervient to this paſſion. It is quoted, as a ſaying of his, that no man who aſpired to a principal place in the republic ſhould be reputed rich,

[25] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. Plutarch in Craſſ.

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unleſs he could maintain an army at his own expence [26]. Such was the uſe of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horſes, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form a high opinion, either from the judgment of his contemporaries, or from his own conduct [27]. It appears indeed, that he owed his conſequence more to his wealth, than to his genius or perſonal qualities of any kind. On account of his wealth, probably, he was conſidered by Cæſar and Pompey as a perſon, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the ſcale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a perſon fit to witneſs their tranſactions, and on occaſion to hold the balance in ſuſpence between them. Theſe circumſtances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an æra in the hiſtory of thoſe factions which were haſtening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his aſſociates Cæſar and Pompey, already disjoined by the diſſolution of their family connection, were left to contend for the ſuperiority, without any third perſon to hold this ſpecies of balance between them.

The calm which had ſucceeded the late election of Conſuls was but of ſhort duration. The time of electing their ſucceſſors was faſt approaching, and the candidates Scipio, Milo, and Hipſæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the ſame time, ſtood for the office of Prætor. Scipio was by birth the ſon of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Naſica. His daughter, in conſequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Craſſus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connection, ſupported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretenſions

[26] Cicero de officiis, lib. i. c. 8.

[27] Is Igitur mediocriter a doctrina inſtructus; anguſtius etiam a natura, &c. Cicero de claris oratoribus, c. 66. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 13.

to

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to the Conſulate. Milo had a powerful ſupport from the ſenate, in whoſe cauſe he had retorted the arts and violences of the ſeditious demagogues againſt themſelves. Clodius had great intereſt with the populace, and from inveterate animoſity to Milo and to his party, joined all his intereſt with Scipio and Hypſæus againſt him.

It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating the good or evil to which they tend. Theſe competitors, in contending for the ſtreets and the uſual places of canvaſſing the people, joined to the former arts of diſtributing money, and of exciting popular tumults, the uſe of an armed force, and a ſpecies of military operations in the city. Three parties in arms every day paraded in different quarters of the town, and wherever they encountered, violence and bloodſhed generally followed. The oppoſite parties of Hypſæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra*; many of both ſides were killed, and the Conſul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

Theſe diſorders ſo long obſtructed the elections, that the term of the preſent Conſuls in office expired, before the nomination of any ſucceſſors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being ſuſpended, the former ſtate of anarchy, with accumulating diſtractions, again enſued. The Senate, and the other friends of Milo, U. C. 701. would gladly have haſtened the elections, but were hindered by the partizans of the other candidates. The populace too enjoying this ſeaſon of gratuities, of entertainments, and of publick ſhews, in which the competitors continued to waſte their fortunes, were glad to have the canvas prolonged [28].

When the Senate propoſed to have recourſe to the remedy uſual in ſuch diſorders of the ſtate, by naming an Interrex, the only title under which any perſon could preſide in reſtoring the magiſtracy by an

[28] Pædianus in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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election of Conſuls, they were forbid by the Tribune Munatius Plancus, who was ſuppoſed to co-operate with Pompey in ſome deſign, to be favoured by deferring every meaſure that was propoſed for the reſtoration of order.

In the midſt of this ſcene, which kept the minds of men in fear of ſome general calamity, an accident happened, which brought the diſorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 20th of January, Milo going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magiſtrate, about three o'clock in the afternoon, met with Clodius returning from his country ſeat at Aricia. Milo was in a carriage with his wife Fauſta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend Fuſius. He had a numerous eſcort, amounting to ſome hundreds of ſervants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horſeback, with a retinue of thirty ſervants likewiſe in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any diſturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to paſs without giving ſome ſpecimen of his calling, as he ſtraggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with ſome of the followers of Clodius. A fray enſued: Clodius himſelf returned to quell it, or to puniſh the authors of it; but meeting with little reſpect among the gladiators, received a wound in the ſhoulder, and was carried to be dreſſed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the diſturbance began. Milo being told of what had paſſed, likewiſe returned to the place; and thinking it ſafer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouſe the fury of the populace againſt him, encouraged his people to purſue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clo-

dious from thence, and having killed him, and diſperſed all his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tedius, a Senator, happening to paſs, put the body into his own carriage, and ſent his ſervants with it to Rome. They arrived before ſix at night, and proceeding directly to the houſe of the deceaſed, which ſtood on the Palatine hill over the Forum, laid the corpſe in the veſtibule.

The ſervants of the family, and multitudes from the ſtreets immediately crowded to ſee this ſpectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, ſtood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceaſed huſband. The crowd continued to encreaſe all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, Tribunes of the People, likewiſe repaired to the ſame place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market place, and there to leave it expoſed to publick view on the Roſtra; and at the ſame time accompanied this ſpectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinſman of the deceaſed, ſoon after removed the body from the market-place to the Senate houſe, meaning to reproach the order of Senators as acceſſory to the murder. The populace, who ſtill followed in great numbers, burſt into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap the materials, with the tables and deſks of the clerks, the journals and records of the Senate, and having ſet the whole on fire, conſumed the corpſe on this extraordinary pile. The fire ſoon reached the roof, and ſpread to the contiguous buildings. The Tribunes, Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the Roſtra by the flames which burſt from the buildings around them. The Senate-houſe, the Porcia Baſilica, and other edifices were reduced to aſhes.

The ſame perſons, by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the houſe of M. Lepidus, who, upon the firſt alarm of an inſurrection, had been named Interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family anceſtors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the induſtry of Roman matrons was ſtill employed, and deſtroyed what elſe they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the houſe of Milo, but there met with a more proper reception. This houſe, during the riots, in which the maſter of it had borne ſo great a part, was become a kind of fortreſs, and, among the other proviſions made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied thoſe who attacked it with arrows from the windows and terrace, in ſuch manner as ſoon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters being repulſed from the houſe of Milo, crowded to the Temple, in which the Conſular Faſces, during the Interregnum, were kept, ſeized them by force, and carried them to the houſes of Scipio and Hypſæus, the preſent popular candidates for the Conſulate; theſe, without any other form of election, they preſſed to aſſume the enſigns of Conſular power. But not having prevailed in this propoſal, they proceeded to the houſe of Pompey, ſaluting him, with mixed ſhouts of Conſul or Dictator, according as they wiſhed him to aſſume the one or the other of theſe titles or dignities.

From this time, for ſome days, an armed populace, mixed with ſlaves, continued, under pretence of ſearching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter [29]. And the partizans of the candidates, Hypſæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a diſadvantage, beſet the houſe of the Interrex; and, though it was not cuſtomary for the firſt in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamoured for an immediate aſſembly of the people for

[29] Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

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this purpoſe. The party of Milo, though profeſſing likewiſe to join the ſame clamour for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the houſe and the perſon of the Interrex from farther violence.

Milo himſelf, who was at firſt ſuppoſed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the exceſſes committed by the oppoſite party, and of the general inclination of the more ſober part of the citizens to check and diſappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and at the head of his friends, renewed his canvaſs. A ſucceſſion of officers, with the title of Interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every uſual term of five days; but ſuch was the confuſion and diſtraction of the ſcene, that no election could be made. The Senate, under the greateſt alarm, gave to the Interrex, and to the Tribunes of the People, to whom they joined Pompey, who by virtue of his proconſular commiſſion as Purveyor of Corn for the People, held a public character in the State, the uſual charge given to the Conſuls, to watch over the ſafety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the neceſſary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repreſſing the diſorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of ſuch temporary expedients, to reſtrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themſelves juſtice, ſome applied for redreſs, in the way of proſecution and civil ſuit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceaſed Publius Clodius, demanded that the ſlaves of Milo, or thoſe of his wife Fauſta, ſhould be put to the torture, in order to force a diſcovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two Valerii, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Herennius Balbus, joined in the ſame demand. On the oppoſite party, a like demand againſt the ſlaves of the deceaſed Publius Clodius was made by Cælius, one of the Tribunes; and a

proſecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manlius Cenianus againſt Hypſæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo, for the office of Conſul.

Milo, in anſwer to the demand that was made to have his ſlaves put to the torture, pleaded that the perſons, now demanded as ſlaves, were actually freemen, he having manumitted them as a reward for their faithful ſervices in defending his perſon againſt a late attempt made by Clodius on his life. It was alleged, on the other hand, that they were manumitted to evade the law, to preſerve them from the torture, and to ſcreen himſelf from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cælius and Manlius Cænianus being Tribunes, and diſpoſed to favour Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the People, and to load Clodius as the aggreſſor, and the intended aſſaſſin in the fray which coſt him his life. Cicero too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unſafe in the ſtreets, maintained the ſame argument in the Senate, and before the people [30]. Milo, however, would have been glad to make a compoſition; and as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the Conſulate, favoured not only Scipio but likewiſe Hypſæus againſt him, he offered to drop his pretenſion in favour of thoſe candidates, if Pompey would agree to ſuppreſs the proſecutions that were commencing againſt him. To theſe propoſals Pompey refuſed to liſten. He probably thought the election ſecure for his friends, and by affecting a zeal for juſtice, hoped to encreaſe his authority with the people.

The partizans of Pompey, in the midſt of this wild and diſorderly ſtate of affairs, were buſy in renewing the cry which they had raiſed in the former interregnum, that he ſhould be named Dictator, for the re-eſtabliſhment of order, and the reſtoration of the public peace.

[30] Aſcon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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Such an extraordinary power had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times, in which it might be ſafely applied, were no more. The name of Dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain againſt whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of Dictator, Bibulus moved in the Senate, that all the preſent candidates for the Conſulate ſhould be ſet aſide, and that the Interrex ſhould aſſemble the people for the election of Pompey ſole Conſul. Cato, to the ſurprize of every body, ſeconded this motion. He obſerved, that any magiſtracy was preferable to none, and that if the republic muſt be governed by a ſingle perſon, none was ſo fit for the charge as the perſon now propoſed. Pompey being preſent, thanked Cato for this declaration of his eſteem, and ſaid he would accept of the charge, in hopes of being aided by his council. Cato made anſwer, in terms, meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other inſtances of the ſame kind, under an aſpect of ſullenneſs, have been intended to flatter, That he meant no favour to Pompey, and deſerved no thanks from him: that his intention was to ſerve the republic.

It was reſolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey ſhould be preſented to the people as ſole candidate for the office of Conſul, and that after two months were elapſed, he might propoſe any other candidate to be joined in this office [31] with himſelf. The election was accordingly brought on by the Interrex Servius Sulpitius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared ſole Conſul [32], with a commiſſion from the Senate to arm, if neceſſary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better eſtabliſhment of order in the city. Pompey ſole Conſul.

The firſt object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the fram-

[31] Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp. & Catonis, Dio. lib. xl.

[32] Aſcon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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ing of ſome laws to reſtrain for the future ſuch diſorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring criminals to juſtice. For this purpoſe, he obtained an act to enforce the laws which already ſubſiſted againſt violence and corruption; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on ſuch criminal accuſations.

By the regulations now ſuggeſted by Pompey, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three firſt; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The proſecutor was allowed two hours to ſupport his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of advocates was reſtricted, and the uſe of commendatory characters prohibited [33]. The Queſitor, or Judge Criminal, was to be choſen from among thoſe who had held the office of Conſul, and eighty judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge or reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were compoſed; and the court being thus reduced to fifty one, they were to be incloſed and to give judgment [34].

Corruption was become ſo frequent, and ſo much a neceſſary art in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to proſecute this crime. To remedy this defect, a clauſe was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any perſon formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remiſſion of the penalties he had incurred by convicting any one other perſon of a crime equal, or by convicting two perſons, though of a crime leſs heinous than his own. By theſe means, it was propoſed that one conviction ſhould produce ſtill more in ſucceſſion. That conviction, in every inſtance, ſhould be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law ſhould ultimately

[33] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. c. 53.

[34] Aſcon. Pæd. ibid.

reſt

reſt only on ſuch perſon as could not find another on whom to ſhift the burden from himſelf [35].

Theſe regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the ſtatutes both of corruption, and of violence or aſſaſſination. The paſſing of theſe laws was oppoſed on this account by the friends of the accuſed, who alleged, that they were not acts of legiſlation, but acts of attainder, having a retroſpect to the caſe of a party concerned in a paſt tranſaction. Cælius the Tribune, and Cicero, maintained this argument. Pompey replied with impatience, That if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he ſhould employ force [36]. He appeared to entertain ſome animoſity againſt Milo, ſuch at leaſt as they who love to govern, have to others who appear not to be eaſily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehenſions of danger to his own perſon, confeſſed or affected this apprehenſion in the Senate, and retired, as for ſafety, to his own houſe in the ſuburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his perſon, a party of armed men; and there too, under the ſame affectation of withdrawing from violence, he cauſed the aſſemblies of the Senate to be held.

The Ariſtocratical or Senatorian party was much intereſted in the preſervation of Milo: they had been frequently aſſailed by the popular rioters, who ſet the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of ſufficient force to protect their perſons, it was their intereſt to protect thoſe who, on occaſion, had ſet aſide the laws in their defence. The argument, in equity, indeed was ſtrong on the ſide of Milo. During the late ſuſpenſion of government, the factions were rather ſeparate parties at war, than ſubjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the juriſdiction of any civil power whatever. They who procured or prolonged this ſtate of anarchy, were alone chargeable with the conſequences. In this conteſt, which could

[35] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. c. 52.

[36] Aſcon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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not be maintained without force or violent meaſures, the friends of the republic and of the Senate were badly circumſtanced. They contended for laws, and a conſtitution which might be turned againſt the very irregularities which had been neceſſary to their own preſervation, while the oppoſite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of forms, which they had endeavoured to ſubvert.

It would have been juſt, perhaps, to have cloſed the late ſcene of confuſion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular uninterrupted exerciſe of government in future. This, however, would not have calmed the reſentments of thoſe who were aggrieved, and Pompey determined to ſignalize his government by a more ſpecious appearance of juſtice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was choſen commiſſioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the moſt reſpectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impannelled in terms of the late ſtatute. The criminal was cited to anſwer this charge on the fourth of April; and on the ſame day, to anſwer a charge of corruption brought againſt him in the ordinary court of the Prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the Prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial ſhould be ended.

The court, it appears, was aſſembled in the Forum or open market place. There was a tribunal or bench railed in for the judges. The whole ſpace was crowded with multitudes of people. The proſecutors began with examining Caſſinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witneſs gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have croſs-queſtioned him; but the populace, and many others who aſſembled in the crowd who favoured the proſecution, raiſed a menacing cry, which alarmed the accuſed and his counſel ſo much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were accordingly received within the rails, and the judge ap-

plied to the Conſul, who had taken his ſtation near to the place of aſſembly, in order to reſtrain, by his preſence, any diſorders that might ariſe at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his lictors, was himſelf likewiſe alarmed by that diſorderly ſhout, and ſaid, that, for the future, a proper force ſhould be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue, which led to the Forum, with men under arms; and, upon ſome tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place ſhould be cleared. In the execution of this order numbers were killed.

Under the impreſſion made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witneſſes continued to be examined for two days without any diſturbance. Among theſe the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the family and relations of Clodius, and his wife Fulvia, were examined on the ſeveral circumſtances that fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with reſpect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the iſſue: ſo that, on the fourth day, when the parties were to plead, all other buſineſs was ſuſpended in the city; the ſhops and offices were ſhut.

There appeared for the proſecutors Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and ſpoke till ten. For the defender appeared Q. Hortenſius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Fauſtus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the laſt only attempted to ſpeak. Some were of opinion, that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be juſtified on the plea of neceſſity and public expedience. Cicero himſelf thought this too bold a plea, and therefore choſe that of ſelf-defence, alleging that Clodius was the aggreſſor, and intended to aſſaſſinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that he began all his orations under conſiderable ſolicitude and awe of his audience. On this occaſion, when he ſtood up to ſpeak, the partizans of Clodius, who were likewiſe inveterate ene-

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mies to himſelf, endeavoured to diſconcert him with clamours and menacing cries. The unuſual ſight of military guards, commanded by an officer, who was ſuppoſed to be prejudiced againſt his client, it is ſaid, ſo far overcame and ſunk his ſpirit, that he ſpoke feebly, and concluded abruptly; and that what he actually delivered was far ſhort of that maſterly oration which he compoſed, and afterwards publiſhed under the title of Milo's defence.

The accuſed however, even in this alarming ſcene, ſtood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one elſe, in imitation of the Senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in an ordinary dreſs. When judgment was given, and the ballots inſpected, it appeared that, of the Senators, twelve condemned, and ſix, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the Tribuni Ærarii, or repreſentatives of the Plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight, againſt thirteen.

Before ſentence was pronounced, being ſtill at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his reſidence at Marſeilles. Thither Cicero ſent him a copy of an oration in his defence, compoſed at leiſure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a ſpecimen of what could be urged in the cauſe. The packet containing this writing, it ſeems, was delivered or read to Milo while he ſat at dinner. "How lucky it "was," he ſaid, "that this oration was not actually ſpoken, I "ſhould not now have been eating theſe excellent fiſh at Marſeilles"." Theſe marks of indifference make a ſtriking contraſt to the figure which Cicero himſelf had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited diſgrace, that ſingle addition of conſtancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed

[17] Aſconius Pædianus et Argument. et Notis in Orat. pro Mil. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

him

him as high in the order of ſtateſmen, as, by the other parts of his character, he ſtands in the liſt of ingenious men and virtuous citizens. CHAP. II.

Milo was likewiſe ſoon after condemned, in abſence, by the Prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypſæus and Scipio, were brought to trial for the ſame offence. The Tribune Munatius Planeus and Pompeius Rufus were, at the expiration of their office, tried and condemned for the ſhare they had in the fire which conſumed the Senate-houſe, and in the aſſault which was committed on the houſe of M. Lepidus the Interrex.

CHAP. III.

Character of Pompey in Capacity of ſole Conſul.——Privilege of Cæſar to be admitted as Candidate for the Office of Conſul, without reſigning his Province.——General Revolt of the Gauls.——Operations in that Country.——Blockade and Reduction of Aleſia.——Diſtribution of Cæſar's Army in Gaul.

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POMPEY, in his dignity of ſole Conſul, having joined a legal authority to the perſonal elevation which he always affected, poſſeſſed much of the influence and conſideration of a real monarch; and it would have been happy, perhaps, for the State, if he could have made ſuch a dignity hereditary, and a permanent part of the conſtitution, or given to the commonwealth that reaſonable mixture of kingly government, of which it appears to have ſtood ſo greatly in need. In his preſent elevation he roſe for a while above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that intereſt which the ſovereign ever has in the ſupport of juſtice. He even ſeems to have perſonated the character of a prince, or to have conſidered himſelf as above the rank of a citizen. Among other inſtances to this purpoſe, is mentioned his haughty ſaying to Hypſæus, late candidate for the Conſulate, now under proſecution for bribery, who, as Pompey paſſed from the bath to ſupper, put himſelf in his way to implore his protection, "Detain me not," he ſaid, "you only make "ſupper to cool for no purpoſe[1]." In the midſt of the ſolicitations of his courtiers and flatterers, he even ventured to diſpenſe with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule he himſelf had laid down for the

[1] Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 5.

direction

direction of criminal trials, he furniſhed Munatius Plancus, when brought to the bar, with a commendatory teſtimony, "I cannot prefer "this writing of Pompey," ſaid Cato, "to the law of which he "himſelf is the author." On account of this ſaying, Plancus, when the Judges came to be incloſed, thought proper to reject Cato: the accuſed was nevertheleſs condemned [1]. CHAP. III.

Beſides the meaſures taken to puniſh paſt offences, it was thought neceſſary to deviſe ſome laws to prevent for the future, or to leſſen the temptation to the commiſſion of ſuch dangerous crimes. The principal ſource of the late diſorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for thoſe offices of State, which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the ſuggeſtion of Pompey, that no man could be appointed to a province till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of Conſul, Prætor, or Quæſtor, in virtue of which he claimed a proportionate ſtation in the provinces.

Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the addreſs to procure for himſelf a prolongation of his government in Spain for five years. This circumſtance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewiſe bore the higheſt civil office in the State at home, ſet a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth.

Cæſar's command in Gaul was ſoon to expire; and, according to the laws then in force, he muſt even reſign it before he could aſpire to the Conſulate, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferments. It had been wiſely ordained by the laws, that the perſons offering themſelves as candidates for the office of Conſul, ſhould appear in perſon to ſue for it; and that no man, without reſigning his command and diſmiſſing his army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By

[1] Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 484.

this

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this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power in the State with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though veſted with ſuch a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the obſervance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman People did not confine him to any ſtation, and in reality extended to the whole empire, or had a particular reference to Italy, ſtill continued to reſide in the city of Rome.

Cæſar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aſpired to the ſame privilege with Pompey, and claimed, as a mere inſtance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained; but what, if beſtowed on himſelf, with his other advantages, muſt give him a great and immediate ſuperiority. The army he commanded was already in the moſt advantageous ſituation. The addition of Conſular power at Rome, to that of general in both the Gauls, was joining Italy itſelf to his provinces, and putting him at once in poſſeſſion of the empire. Any oppoſition made to his authority as Conſul would be conſtrued as rebellion againſt the State itſelf. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a diſtant province, in which he, at moſt, could only defend himſelf; but not entertain any deſigns on the ſovereignty of Italy, which would be covered from his attempts by the Pyrennees and the Alps, and the great armies of Gaul.

With theſe objects in his view, Cæſar inſtructed his partizans among the Tribunes to move, That, being continually engaged in a hazardous war, which required his preſence, and being neceſſarily detained abroad in the ſervice of his country, he might be exempted from the law, which required the candidates for office to attend their canvaſs in perſon, and might therefore be elected into the Conſulate without preſenting himſelf to the People for that purpoſe.

This propoſition was ſufficiently underſtood by the leading men of the Senate, and by the few who joined with them in ſupport of the

commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæſar ſhould have a privilege of being elected Conſul, without reſigning his province, or diſmiſſing his army; and they withſtood the motion as of the moſt dangerous conſequence. But Pompey, who ought likewiſe, for his own ſake, to have been alarmed at the progreſs of Cæſar, and at the uncommon advantage at which he now aimed, was either lulled into ſecurity by the artifices of his rival, or thought himſelf ſufficiently raiſed above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own perſon, many unprecedented honours, and was poſſibly unwilling to contend for forms which, at ſome future period, might limit his own pretenſions. Cato loudly renewed his ſuſpicion of Cæſar's deſigns. Cicero could not be neutral in any diſpute that ſhould ariſe between Cæſar and Pompey. He had been baniſhed by the one, and reſtored by the other. Beſides the perſonal conſideration he owed to Pompey on this occaſion, his natural bias was on the ſide of the Senate, and for the ſupport of the forms which were provided for the ſafety of the commonwealth. He nevertheleſs ſuffered himſelf to be dazzled with the court which Cæſar had paid to him for ſome time, with a view to this very queſtion; he condemned the indiſcreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cauſe of the republic by ſetting both Cæſar and Pompey at defiance, while he himſelf, by temporiſing, and by managing the inclinations of theſe parties, had ſecured them both in its intereſts. He ſtated the danger of a quarrel with Cæſar at this time, ſupported as he was by a powerful army, and in the bowels of Italy; but did not conſider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that any quarrel could extort.

The army of Cæſar was not then ſo well prepared to follow him againſt his country, nor he himſelf furniſhed with the ſame colours of juſtice, under which he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. If a civil war were to be dreaded, to temporiſe, in this inſtance, was to give a delay which proved favourable to the enemy, or rather, in

effect, to deliver up the republic, without a conteſt to that fate which the prudent councils in queſtion were intended to remove. Under colour of this prudence, nevertheleſs, Cicero, as well as Pompey, ſupported the Tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the Proconſul of Gaul the diſpenſation he deſired, to retain his army, while he offered himſelf a candidate for the higheſt office of the ſtate at Rome.

Cæſar, immediately upon his arrival on that ſide of the Alps in the beginning of winter, obſerving the diſtractions which took place in the city upon the murder of Clodius, affected much zeal for the laws which had been ſo groſsly violated in that inſtance; and, under pretence of furniſhing himſelf with the means of ſupporting the ſtate againſt thoſe who were inclined to diſturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a conſiderable addition to his army; but, contented for the preſent with the privilege he had obtained of ſuing for the Conſulate, without quitting his province, or reſigning his military power, he left the State, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and, in the middle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gauliſh nations, repaſſed the Alps.

Moſt of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, rouſed by the ſenſe of their preſent condition, or by the cruel maſſacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had ſubmitted to Cæſar, or were ſeparately gained by him, under the ſpecious pretence of alliance or protection againſt their enemies; and with the title of ally, ſuffered him to become their maſter. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes [3], for abſenting themſelves from the convention which he had aſſembled on the Seine, and the mercileſs ſeverities executed by

[3] Now Chartres.

him

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him againſt the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuſe[4], convinced all the nations of Gaul that they were reduced to the condition of ſlaves; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to be puniſhed as a crime. They ſaw the folly of their former diſſentions, and ſuſpended all their animoſities to enter into a general concert for their common ſafety. The occaſion, they ſaid, was favourable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were diſtracted at home, and Cæſar had ſufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his abſence. The preſent time, they concluded, was the favourable opportunity to ſhut out the Romans for ever beyond the Cevennes, or even to force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the ſea-coaſt, received theſe repreſentations with joy. They held private meetings, and inſtead of exchanging hoſtages, which would have been too public a meaſure, and have led to a diſcovery of their deſigns, they plighted their faith by a more ſecret form, commonly practiſed among them on great occaſions, that of preſſing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes[5] undertook to begin hoſtilities; and accordingly, on a day fixed, ſurpriſed the town of Genabum[6], where they put many Roman traders, together with the commiſſary general of the army, to death.

It was the cuſtom of the Gauls to convey intimation of ſuch events by means of a cry which they raiſed at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till paſſing almoſt with the velocity of ſound itſelf, it gave the ſpeedieſt information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been tranſacted at Genabum at the riſing of the ſun, was, before night, propagated in

[4] Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland. [5] Chartres. [6] Orleans.

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every direction to the diſtance of a hundred and ſixty miles, and put all the nations within this compaſs in a ferment. Its firſt and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni[7]. Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic ſpirit and great capacity, aſſembled his retainers, took poſſeſſion of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence ſent meſſengers in every direction to urge the execution of the meaſures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himſelf, in return for his zeal, being choſen the common head of the confederacy, in this capacity, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furniſhed by each ſeparate canton, and took hoſtages for the regular obſervance of the conditions to which the ſeveral parties had agreed.

Vercingetorix having aſſembled a conſiderable army, ſent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to haraſs the frontiers of the Roman province, while he himſelf moved to the Loire, in order to rouſe the nations of that quarter, who appeared to be too ſecure; and he accordingly brought to his ſtandard all the warriors of thoſe cantons that lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the ſame time, were joined by all the nations of Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate deſtruction the cities of Thouloufe and Narbonne, or ſuch parts of their diſtricts at leaſt as were open to invaſion.

Thither Cæſar, with all the forces he could aſſemble upon his arrival from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be inſulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if poſſible, to put himſelf at the head of the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquiſitions. He did not chuſe that thoſe legions ſhould move in his abſence ſo far as to expoſe

[7] Auvergne.

themſelves

themſelves to be cut off by the natives. Nor was it eaſy for himſelf, with the force under his command, to penetrate through ſo many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with ſnow. This circumſtance, which increaſed his difficulties, as it was likely to render the enemy ſecure, ſtill encouraged him to make his attempt. He accordingly paſſed the mountains[9] which lay in his way, at a time when the ſnow, in many places, being ſix feet deep, muſt be removed with ſhovels, and when that paſſage was ſuppoſed to be intirely impracticable. After he had ſurmounted this difficulty, his object being to draw the attention of the prince of the Arverni to his own country, he ſent his cavalry abroad in numerous parties to deſtroy with fire and ſword the people with their habitations and poſſeſſions. When he thought the alarm was ſufficiently ſpread, and muſt have reached the Gauliſh army on the Loire, he pretended, that his preſence was required in the province behind him, gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders at the ſame time to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to haraſs the country as he himſelf had done.

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Having taken theſe meaſures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæſar, with a few attendants, made haſte to paſs in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by a party of horſe, which he had appointed at that place to wait his orders; and, under this eſcort, without halting by day or by night, he paſſed by Bibracte[10] and the country of the Lingones[11], to the neareſt quarter of his army on the Seine; and while he was yet ſuppoſed to be in Auvergne, had actually aſſembled his legions which had been diſtributed on the courſe of that river.

[9] The Cevennes.
[10] Afterwards Auguſtodunum, now Autun.
[11] Langres.

Vercingetorix

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Vercingetorix having notice that Cæſar, in this manner, had paſſed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion, perceived that the invaſion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he reſumed the operations which he had intermitted on the Loire, and endeavoured to poſſeſs himſelf of a poſt in the territory of Bibracte, where the people ſtill profeſſed themſelves to be in the alliance of the Romans.

Cæſar, notwithſtanding the difficulty of procuring proviſions and forage ſo early in the ſeaſon, thought himſelf under a neceſſity of oppoſing the progreſs of the enemy. For this purpoſe he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum [12]; and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum [13], leaving Trebonius by the way to take poſſeſſion of a town which the natives, after a little ſhow of reſiſtance, had ſurrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, reſolved to abandon the town; and ſhutting the gates againſt the Romans on one ſide, endeavoured to eſcape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæſar, having notice of their deſign, forced open their gates, and overtook them, while crowded together in the entrance of the bridge, and in the narrow ſtreets which led to it, put the greater part to the ſword, and, under pretence of revenging the maſſacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town ſhould be deſtroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges [14], on the left of the Loire; and, on his way towards Avaricum [15], the capital of that diſtrict, forced every place that oppoſed his paſſage.

Vercingetorix, obſerving the rapid progreſs of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or diſcipline, could not

[12] Sens. [13] Orleans. [14] Now Berri. [15] Bourges.

withſtand

withſtand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to diſtreſs the enemy by delays and want of proviſions. He had authority enough with his own people to perſuade them to lay their country waſte every where within many miles of Cæſar's route. Twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to the opinion of Vercingetorix, and at the earneſt requeſt of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the laſt extremity, was ſpared. CHAP. III.

Thither, accordingly, Cæſar advanced as to the only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great diſadvantages, in the midſt of a country that was intirely laid waſte, and truſting for the daily ſubſiſtence of his army to the Ædui beyond the Loire, who, notwithſtanding their profeſſions, were far from being hearty in his cauſe, or diligent in ſending their ſupplies of proviſions to his camp. Such as they ſent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a ſtrong poſt with his army, and infeſted the highways with his parties. In theſe circumſtances, Cæſar's army was ſometimes reduced to great diſtreſs; he himſelf, to pique the reſolution of his ſoldiers, affected a willingneſs to raiſe the ſiege, whenever they were pleaſed to intimate, that they could endure it no longer: "We are got "into a difficult ſituation," he uſed to obſerve; "if the troops are diſ- "couraged, I ſhall withdraw." To this affected tenderneſs for the ſufferings of his men, he was every where anſwered, with intreaties that he would not diſhonour them, by ſuppoſing that any hardſhips could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labour of ſo many ſucceſsful compaigns. He accordingly continued the attack of Avaricum under all his diſcouragements.

The place was covered on two ſides by a river and a moraſs, and was acceſſible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniouſly conſtructed with double frames of wood, having compartments or pannels filled up with maſonry and large blocks of ſtone.

The

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The maſonry ſecured the timber from fire, and the frames preſerved the maſonry againſt the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the ſtones contained within a ſingle pannel or diviſion of the frame, without ruining at once any conſiderable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army approached to this wall by the moſt laborious and difficult methods which were practiſed. They began, in the ancient form of attack, at a proper diſtance, and on a breadth of eighty-three feet, to lay a ſloping mound [16], which riſing by degrees on the plain, formed, as it advanced, an eaſy aſcent to the level of the battlements. The earth on the ſides of this mound was ſupported by timbers, hurdles, and faggots, and the workmen in front were covered with mantlets and moveable pent-houſes. The beſieged, that they might ſtill overtop the beſiegers, raiſed their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a ſecurity againſt the burning arrows and ſhafts which were darted againſt them.

In this conteſt the works on both ſides were raiſed about eighty feet, and the beſieged endeavoured to keep the advantage of ſuperior height, not only by raiſing their own walls, but likewiſe by undermining and ſinking the mound of the beſiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own wall to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured to remove the earth and other materials from below, as faſt as they were accumulated above. They came from their ſally-ports on different ſides of the mound, and endeavoured to ſet fire to the wood by which the earth was ſupported. In all theſe particulars ſhowing that they poſſeſſed the arts of defence in common with antient nations [17]. Vercingetorix, in the mean time, continued to haraſs the Roman army from without, intercepted their ſupply of proviſions, and, by means of the

[16] The Agger. [17] Cæſar de Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 22, &c. Vid. Thucidid. lib. ii. in the ſiege of Platæa.

river

river and the moraſs, maintained his communication with the town, and ſent in frequent relief. CHAP. III.

Notwithſtanding all theſe difficulties, Cæſar by degrees brought forward and raiſed his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; ſo that by a ſingle aſſault he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a laſt effort, he took the opportunity, as he frequently did, of a heavy rain to make his attack. The beſieged, as he ſuppoſed, had taken ſhelter from the weather, and were in that inſtant put off their guard. He got poſſeſſion of the battlements with little reſiſtance, and drove the parties who manned them before him from the walls. The inhabitants formed in the ſtreets, and the Romans who had entered, extending their line to right and left along the ramparts, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garriſon, obſerving their danger, began to eſcape by the gates. In the confuſion that followed, the town was ſacked, and could make no reſiſtance. Of forty thouſand perſons who had taken ſhelter in it, no more than eight hundred eſcaped. This maſſacre was joined to that lately performed at Genabum, under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders who were put to death at the breaking out of the preſent revolt.

The Gauls, as uſual on every calamitous event, were greatly diſheartened; and were about to deſpair of their cauſe, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had reſerved this place from the general devaſtation, and had themſelves undertaken to defend it; that what they ſuffered was the conſequence of a miſtake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority as uſual roſe on the ill ſucceſs of councils which he had not approved, and brought an acceſſion of numbers to his ſtandard.

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Cæſar, finding a conſiderable ſupply of ſtores and proviſions at Avaricum, remained ſome days to relieve and to refreſh his army. The country around him, however, being intirely laid waſte, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became neceſſary for him to repaſs the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants ſtill profeſſed to be in alliance with the Romans, and having had their poſſeſſions covered by the river from the incurſions of the enemy in their late devaſtations, were ſtill in condition to ſupply his camp. As in this movement he ſeemed to retire and to give up the ground he had diſputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to ſettle a diſpute which had ariſen among the Ædui, relating to the ſucceſſion of the chief magiſtrate, or head of their canton. Having repaſſed to the right of the Loire without any loſs, he made a demand on his allies of that ſide for ten thouſand men on foot, and all the horſes they could furniſh.

He now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them ſeparately. For this purpoſe he ſent four legions towards the Seine; while he himſelf took the route of Noviodunum [19], at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, ſpare horſes, and unneceſſary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to paſs that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whoſe chief was now at the head of it. This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of ſnows on the Cevennes begin to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demoliſhed, and hoped to prevent the Romans from paſſing it during the greater part of ſummer. As ſoon as Cæſar marched from Noviodunum, he preſented himſelf on the oppoſite bank of the river, and regulated his motions by that of

[19] Nevers.

the

the enemy. The two armies commonly decamped, marched, and encamped again in ſight of each other; and Cæſar never affected to elude the vigilance of the Gauls, till he ſaw an opportunity to do ſo with advantage.

It happened that one of the bridges of the Allier had been but imperfectly deſtroyed; moſt of the piles were yet faſt in the ground, and appeared above water; ſo that a paſſage might be effected in a few hours. The country around was woody, and furniſhed cover, or a place of ambuſh, to any number of men. From theſe circumſtances Cæſar conceived the deſign to over-reach the enemy. He put his army in motion as uſual, but himſelf remained with a ſufficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In order that the Gauls might not be led to ſuſpect that any part of his army was left behind, he ordered that thoſe who were to move ſhould divide, and preſent the ſame number of ſeparate bodies, the ſame diſtinction of colours and ſtandards, which they were accuſtomed to ſhow on a march of the whole army; at the ſame time, as he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep pace with his people, in order to haſten and increaſe their diſtance, he ordered them to make a quicker and a longer march than uſual. When he ſuppoſed that this feint or ſtratagem had taken its full effect, he began to work on the piles which were left in the river, and in a few hours repaired the bridge ſo effectually, that he paſſed with the diviſion of the army he had reſerved for this purpoſe, and inſtantly fortified a poſt to cover them on the oppoſite bank. From thence he ſent orders to recall the main body; and before the enemy were appriſed of his deſign, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

Vercingetorix, as ſoon as he had intelligence that the Romans had paſſed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia [20], the capital of his own

[20] Now ſuppoſed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

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principality, in order to take meaſures for the ſafety of that place. It being ſituated on a height, having an aſcent of above a mile from the plain, and ſurrounded by other hills, which made part of the ſame ridge, he ordered a ſtone wall to be built ſix feet high about half way up the aſcent to the town, and encamped as many as the ſpace could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the ſame time with ſeparate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this diſpoſition Cæſar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no poſſibility of inveſting the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of poſts. He pitched his camp at ſome diſtance from the foot of the hill, and from thence in a few days got poſſeſſion of a height in his way to the town, on which he poſted two legions, with a lane of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from this advanced ſtation to his main encampment.

In this poſture Cæſar foreſaw, that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in poſſeſſion of the enemy, while he preſſed upon the town, he himſelf might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the ſupplies neceſſary for the ſupport of his army. To preſerve his communication, therefore, with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the oppoſite ſide of theſe rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They accordingly took the field; but their leaders having been for ſome time inclined to favour the general cauſe of the Gauls, they thought this a favourable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæſar's army, they halted; and, upon a report which was induſtriouſly ſpread amongſt them, that he had murdered ſome of their countrymen who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans in their company to death, and took meaſures to join their countrymen who were aſſembled for the defence of Gergovia. They had

not

not yet moved to execute this reſolution, when Cæſar had notice of what was intended, and with his uſual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent its effects. He preſented himſelf as a friend; and thinking it ſafeſt for the preſent to diſguiſe his reſentment, he produced into public view all the perſons who were ſaid to have been killed by his orders, convinced ſuch as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the ſeeming cordiality of allies, to his camp.

Cæſar made a merit with the Ædui of this act of clemency towards their people; but found that the ſpirit of defection was not confined to theſe detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the violence committed in the camp was an effect of the reſolutions adopted by the whole people; that, in purſuance of the ſame meaſures, his purveyors and commiſſaries had been aſſaulted and pillaged even where they thought themſelves ſecure, as in a friend's country; and that he could no longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was ſhown to ſuch of their people as were in the power of Cæſar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæſar, not to break at once with the only ſuppoſed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to conſider the late diſorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himſelf willing to rely on the wiſdom of the State itſelf for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-adviſed perſons of their country had committed.

This able commander appears, on many occaſions, to have truſted greatly to the ſuperiority of the Roman ſoldiers, as well as to that of his own reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the higheſt degree to ſupport him in continuing, or even in attempting, a ſiege under his preſent difficulties, beſet by numerous

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numerous enemies, who were in appearance ably conducted; while he himſelf was deſerted by thoſe who were reputed his friends.

In his laſt march to repreſs the defection of his allies, he had left his camp expoſed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions againſt the whole force of ſo many nations as were aſſembled for the defence of Gergovia. Theſe ſeized their opportunity in his abſence, made a vigorous attack, and muſt have prevailed, if he had not returned with the utmoſt celerity to relieve his camp.

With the ſame confidence in the ſuperiority of his men, Cæſar ſoon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned, the Gauls had built on the aſcent of the hill which led to the town; and having made a feint on the oppoſite ſide with part of his horſe, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horſeback, who ſhowed themſelves at a diſtance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually paſſed the wall, and made himſelf maſter of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town; but not being ſupported, were ſurrounded and ſlain; even thoſe who had ſucceeded at firſt under favour of the feint by which he had drawn off the enemy, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulſed with conſiderable loſs. In conſequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæſar would be under the neceſſity of raiſing the ſiege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days ſucceſſively on the plain before his entrenchment, and offered the enemy battle. On the third day he decamped; and, with the credit he derived from this ſpecies of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repaſſed undiſturbed by the enemy. His paſſage of the ſame river, a ſhort time before, was eſteemed as a victory, and his return,

return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the ſafety of his army, was undoubtedly conſidered as a defeat. The low ſtate of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gauliſh leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the liberties of Gaul; and as a commencement of hoſtility, they carried off or rifled the treaſure he kept for the pay of his army, and ſeized all the ſpare horſes and baggage which he had left at Noviodunum [21], as at a place of ſecurity at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire.

He himſelf was yet incloſed between theſe two rivers, having enemies on every ſide, and no magazines or ſtores for the ſupply of his army. He deliberated whether he ſhould not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he muſt expoſe Labienus, commanding a diviſion of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of paſſing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and the diſcredit which his arms muſt incur from ſuch a retreat, prevented him. He determined therefore to advance; paſſed the Loire by a ford above its confluence with the Allier; found a conſiderable ſupply of proviſions and forage in the country of the Ædui, and continued his march from thence to the Seine.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had beſieged Lutetia, the original germ from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a ſmall iſland in the Seine, and had made ſome progreſs in the ſiege, when he heard of Cæſar's retreat from Gergovia, of the defection of the Ædui, and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right againſt himſelf. In theſe circumſtances, he laid aſide his deſign on Lutetia, and aſcended by the left of the Seine to the country of the Senones, through which Cæſar was now advancing to meet him. In paſſing the river at Melodunum [22],

[21] Nevers. [22] Now Melun.

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he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a conſiderable victory; and, with the credit of this event in his favour, continued his march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was ſoon afterwards joined by Cæſar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had paſſed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gauliſh nations at Bibracté. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moſelle to the Loire, except the Treviri, Remi, and Lingones[23]. The firſt ſtood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two laſt profeſſed an attachment to the Romans, who were ſtill maſters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gauliſh confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requiſition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of cavalry, and accordingly increaſed this part of his army to fifteen thouſand. To the end that he might give the Romans ſufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two ſeparate invaſions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouſe; the other, from the Soane and the upper parts of the Loire, towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himſelf, though ſtill determined to avoid any general action, was to haraſs the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their ſupplies of proviſions.

Cæſar, on his part, wiſhed to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have acceſs to cover it againſt the deſigns of the enemy, and to avail himſelf of its reſources for the ſubſiſtence of his army. For this purpoſe it was neceſſary for him to return, by the Soane and the Rhône, through a level country which was in poſſeſſion of the enemy, to whom he was greatly in-

[23] Now Trevcs, Rheims, and Langre.

ferior in cavalry. He ſent into Germany for a reinforcement of horſe; and the natives of that part of the continent being already ſenſible, that wherever they were admitted to act as ſoldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themſelves to act as maſters, without ſcruple beſtowed their ſervices for or againſt any cauſe; two thouſand of them joined Cæſar, but ſo ill mounted that he was obliged to ſupply them with horſes, by borrowing ſuch as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be ſpared from his cavalry. To compenſate their defect in horſes, the men were brave, and, in many of the operations which followed, turned the event of battles, and determined the fate of the war. CHAP. III.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæſar began his march to the ſouthward; and having paſſed the heights at the ſources of the Seine, found the Gauls already poſted in three ſeparate diviſions, contiguous to the different routes he might take, with numerous flying bodies of horſe, ready to haraſs him in any movement he ſhould make in their preſence. By continuing his march, he ſoon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a ſharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The Gauls were routed chiefly by the valour and addreſs of the Germans, to whom Cæſar imputed his victory. This event was deciſive in reſpect to the cavalry, that part of both armies on which it was ſuppoſed that the fate of the war muſt turn. And Vercingetorix, not to expoſe his infantry to the neceſſity of a general action, inſtantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers which mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their ſource. Cæſar, no longer apprehenſive of the enemy's horſe, reſumed the confidence with which he always purſued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into this retreat.

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Vercingetorix, with his very numerous army, took poſt at Aleſia, a place raiſed on a hill at the confluence of two rivers; the point on which it ſtood being the termination of a ridge which ſeparated the channels by which theſe rivers deſcended to the plain. The fields on one ſide were level, on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Aleſia, under the walls of the town, and in that poſition thought themſelves ſecure from any attack. But not aware of the reſources, enterprize, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themſelves inacceſſible, they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up; and Cæſar immediately began to ſurround them, making a proper diſtribution of his army, and employing working parties at once on a chain of twenty-three poſts and redoubts.

Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the enemy's deſign, ſent his cavalry to collect what proviſions could be found in the neighbouring country; but theſe troops, in conſequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field againſt the Roman and German horſe, he propoſed to diminiſh the conſumption within his lines by diſmiſſing them altogether, giving them inſtructions to make the beſt of their way to their ſeveral cantons, and there to repreſent the ſituation in which they had left the army, and the neceſſity of making a great and ſpeedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thouſand men under his command, and might be able to ſubſiſt them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæſar, from the enemy's having ſent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defenſive, and to remain in their preſent ſituation until they ſhould be relieved. With little apprehenſion of diſturbance, therefore, from within his lines, he proceeded to execute amazing works; at once to ſecure his prey and to cover himſelf againſt any attempts which might be made to reſcue them. This great commander owed many of his diſtinguiſhed ſucceſſes to

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the ſurpriſing works which he executed; ſo far exceeding the fears or apprehenſions of his enemy, that they found themſelves unexpectedly forced into difficulties with which they were not prepared to contend.

The Roman armies in general, and thoſe which ſerved under Cæſar in particular, had learned to make war with the pick-ax and the ſhovel, no leſs than with the javeline and the ſword, and were inured to prodigies of labour as well as of valour. In the preſent caſe they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular ſides, in order to prevent any ſurpriſe from the town. At the diſtance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's miſſiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, conſiſting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furniſhed, as uſual, with a paliſade. At a proper diſtance from this firſt line which fronted the town, ſo as to leave a proper interval for the lodgement and forming of his army, he drew another line, conſiſting of the ſame parts and dimenſions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of theſe works were upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys; and the ditches, wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reaſon, at leaſt after the diſtreſs of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garriſon, which exceeded his own army in numbers, the moſt vigorous ſallies from within; and, by the united exertions of all the Gauliſh nations in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made from without; and as his own army, conſiſting of no more than ſixty thouſand men, could not equally man, in every place, works of ſuch extent, he thought it neceſſary to cover

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his lines with every ſpecies of outwork then practiſed in the art of attack or defence, the *Cippi*, *Liliæ*, and the *Stimuli*.

The firſt were forked ſtakes, or large branches of trees planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, bound together to prevent their being pulled up ſeparately, and cut ſhort and pointed to wound the enemy who ſhould attempt to paſs them.

The ſecond, or liliæ, conſiſted of ſingle ſtakes ſharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom, of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quincunx; ſo that a perſon who had paſſed in the interval of any two muſt neceſſarily fall into a third. This device was commonly maſked or concealed with ſlender bruſhwood covered with earth.

The laſt, or the ſtimuli, were wooden ſhafts ſet in the ground and ſtuck thick with barbed hooks, to faſten or tear the fleſh of thoſe who attempted to paſs them in the night, or without the neceſſary precautions.

All theſe ſeveral works, it appears, the Roman army completed, conſiderably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that his proviſions might laſt. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to haſten the event, ſeemed to wait for the ſeveral circumſtances on which they relied for the iſſue. Cæſar truſted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the aſſiſtance of their friends, who were in reality aſſembling in great numbers from every quarter to effect their relief. They are ſaid to have muſtered at Bibracte[23] no leſs than two hundred and forty thouſand foot, with eight thouſand horſe. But if theſe numbers are not exaggerated, they may be conſidered as a proof how far thoſe nations were ignorant of the circumſtances on which the fortunes of armies

[23] Autun.

really

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really turn. The ſupreme command of this multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of one of the northern cantons, who having ſome time made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed the rank which he held in his own country to the favour of Cæſar, but could not reſiſt the contagion of that general ardour with which his countrymen now roſe to recover their freedom.

While this great hoſt was aſſembling, the unhappy garriſon of Aleſia received no tidings of relief. Their proviſions being near exhauſted, they began to deſpair of ſuccour. A council was held to deliberate on their conduct, and to form ſome plan of eſcape. Some were of opinion that they ought to ſurrender themſelves, and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that they ſhould make a general ſally, endeavour to cut their way through the enemy, and eſcape or periſh with ſwords in their hands. Critognatus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the Arverni [26], treated the opinion of thoſe who propoſed to ſurrender as mean and daſtardly; that of the ſecond, as brave rather in appearance than in reality. "Bravery," he ſaid, "does not conſiſt in ſudden efforts of impatience and deſpair, but in "firmly enduring for any length of time what the circumſtances of "war may require. Shall we think merely, becauſe we have no "communication with our friends, that they have deſerted us, and "do not intend to make any effort to ſave us? Againſt whom do "you think Cæſar hath conſtructed ſo many works in his rear? "Againſt whom does he man them in your ſight with ſo much "care? He has intelligence, although you have not, that a power"ful army is preparing to relieve you. Take courage, and wait "the coming of your friends. Even if your proviſions ſhould "fail, the example of former times will point out a reſource. Your "anceſtors, being ſurrounded by the armies of the Cimbri and the

[26] Auvergne.

Teutones,

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"Teutones, rather than ſurrender themſelves, fed on the bodies of "thoſe who were unſerviceable in the war; and by this expedient "held out till the enemy was obliged to retire. And yet, on that "occaſion, our anceſtors had leſs cauſe than we have to make every "effort of conſtancy and fortitude. *Their* enemies were paſſing, "and meant only to plunder a country which they were ſoon to "abandon; *our* enemies come to bind us in perpetual chains, and to "eſtabliſh a dominion at which human nature revolts."

The Gauls kept their reſolution to hold out, but rejected the means that were propoſed to ſupply their neceſſities, or reſerved them for a time of greater extremity. The propoſition of Critognatus is, by Cæſar, who was himſelf the unprovoked author of ſo much diſtreſs, and who continued, without remorſe, to gratify his ambition at the expence of ſo much blood, mentioned with horror as an act of nefarious cruelty[27]. So much are men affected with appearances which ſhock the imagination more than with the real meaſure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no leſs cruel on the part of the Gauliſh army than it was on the part of Cæſar; the firſt, to leſſen the conſumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town to the mercy of the enemy; and Cæſar, in order to accumulate the ſufferings of the beſieged, would neither relieve nor ſuffer them to paſs. From theſe circumſtances we may preſume, although it is not mentioned, that they muſt have periſhed a ſpectacle of extreme anguiſh and ſuffering in the preſence of both armies.

In the midſt of theſe extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gauliſh nations, at laſt appeared for the relief of Aleſia, and with their multitudes covered the neighbouring hills. Being favoured by the nature of the ground, they were enabled to advance within five

[27] Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus ſingularem ac nefariam crudelitatem. De Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 76.

hundred

hundred paces, or leſs than half a mile, of Cæſar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both ſides began to act. The Gauliſh horſe, truſting to their ſuperiority in numbers, or to the defenſive plan which the Romans were likely to follow on the preſent occaſion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and propoſed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæſar thought it neceſſary to repel this ſpecies of inſult, and ſent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and laſted till the ſetting of the ſun, when the Gauliſh horſe, who till then had maintained the fight with great obſtinacy and valour, being taken in flank by the Germans in Cæſar's ſervice, were obliged to give way. Both ſides, on this occaſion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horſe; and the Gauliſh foot, who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the ſwords of the enemy, fled in the utmoſt confuſion to the rear of their own army.

After this action nothing paſſed for a day and a night; but it appeared that, during this time, the Gauliſh army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæſar, and preparing graplings to tear down the paliſade and the parapet; and that they only waited till theſe preparations ſhould be finiſhed to make a vigorous attempt to raiſe the ſiege. They accordingly came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great ſhout, the only ſignal they ſuppoſed could be underſtood by their friends in the town, gave a general aſſault on Cæſar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæſar had aſſigned to every legion and ſeparate body of men their ſtation, and had repeatedly, to render them familiar with his diſpoſition, given the alarm, and taught them to repair to their poſts; he had placed Mark Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reſerve, to ſuccour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any ſurpriſe, the general aſſault

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aſſault of the Gauls. His men ſuffered conſiderably from the firſt ſhower of miſſiles that came from ſo numerous an enemy; but as ſoon as the aſſailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themſelves entangled in the ſnares which had been laid for them, and againſt which they had taken no precaution, they were ſenſible that they fought at a great diſadvantage, and deſiſted at once from this raſh and inconſiderate attempt.

The beſieged, in anxious expectation of what was to paſs in the field, hearing the ſhout that was raiſed by their friends, returned it to make known their intention, to co-operate in every attack, and inſtantly begun to employ the preparations which they likewiſe had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to caſt ſuch materials as they could throw into the broad ditch at the foot of the hill; but, when day appeared, ſeeing that their friends had retired, without making any impreſſion on the exterior line, they too, not to expoſe themſelves in an attempt in which they were not to be ſeconded, withdrew to their ſtation on the hill.

From this diſappointment the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were ſenſible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's works. To correct this miſtake, they viſited the whole circumference of Cæſar's lines. They obſerved, in a particular place, that the exterior line was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit. That Cæſar, to avoid ſo great an addition to his labour, and ſo much outline to defend, had encamped two legions in that place with their uſual entrenchment, which formed a kind of fortreſs on the ſummit of the hill, truſting to this camp as a redoubt that would connect his defences on that ſide.

This place was choſen by the Gauls for a ſecond and better concerted attempt than the firſt; and they determined, inſtead of the night to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were moſt

likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thouſand men were ſelected for this ſervice; and they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furniſhed not only with grappling irons to tear down the paliſade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to ſmother the ſtimuli from which they had ſuffered ſo much in their former attacks.

Cæſar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former ſucceſs, was ſenſible, that he was now attacked in his weakeſt place. He ordered Labienus inſtantly, with ſix cohorts, to ſupport the legions that were poſted in that ſtation; and as he had reaſon to expect, at the ſame time, a general aſſault, both from within and from without his lines, to favour this principal attack, he ordered every ſeparate body to its poſt of alarm; and he himſelf, with a conſiderable reſerve, took a ſtation from which he could beſt obſerve the whole, and be ready to ſuſtain any part that was preſſed. He had given Labienus inſtructions, in caſe he found that the lines could not be defended, to ſally forth, and bring the action to an iſſue, in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage by mixing with the enemy ſword in hand.

The Gauls, who were ſhut up on the heights of Aleſia, only waiting to ſecond the attempts of their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the ſame time; and the Romans, being alarmed with hoſtile cries and ſhouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being ſeized with a panic, from which the beſt troops, on occaſion, are not exempted.

Labienus was ſo much preſſed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæſar detached two ſeveral parties from his reſerve to ſuſtain him. Firſt, a body of ſix cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of ſeven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon

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receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from paſſing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different ſtations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general ſally according to his inſtructions, and to mix with the enemy ſword in hand; he himſelf inſtantly moved to ſupport him.

Cæſar had, by this time, obſerved, that the enemy, by a groſs miſconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favour their principal attack; and he therefore, with thoſe he ſtill retained as a body of reſerve, not only left the poſt of obſervation he had taken in the beginning of the action, but ventured even to unfurniſh ſome other parts of the line as he paſſed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the ſally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conſpicuous dreſs which he generally wore in time of battle; and his arrival, on this occaſion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army which had begun to deſpair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his uſual genius and preſence of mind, ordered his cavalry to get out of the lines; and, while the foot were engaged in front, to take the enemy in flank or in the rear. If the event had been otherwiſe doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, muſt have ſecured it in his favour. The Gauls, although in the attack they had acted with ardour, yet loſt courage when puſhed to defend themſelves; and, upon the appearance of Cæſar's cavalry in their rear, took to flight, and were purſued with great ſlaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attacks; of the Gauls, who were ſhut up in Aleſia, and of their countrymen, who had come to their relief. During the night, thoſe in the field, diſcomfited by their repulſe, were ſeparating, leaving their chieftains, and diſperſing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties who

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who were ſent in purſuit of them. Thoſe from within the lines, who had ſuffered ſo long a blockade, now ſeeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer diſpoſed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having aſſembled the leaders together, told them, That, as he had undertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earneſt deſire to recover, if he could, the freedom of his country, ſo he was now ready to become a ſacrifice to the ſafety of his countrymen, and in any manner they thought proper to diſpoſe of him, whether dead or alive, was willing to be made the means of appeaſing the victor's revenge.

At this conſultation it was determined to ſurrender; and Vercingetorix ſuffered himſelf to be delivered up. With reſpect to the treatment he received, Cæſar is ſilent; but it is probable, that, like other captive chiefs, on ſuch occaſions, he was deſtined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had ſeverally acted, likely to furniſh a compariſon not altogether to his advantage, and in ſome reſpects fit to obſcure his glory.

The other priſoners alſo, except thoſe who belonged to the cantons of the Ædui and Arverni, underwent the ordinary fate of captives; and, in this capacity, were expoſed to ſale, or divided as plunder among the troops. Cæſar reſerved the priſoners of the Ædui and Arverni, on this occaſion, to ſerve him as hoſtages in ſecuring the ſubmiſſion of their reſpective cantons, and in obtaining from thence an immediate ſupply of proviſions.

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Cæſar remains in Gaul.——Pompey aſſumes Piſo into the Office of Conſul.——Succeſſion of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus.——Arrangement for the Provinces.——Motion to recall Cæſar.——Continued Debates in the Senate.——Operations of Cæſar in Gaul.——Intrigues in the City.——Affairs in the other Provinces.——Campaign of Cicero.——Succeſſion of Conſuls.——State of Parties in the City and in the Senate.——Arrival of Cæſar in Italy in the Spring.——Return to Gaul.——Parts with two Legions to Pompey and the Senate.——Alarm of Cæſar's March.——The Conſul Marcellus commits his Sword to Pompey.

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THE ſeventh and the moſt difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæſar ſent Labienus, with two legions beyond the Soane[1]; Caius Fabius, with two more, to the heads of the Marne and the Meuſe; other officers with ſeparate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different ſtations beyond the Loire and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero, with ſome other officers, to a ſtation allotted them on the Soane, to ſuperintend the formation of magazines and the ſupply of proviſions, which were chiefly tranſported by the navigation of that river.

Cæſar himſelf having now no other object of equal importance with that of ſecuring the poſſeſſion of a country ſo populous and of ſo great extent, from which he might draw ſuch reſources of men and of revenue, as muſt put him on the foot of a great monarch, determined to paſs the winter on this ſide of the Alps. He had ob-

[1] The Arar.

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tained a diſpenſation from the law which excluded him from the Conſulate, ſo long as he retained his army; but as it was not yet time to avail himſelf of his privilege, he reſolved, by remaining at a diſtance, as much as poſſible to ſhun the notice of ſuch parties at Rome as were known to obſerve his proceedings, and to ſtate them as matter of general alarm. He nevertheleſs did not ſuffer any thing of moment to paſs in the city without taking ſome part by means of his agents and partizans, and was continually employed in gaining to his intereſts all thoſe who were likely to come into office, or who, by their perſonal conſideration, were of any importance in the State, and ever ſtrove to exclude from office ſuch as were diſinclined to himſelf, or who could not be gained.

Pompey had now, for ſome months, exerciſed the office of ſole Conſul. In that time he had, in ſome meaſure, reſtored the authority of government, and had exerciſed it with moderation. He had ſhown himſelf qualified to act the part of an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual deſire of unprecedented honours was one of the evils that diſtreſſed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he parted with power. Having enjoyed his preſent dignity from the firſt of March to the beginning of Auguſt, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, ſuſpending the proſecution under which he then lay, for bribery, in ſoliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly elected colleague of Pompey, deſirous to ſignalize his adminiſtration by ſome act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the act in which Clodius had ſo greatly circumſcribed the power of the Cenſors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magiſtracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inſpection of this once awful Tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exerciſe its truſt. The inſtitution accordingly

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ingly had fallen into diſuſe, becauſe it was not fitted to the times. And there being few of the People that were fit either to cenſure, or that could bear to be cenſured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general ſenſe and manners of the age had aboliſhed.

Diſorders ariſing from the weakneſs of government had come to that extreme at which ſtates muſt either correct themſelves, or undergo ſome fatal change. The example of puniſhments inflicted, and of proſecutions ſtill carried on againſt perſons lately in office, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themſelves for any of the offices of State; and the late law, excluding Conſuls, Prætors, and other magiſtrates from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their term, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to ſeek for ſuch honours.

At the elections for the enſuing year only three candidates appeared; M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius, and M. Cato: all of them ſuppoſed to be of the Senatorian party; but very differently conſidered by thoſe who now endeavoured to rule the State. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himſelf to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæſar; and both were warmly eſpouſed by theſe powerful patrons in the preſent conteſt in oppoſition to Cato, whoſe ſucceſs might have proved a conſiderable obſtruction to Cæſar's deſigns.

It is obſerved of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were ſuppoſed to be all of the Senatorian party, the Senators thought their intereſt ſecure whichever of the candidates ſhould prevail. And as the Senatorian party divided upon the occaſion, the influence of Cæſar and Pompey eaſily caſt the balance on the ſide of Sulpicius and Marcellus. Cato, during the competition, continued in the ſame habits of friendſhip as uſual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favour, inſtead

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inſtead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under ſuch diſappointments, he went to the field of Mars as uſual from the aſſemblies of the People, ſtript and went to exerciſe, and continued from thence forward to frequent the Forum in his common undreſs. To thoſe who condoled with him, or preſſed him to continue his ſuit for another year, as he had done when firſt diſappointed of the Prætorſhip, he made anſwer, That he thought it was the part of a good man to undertake the public ſervice, whenever he was intruſted with it, and to make his willingneſs known, but not to court the public for employments as a favour to himſelf. "The people," he ſaid, "at the time that they refuſed me the Prætorſhip, were under "actual violence: in this caſe, they have made a free choice, and it "appears that I muſt either violate my own mind, or renounce their "good-will. My own mind is of more conſequence to me than "their favour; but, if I retain my character, I ſhall not be ſo un-"reaſonable as to expect conſideration from perſons to whom it is "not agreeable[a]."

When the new Conſuls were received into office, their immediate predeceſſors being by the late act precluded for five years from holding any provincial government, it became neceſſary to fill ſtations of this ſort with thoſe who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any command in the Provinces. Accordingly Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæſar in his Conſulate, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Craſſus. Cicero was named to ſucceed Appius Claudius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed Prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a diſpenſation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he filled

U. C. 702. Serv. Sulpicius, M. Claud. Marcellus, Coſſ.

[a] Plutarch. in Caton. p. 268.

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the office of Conſul in the city, now profeſſed an intention to take poſſeſſion of his province in perſon, and he actually ſet out from Rome for this purpoſe; but was induced to ſuſpend his journey by a motion, which was made in the Senate by Marcellus, ſoon after his acceſſion to the office of Conſul.

Cæſar was now in poſſeſſion of a very important privilege, which entitled him to ſue for the Conſulate, without reſigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his addreſs in attaching the army to himſelf; his inſinuation; his liberality; his aſſiduity to gain every perſon that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppoſe himſelf: the whole tendency of his conduct, and the enormous power he had acquired, began to be obſerved, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had ſo often repreſented to no purpoſe, began to be generally perceived; and perſons, formerly the leaſt attentive to the warnings they received, would now have been glad to remove Cæſar from the poſt of advantage they had given him.

The greater part of the Senate had become remiſs in their attendance, and regardleſs even of their own political intereſts. The few who exerted themſelves, were diſtracted with perſonal jealouſies and diſtruſt of each other. Cicero in particular, who before his baniſhment had been ſtrenuous on the ſide of the ariſtocracy, now grown timorous from the ſufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own ſafety, which he ſtudied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæſar's way, beſide the great conſideration and the jealouſy of Pompey, who had aſſiſted him in procuring his privilege to ſtand for the Conſulate in abſence; but now ſaw its tendency, and wiſhed to recall it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the Conſul Marcellus, while the Senate was deliberating

berating on the other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, propoſed that, the war in Gaul being finiſhed, Cæſar ſhould be recalled; or, if his friends inſiſted on his being continued in his command, that he ſhould not be admitted on the liſt of candidates for the Conſulate, until he preſented himſelf perſonally for this purpoſe.

This motion gave riſe in the Senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often reſumed. The Conſul Sulpicius, ſupported by numbers of the Tribunes who were in the intereſt of Cæſar, oppoſed the proceeding. Pompey himſelf, under pretence that he waited the iſſue of theſe debates, ſtopped ſhort in his journey to Spain, paſſed ſome time at Ariminum in reviewing the new levies which were deſtined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at laſt, being ſummoned to attend the Senate on the fifteenth of Auguſt, to conſider of the provincial arrangements[3], he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to cenſure the violence with which it had been propoſed to recall, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He acknowledged his opinion, that Cæſar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army, with the dignity of Conſul; but diſſuaded the Senate from taking an immediate reſolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the firſt of September[4]. Then no meeting of the Senate could be formed; but as ſoon as the ſubject was again reſumed, the late Conſul Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey, propoſed, that on the firſt of March, when the perſons deſtined to ſucceed the preſent Conſuls muſt have entered on office, a day ſhould be fixed to conſider of the province of Gaul, and moved that this queſ-

[3] Cicer. Epiſt. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 4. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. c. 58, 59.

[4] Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

tion ſhould be reſumed in preference to every other buſineſs[5]. Marcellus accordingly prepared, and laid before the Senate, a decree for this purpoſe on the laſt of September. By the firſt clauſe of this decree, the Conſuls elected for the following year were required, on the firſt of March, to move in the Senate the conſideration of the conſular provinces, to admit no other buſineſs to precede or to be joined with this, and to ſuffer no interruption in the meetings of the Senate, even on account of the aſſemblies of the people. By the ſame clauſe, it was reſolved, That the three hundred Senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their ſittings in the courts to attend the Senate on this buſineſs; and if it ſhould be neceſſary to make any motion on this ſubject in the aſſemblies of the People at large, or of the Plebeians[6] ſeparately, that the Conſuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the Prætors, the Tribunes, or ſuch of them as ſhall be agreed upon, ſhould move the people accordingly.

To this clauſe were prefixed, in the uſual form, the names of twelve Senators, as the authors or movers of it.

By a ſecond clauſe, bearing the ſame names, a caution was entered againſt any obſtruction to be given in this buſineſs by perſons empowered to controul the Senate's proceedings; and it was reſolved, That whoever ſhould put a negative on this decree, ſhould be declared an enemy to his country; and that the Senate, notwithſtanding any ſuch negative, ſhould perſiſt in recording its own decree, and in carrying its purpoſe into execution. In the face of this reſolution, the Tribunes C. Cælius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Panſa, interpoſed their negatives.

By another clauſe, the Senate reſolved, That on the ſame day, the caſe of the armies of the republic ſhould be taken into conſideration, and all who claimed their diſmiſſion, either on account of the

[5] Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

[6] Ad Populum Plebemve ferrent. Ibid.

length

length of ſervice, or any other conſideration, ſhould be heard; and that this likewiſe ſhould be entered as a decree of the Senate, notwithſtanding any negative interpoſed to the contrary. Here the Tribunes C. Cælius and C. Panſa, again forbad the decree. The laſt clauſe related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpoſe of the Pompeian law, with reſpect to the nomination of Pro-prætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight Prætorian provinces; and on this clauſe likewiſe, the two laſt mentioned Tribunes entered their negative[r].

Thus the reſolutions of the Senate, though preſerved in their own records, were, by the continual interpoſition of the Tribunes, prevented from having any real effect. And Cæſar, from the diſputes which had ariſen on his account, had ſufficient warning, if this had been neceſſary, to prepare himſelf for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were deciſion and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his deſigns more deep, looked forward to conſequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his purpoſe. He had now, by the unremitted application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the ſake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul; he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or three legions, the eſtabliſhment of his province, to twelve, well inured to ſervice, and attached to his perſon. He was in poſſeſſion of a privilege to ſtand for the Conſulate, without diſbanding his army; and when he ſhould unite the firſt civil and political authority in the ſtate, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be conſidered as ſovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was ſuch, that the reſolutions of the Senate againſt him, however

[r] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 8.

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neceſſary to the preſervation of the commonwealth, might have the ſemblance of injuſtice, and were likely to engage both his own army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. He himſelf prepared for the iſſue, by removing every cauſe of embarraſſment in his province, and by paying freſh court to the legions under his command with gratifications and bounties.

He had diſperſed or deſtroyed all the great armies, which the utmoſt efforts of the Gauliſh nations, in the preceding campaign, had been able to aſſemble againſt him; but he had not reconciled the ſpirits of that people, nor inured them to his government. He had a plauſible ground, therefore, from which to refute the allegations of the Senate, who proceeded in their reſolutions againſt him, on a ſuppoſition, that the war in his province was ended; and at the ſame time, had a fair pretence to gratify his army with the ſpoils of the country. For theſe purpoſes, ſoon after he had placed his army in winter quarters, he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that the war was likely to break out afreſh in different cantons; and under this pretence, took occaſion to carry his legions ſucceſſively into action. Leaving M. Antony to command at Bibracté [a] on the right of the Loire, he himſelf, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, paſſed that river, took the canton of the Bituriges by ſurprize, plundered their habitations, carried many of the people into captivity, and continued to lay waſte the country, until they and all the neighbouring cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert theſe calamities, ſurrendered themſelves at diſcretion.

From this expedition, in which he ſpent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred ſeſtertii, or about thirty ſhillings a man to the private ſoldiers; and of about two thouſand ſeſ-

[a] Afterwards Auguſtodunum, now Autun.

tertii,

tertii, or ſixteen pounds, to the Centurions. This money, it is obſerved by the hiſtorian [9], was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæſar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a ſpecial intereſt in the ſafety and ſucceſs of his general.

About eighteen days after this firſt diviſion of the army was brought back to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine [10]. The inhabitants of this tract were to ſuffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infeſted the newly acquired ſubjects of Cæſar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from whence they were ſaid to be invaded, found the ſuppoſed enemy, by the devaſtations of the preceding campaign which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withſtood with difficulty the inclemency of the ſeaſon, and were rather objects of pity than of hoſtile reſentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they periſhed in great numbers, from the effects of famine and cold. To force them to an immediate ſurrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæſar made a diſpoſition to prevent their having any reſpite from their preſent ſufferings. He ordered the ruins of Genabum [11] to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horſe and light infantry in the field to purſue the natives, to ſeize their perſons, and to multiply the evils to which they were expoſed. In this ſervice too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the diſtribution of captives, the only ſpoils of ſuch an enemy, and came to have a demand on Cæſar for gratuities equal to thoſe which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

[9] Hirt. de Bell. Gallico. [10] To the country of the Carnutes. [11] Now Orleans.

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Theſe operations led on to the ſpring, when a more real ſervice took place on the frontiers of the low countries. From that quarter, the people of the Remi [22] had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvais, with other cantons on the right of the Oiſe, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

On this intimation, Cæſar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into ſervice; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expreſsly ſaid to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a diſcipline, in which, when compared to the other legions, they were deemed to be ſtill defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the ſtation of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Sueſones [23], near the confluence of the Oiſe and the Aiſne. With this force Cæſar paſſed the Oiſe; but arrived too late to ſurprize his enemy. The Bellovaci [24], with ſome of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for ſafety on their innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had taken arms for their own ſecurity, and had retired with all their effects to a ſtrong poſt. They had a hill in their front, beyond which there lay a moraſs, and in that ſituation they thought themſelves ſufficiently ſecure without any artificial work.

Cæſar poſted himſelf in their neighbourhood; and ſuppoſing that the ſuperiority of their numbers would inſpire them with confidence, took meaſures to augment their preſumption, and to derive ſome advantage from the errors they were likely to commit, under the effects of this diſpoſition. He affected unuſual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, ſcarcely ventured abroad to cover

[22] Rheims. [23] The Soiſſons. [24] The Beauvois.

his foragers, and ſeemed to be entirely occupied in ſecuring himſelf.

The enemy however continued to avoid any general action, and were ſatisfied with the ſucceſsful war they were ſuffered to make on the foraging parties which were ſent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horſe, they attacked and deſtroyed the cavalry, which had come to the aſſiſtance of Cæſar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones [34], and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loſs he might have been in a little time reduced to great diſtreſs, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a ſpeedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately ſtationed at Genabum [35], and a third from Avaricum [36], to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great acceſſion of ſtrength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Aleſia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this reſolution in the night, by removing their ſick, wounded, and baggage; but had made ſo little progreſs at break of day, that their intention was diſcovered, and Cæſar, before they began their march, had time to paſs the moraſs, and to take poſſeſſion of the riſing ground in their front. This he did with the greateſt diſpatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their preſent poſition, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they ſhould make, and continued to awe them and to keep them in ſuſpence.

The Gauls therefore, inſtead of being able to depart as they expected before day-light, were obliged to continue to front the enemy, in order to cover the retreat of their baggage. They ſtill flattered themſelves, that Cæſar before night would be obliged to

[34] Rheims and Langres. [35] Orleans. [36] Bourges.

retire

retire to his camp; but obſerving, that whilſt the greater part of his army continued in readineſs for action, he began to entrench himſelf where he ſtood, they bethought themſelves of a ſtratagem to elude his deſign. They brought forward the wood and ſtraw, which remained, as uſual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and having ſet them on fire, produced ſuch a line of ſmoke, as darkened the whole fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæſar could venture to penetrate the cloud of ſmoke in purſuit of them, had gained a conſiderable diſtance. On the firſt ſight of this uncommon appearance, he ſuſpected their deſign, and began to advance; but the precautions, which he was obliged to take, in order to guard againſt an ambuſcade or ſurprize, gave the Gauls the time they wanted to effect the firſt part of their retreat undiſturbed.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former ſtation, and recurred to the ſame means they had hitherto employed to diſtreſs the Roman army. They ſucceeded in moſt of their attempts on the parties that were ſent abroad by Cæſar to procure him proviſions; and having reduced him to the neceſſity of depending intirely for the ſubſiſtence of his army on what a particular diſtrict could ſupply, they formed a deſign, with the choice of their army, to ſurround and cut off the parties, which they expected he muſt employ on that ſervice. Cæſar had intelligence of their deſign, and prepared, in his turn, to counteract them. He placed his army in a proper poſition to ſurpriſe the great detachment they had made; and having thus taken or deſtroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into deſpair by ſo great a loſs, to ſurrender themſelves at diſcretion; in conſequence of this ſurrender, he got poſſeſſion of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The

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The Belgic nations being thus finally ſubdued, and Cæſar having no longer any enemy to oppoſe him in the field, except a few deſperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his ſeverity, or averſion to his government, had deſerted their ſettlements, he determined to act againſt them in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in caſe of diſtreſs, this remnant of the nations who lately oppoſed him mutually gave to each other. He ſent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire; the twelfth legion, towards the ſources of the Garonne with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incurſions of any ſtragglers, whom his intended ſeverities might force upon deſperate attempts on that ſide. He himſelf, with Labienus and Mark Antony, proceeded to the Meuſe, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix [17], beginning to be re-peopled, and the nation reinſtated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people, that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a Prince who had preſumed to circumvent and to deſtroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution againſt them, iſſuing his orders, as in the former inſtance, to ſpare neither ſex nor age.

While Cæſar himſelf was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his deſtination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a conſiderable force in arms againſt Caninius Rebilus, the Roman officer, who was ſtationed in that quarter. The natives had laid ſiege to a fortreſs that was in poſſeſſion of the Romans; but alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to paſs the Loire to the northward. In this attempt, being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated with great ſlaughter. After this calamity,

[17] Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.

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about five hundred, who eſcaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly diſtinguiſhed in the war againſt the Romans, took their flight in the oppoſite direction, and propoſed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order to compenſate their loſſes with its ſpoils.

Fabius, in conſequence of his victory, received the ſubmiſſion of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the ſea coaſt. And having taken meaſures to ſecure his conqueſt, followed Drapes to the ſouthward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Roman province, to take refuge at Uxellodunum [11], a place of ſtrength, ſituated on a ſteep rock, at the confluence of ſome of thoſe ſtreams, which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius having joined their forces together, made diſpoſitions to inveſt their enemy; but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet acceſs to the fields, willing to ſpare the magazines which he had made up in the town, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was ſurpriſed and taken. The natives, however, who remained in the place, being ſupplied for a conſiderable time with proviſions, reſolved on a vigorous defence; and, by keeping the Roman army for ſome time at bay, began to raiſe up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæſar thought the reduction of this place an object that required his own preſence. Having therefore ſent Labienus to the Moſelle, and having left M. Antony to command in the low countries, he himſelf, with his uſual diſpatch, croſſed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected

[11] Suppoſed to be Cadenac.

by

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by his own people, and by the enemy who were beſieged in the town of Uxellodunum.

The place being ſtrong by nature, and in no want of proviſions, could be forced only by cutting off its acceſs to water. For this purpoſe Cæſar lined the banks of the river with archers and ſlingers, and effectually prevented the beſieged from ſupplying themſelves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the uſe of a ſpring which burſt from the rock in the approach to their town; for having got the command of the ground, he puſhed a mine to the ſource from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the beſiegers of this laſt reſource, obliged them to lay down their arms and truſt to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author [19], from whom theſe accounts are taken, conſidered as more than the uſual ſeverity of antient war. Cæſar, according to this hiſtorian, having given proof of his clemency, bethought himſelf now of an example of juſtice; and for this purpoſe ordered ſuch as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands ſtruck off [20]. And this refined act of cruelty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conqueſt of that country had been atchieved, thus ended the war in Gaul.

The uſual time of putting the troops into winter quarters not being arrived, Cæſar thought proper to viſit the nations upon the Adour, or what is now called Gaſcony [21]; the only part of his new conqueſts in the acquiſition of which he had not acted in perſon. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was every where received with the moſt perfect ſubmiſſion. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his

[19] Hiſt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

[20] Cæſar quum ſuam lenitatem cognitam omnibus ſciret.——Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus precidit. Vitam conceſſit quo teſtatior eſſet pœna improborum. De Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

[21] Acquitania.

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original province, held the uſual meetings for the diſpatch of civil affairs, and made a diſpoſition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this diſpoſition two legions were ſtationed in the high country, from which ſpring the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni [22]: two at Bibracté between the Soane and the Loire; two between the Loire and the Seine [23]; and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the low countries. To this extremity of his new conqueſts he himſelf repaired, and fixed his quarters at Nemetocenna [24], in the centre of his northern ſtations.

By this diſtribution of his army, Cæſar formed a kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquiſitions to the Meuſe and the Scheld. And by his ſeeming anxiety for the ſafety of the northern extremities of his province, and ſtill more by his own diſtance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealouſy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention, however, to the ſtate of politics was never leſs remitted.

Mark Antony, a perſon profligate and diſſipated; but when the occaſion required exertion, daring and eloquent, deſtined to be frequently mentioned in the ſequel of this hiſtory, now began to be employed by Cæſar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of ſtanding for the prieſthood, was ſent from Gaul, where he had recently ſerved in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emiſſaries of his general. Theſe agents were continually buſied in magnifying his ſervices, and in gaining to his intereſt every perſon of conſideration who could in any degree advance or obſtruct his deſigns. In the conqueſt of Gaul, they alleged that he added

[22] Limoges and Auvergne. [23] At Tours & Chartres. [24] Suppoſed to be Arras.

to

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to the patrimony of the Roman People a territory of no leſs than three thouſand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money [25]. They took care at the ſame time, in his name and by his directions, under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feaſts; and proceeded to execute, at a great expence, the ſplendid works which Cæſar had formerly ordered.

He himſelf, at the ſame time, was careful to ſecure the affections of the army; doubled their pay, and was laviſh in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Beſides his occaſional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himſelf to pay, to each particular ſoldier, what to perſons of that condition was a conſiderable object. In the city he even entered into the ſecrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the maſter by courting the miſtreſs or favourite ſlave. His purſe was ever open to gratify the covetous with preſents, to relieve the neceſſitous, and to ſilence the creditors of thoſe who were oppreſſed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to ſquander their patrimonies, and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered neceſſary to them. He kept a correſpondence at the ſame time with dependant and foreign princes; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to ſecure their affection and their confidence [26].

While Cæſar was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amuſed Pompey by aſſigning to him, in all their arrangements, what was apparently the place of honour and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome; as he had gratified Craſſus likewiſe by leaving him to chooſe the moſt lucrative government, while he himſelf ſubmitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer, to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus

[25] Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, p. 268. Sueton. in Jul. Cæſ. c. 25. Between about three and four hundred thouſand pounds.

[26] Sueton. in Jul. Cæſ. c. 26, 27, 28.

yielding

yielding the ſuppoſed preference of ſtation to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and miniſters of his own ambition. The former, with all his diſpoſition to emulation and jealouſy, and perhaps for ſome time the dupe of theſe artifices, imagined that Cæſar advanced by his permiſſion, and that the preſent ſtate of parties was the fruit of his own addreſs. As he himſelf, for the moſt part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more eaſily duped by thoſe who affected to be deceived by him, and who were able to over-reach him. Although it was impoſſible for him now to remain any longer inſenſible to the ſuperiority which Cæſar had acquired, or to thoſe ſtill more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly againſt him, but contented himſelf with employing others in ill-concerted and ineffectual attacks, which he ſometimes diſowned, and always feebly ſupported. At laſt, and in the proſecution of the meaſures of which we have obſerved the beginning in the Senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body againſt Cæſar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

Pompey himſelf, while moſt under the influence of ambition, and when he had it moſt in his power to trample on the civil conſtitution of his country, had ſhewn a reſpect for the commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were conſiſtent with this ſpecies of government; and he imagined that no man could preſume to ſurpaſs himſelf in pretenſions to riſe above the ordinary level. In the courſe of debates relating to the preſent ſtate of affairs, he generally ſpoke ambiguouſly, or affected to diſbelieve the deſigns that were imputed to Cæſar; but finding, on the laſt motion which was made to recall him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole Senate were turned upon himſelf, he was forced to break ſilence; and, with ſome degree of embarraſſment, ſaid, that although it was his opinion, that the proconſul of Gaul could not, in conſiſtence with juſtice, be inſtantly recalled, yet that

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that after the firſt of March he ſhould have no difficulties on the ſubject. "But," ſays one of the Senators, "What if this motion "ſhould then have a negative put upon it?" "I ſhall make no diſ- "tinction," replied Pompey, "between Cæſar's refuſing to obey the "order of the Senate, and his procuring ſome one here to forbid that "order." "But what if he perſiſt in demanding the Conſulate while "he retains his province and his army?" What," replied Pompey, "if my own child ſhould offer me violence [27]?"

After the attempt which had been made to fix the queſtion of Cæſar's recall for the firſt of March, Pompey being at Naples, was taken ill, and ſuppoſed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general ſatisfaction, of which he had afterwards very flattering proofs in his progreſs through Italy. He was every where met by proceſſions, found the ways ſtrowed before him with flowers, and was received by multitudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himſelf or his emiſſaries may have had in procuring theſe demonſtrations of reſpect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either miſtook them himſelf, or hoped that others ſhould miſtake them, as the proofs of a conſideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overſet or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this ſummer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the affairs of Cæſar, and the dangerous tendency of the courſe he purſued: and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the ſide of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late ſucceſs againſt Craſſus, paſſed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, ſon to Orodes, under the direction of Oſaces, a veteran

[27] Cicer. Epiſt. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 8.

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and experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter, made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and were to be joined by his forces in this invaſion. The diſaſter of Craſſus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence ſtruck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some propoſed to give Pompey the command in Syria; ſome to ſend Cæſar thither; and others, to ſend both the preſent Conſuls to the army with a proper reinforcement [33].

But before theſe meaſures could be determined, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Caſſius, the general then commanding in that province, who had obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch; in their retreat attacked them, and made great ſlaughter. Oſaces in that action received ſome wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died, and the Parthian army continued in their retreat during the following year beyond the Euphrates; ſenſible, in their turn, that a war carried over the waſtes of that deſolated frontier might be ruinous to any power by which it was attempted.

Bibulus, the preſent Proconſul of Syria, ſoon after the retreat of the Parthians, arrived in his province, and, according to the eſtabliſhed practice of the Romans, laid his pretenſions to a triumph for the victory which, under his auſpices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This invaſion of Syria, as well as ſome diſturbances in his own province, furniſhed Cicero, at the ſame time, with the occaſion of ſome military operations, of which we have a particular account, in his letters, and which, though not material to the military hiſtory of the times, are not unworthy of notice, as the relate to this eminent perſonage. He had taken poſſeſſion of his command in Cilicia, and

[33] Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 10.

however

however better fitted by his habits for the Forum and the political aſſemblies at Rome than for the field, poſſeſſed abilities to qualify him for any ſtation, put himſelf at the head of an army, and prepared for the defence of his province. He had ſet out from Rome in May; and having had a conference with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundiſium on the twenty-firſt of that month [29].

The military eſtabliſhment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it, and on the fourth of June was ſtill at Brundiſium, waiting for an anſwer to this application. But finding that his requeſt, having been oppoſed by the Conſul Sulpicius [30], was unſucceſsful, he ſet ſail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and, paſſing through Athens, reached his province on the laſt of July. Here he found the troops, in conſequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out among them, ſeparated from their officers, diſperſed in places of their own chooſing, the men of entire cohorts abſent from their colours, and conſidering themſelves as exempt from any authority or government whatever. Truſting to the reſpect that was due to the name and commiſſion of Proconſul, he ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to aſſemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconium in Licaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of Auguſt; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invaſion, took meaſures for the ſecurity of his province; marched, without loſs of time, to Cybiſtra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then threatened by a powerful faction in his own kingdom, and by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, diſpelled the ſtorm that had been gathering againſt him. He accepted, at the ſame time, of the offers that were made by De-

[29] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3. [30] Ibid.

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jotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this ſituation when he received accounts that the Parthians had preſented themſelves before Antioch, he ſuppoſed that his preſence might be wanted to cover his own frontier on the ſide of Syria. He accordingly moved to that quarter, in order to ſecure the paſſes of the mountains. Here however he learnt, that the ſtorm had blown over; that the enemy had retired, and had ſuſtained a conſiderable loſs in their retreat; and that Bibulus was then at Antioch. This intelligence he communicated to Dejotarus, intimating, at the ſame time, that his aſſiſtance was no longer neceſſary.

The province of Cilicia had been for ſome years ſubject to the Romans; but the inhabitants of the mountainous parts had never acknowledged their authority, nor even that of their own national ſovereigns. Cicero, on his arrival in the neighbourhood of their country, finding that the people had retired to their ſtrong holds, and were ſtill determined to oppoſe his authority, formed a deſign to ſurpriſe them; and, for the better execution of his project, made a feint to withdraw to Epiphania, where he halted for a day, as if to refreſh his troops. On the day following, which was the eleventh of October, in the evening, he put his army again in motion towards the mountains, and before morning arrived in the midſt of his enemies, who by this time had returned to their uſual habitations; cut them off ſeparately, purſued ſuch as fled, forced their ſtrong holds, and in about ſixty days reduced ſome towns and a conſiderable tract of country, which had never before acknowledged the Roman government.

The troops, on this occaſion, ſaluted Cicero with the title of Imperator; which being uſually given to victorious leaders [31], was commonly underſtood as the ſuffrage of the army for obtaining a triumph. He himſelf, accordingly, on this circumſtance, together

[31] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 4.

with

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with the ſervice which gave occaſion to it, afterwards grounded his claim of that honour. This claim he ſcarcely ſeems to have ſeriouſly entertained; he even treats it as a jeſt in ſome of his letters: yet the triumph being in theſe latter times conſidered rather as the means of acquiring a certain rank in the commonwealth, than as the juſt reward of military merit, he ſubmitted his claim to the Senate, and urged his friends to ſupport it. His conduct as governor of a province, at a time when this ſtation was ſuppoſed to give a licence to every ſpecies of rapine and oppreſſion, did honour to his own diſpoſition, and to thoſe literary ſtudies in which he was taught to chooſe the objects of his ambition and his habits of life. In this character he declined, both for himſelf and for his attendants, all thoſe preſents, contributions, and even ſupplies of proviſions, of which cuſtom or law had authoriſed the Roman governors, in paſſing through the provinces, to avail themſelves. In his command he diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his humanity, condeſcenſion, and diſintereſtedneſs; was eaſy of acceſs and hoſpitable; open, in particular to all perſons of literary merit and ingenuity, whom he entertained without oſtentation. In ſuch ſituations other Roman generals, though of great merit, indulged themſelves in what was the cuſtom of their times; they drained the provinces to accumulate their own fortunes, or placed their money there at extravagant intereſt. He was governed by different maxims, and wiſhed to riſe above his contemporaries by the fame of his diſintereſtedneſs, as well as of his ingenuity and civil accompliſhments. Other citizens might poſſeſs greater ſteadineſs, and force or elevation of mind; but his fine genius, his talents and fair diſpoſition, of which his weakneſs indeed often prevented the full effect, ſtill rendered him an important acquiſition to either of the parties in the commonwealth. And as they endeavoured to gain, ſo they even ſeemed to acquire, his ſupport in their turns.

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Whilſt the affairs of the reſpective provinces were thus adminiſtered by the commanders to whom they were intruſted, the uſual time of elections at Rome being arrived, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus were elected to ſucceed to the Conſulate for the following year. Soon after theſe elections attempts were made, though without effect, to carry into execution ſome of the regulations deviſed by Pompey, in his late adminiſtration, to check the corruption of the times. Calidius had been engaged in the laſt competition, and immediately upon his diſappointment was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvaſs. He was acquitted; and, in reſentment, retorted the charge on Marcellus, in order, if poſſible, to annul his election; but failed in the attempt.

Of thoſe who were now elected Conſuls, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predeceſſor Marcus Marcellus, was underſtood to be in the intereſt of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a Senator of rank, and of courſe intereſted in the preſervation of the republic, the honours of which he was ſo well intitled to ſhare, was expected to ſupport the meaſures of the Senate, and adhere to the eſtabliſhed forms. Together with internal tranquillity, the government ſeemed to recover its antient feverity. Appius Claudius, late Proconſul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piſo were choſen Cenſors, and appeared to have authority enough to carry into execution the powers lately reſtored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was expected that theſe Cenſors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favoured Pompey, and Piſo, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæſar, was neceſſarily diſpoſed to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the Senate were likewiſe conſiderably raiſed by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the Tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery, the election was ſet aſide, and Curio ſubſtituted in his place. This young man was of an honourable family;

and

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and poſſeſſing talents which qualified him for the higheſt preferments, naturally ſet out on a foot of independence, and joined thoſe who were for maintaining the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretenſions to honour and power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the Senators were fond of a partizan who was likely to take upon himſelf much of that fatigue and danger which many of them were willing, even where their own eſtates and dignities were concerned, to devolve upon others.

U. C. 703. L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus.

The new magiſtrates accordingly entered on office with high expectations that the dangerous pretenſions of ambitious citizens, particularly thoſe of Cæſar, would be effectually checked. The Conſuls were poſſeſſed of a reſolution of the Senate, requiring them to proceed to the buſineſs of Cæſar's province by the firſt of March. This reſolution wanted only the conſent of the Tribunes to render it a formal act of the executive power, of which this branch was by the conſtitution lodged in the Senate. But one of the Tribunes having forbid the decree, M. Marcellus, late Conſul, moved that application might be made to this officer to withdraw the negative, which prevented the effect of what the Senate had reſolved. But the motion was rejected by a majority [32] of the Senate itſelf; and many other ſymptoms of Cæſar's great influence, even over this order of men, ſoon after appeared.

This able politician, probably that he might not ſeem to have any views upon Italy, had fixed his quarters, and that of his army, in the low countries, and at the extremity of his recent conqueſts. But, inſtead of ſeizing every pretence, as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul, he endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate their affections [33]; and while he kept the whole province in a ſtate of profound tranquillity, collected money, provided

[32] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 13.

[33] Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 49.

arms,

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arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His diſtance from Italy lulled the jealouſy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobſerved. He ſpared no expence in gaining acceſſions to his intereſt; and when promiſes were accepted, ſeemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for the performance of them. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raiſe him above the want of reſources, or above the neceſſity of a ſcrupulous faith with private perſons. He actually remitted at this time great ſums of money to Rome; and no leſs than fifteen hundred talents, or about £289,500, to the management of the Conſul Æmilius alone, who was ſuppoſed to expend this money in erecting public buildings for the uſe of the city. But not being ſuperior to corruption, at leaſt not to that which was addreſſed to his vanity, in being made agent and truſtee for ſo popular a leader as Cæſar, he diſappointed the hopes of his friends, and in all the conteſts which aroſe during his Conſulate [34], became an active partizan for the perſon who had honoured him with ſo flattering a truſt.

It was likewiſe very early obſerved in theſe debates, that the zeal of Curio, who ſet out with violent invectives againſt Cæſar, began to abate; that he for a while endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects [35]; and at laſt fairly withdrew himſelf from the ſupport of the Senate, and eſpouſed the intereſt of Cæſar in every queſtion.

This intereſt was now likewiſe ſtrengthened by the acceſſions brought to it in conſequence of the diſputes of the Cenſors. Theſe magiſtrates concurred in expunging from the Rolls of the Senate ſuch as were of ſervile extraction, and many even of noble family, on account

[34] Appian. Plutarch.

[35] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

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of ſome infamy or blemiſh in their character. But Appius, having carried his affectation of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being ſuſpected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piſo, who, by protecting many citizens who were ſtigmatized by his colleague, gained them to the intereſt of Cæſar. From theſe ſeveral cauſes this party became very numerous even in the Senate, and continued to ſuſpend any decrees that were propoſed to deprive Cæſar of his command, or to recall the extraordinary privilege which had formerly been granted to him.

It was afterwards diſcovered, in the ſequel of theſe tranſactions, that Curio, ſome time before he openly declared himſelf for Cæſar, had been actually gained by him. This young man, like the youth of that age in general, had diſſipated his fortune, and contracted immenſe debts. His popularity was the effect of his profuſion; and the load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to government, and to laws which ſupported the juſt claims of his creditors againſt him. He readily liſtened to Cæſar, who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount[36]; according to ſome reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money[37]; according to others, of ſix times that ſum[38].

Curio, after he took his reſolution to join Cæſar, continued to ſpeak the language of his former party, and to act in concert with them, until he ſhould find a plauſible excuſe for breaking with them. Such a pretence[39] he ſought by ſtartting many ſubjects of debate without conſulting them, and by making propoſals in which he knew that the leading men of the Senate would not concur. To this effect he deviſed a project for the reparation of the highways, offering himſelf to have the inſpection of the work for five

[36] Plutarch. Dio. Sueton. Appian.

[37] Velleius, lib. ii. c. 48.—80,729 l. See Arbuthnot's Tables.

[38] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 1.

[39] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xl. c. 61. Appian. de Bello Civile.

years.

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years. And when much time had been ſpent in fruitleſs debates on this ſubject, he inſiſted, that a conſiderable intercalation ſhould be made to lengthen the year, to give him ſufficient time to ripen his projects. Being oppoſed in this by the college of Augurs [49], he employed his Tribunitian power to obſtruct all other buſineſs, and ſeparated himſelf intirely from his friends in the Senate.

Curio, having in this manner withdrawn himſelf from his former party, did not at once openly join their opponents; but, with profeſſions of independence, affected to oppoſe the errors of both; and, by this artful conduct, ſeemed to have received the inſtructions, or to have imitated the policy of his leader. When the great queſtion of Cæſar's recall was revived, he inveighed, as formerly, againſt the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the neceſſity of having them revoked; but ſubjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and propoſed, that both ſhould be ordered to diſband their armies, and return to a private ſtation. The partizans of Pompey inſiſted, that the term of his commiſſion was not yet expired; nor that of Cæſar's, replied Curio. If either is to be diſarmed, it is proper that both ſhould be ſo; if only one army be diſbanded, we are certainly the ſlaves of that which remains.

There were probably now three parties in the State; one devoted to Cæſar, another to Pompey, and a third that meant to ſupport the republic againſt the intrigues or violence of either. The latter muſt have been few, and could not hope to be of much conſequence, except by joining ſuch of the other two, as appeared by the character of its leader leaſt dangerous to the commonwealth. Cæſar had ſhown himſelf in his political courſe a dangerous ſubject, and an arbitrary magiſtrate. In the capacity of a ſubject, he had ſupported every

[49] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

party that was inclined to commit diſorder in the State, or to weaken the hands of government. In that of a magiſtrate he ſpurned every legal reſtraint, acted the part of a demagogue, ſupporting himſelf by popular tumults, and the credit of a faction, againſt the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of conſiderate perſons, that his thirſt of power and emolument was not to be ſatiated without a total ſubverſion of government: that if, in the conteſt which ſeemed to impend, his ſword ſhould prevail, a ſcene of bloodſhed and rapine would enſue, far exceeding what had yet been exhibited in any calamity that had ever befallen the republic. The deſcription of his adherents [41], and the character of perſons that crowded to his ſtandard, juſtified the general fear and diſtruſt which was entertained of his deſigns. All who had fallen under ſentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had ſuffered any diſgrace, or were conſcious they deſerved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an averſion to order; the bankrupt, to whom law and property itſelf were enemies; all theſe looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raiſed in his favour. CHAP. IV.

Pompey, the leader of the oppoſite party, had never ceaſed to embroil the State with his intrigues, and even invaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented honours; yet, when poſſeſſed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and ſeemed to delight in receiving theſe ſingular truſts by the free choice of his country; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal uſe of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms preſcribed by his commiſſion. It appeared, that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth ſo deeply, as in caballing with Cæſar while he roſe

[41] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.

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to his preſent elevation, from which he was not likely to deſcend, without ſome ſignal convulſion in the State [42].

This compariſon of the parties which were now to contend for power at the hazard of the republic, made it eaſy for good citizens to chooſe their ſide. But they nevertheleſs naturally wiſhed to prevent the conteſt from coming to extremities; as in the event of the war, which they dreaded, it was ſcarcely poſſible to avoid a military government. They conſidered the propoſal of Curio as a mere pretence to juſtify Cæſar in keeping poſſeſſion of his army: but they ſaw that there was no force in the republic ſufficient to reſiſt him. They wiſhed to arm Pompey for this purpoſe; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he ſtill gave them of his own ſuperiority, or by their fear of precipitating the State into a civil war, by ſeeming to take any precautions againſt it.

Cæſar would have conſidered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration againſt himſelf; and was ready to commence hoſtilities before any ſuch meaſure could be carried into execution. The propoſal for diſarming at once both Cæſar and Pompey, in the mean time, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually ſounded the cry of liberty againſt the Senate, and lately too againſt Pompey himſelf, who, on account of the ſpirit of his adminiſtration when laſt in office, and the ſeverity of his proſecutions againſt bribery and other offences, which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a conſiderable degree unpopular, and ſuppoſed to aim at a tyranny. With ſuch powers as Pompey already poſſeſſed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to oppoſe him. And Curio, in coming from the Senate, with the luſtre of having acted ſo bold a part, was received by the populace with ſhouts and acclamations, was conducted to his houſe over ways ſtrewed with flowers, and, like a victor in the circus, pre-

[42] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 3.

ſented

ſented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been obſerved, was making a ſhew of his great popularity in the country towns, where he was received with feaſts, proceſſions, and acclamations, on occaſion of his recovery from a ſuppoſed dangerous illneſs. Cæſar too had a like reception in the towns of the Ciſalpine Gaul; but it is likely, that of theſe three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was moſt elated with his ſhare of the public favour, and the moſt likely to miſtake theſe appearances of conſideration for the ſtable foundations of power. Under this miſtake probably it was, that when one of his friends aſked him, with what force he was to oppoſe Cæſar if he ſhould march into Italy with his army? "In Italy," he anſwered, "I can raiſe forces with "a ſtamp of my foot." He was, however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met, both in the approbation of the Senators, and in the acclamations of the People. He wrote a letter, on this occaſion, to the Senate, in which he acknowledged the ſervices of Cæſar, and mentioned his own. "His late Conſulate," he ſaid, "was not of his ſeeking; "it was preſſed upon him to ſave the republic in the midſt of "great dangers; the command he then bore had devolved upon "him in conſequence of his having been Conſul, and was given for "a term of years, yet far from being expired; but he was ready, "nevertheleſs, without waiting for the expiration of his term, to "reſign with alacrity what he had accepted with reluctance." He continued, on every occaſion, to repeat the ſame profeſſions, adding, "That he made no doubt, his relation and his friend Cæſar would "cheerfully make a like ſacrifice to the fears and apprehenſions of "his fellow-citizens; and that, after many years of hard ſtruggle "with warlike enemies, he would now haſten to retire in peace, "and to ſolace himſelf in the midſt of domeſtic repoſe."

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Pompey, for the moſt part, choſe to diſſemble his ſentiments, and advanced to his purpoſe by indirect means; he was therefore like moſt artful men, eaſily over-reached by perſons who perceived his deſigns; and probably, on the preſent occaſion, was the only dupe of his own artifices, or of thoſe that were employed againſt him. Curio, in the Senate, openly attacked this part of his character, inſiſting that actions, and not profeſſions, were now to be regarded: that the army of Cæſar was, to the republic, a neceſſary defence againſt that of Pompey; that nevertheleſs, both ſhould be ordered to diſband, under pain of being declared, in caſe of diſobedience, enemies to their country; and that an army ſhould be inſtantly levied to enforce theſe orders. "Now," ſaid he, "is the time to reduce this "aſſuming and arrogant man, while you have a perſon who can "diſpute his pretenſions, and who can wreſt thoſe arms out of his "hands, which he never would have willingly dropped."

The friends of Cæſar, in the Senate, offered to compromiſe the diſpute; and provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæſar were allowed to retain the Ciſalpine Gaul with two legions, they propoſed, in his name, to diſband the remainder of his army, and to reſign the other part of his provinces. "Obſerve the dutiful citi-"zen and good ſubject," ſaid Cato, "how ready he is to quit the "northern parts of Gaul, if you only put him in poſſeſſion of Italy "and of the city; and how ready to accept of your voluntary ſub-"miſſion, rather than employ your own army againſt you to en-"force it[42]."

In the reſult of theſe debates, the Senate, upon the motion of the Conſul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following queſtions, which were ſeparately ſtated, relating to the appointments both of Cæſar and of Pompey. On the firſt queſtion, Whether Cæſar ſhould diſband his army? the *Ayes* were general throughout the houſe. On

[42] Plutarch. in Catone.

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the ſecond, relating to Pompey, the *Noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony inſiſted, that the queſtions were not fairly put; and that they did not collect the ſenſe of the Senate; that the majority might be of opinion, that both ſhould diſband; and that both, therefore, ſhould be included in the ſame queſtion. To this purpoſe, accordingly, a third queſtion was put; and the Senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and ſeventy *Ayes* appeared againſt twenty-two *Noes*[44]. Whether theſe proceedings of the Senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumſtance, does not appear? The only immediate conſequence they ſeem to have produced, was an order to Pompey and Cæſar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where the Parthians, though repulſed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the Cyrrheſtica, a diſtrict of that province, and threatened to repeat their invaſion in the preſent ſpring and ſummer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt to ſtrip Cæſar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to diſappoint the effect.

While the ſubject of Cæſar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himſelf, with his army, paſſed a quiet winter in Gaul; and at the end of it, or early in the ſpring, ſet out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the college of Augurs, which was faſt approaching; and for which his friend Mark Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was beyond the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon ſpeed to ſecure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of Augurs was paſt, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheleſs continued his journey, and

[44] Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Plutarch. in Cæſar. p. 134.

with

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with the ſame diligence as before he received this information, ſaying, It was proper he ſhould thank his friends for their good offices, and requeſt the continuance of their favour in his own competition for the Conſulate, which he propoſed to declare on the following year. He alleged, as a reaſon for his early application, that his enemies, in order to oppreſs him, or to withſtand his juſt pretenſions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus in the magiſtracy of the preſent year, and had rejected the pretenſions of Galba, though much better founded.

He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Ciſalpine Gaul with more than a kingly reception, with ſacrifices and proceſſions every where made by innumerable crowds, which were aſſembled to ſee and admire him. Having made the circuit of this province, and ſounded the diſpoſitions of the People, he returned with great diſpatch to his quarters at Nemetocenna [45], in the Low Countries, where he likewiſe wiſhed to know the diſpoſition as well as the ſtate of his army; and, for this purpoſe, ordered the whole to aſſemble on the Moſelle. He foreſaw, that the Senate might poſſibly paſs a decree to ſuperſede him; and that he muſt then depend upon the attachment of his legions, and make war, or ſubmit as he found them inclined; in this, however, it is probable he was in a great meaſure reſolved, or had no doubt of their willingneſs to become his partners in a military adventure for the ſovereignty of the empire.

In this ſtate of affairs he aſſigned to Labienus his ſtation within the Alps; and ſeeming to have conceived a ſuſpicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not diſpoſed to follow him, in caſe his commiſſion ſhould be withdrawn by the Senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hoſtility againſt the republic, he wiſhed to prevent the diſputes which might ariſe on ſuch an occaſion, and

[45] Arras.

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to avoid the difficult taſk of determining how he ſhould deal with a citizen, who being an offender againſt himſelf, was nevertheleſs in his duty to the State, and who either, by his impunity or by his ſufferings, might ſtart dangerous queſtions, and divide the opinions and affections of the ſoldiers. He diſmiſſed him, therefore, from the army in the northern Gaul, to command on the Po, a ſtation from which he could eaſily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic; and by this means rid him at once of a perſon on whom he could not rely, and whom he would ſcarcely dare to puniſh for defection. But in whatever manner we underſtand this ſeparation, it is noticed, that while Cæſar himſelf remained with the army upon the Moſelle, and made frequent movements merely to exerciſe the troops and to preſerve their health, a rumour prevailed, that his enemies were ſoliciting Labienus to deſert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the ſame time it was reported, that the Senate was preparing a decree to diveſt Cæſar of his government, and to diſband his army. Theſe inſinuations he affected to treat as groundleſs; obſerving, that he could not believe ſuch an officer as Labienus would betray his truſt; and that for himſelf, he was at all times ready to ſubmit his cauſe to a free Senate. The propoſals of Curio, and his other friends, he ſaid, had been ſo reaſonable, that the Senate would have long ago accepted of them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

About the ſame time, Cæſar received the famous order of the Senate to detach a legion from his army to be tranſported into Syria, and employed in the Parthian war; and likewiſe to reſtore that legion which he had borrowed from Pompey. It is probable, that he had deſired the laſt might be ſent to him merely to take off a part of his rival's force; and though he now, with ſeeming cheerfulneſs, complied with the requiſition to reſtore them, yet he afterwards complained of this meaſure reſpecting the two legions in queſtion, as a

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mere artifice to turn his own forces againſt him. In compliance with the Senate's order, he ſent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his preſent camp. In diſmiſſing the ſoldiers of Pompey, he was, under pretence of gratitude for paſt ſervices, moſt laviſh of his careſſes and thanks; and as an earneſt of future favour, ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii [46]. By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he took care to retain their affections, and ſent them, together with his own legion, as at beſt but an uncertain and dubious acceſſion of ſtrength to his enemies [47].

The officers, who were ſent to make theſe demands, and to conduct the troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering report of the ſtate and diſpoſitions of Cæſar's army: that they longed to change their commander; had a high opinion of Pompey; and, if marched into Italy, would ſurely deſert to him: that Cæſar was become odious on account of the hard ſervice in which he had ſo long employed them, without any adequate reward, and on account of the ſuſpicion that he aimed at the monarchy [48]. It is in the higheſt degree probable, that their crafty leader employed proper perſons to hold this language to the commiſſioners of the Senate, and to the officers of Pompey; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the ſervice, on purpoſe that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the ſupine ſecurity into which he endeavoured, by this and every other meaſure, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter he conducted his army back to their quarters in the Low Countries, and the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was ſtationed with four legions on the Scheld and the Meuſe, and Fabius, with other four between the Soane and the Loire, in the

[46] About 5 l.

[47] Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 435.

[48] Plutarch. in Vita Cæſaris, p. 133. et in vita Pompeii, p. 486.

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canton of Bibracté, now Autun. This diſpoſition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himſelf intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that ſide of the mountains that could occaſion any ſuſpicion; only one veteran legion is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had ſent to replace the fifteenth; that, upon pretence of the Parthian war, had been called away from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy he affected ſurpriſe upon hearing that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been ſent into Aſia, but were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed; that his enemies meant to diſarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is ſafe, and matters can be made "up on amicable terms, I will bear," he ſaid, "with any indignities, "rather than involve the State in a civil war[47]."

While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this ſituation, C. Marcellus, now third of this name in the ſucceſſion of Conſuls, together with Publius Lentulus, were choſen for the following year. Before they entered on office a rumour aroſe, that Cæſar, with his whole army, was actually in motion to paſs the Alps. Marcellus, Conſul of the preſent year, aſſembled the Senate; laid before them this report, and moved, that the troops then in Italy ſhould be prepared to act, and new levies ſhould be ordered. A debate enſued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his Tribunitian authority, forbade the Senate to proceed in any reſolution upon this ſubject.

On this interpoſition of the Tribune, the Conſul diſmiſſed the aſſembly, uſing, together with other expreſſions of impatience, the words following: That if he were not ſupported by the Senate, in the meaſures which were neceſſary for the preſervation of the common-

[47] Hirtus de Bello Gallico, lib. viii. c. 46.

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wealth, he ſhould put the exerciſe of his power into hands more likely to make the State be reſpected: then, together with Lentulus, one of the Conſuls elected for the enſuing year, he repaired to the gardens where Pompey reſided; this officer being obliged, on account of his military command, to remain without the city; and preſenting his ſword, bid him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to aſſume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this addreſs, Pompey, with an air of modeſty, made anſwer, "If no-"thing better can be deviſed for the commonwealth."

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Return of different Officers from their Provinces.——Decree of the Senate to ſuperſede Cæſar.——Forbidden by the Tribunes.——Commiſſion to the Conſuls and to Pompey.——Their Reſolutions.——Flight of the Tribunes Antony and Quintus Caſſius.——Speech of Cæſar to the Legion at Ravenna.——Surpriſe of Ariminum.——March of Cæſar.——Flight of Pompey and the Senate, &c.——Approach of Cæſar.——Embarkation and Departure of Pompey from Brundiſium.——Return of Cæſar to Rome.——Paſſes by Marſeilles into Spain.——Campaign on the Segra.——Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.

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IN this poſture of affairs, the officers, who had been ſent in the preceding year to the command of provinces, were returned to Rome, and ſome of them remained with their enſigns of magiſtracy in the ſuburbs, to ſolicit the military honours to which they thought themſelves entitled by their ſervices. Bibulus, though not preſent in the action in which Caſſius defeated the Parthians, yet being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained, with the number of the enemy ſlain, coming up to the legal deſcription of thoſe ſervices for which the triumph was obtained, he entered his claim; and was accordingly, upon the motion of Cato, who probably wiſhed him this conſolation for the mortifications he had received in his Conſulate, found to be entitled to this honour. It had been long appropriated as the ſpecific reward of victories, obtained by the ſlaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been prepoſterous in the caſe of any other merit: Cicero, nevertheleſs, now likewiſe applied for a triumph, partly in emulation

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to Bibulus, of whom he expreſſes ſome jealouſy; and partly, that he might have a pretence for his ſtay in the ſuburbs, and for abſenting himſelf from the Senate, and from the aſſemblies of the people, being very much perplexed how to ſteer between the parties of Cæſar and Pompey, who had both applied to him by letters to join them in the preſent diſpute [1]. He had, ſome time before his departure from Cilicia on his return to Rome, ſent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to ſome others of his friends, with an earneſt requeſt, that a thankſgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. Such an appointment was reckoned one of the greateſt honours which a Roman officer could receive in abſence, and might lead to a triumph. Cato replied in terms that were polite; but carrying ſome degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which Cicero betrayed in this requeſt, intimating that his merit was not ſo much that of a general, as of a humane, upright, and able magiſtrate; that he had moved the Senate to paſs a decree to this purpoſe in his favour, as thinking it more honourable than a thankſgiving, which always had a reference to ſome event, depending on chance or the valour of an army; but that, ſince Cicero had choſen to put his ſervices on the laſt footing, he had a double ſatisfaction, that of having done what he thought incumbent on himſelf, and that of finding that the deſire of his friend was gratified [2].

Cicero at firſt received this declaration of Cato as a proper expreſſion of friendſhip, and in the higheſt degree honourable to himſelf [3]; but on hearing of the military honours which were decreed to Bibulus upon Cato's motion, he was greatly provoked, and conſidered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himſelf [4]. He was inſtigated or confirmed in theſe ſentiments by Cæſar, who gladly

[1] Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 1.
[2] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 5.
[3] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 6.
[4] Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 2.

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ſeized the opportunity to incite him againſt Cato. "Obſerve," he ſaid, in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this ſubject, "the malice of the man, he affects to give you the commendations "of clemency and integrity, which you did not deſire, and with-"holds a piece of common reſpect, which you had aſked. This "conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "beſpeaks the envy from "which it proceeds. It is not ſufferable, nor will I endure it. "Cæſar, in his letter to me, has not miſſed the proper remarks." Such were the concerns that diſtracted the mind of this ingenious but weak man, even while he himſelf foreſaw a conflict, in which the republic itſelf, and all the honours it could beſtow, were probably ſoon to periſh.

In the preſent ſituation of affairs, every reſolution which the friends of the republic could take was fraught with danger, and every day increaſed their perplexity. To leave Cæſar in poſſeſſion of his army, and to admit him with ſuch a force to the head of the commonwealth, was to ſubmit, without a ſtruggle, to the dominion he meant to aſſume. To perſiſt in confining him to one or other of theſe advantages, was to furniſh him with a pretence to make war on the republic. The powers which were neceſſary to enable Pompey to reſiſt Cæſar, might be equally dangerous to the republic in the poſſeſſion of the one, as they were in that of the other. This perſon, on whom the State was now to rely, even while his own conſideration, with that of every other Senator, was at ſtake, did not ſeem diſpoſed to act, until all the powers that were wanting to gratify his ambition ſhould be put into his hands. With an appearance of eaſe and negligence, he went upon parties of pleaſure through Italy, while every one elſe apprehended that Rome itſelf, as well as Italy, muſt ſoon become a ſcene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himſelf ſpoke of a civil war as unavoidable.

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avoidable [5]. Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-ſixth of December, he even ſeemed averſe to any accommodation. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæſar ſhould obtain the Conſulate, even upon laying down his arms, the ſtate muſt be undone; that in his opinion, whenever a vigorous oppoſition appeared, Cæſar would chooſe to retain his army, and drop his pretenſions to the Conſulate; but, continued he, if Cæſar ſhould proceed headlong, and bring matters to the deciſion of the ſword, how contemptible muſt he appear, a mere private adventurer againſt the authority of the ſtate, ſupported by a regular army under my command.

To juſtify this ſecurity, or preſumption on the part of Pompey, it muſt be remembered that while Cæſar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewiſe formed a great army of ſix complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and that if Cæſar ſhould make any attempt upon Italy, it is probable he intended that his army ſhould paſs the Pyrennees as faſt as that of Cæſar paſt the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his reſources, and while Pompey himſelf received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spaniſh army ſhould preſs upon his rear, and place him at once between two attacks. It ought likewiſe to be conſidered, that although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nurſery of ſoldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any ſudden emergency, be embodied in every part of that country [6].

Pompey, with theſe ſecurities in his hands for the final ſucceſs of his views againſt Cæſar, ſuffered this rival to run his career, leaving the Senate expoſed to the dangers which threatened them; and under the influence of apprehenſions, which he expected would render them more tractable, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own deſires, than he had generally found them in times of greater ſecurity.

[5] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 8.

[6] Cic. ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

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In the ſame ſtrain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himſelf the more neceſſary, and to draw from the Senate and the People offers of extraordinary truſt and power. By the addreſs of Cato, and of other active men in the Senate, he had been obliged on a late occaſion, when he aimed at the powers of Dictator, to be content with thoſe of ſole Conſul. It is probable, that he had entertained the ſame views on the preſent occaſion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wiſhed for ſhould appear to be neceſſary. He continued accordingly with votes and reſolutions of the Senate to combat Cæſar, who was at the head of a numerous army, ready on the firſt plauſible pretence to fall upon Italy, to ſeize the ſeats of government, and avail himſelf of that name and authority of the republic, on which Pompey himſelf ſo greatly relied.

U. C. 704. C. Claudius Marcellus & L. Cornelius Lentulus.

Mean time, the new year commenced, and C. Claudius Marcellus with L. Cornelius Lentulus, entered on their office as Conſuls. Both parties were prepared for a deciſive reſolution on the ſubject of Cæſar's claims. He himſelf for ſome years had wintered near to the northern extremity of his provinces. He was now at Ravenna, the neareſt ſtation of his army to Rome; but without any troops, beſides what appear to have been the uſual eſtabliſhment of the Ciſalpine province; that is, the thirteenth legion, which had been ſent thither to ſupply the place of a legion, with which he had been required to reinforce the army in Syria, and three hundred horſe, making in all between five and ſix thouſand men[7]. Soon after his arrival at Ravenna, he had been viſited by Curio, who, at the expiration of his Tribunate, made this journey to receive his directions in reſpect to the future operations of the party; and after their conference, returned to Rome with a letter from Cæſar, addreſſed

[7] Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 447. Plut. in Cæſare.

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to the Senate, which was preſented on the firſt of January, at the admiſſion of the new Conſuls into office [8].

The Conſul Lentulus moved, that prior to any other buſineſs, the ſtate of the republic, and that of the provinces, ſhould be taken under conſideration; and alluding to the reſolutions which were already on record, relating to Cæſar's province, ſaid, that if the Senate ſtood firm on this occaſion to their former decrees, his ſervices ſhould not be wanting to the commonwealth. He was ſeconded by Scipio, and was applauded by the general voice of the Senate; but Cæſar had procured the admiſſion of Mark Antony and of Quintus Caſſius, two of his moſt noted and determined partizans, into the college of Tribunes. Theſe could make riots, or furniſh the pretence of violence in the city, whenever the military deſigns of their patron were ripe for execution: they were to be the executors of what had been concerted with Curio, or whatever elſe ſhould be thought proper to promote Cæſar's deſigns. They began with threatening to ſtop all proceedings of the Senate, until Cæſar's letter was read; and prevailed on this meeting to begin with that paper. It was expreſſed, according to Cicero, in terms menacing and harſh [9], and contained in ſubſtance a repetition of the propoſals, which Cæſar had been all along making through Curio, and his other adherents at Rome, "That "he ſhould be allowed to retain the honours, which the Roman "People had beſtowed upon him; that he ſhould be left upon a foot "of equality with other officers, who were allowed to join civil of-"fice at Rome with military eſtabliſhments in the provinces; and that "he ſhould not be ſingled out as the ſole object of their diſtruſt and "ſeverity [10]."

This letter was conſidered as an attempt to preſcribe to the Senate, and unbecoming the reſpect due to their authority. It was

[8] Dio. Caſſius, lib. xli. c. 1.
[9] Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.
[10] Suetonius in Cæſare, c. 29.

by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar to dismiss his army, and by a certain day to retire from his provinces, or in case of disobedience, declaring him an enemy to his country. The Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed with their negative.

The hands of the Senate being thus tied up by the prohibition or interdict of the Tribunes, it was moved that the members should put on mourning, in order to impress the People with a deeper sense of the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the Tribunes forbad; but the Senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from this factious interposition of the Tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined to give to the Consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of Proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures; *to preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.*

This charge suggested to the minds of the People, what had passed in the times of the Gracchi of Saturninus and of Cataline. The Tribunes, who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome in hired carriages [11]. The Consuls repaired to Pompey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the Senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties

[11] Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 3. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

with which they were jointly intruſted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they ſhould ſupport the authority of the Senate with a proper military force, that they ſhould proceed to make new levies with the greateſt diſpatch; and in order to give effect to theſe preparations, that Pompey ſhould have the ſupreme command over the treaſury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now ſet in, or faſt approaching. The ſeaſon, although nominally in the month of January, being only about fifty days paſt the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæſar had few troops on the ſide of Italy; the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now entruſted with the ſafety of the commonwealth, flattered themſelves that much time might be found to put the republic in a ſtate of defence, before his army at this ſeaſon could paſs thoſe mountains, even if he ſhould be ſo deſperate as to make war on the commonwealth; which Pompey did not even, in this ſtate of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæſar received accounts of the Senate's reſolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue enumerated the wrongs which for ſome years he alleged had been done to himſelf; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite againſt him even Pompey, a perſon whoſe honour he had always promoted with the warmeſt affection; that the interpoſition of the Tribunes, in behalf of the army and of himſelf, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their ſacred perſons had been violated, in order to oppreſs him; that reſolutions, which had never been taken but in the moſt dangerous and threatening conjunctures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carried by inſurrection and violence, were now formed againſt peaceable magiſtrates, and in times of profound tranquillity; he therefore exhorted the army to maintain the honour of an officer, under whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully ſerved the republic; under whom they had gained

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gained many victories in Gaul and in Germany, and reduced a moſt warlike province into a ſtate of abſolute ſubmiſſion. He was anſwered with a ſhout of applauſe, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the Tribunes of the People.

On receiving theſe aſſurances from the troops then preſent, Cæſar immediately diſpatched an expreſs to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps with orders to march. The remainder of his army being ſuppoſed in the low countries, or in the heart of Gaul, it would not have appeared to an ordinary capacity, that even in caſe of hoſtilities any deciſive operation could take place before the ſpring. At that ſeaſon, indeed, the meaſures now taken by both parties ſeemed to threaten a dangerous convulſion; but it is not to be doubted that Cæſar had foreſeen, or prepared, many of the moſt important circumſtances of the preſent conjuncture; that he had brought his affairs into that poſture, at which he intended hoſtilities ſhould commence; and that the ſeeming neglect with which he ſuffered himſelf to be taken with ſo ſmall a force on the ſide of Italy, was probably the beſt concerted preparation he could have made for the war. While he brought no alarming force towards Rome, his antagoniſts continued ſecure, and made no effectual proviſion to reſiſt him. He apprehended more danger from the legions which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then ſubſiſting in Italy, and he made his diſpoſition againſt thoſe legions, by placing the ſtrength of his army between the Pyrennees and the Alps. There the army formed in Gaul, ſerved him ſufficiently in his deſign againſt Italy, by ſecuring him from any interruption on that quarter. When the war broke out, being well aware that the effects of ſurpriſe are often greater than thoſe of force, even if

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he had wiſhed for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue juſt mentioned to the legion that was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered a choſen body of men, in the manner of ſtragglers roving for pleaſure through the country, and armed only with ſwords, to take the road ſeparately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the firſt fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his province; there to remain, and at a certain time of the night to ſeize upon one of the gates. He likewiſe ordered a party of horſe to parade at ſome diſtance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them orders. He himſelf paſſed the day, as uſual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exerciſes of the legion; at night he went to ſupper at the uſual hour, and after he had taken his place, pretending buſineſs, or ſome ſlight indiſpoſition, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate oppoſite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had poſted the party of horſe; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break of day, entered Ariminum by a gate which the party he had ſent before him kept open; and thus without any reſiſtance took poſſeſſion of the place.

It was of importance, that the firſt report of hoſtilities at Rome ſhould carry an account of his ſucceſs; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumſtance may juſtify the meaſures which he took to ſurpriſe a place which, without ſo many precautions, might have been eaſily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himſelf indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any ſuch meaſures, nor of the doubts and heſitations under which he is ſaid to have halted on the banks of the Rubicon,

Rubicon, by the paſſing of which he entered into a ſtate of war with the commonwealth.

At Ariminum his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Caſſius joined him from Rome. He preſented them to the army in the diſguiſe in which they affected to have eſcaped from the violence of a tyranny then eſtabliſhed in the city. "Obſerve," he ſaid, "to what ex-"tremities perſons of noble birth, veſted with the ſacred character of "Tribunes are reduced, for having ſupported their friends, and for "having pleaded the cauſe of an injured army[12]." The occaſion was ſuited to popular eloquence; and this eminent maſter of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is ſaid to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his veſt from his breaſt, and to have ſhed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the common enſign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared, that he would ſacrifice all the honours of his rank to reward thoſe who were willing to ſupport the public cauſe, and who adhered to himſelf on the preſent occaſion. From theſe ſigns, where he was not diſtinctly heard, it was ſuppoſed that he promiſed the honours of nobility, and a large ſum of money to every ſoldier in his army[13].

Lucius Cæſar and the Prætor Roſcius, who, while the decree againſt Caius Cæſar was depending in the Senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to an amicable accommodation, were now come without any public commiſſion, probably to hinder their friend from taking any deſperate reſolution. They brought, at the ſame time, a private meſſage from Pompey, with ſome expreſſions of civility, and an apology, taken from the neceſſity of the public ſervice, for the hardſhip which he ſuppoſed himſelf

[12] Appian. de Bell. Civile, lib. ii. [13] Sueton. in Cæſ. c. 33.

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to have put upon Cæſar. Pompey, in this meſſage, proteſted, "That "he had always preferred the public to private conſiderations;" and ſubjoined, "That he hoped Cæſar would not ſuffer any paſſion to "carry him into meaſures hurtful to the State, nor, in avenging "himſelf of his private enemies, ſtretch forth his hand againſt the "republic."

Such profeſſions had little credit with Cæſar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the uſe of them. He deſired thoſe perſons, by whom Pompey had favoured him with this meſſage, to carry for anſwer, "That the "republic had always been to him dearer than his fortune or his "life; but that he could not ſuffer the honours which the Roman "People had beſtowed upon him in public, to be contemptuouſly "torn away by his private enemies. His commiſſion, he ſaid, "would have expired in ſix months; his enemies, in their eagerneſs "to degrade him, could not bear even with this delay, but muſt "recall him immediately. The Roman People had diſpenſed with "his attendance at the elections, yet he muſt be dragged to town at "that time to gratify private malice. Theſe perſonal inſults he had "patiently borne for the ſake of the public; and being reſolved to "diſarm, requeſted the Senate only that others ſhould diſarm as well "as himſelf; that even this was refuſed, and new levies were or-"dered throughout Italy; that two legions which had been called "off from his own army, under pretence of the Parthian war, were "now retained againſt him; that the whole State was in arms; "for what purpoſe but for his deſtruction? that, nevertheleſs, he "would ſuffer any thing for the good of the commonwealth. Let "Pompey repair to his province; let all parties diſband, and no "army whatever be aſſembled in Italy; let no one pretend to over-"awe the city; let the aſſemblies of the People and of the Senate be "free; and, in order the more ſpeedily to terminate theſe diſputes, let

" the parties meet and confer together; let Pompey ſay where he will " be waited on, or let him name a proper place of meeting; at a " friendly conference every difficulty will be ſoon removed "[14]."

From this time forward Cæſar affected, on every occaſion, to have no object in view but to prevail on his enemies, by ſome reaſonable accommodation, to ſave the republic from a ruinous war, and to ſtop the effuſion of innocent blood[15]. He continually repeated his propoſals of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity. He ordered new levies at Ariminum, and ſent Antony to occupy Arretium[16], a paſs in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Apennines; and as faſt as troops could march he ſeized Piſaurum[17], Faunum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places neceſſary to give him the command of that diſtrict, or to open his way to Rome.

A general conſternation ſpread over all the country before him; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every ſort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no leſs on his own. Others thought themſelves ſecure while this renowned and experienced commander gave them aſſurances of ſafety. Now, like a perſon awake from a dream, he ſeemed to perceive the whole was illuſion. Cæſar paid no regard to the authority of the Senate, nor ſtood in awe of the State. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops freſh from ſervice, and inured to blood. The republic was but a name; and they who compoſed it, though reſpectable at a diſtance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irreſolute, diſunited, and incapable of the exertions which ſuch an occaſion required. Orders had gone forth

[14] Cæſar de Bell. Civil. lib. i.
[15] Cæſar. Appian. in lib. viii. Ad Atticum, poſt ep. 13.
[16] Arrego.
[17] Piſaro, Feno, and Oſimo.

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to raiſe troops in every part of Italy; but no great progreſs in ſo ſhort a time could yet have been made in that ſervice. Beſides the two legions which had ſerved ſo long under Cæſar himſelf, there were not any forces embodied in the country. Theſe were juſtly ſuſpected of inclining to their former general; and, inſtead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furniſhed him, at the head of ſuch troops, with particular reaſons for his keeping at a diſtance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I ſent you word," he writes, "that with theſe two legions "I did not chooſe to be near Cæſar[28]. If I ſhould retreat, therefore, "at his approach, be not ſurpriſed[29]."

Domitius had been appointed to ſucceed Cæſar in the government of Gaul; and, with ſome other officers in the Picenum[30], had made ſome progreſs in raiſing troops. Their numbers, perhaps, ſurpaſſed thoſe of Cæſar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it poſſible to defend the city, he muſt have haſtened to that quarter, and have put himſelf at the head of thoſe troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his own reputation, a weakneſs from which Cæſar was altogether exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey ſeldom committed his fame where the proſpect was unfavourable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæſar, on ſuch occaſions, never choſe to truſt his affairs in any other hands than his own.

Pompey, acting under theſe motives, aſſembled the Senate, and informed them that it was neceſſary to abandon Rome; that he would meet them again at Capua, where he propoſed to aſſemble his forces; that he ſhould conſider all thoſe who remained in the capital

[28] Meaning probably that he did not chooſe to give them an opportunity to deſert.

[29] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. viii. ep. 2. Ad Domitium.

[30] March of Anconia.

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to countènance or to witneſs the violences of Cæſar as equally guilty with thoſe who ſhould be found in his camp.

It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to abſent themſelves from the city, the Senate paſſed an act to diſpenſe with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exerciſe the powers of magiſtracy wherever the neceſſities of the State might require their preſence. Theſe preparations for diſlodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey, damped all the courage that remained in any order or claſs of the People. It made Cæſar appear at once more odious and more terrible[21]. It was generally expected[22] that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty[23]; and that the city, if he ſhould ſurpriſe his opponents there, would become a ſcene of blood. The Conſuls, and moſt of the other officers of State, ſet out with their enſigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with Senators and other perſons of rank who fled on this occaſion; ſome with their families and moſt valuable effects, others alone, and diſtracted by the general panic, without knowing whither they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæſar, in the mean time, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the dutchy of Urbino[24], and the Picenum, or March of Ancona[25], not only took poſſeſſion of every place as he paſſed, but gained daily acceſſions of ſtrength by the junction of the new levies that had been raiſed to oppoſe him. Soldiers are averſe to the loſing ſide; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The Prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken poſt at Iguvium[26], among the Apennines, on the Flaminian Way. Obſerving that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing

[21] Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 11.
[22] Ibid. ep. 12. 22.
[23] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.
[24] Umbria.
[25] Picenum.
[26] Gubio.

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towards him with a part of Cæſar's forces, he reſolved to abandon his poſt; but as ſoon as he began to execute this purpoſe, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deſerted him on the march, returned to the poſt from which he had removed them, and declared for Cæſar.

The diſpoſitions of the towns of which Cæſar had got poſſeſſion, made it unneceſſary for him to leave any garriſon behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his forces. Auximum [27] declared for him before his arrival, and obliged Atius Varus, who held that poſt for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæſar's advanced parties, and, like Thermus, was deſerted by his People.

At Cingulum, in the Picenum, Cæſar was joined by the twelfth legion, to which, on his firſt motion from Ravenna, he had ſent orders to march. With this acceſſion of force, he advanced to Aſculum [28] on the Fronto; and having diſlodged from thence Lentulus Spinther, who commanded ten cohorts, the greater part of theſe troops deſerted to him. The remainder put themſelves under the command of Vibullius, who was juſt arrived from Pompey to ſupport the hopes of the cauſe in that quarter.

As Cæſar made his principal puſh on the Adriatic ſide of the Apennines, the troops that were ſuddenly raiſed for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coaſt. And Pompey himſelf had not yet openly laid aſide the deſign of making head againſt Cæſar in thoſe parts. Vibullius having aſſembled in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the Aternus, now called the Piſcara, and joined L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, a paſs in the Apennines that commanded the Valerian way to Rome. This officer having aſſembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to have joined Pompey wherever he ſhould be found, and had ordered Thermus to follow with five cohorts more [29]; but imagining probably that Pom-

[27] Oſimo. [28] Oſcale. [29] Pomp. ad Cicer. in lib. ad Att. poſt ep. 11.

pey ſtill intended to cover Rome from the incurſions of Cæſar, and that Corfinium was an important poſt for this purpoſe, he determined to obſerve the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey by this time had moved from Capua to Luceria, and ſeemed to have taken the reſolution not only of abandoning the poſts that covered the acceſs to Rome, but even all Italy, to Cæſar. The Conſuls, the greater part of the magiſtracy, and the Senate, had followed him to Capua. Here was received the meſſage which Cæſar had given to Roſcius and to L. Cæſar. It contained ſeveral reflections and inſinuations in the higheſt degree provoking to Pompey; and to this circumſtance Cæſar probably truſted, that he ſhould not be bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impreſſed with the neceſſity of their own affairs, gladly liſtened to any terms of accommodation. They objected indeed to the propoſed interview between Pompey and Cæſar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into againſt the commonwealth.

Pompey himſelf was ſo ſenſible of the diſadvantage at which he was taken, that he diſſembled his reſentment of the perſonal reflections caſt on himſelf, and conſented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with diſdain. It was agreed accordingly that he ſhould repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he ſhould reduce his military eſtabliſhment. Cæſar, on his part, beſides the conditions he himſelf had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately ſeized in Italy; and it was propoſed that the Conſuls, Magiſtrates, and Senators ſhould return to the city, and from the uſual ſeat of government give all the ſanction of public authority to theſe arrangements. From ſuch appearances it was not doubted that an accommodation muſt follow. And in this belief Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily,

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choſe to abide by the Senate while the treaty remained in dependance. And Cicero thought the agreement almoſt concluded. "The one," he wrote to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his pre-"cipitation, and the other is ſenſible he has not a force ſufficient to "ſupport ſuch a war [30]."

Cæſar therefore was likely to be caught in the ſnare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aſide the diſguiſe which he had aſſumed in affecting ſuch earneſt deſires for peace. To avoid either of theſe inconveniences, he objected to ſome of the conditions which the oppoſite party had ſubjoined to his propoſals, and complained of the ſilence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpoſe to circumvent and betray him. "Pompey will repair to "Spain," he ſaid, "but when? I am required to evacuate all the "towns of Italy, while Pompey and the whole State continue in "arms againſt me, and while my enemies not only make new levies, "but employ for my deſtruction legions which they have actually "taken away from my own army. If Pompey be ſincere in de-"ſiring a peace, why does he decline the perſonal interview which "has been propoſed for that purpoſe?"

Cæſar had, by this time, advanced with haſty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garriſon, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town, ſat down under the walls, and employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horſe, he ordered proper poſts to be ſeized on every ſide of the town, and effectually ſhut up thoſe who were within from any relief, or from any communication with their friends. When his works began to appear

[30] Ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 14.

againſt

againſt the place, Domitius publiſhed a reward to any one who ſhould carry letters to Pompey. Different meſſengers were diſpatched for this purpoſe, and brought for anſwer, that Pompey diſapproved of his having allowed himſelf to be inveſted by Cæſar, had foretold him the bad conſequences of this meaſure, and now earneſtly exhorted him, if poſſible, to extricate himſelf; for that it was not in his power with theſe doubtful legions, which had been ſo lately drawn from Cæſar's army, or with new levies, to force the hardy and veteran troops of the enemy [31].

This anſwer Domitius endeavoured to conceal from his army; encouraged them with hopes of a ſpeedy relief from Pompey, and ſeemed intent on the defence of the place, while he was actually taking meaſures to get off in perſon, without any hopes of preſerving the forces he had aſſembled for the commonwealth. This deſign being ſuſpected, the troops ſurrounded his quarters in the night, took him priſoner, and to pay their court, while they delivered up their general and ſurrendered the town, made offer of their own ſervices to Cæſar.

Upon this ſurrender, Cæſar took poſſeſſion of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no perſon whatever from his army ſhould enter the place before it was day. He knew, that beſides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many Senators and Roman knights now ſhut up in the town. Theſe he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expoſtulated with them on the ſubject of their enmity to himſelf, and their precipitation in hurrying the State into this unnatural war. He then diſmiſſed them with the reſpect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank; and being told that a conſiderable ſum of money, amaſſed at Corfinium for the ſupport of the troops, had been ſeized by his people, to complete this ſcene of

[31] Pompeius ad Domitium, lib. viii. Et ad Atticum, poſt ep. 12. Cæſ. de Bell. Civ.

unexpected

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unexpected moderation, by an exhibition of diſintereſtedneſs as well as of clemency, he ordered this money to be reſtored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildneſs and generoſity, as he expected, was every where diffuſed; and though, by over-acting his part in abſtaining from the public money, he furniſhed every thinking perſon with a ſufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct; yet many were happy to underſtand, that, in this alarming conteſt, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be ſpared.

Rome was now open to Cæſar; but he thought the poſſeſſion of it of no moment, until he had ſuppreſſed the military arrangements that were making in the country, and had decided who was to have the poſſeſſion of Italy. He therefore, on the very day on which he became maſter of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops that deſerted to him in making this conqueſt [32]. He himſelf ſet out for Apulia, and, before ſunſet, accompliſhed a conſiderable march; but while he thus urged the war with the greateſt rapidity, ſent meſſengers before him to the leaders of the oppoſite party, with profeſſions of friendſhip and overtures of peace.

Immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, Balbus, an officer in Cæſar's army, was diſpatched with a meſſage to the Conſul Lentulus, containing earneſt intreaties, that this magiſtrate would return to Rome, and prevent the diſorders that were likely to ariſe from the ſuſpenſion of government. To induce him to comply with this requeſt, Balbus had ſecret inſtructions to aſſure the Conſul of a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this meſſage declared, that Cæſar deſired nothing ſo much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæſar's retinue, wrote, at the ſame time, to Cicero, that Cæſar had no object

[32] Cæſar de Bello Civ. lib. i. c. 25.

but



10 15 20 25 30

PART OF BRITAIN

Trinobantes

Atrebates

Nervii

Belgae

Bellovaci Remi

Suessones

Caletes

Veneti

Pictones

Transalpine Gaul

Lemovices

Arverni

Gabali

Provincia

Volcae Tectosages

Helvetii

Germania

Gallia Cisalpina

Corsica

Sardinia

Mediterranean

Africa

Utica

Fair Promontory

Carthage

Mercury

Clupea

Adrumetum

Achilla

Zeta

Leptis

Thapsus

Vada

Tarraco

Ilerda

Iberus

PART OF SPAIN

Pompeiana

Provincia

40

35

15 20

ished according to Act of Parliament. by W. Strahan. and

Plate 2d To be placed fronting Page 390 Vol 2nd

ITALY,
with the PROVINCES of
CÆSAR
And part of
the PROVINCE of
POMPEY

30 35 40 45 50

55 50 45 40 35

HADRIATIC SEA


TYRRHENE SEA

EUXINE SEA

Ravenna
Rubicon
Ariminum
Pisaurum
Fanum
Auximum
Sena
Ancona
Asculum
Corfinium
Rome
Ostia
Cerveteri
Sipontum
Luceria
Canusium
APULIA
Beneventum
Tarentum
CAMPANIA
Capua
LUCANIA
Gulf of Tarentum
Dyrrachium
Bay of Nauplia
Apollonia
Lissus
Asparagium
Apsus
MACEDONIA
Thessalonica
Berhœa
Almopia
Lake of Diaccia
THESSALY
Amphrysia
Tempe
Aonium
CORCYRA
Torone
CEPHALENIA
PELOPONNESUS
THRACE
Cyricus
ASIA
Thyatira
Sardis
Ephesus
Miletus
RHODES
CRETE
Lipari
Messina
Italybæum
Taurominium
Mt Etna
SICILY
Rhegium
Leucopetra
Agina
Syracuse
Promontory Mercury
Clupea
Vada

by W. Strahan, and T. Cadell, in the Strand. Feb.y 1.st 1783.

J. Bell Sculp.



but to enjoy peace and ſecurity under Pompey [33]. But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful diſpoſition to peace was ſpread throughout Italy, and reconciled the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror [34]. While he hoped to amuſe his enemies, and to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with ſo much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time that was neceſſary to croſs the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canuſium, and from this laſt place, without a halt, to Brundiſium.

Pompey, while he moved in this direction, having ſent Metellus Scipio, and his own ſon Cnæus into Syria, to provide and aſſemble the neceſſary ſhipping to embark his army [35]; his intention to abandon Italy began to be ſuſpected, and ſhook the great authority which he ſtill derived from his military reputation. His officers were every where deſerted on the march by the new levies, who returned to offer their ſervices to Cæſar. His own preſence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them ſafe to the port from which it was ſuſpected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port he effectually verified theſe ſuſpicions, embarking a great part of his army with the Conſuls, while he himſelf, not having ſufficient ſhipping to tranſport the whole, remained with a ſecond diviſion to wait for the return of his ſhips.

Such was the poſture of Pompey, when Cæſar, with ſix legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly raiſed or completed from thoſe who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of Brundiſium. Even here, he never dropt the project of amuſing his enemy with propoſals of peace. Cn. Magius, an officer in the ſervice

[33] Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 9.

[34] Ibid. ep. 13. Si mehercule neminem occidet, nec cuiquam quicquam ademerit, ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligetur.

[35] Plutarch. in Pompeio.

of

BOOK IV.

of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was diſmiſſed with great courteſy, and a meſſage to Pompey, containing a requeſt, that he would admit Cæſar to an interview; and obſerving, that differences are ſoon made up at a conference, which otherwiſe might occaſion many journies and meſſages to no purpoſe.

This pacific meſſage, as in other inſtances, only conſtituted a part in the military plan of Cæſar, and was accompanied with effectual preparations for a blockade and a ſiege. It did not as yet appear, whether Pompey meant to tranſport all his troops, and to abandon Brundiſium, or to keep poſſeſſion of this poſt, in order to retain a paſſage into Italy, and to command both ſides of the gulf. Cæſar, to try his intentions, and either to ſhut him up, or to haſten his departure, obſerving, that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be ſhut up, began an alarming work for this purpoſe. He employed numerous parties to throw ſtones, earth, and other heavy materials into the paſſage between the two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them, and thus effectually to exclude all communication with the ſea.

In this work the beſiegers advanced, for ſome time, with great rapidity; but being come into deeper water, where the materials they threw in were abſorbed or unſettled, and diſplaced by the motion of the ſea, they found it neceſſary to change their plan, and endeavoured to ſhut up the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the paſſage. In executing this project they were diſturbed by a continual diſcharge of arrows, ſtones, and other miſſile weapons from veſſels in the mouth of the harbour, on which proper engines were mounted for this purpoſe.

While the parties were thus, without intermiſſion, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæſar again made a ſhew of propoſing a treaty. As he had received no anſwer to his former meſſage by Magius, he affected to deſpair of making any progreſs by direct ap-

CHAP. V.

plications to Pompey, and ſent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæſar's name, to intreat his good offices in bringing on a negotiation; particularly, if poſſible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himſelf. Repreſenting to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, ſome way might be diſcovered to ſtop the iſſues of blood, a bleſſing which, in that caſe, would for ever be mentioned as the effect of ſo eſſential a ſervice performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving theſe propoſals, which, though addreſſed to Libo, were carried directly to himſelf, made anſwer, That, in the abſence of the Conſuls, he could not treat. In this inſtance, he perceived, no doubt, the inſincerity of Cæſar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardour with which he now at laſt prepared for the conteſt: yet he could not altogether prevent one advantage which Cæſar meant to reap from theſe repeated profeſſions of moderation and deſire of peace, that of appearing in the eyes of the People, not the author of the war, but a perſon forced to theſe extremities by the violence and obſtinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundiſium had been continued three days, and had made conſiderable progreſs, the tranſports which had carried the firſt diviſion of Pompey's army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the paſſage at the mouth of the harbour was ſtill open, he prepared to embark with the remainder of his forces. The inhabitants of the town, being diſaffected to him, were likely to give intelligence to Cæſar of all his motions; and he made no doubt that as ſoon as he ſhould withdraw his guards, they would throw open their gates, and expoſe him to be attacked in his rear, and poſſibly to loſe ſuch part of his army as might be overtaken on ſhore. To provide againſt this event, and to retard Cæſar's entry into the

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town, he built up the gates with ſolid mortar and ſtone, and traverſed the ſtreets with walls and large ditches repleniſhed with ſharp ſtakes, which were maſked or hid with a ſlight covering of bruſh-wood and earth.

When the legions began to move towards the harbour, the rear guard ſtill endeavoured to preſent the uſual appearances on the ramparts, by occupying every poſt with archers, ſlingers, and other light troops. Theſe being to remain in their poſt while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a ſignal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the tranſports which were ready to receive them.

The troops in Brundiſium thus began to embark in the night, and Cæſar, having immediate intelligence of it from the town, brought forward his ſcaling ladders, and, as ſoon as the ramparts appeared to be deſerted, began to aſcend them in ſeveral places at once, and effected one part of his purpoſe, by gaining the battlements without oppoſition; but when he was about to deſcend from thence into the ſtreets, having notice of the ſnares and obſtructions which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with ſo much precaution, that the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and get under ſail. Only two tranſports, that ſtruck and were aground on the banks which had been formed or begun at the mouth of the harbour, fell into his hands. The remainder, with the greater part of the Senate, attended by the officers of State and the enſigns of magiſtracy, proceeded in their paſſage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæſar in poſſeſſion of Italy and of the ſeats of government, from which the world could ſcarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command.

Cæſar having, in this manner, ſurpriſed the republic, and in ſixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him ſole maſter of the forces which began to be muſtered againſt him, it is probable, notwithſtanding the queſtion he ſtates relating to the expedience

pedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his reſolution to conſider the reduction of Spain as the next object of conſequence to that of Italy. In that province, which was full of reſources, a regular army of ſeven or eight legions had been for ſome time formed, with an evident purpoſe to keep him in awe. He was threatened therefore with the moſt immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements too were yet wanting for the ſecurity of Italy. The profeſſions which he had made of pacific diſpoſitions, and of zeal for the republic, were to be confirmed by ſhowing a proper reſpect to the forms of the conſtitution, and by endeavouring to reſtore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For theſe reaſons, Cæſar contented himſelf, for the preſent, with having ordered ſhipping to be provided at the port of Brundiſium, that he might amuſe the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that ſide, or that he might be actually ready to do ſo, when he had elſewhere accompliſhed the purpoſe on which he was bent. Notwithſtanding his pacific declarations, and his oſtentation of clemency on every occaſion, the People ſtill trembled when they ſaw almoſt every citizen of reputation and honour obliged to fly from the ſeats of government, and, in their place, collected from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every perſon of infamous character [36]. Theſe being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæſar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppreſſed citizens, whoſe wrongs he was come to redreſs.

With this company, ſtill multiplying around him, having given orders to ſecure Brundiſium from the ſea, and poſted there, and

[36] Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 19. Cave autem putis quemquam hominem in Italiam turpem eſſe, qui hinc abſit. Vidi ipſe Formiis univerſos, &c.; et Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 1. qui hic poteſt ſe gerere non perditi vita mores ante facta ratio ſuſcepti negotii, ſocii, &c.

at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion; and having ordered ſhips from every part of the coaſts of Italy and Gaul, he ſet out for Spain, intending, while the troops, with whom he had over-run Italy, took ſome repoſe in quarters, and while thoſe who were deſtined for the ſervice in Spain were on the march, that he himſelf ſhould viſit Rome, and obſerve the aſpect of his party. His father-in-law, Calpurnius Piſo, although, by his relation to Cæſar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his ſon-in-law ſo far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, then Prætor, was the officer of higheſt rank who continued in his place; and beſide the Tribunes who had been the inſtruments in kindling this war, was the only magiſtrate who reſigned himſelf intirely to the victor's diſpoſal. Among the Tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though diſpoſed to have followed the Senate, being detained in the city by the ſacred duties of his function, had taken his reſolution to employ the negative with which he was intruſted, in reſtraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in ſuch a ſcene as was now to be opened at Rome.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hoſtilities, having ſtill the enſigns of Proconſul, was appointed to inſpect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coaſts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this ſtation with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irreſolution. He affected reſpect and gratitude to Pompey, though he ſurely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy; but in the laſt perhaps he only meant to juſtify himſelf for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having embarked with more deciſion in the cauſe. He ſincerely lamented the ſtate of the republic, of which he now certainly deſpaired, and only wiſhed to ſteer a courſe, the ſafeſt he could for his own reputation and his perſon.

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Cæſar, in the beginning of this conteſt, had contributed much to perplex the reſolution of Cicero, who generally ſaw ſo many objects in every queſtion of State, that it was difficult for him to decide between them. He had been kept undetermined by means of a flattering correſpondence, in which Cæſar made repeated applications for his good offices towards preventing the preſent troubles. Being now in the way of Cæſar from Brundiſium to Rome, he was honoured with a perſonal interview; at which, ſays Cicero to his friend Atticus, I ſhall ſtudy rather to appear an object of his reſpect than of his liking. He accordingly, on that occaſion, reſiſted his flattery, and withſtood his intreaties to attend a meeting of the Senate, which Cæſar had ordered to be aſſembled by a meſſenger diſpatched from Formiæ. Cæſar appeared to be piqued at this refuſal: "It will be ſuppoſed "you condemn me," he ſaid, "and others will be led by your ex-"ample." Cicero replied, "That his caſe was different from that of "others who had leſs connection with Pompey." "Come, then," continued Cæſar, "and treat of an accommodation with Pompey." "Shall I be at liberty to do ſo in my own way?" "Who will reſtrain "you?" "Shall I move the Senate then, that the war ſhall not be "carried into Spain, nor into Greece? Shall I lament the treatment "which Pompey has received?" "That indeed," ſaid Cæſar, "I "ſhall not like to have ſaid." "I thought ſo," replied the other, "and choſe to abſent myſelf." At parting, Cæſar deſired him to conſider of the matter. "If you deſert me," he ſaid, "I muſt have "recourſe to other counſels, and know not what I may be forced to "do"[37].

Upon the arrival of Cæſar in the ſuburbs of Rome, ſuch of the Senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, aſſembled at his ſummons. He opened the meeting by enumerating the wrongs

[37] Cicer. ad Atticum. lib. ix. ep. 18.

he

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he had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the preſent war. "He never had aſpired," he ſaid, "to unprecedented "honours. The office of Conſul was now again open to him by "the laws of the commonwealth; and the Roman People had diſ-"penſed with his perſonal attendance in ſuing for it. An act to "this purpoſe," he ſaid, "had been obtained in the faireſt and moſt "conſtitutional manner. Ten Tribunes had concurred in propoſing "it. His enemies, particularly Cato himſelf, had been heard at full "length againſt it, and had practiſed his uſual artifice for diſappoint-"ing the Senate or the People, by prolonging the debates. Pompey "himſelf was Conſul when this act was paſſed. If he diſapproved of "the act, why did he not oppoſe it then? If he approved of it, why "rob him now of the privilege it beſtowed? He reminded this meet-"ing of the moderation with which he himſelf had offered to reſign "his command, while others were ſo tenacious of theirs; or while "they impoſed conditions on him, to which they themſelves would "not ſubmit, and choſe to throw the State into confuſion, rather than "abate the leaſt of their own pretenſions. He obſerved, that his "enemies had made uſe of a falſe pretence to call off two legions "from his army; that they had violated the ſacred character of the "Tribunes, who were guilty of no offence, but that of protecting "him againſt the oppreſſion of his enemies; that they had rejected "all offers of an accommodation, or even of a conference.

"He now exhorted the Senate not to deſert the commonwealth, "nor to oppoſe ſuch as, in concert with him, might endeavour to "reſtore the government; but if they ſhould ſhrink in this arduous "taſk, he ſhould not preſs it upon them. He knew how to act for "himſelf. If his opinion were followed, deputies ſhould be now "ſent from the Senate to Pompey, with intreaties, that he would ſpare "the republic. He knew, that Pompey had formerly objected to "to his having any ſuch deputation ſent to himſelf, conſidering ſuch

" advances as a conceſſion of right in him to whom they were made, " or of fear in thoſe who made them. Theſe, he ſaid, were the " reflections of a narrow mind; for his own part, as he wiſhed to " overcome his enemies in the field, ſo he wiſhed to excel them in " acts of generoſity and candour."

Such were the colours in which this artful man endeavoured to diſguiſe his cauſe; and while he took effectual meaſures to maintain it by force, employed likewiſe an inſinuation, and an eloquence not leſs dangerous than his ſword. The propoſals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having aſſiſted at ſuch a meeting of the Senate, to hazard his perſon in Pompey's camp.

While Cæſar, to reconcile all men to his cauſe, affected clemency even to thoſe who were taken in arms againſt him, Pompey, ſuppoſing himſelf entruſted with the powers and ſeverities of the law, had threatened to employ thoſe powers and ſeverities to the utmoſt extent againſt every perſon who ſtaid behind him at Rome. *Proſcription* and *maſſacre* of thoſe who abandoned the commonwealth were the ordinary language at his quarters [31]. He propoſed to operate in this caſe by fear alone, and had forgotten, that legal government itſelf, on certain occaſions, with all its authorities and powers, ſtands in need of inſinuation and of popular arts.

Cæſar, in taking the oppoſite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the iſſue of a fair negotiation and treaty, relied on the difficulties that were likely to occur in the conduct of any negotiation; or he preſumed upon theſe difficulties in making offers which he did not wiſh his enemies to accept. His intention was to load his antagoniſt with the blame of a war which, it is probable, he had a long time been deviſing. If he had really meant to

[31] Cicer. ad Attic. lib. viii. ep. 11.

renew

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renew his former concerts with Pompey, he would have employed again the ſame concealed methods by which thoſe concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intruſted the mediation to the Senate, a body which, however compoſed, had a natural claim to authority, and might have carried their negotiations farther than he propoſed. He had ever entertained a ſerious averſion to the name and pretenſions of the Senate. Being altogether indifferent to public intereſts of every ſort, the mediocrity of parts, that muſt ever appear in the majority of ſuch a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had eſpouſed the cauſe of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal againſt them; and, at one time, rather than be ſubject to their authority, had propoſed, that Pompey himſelf ſhould tranſport this army from Aſia to uſurp the government. Even the few Senators, who, upon the former occaſion, from indifference to public queſtions, or from a diſpoſition to favour his cauſe, had remained in the city, became the objects of his diſguſt. Many of them, though willing to be his inſtruments, were not yet formed for his purpoſe. When he affected to treat them with reſpect, they received his addreſſes as matter of right; when he propoſed any meaſure, they took the matter into ſerious conſideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He deteſts the Senate," ſaid Curio to Cicero, "now more "than ever; he will leave them no authority. I meant to have "held my commiſſion by a fictitious decree of that body: but he "ſaid, I ſhould hold it of himſelf; and that every honour, and every "power ſhould be derived from him [39]."

Cæſar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal aſſembly the tools of every ungracious or improper meaſure he had occaſion to execute, and, in particular, to avail himſelf of their authority in ſeizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been

[39] Cicer. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

authoriſed

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authoriſed to draw from the treaſures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the ſervice. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the Conſul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a ſudden alarm of Cæſar's approach obliged him to deſiſt, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the publick repoſitories. Cæſar now moved the Senate, that the doors ſhould be opened; and that the public money ſhould be iſſued from thence to defray the expence of the war[40]. To this motion the Tribune Metellus Celer oppoſed his negative; and Cæſar, diſdaining any longer to wear a maſk which ſubjected him to the obſervance of inſignificant forms, proceeded to the treaſury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The Tribune had the boldneſs to place himſelf in the way, and was about to reduce Cæſar to the diſagreeable alternative of being diſappointed of his purpoſe, or of rendering himſelf the object of popular deteſtation, by violating the ſacred perſon of a Tribune, from a veneration to which, he himſelf profeſſed to have undertaken the war. On this occaſion, contrary to his uſual character, he appeared to have loſt his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate death. "This," he ſaid, "is eaſier for me "to execute than to utter." It was thought, that if the Tribune had perſiſted, not only this officer, but numbers of Senators, and many of the more reſpectable citizens, whom he conſidered as enemies and promoters of the Tribune's contumacy, would have been involved in a general maſſacre. "Think not," ſaid Curio, in relating theſe particulars to Cicero, "that his clemency proceeds from "temper, or is ſecured to you by any real diſpoſition of his mind. "It is a mere effect of his policy; he is naturally indifferent to "blood, and, if he is provoked, will make it to run in the "kennels[41]."

[40] Dio. Caſſius, lib. xli. c. 17 & 18.

[41] Cicero ad Atticum, lib. x. ep. 4.

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The Tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, ſuffered himſelf to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence, even the ſacred depoſit, ſuppoſed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its deſtruction by the Gauls, and ſtill kept as a reſource for the utmoſt exigency of publick affairs, was now carried off. I have ſubdued the Gauls, ſaid Cæſar, and there is no longer any need of ſuch proviſion againſt them. He is ſaid, on this occaſion, to have carried off in bars, 25,000 lb. [42] of gold, 35,000 lb. [43] of ſilver, and in coin, 40,000,000 Roman money [44].

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæſar diſtruſted the affections of the people. He had propoſed to harangue them in a publick audience, which had been appointed for that purpoſe; but apprehending that he might be expoſed to inſult from ſome one in the crowd, he declined that ſolemnity, even avoided the public view altogether, and having paſſed but a few days at Rome, ſet out for Spain ſullen and diſpleaſed. It was no longer a doubt, that his victories led to the ſubverſion of the republic, and of every ſpecies of civil government whatever [45].

Marcus Emilius Lepidus, who, as has been obſerved, was at this time Prætor, and the officer of higheſt rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Mark Antony had the command of Cæſar's forces in Italy; and by the uſe which he made of his power, treating perſons of the moſt reſpectable condition with great inſolence, and indulging himſelf in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his genius appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increaſed the diſ-

According to Arbuthnot, ch. 18.

[42] £ 678,125 0 0
[43] 94,937 10 0
[44] 322,916 13 4 Vid. Plin. lib. xxxiii. c. 3.

£ 1,095,982 3 4

45 Cic. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

mal

mal apprehenſions of the public. He is ſaid to have travelled through Italy himſelf in an open litter, with Citheridé, a celebrated actreſs, followed by ſeven other carriages repleniſhed with courtezans, and even attended by his wife Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, who, to enjoy her huſband's ſtate, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part in this ſcandalous train[46]. The whole, a lively ſpecimen of the purpoſe for which the accomplices of Cataline, and many of the followers of Cæſar wiſhed to be maſters of the republic, and a foretaſte of the wanton caprice with which this overgrown republic, ſo long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the ſubject and the ſport of a military uſurpation.

Soon after hoſtilities had commenced, Cotta had been ſent to command for the republic in Sardinia, and Cato to command in Sicily. Cæſar, when about to carry the war into Spain, thought it neceſſary, if poſſible, to get the poſſeſſion of theſe iſlands, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having ſtationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coaſt of Illyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to attack Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæſar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take poſſeſſion of their iſland, declared for his intereſt, took arms againſt Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa, where he joined Atius Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, ſome time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negotiation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his aſſiſtance in forming an accommodation, the leaſt ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. On Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into

[46] Cic. ad Att. lib. x. & xiii.

Sicily, and the province being unprovided with every means of defence, he gave orders to repair, and to build ſhips in all the ports of the iſland, and in thoſe of the neighbouring coaſt of Italy. He had likewiſe ordered all the towns to furniſh their quota of troops; but had not been able to aſſemble any force, when Curio landed at Meſſina, with the two legions deſtined by Cæſar to take poſſeſſion of the iſland. Senſible that any attempts to reſiſt this force would only expoſe the lives of a few well-affected citizens or ſubjects, who might on this occaſion be diſpoſed to ſupport him as an officer of the republic, he diſcontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the iſland.

This officer had often diſapproved of Pompey's conduct; and on this occaſion, complained particularly of the defenceleſs ſtate in which he had ſuffered the republic to be ſurpriſed in all its poſſeſſions. Cæſar, who no doubt wiſhed to have the ſuffrage of ſuch a citizen, and of his own enemy againſt Pompey, repreſents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed, that the Senate had been deceived, and that the war itſelf was unneceſſary[47]. The conduct of Pompey, not only as a citizen, but as an officer of ſtate and as a ſoldier, has been cenſured in many parts of this memorable conteſt; and it is indeed eaſy to ſpy faults after the event, and when experience has expoſed them to view. Cæſar himſelf is ſaid to have cenſured him for abandoning Italy; and it is probable would have reſpected him more, if in executing this reſolution, inſtead of paſſing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated ſaying, in leaving Brundiſium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, implied an opinion to this purpoſe, "We go," he ſaid, "from this "general who has no army, to an army that has no general."

Cæſar's own diſpoſition of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in aſſigning what appeared to have been the reaſons of his

[47] Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

conduct,

conduct, had been made with the greateſt ability; and the more, that they gave him the appearance of a perſon acting without deſign, and ſuddenly forced to the meaſures which he embraced. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to deſign and concert; but with reſpect to Cæſar, the miſtake to be feared, is not perceiving the whole extent of his foreſight and plan. He at once armed himſelf with a military force, and artfully guarded the appearances under which he was to uſe it. When the Senate paſſed their reſolution againſt him, he ſeemed to be caught unprepared to reſiſt; but the Senate was ſtill leſs prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cauſe of ſuſpicion, by any unneceſſary aſſemblage of forces on the ſide of Italy, while he had ſufficient ſtrength to take the full benefit of the conſternation into which they were thrown by his firſt alarm. Though long meditating the invaſion of Rome with an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the Tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a ſudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cauſe. When we conſider that Mark Antony was the Tribune who furniſhed this pretence, there is no doubt that Cæſar had his choice of the time at which it ſhould be preſented to him.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army ſtill remained beyond the Alps, and in the preciſe ſituation in which they were moſt likely to be wanted to encounter the firſt conſiderable difficulty that would probably ariſe in the war, from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were ſtationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain[48]. If theſe legions had attempted to paſs the Pyrennees, the army of Cæſar was ſtationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly ſecure of being able to finiſh the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this ſervice was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the moſt advantageous

[48] See p. 374. 378, 379. the preceding parts of this chapter.

poſition, from which to enter upon what was likely to become the ſecond object of his enterprize, the reduction of Spain.

The antagoniſts of Cæſar, without any apprehenſion of theſe diſpoſitions, and perfectly ſecure before hoſtilities commenced, were completely ſurpriſed, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make any defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the ſaying of Pompey, *at the ſtamp of his foot*; but they were armies that ſerved the purpoſe of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and though raiſed to ſecure Italy againſt Cæſar, became in the reduction of Italy itſelf an acceſſion to his force, and were ready to be ſent in ſeparate diviſions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; inſomuch, that while Cæſar himſelf, with the ſtrength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, haſtened into Spain to reduce what was the moſt formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with ſeparate bodies of theſe newly acquired troops, into Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa.

Pompey, although he had never viſited his government in perſon, nor ſought for occaſions of war, as Cæſar, in order to form his army and inure them to ſervice, had done in Gaul, had nevertheleſs formed a great military eſtabliſhment, conſiſting of ſeven Roman legions, with five thouſand horſe, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæſar had reaſon to believe, that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his reſources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himſelf on the north of the Alps. He accordingly, inſtead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the low countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this ſtorm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the ſucceſs of his affairs in Italy ſhould admit of it, that theſe legions ſhould croſs

croſs the Pyrennees, and fix the ſcene of the war amidſt his rival's poſſeſſions. CHAP. V.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two ſeparate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The firſt commanded, from the river Guadiana weſtward to the extremities of Luſitania [49] and Gallicia; the ſecond, from the Guadiana eaſtward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrennees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey ſent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to theſe officers to aſſemble their forces, and to prepare for the defence of their province. Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the oppoſite parties concerned in it. An accident, he ſaid, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæſar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander in chief, engaged with more zeal in the cauſe. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the weſtern province, while they themſelves drew the principal part of their force towards the eaſtern frontier; and by occupying the paſſes of the mountains, or ſome ſtrong poſt on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country entruſted to their care, until Pompey ſhould either arrive in perſon to take the command on himſelf, or until, having rallied his forces in Macedonia, he ſhould bring the ſcene of the war again into Italy. For this purpoſe, they took poſt at Ilerda [50], a place of ſtrength on the Segro, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cinea; Afranius with three legions, Petreius with two more, together with five thouſand horſe, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry.

[49] Portugal. [50] Now called Lerida.

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Such were the diſpoſitions that were making in Spain, when Cæſar, having expelled his rival from Italy, took poſſeſſion of Rome, and having paſſed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, ſet out for his army in the province of Narbonne.

Being to paſs by Marſeilles, he intended to take poſſeſſion of that city; but the inhabitants were already diſpoſed to favour his antagoniſts, and ſhut their gates againſt him. This ancient Greek colony, after having long defended their ſettlement againſt the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themſelves at laſt unde the protection of the Romans; but with a reſerve of all their immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. Cæſar propoſed to have entered their city as a neutral place, and to prevail on the citizens to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itſelf, and of all the other cities of Italy who had opened their gates, and given a paſſage to his army, without taking any part in the preſent diſputes. To this propoſal, the people of Marſeilles made anſwer, That in every caſe where the Romans were divided among themſelves, every ally in their ſituation muſt ſo far preſerve their neutrality, as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that in the preſent caſe particularly, they lay under ſuch high obligations to the leaders of both parties, that they muſt carefully avoid giving offence to either.

It ſoon after appeared, however, that this plauſible anſwer was intended merely to gain time. Vibullius had paſſed by Marſeilles in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a meſſage from Pompey, with aſſurances of ſupport; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this meſſage, was followed by a reſolution to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagoniſts.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been diſmiſſed from Corfinium, no ways affected by the oſtentatious clemency of Cæſar, had, in

in purſuance of the Senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raiſed ſome troops, with which he was expected to take poſſeſſion of Marſeilles, and actually, in a few days after this anſwer was given to Cæſar, entered the harbour of that place with ſeven ſhips, and ſome land forces on board. Upon his arrival, the people of this republic called in to their aſſiſtance the force of ſome neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their fortifications; repleniſhed their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was neceſſary, in caſe they ſhould be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

Cæſar being greatly provoked, inveſted the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered ſome ſhips to be built on the Rhône, prepared to aſſail it at once by ſea and by land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius; and that from the ſea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making theſe preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was paſſing the ſeas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of his army in Spain. It is probable that Cæſar, in like circumſtances, would have even taken a ſhorter road to the head of his army. He appears at leaſt to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been ſomewhat alarmed. As if the proſpect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practiſed by himſelf on this occaſion, which may be conſidered as a ſpecimen of his addreſs, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the ſoldiers; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the one, and purchſiang that of the others by his bounty.

BOOK IV.

While Cæſar was yet employed in opening the ſiege of Marſeilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrennees; and if the paſſes were open or ſlightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy ſome advantageous ſtation on the frontier of that country. This officer accordingly, having forced the paſſes of the Pyrennees, penetrated to the Segra, or, as it was then called, the Sicoris; and took poſt on the right of this river, in the front of the united armies of Afranius and Petreius, who were encamped near the town of Ilerda.

Fabius, not to be interrupted by occaſional floods in his communication with the country through which he had paſſed, and to keep open the ordinary route from Gaul, laid two bridges upon it, at the diſtance of four miles from each other. By theſe communications, he was chiefly ſupplied with proviſions; and as the Spaniſh army had an eaſy acceſs by the bridge of Ilerda to intercept his ſupplies, it was neceſſary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful eſcorts. Two intire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched on this ſervice, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had paſſed the river, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived thoſe who were already over, of any communication with the camp. The timber and wreck of the bridge floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and ſuggeſted the deſign to ſcour the country on the left of the Segra, with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of the army. For this purpoſe, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or deſtroyed thoſe who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for ſome time to reſiſt the ſuperior numbers of his enemy. In the mean while, Fabius ſuſpecting the danger to which his

his detachment was expoſed, diſpatched two legions more by the other bridge to ſupport the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius, whoſe plan in the preſent campaign was altogether defenſive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be expoſed to a too haſty deciſion of the cauſe.

Two days after this adventure, Cæſar, with an eſcort of nine hundred horſe, arrived in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the ſituation of both armies, and ordered the bridge on the Segra to be rebuilt, he proceeded as uſual to act on the offenſive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with ſucceſſive operations againſt them, by which he left them no leiſure to form any deſigns of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the preſent war, to need a ſpeedy deciſion, which made him take meaſures that forced his enemies to remain on the defenſive, and inſpired his men with a notion of their own ſuperiority; an opinion which, after it has been ſome time received, ſeldom fails to verify itſelf.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army in three diviſions to the foot of the hill on which the Spaniſh army was encamped, and while they continued to obſerve, and endeavoured to penetrate his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgment for himſelf in that place. That his purpoſe might not be known, until the work was conſiderably advanced, he kept the firſt and ſecond lines under arms, and ordered the third, without raiſing a parapet, or planting their paliſades; to ſink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of a ſufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired with his whole army behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary entrenchment, he on the following day completed the uſual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of his army, which till then had remained under a proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in poſſeſſion of a poſt within four hundred paces, or leſs than half a mile of the enemy's lines; and having a view of the

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ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilerda, extending about three hundred paces, and moſtly plain, with a ſmall height in the middle of it, he formed a project to ſeize this height; and knowing that the enemy lodged their magazines and ſtores in Ilerda, propoſed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, he drew up a body of three legions in a proper poſition, from which to execute his purpoſe; and ordered the front rank [14] from one of thoſe legions to ſtart from their colours, and with the utmoſt ſpeed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The ſudden movement of this body explained his deſign to the enemy, and they inſtantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the advantage of the ground, they prevented Cæſar's party; and being in poſſeſſion of the height before they came up, repulſed and beat them back to their main body. Here too, they purſued their advantage; and as they ruſhed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Cæſar had advanced, they put the whole in ſome degree of confuſion, and forced them back to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spaniſh army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in ſuſpence, Cæſar iſſued from his camp with a freſh legion to ſupport the flying diviſion of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of theſe walls was ſteep, and the acceſs to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, with whom Cæſar had renewed the action, fluſhed with victory, had followed the enemy, and got into a ſituation in which they could not gain any advantage, nor retire without loſs. The parties however continued to ſkirmiſh during five hours, and being continually reinforced from

[14] Unius Legionis Antefignanos. Cæſar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 43.

their reſpective armies, a general engagement was likely to enſue on ground extremely unfavourable to Cæſar.

In order to extricate himſelf with the leaſt poſſible appearance of diſgrace, he ordered a general charge, and having drove his antagoniſts before him to the foot of the wall, he ſounded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men, before the enemy could rally or return to the purſuit.

In this manner, Cæſar retired to his camp with conſiderable loſs, and foiled in his deſign; but on account of the laſt impreſſion he made on the enemy, with ſome pretenſions to a victory, of which, to ſupport the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himſelf.

In a few days after this miſcarriage, the army of Cæſar ſuffered a worſe and more alarming calamity. The ſummer being far advanced, and the ſnow on the Pyrennees melting, all the rivers which are ſupplied from thence, roſe of a ſudden to their greateſt height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were uſed to reſtore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpoſe, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the oppoſite bank, or the materials were ſwept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were paſſable, and the country between them, though extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhauſted, could no longer furniſh any ſupply of proviſions to Cæſar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their diſtreſs, a convoy which arrived from Gaul, conſiſting of many carriages, eſcorted by a large body of Gauliſh horſe, and accompanied with many officers and perſons of diſtinction, who came to witneſs the glories of this campaign, the whole, together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about ſix thouſand men, were attacked by Afranius, and with great loſs obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

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In conſequence of this diſaſter, and under the ſenſe of the preſent, and apprehenſion of the future diſtreſs, the modius[51] of corn ſold in Cæſar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of thirty ſhillings a peck. All their attempts to procure a ſupply were fruſtrated by the difficulties of their ſituation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the ſeaſon, in ſwelling every river which deſcends from mountains that retain their ſnow in the ſummer, and as the enemy were plentifully ſupplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place, an open communication with the fertile country which is now named Catalonia on their right, Cæſar could have no immediate proſpect of relief. The Spaniſh army accordingly triumphed in their good fortune, and ſent exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many perſons, who had hitherto heſitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himſelf in his province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many haſtened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of ſuch agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themſelves of the party of the republic, while the iſſue of the war yet remained in any degree of ſuſpence.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening ſecurity and confidence which they inſpire, give an able enemy great advantage, even in his diſtreſs, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favour. Afranius and Petreius, while they truſted to the ordinary courſe of the ſeaſons, were not ſufficiently upon their guard againſt the ſuperior reſources of ſo able an adverſary. They ſuffered him to build, unobſerved, a number of boats, upon a conſtruction which his workmen had learned in

[51] Little more than a peck.

Britain;

Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and ſome timbers of ſtrength on the ſides; but, inſtead of plank, finiſhed between theſe timbers with baſket-work and covered with hides. Theſe veſſels being of eaſy carriage, were tranſported by land about twenty miles above Cæſar's camp; and in a firſt embarkation ferried over a party ſufficient to make a lodgement on the oppoſite bank. Cæſar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that ſide, he ventured to employ his carpenters openly in conſtructing a bridge, which they began at once from both ſides of the river. This work was completed in two days, and again gave him acceſs to the left of the Segra, where he ſurpriſed ſome of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a ſupply of proviſions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæſar had effected this change in the ſtate of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coaſt of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a ſpeedy proſpect of the reduction of Marſeilles. This report, together with the diſappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was ſuppoſed to be, even before the diſtreſſes which he had lately experienced. His antagoniſts, from a ſtate of ſanguine expectation, ſunk into a proportional degree of deſpondency, and became ſo much in awe of his ſuperior conduct, that they abandoned the country on the left of the Segra to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the neceſſary ſupplies of their own camp. Theſe events affected the natives of the country in a ſtill higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their ſervices in ſupplying Cæſar with proviſions, or in ſeconding him in his military operations.

In conjunction with the natives, who were now become his allies, Cæſar again found himſelf in condition to act on the offenſive, and to deviſe new alarms for the enemy. His firſt object was to render the paſſage of the river at all times practicable; and as he had failed

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in his purpoſe of ſeparating the Spaniſh army from the town of Ilerda, he now propoſed to extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of poſts, by which he might circumſcribe the town itſelf, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a diſtance, and he experienced the inſecurity of ſuch communications over torrents, which came with ſuch force and ſo much inequality from the mountains. Inſtead, therefore, of attempting to erect any more bridges, he propoſed to render the river fordable, by ſeparating its courſe into many different channels; and for this purpoſe made a number of cuts, of about thirty feet deep, through the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might ſufficiently drain the principal ſtream.

The enemy, as ſoon as they underſtood the purpoſe of theſe operations, were greatly alarmed. They foreſaw that Cæſar, having the paſſage of the river ſecured, might command its oppoſite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, ſince the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to ſupport him in all his deſigns, might have it in his power to prevent their ſupplies, and diſtreſs them, in their turn, for want of proviſions.

To remove from a ſituation in which they were expoſed to ſo many evils, they reſolved inſtantly to abandon their preſent ſtation, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were ſtill in their intereſt. They proceeded to the execution of this purpoſe with much ſeeming precaution and foreſight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain diſtance on that river and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpoſe. They placed a proper garriſon in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or if he attempted to reduce that place, to employ

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employ his forces until they themſelves ſhould have effected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new poſition they intended to take.

As their firſt movement in filing off from their preſent encampment, and in paſſing through the town of Ilerda, incumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them ſome time in preſence of the enemy, and expoſed them to the attacks of his cavalry and light troops, they intended no more, on the firſt day, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a poſt at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper diſpoſitions to continue their march. This poſt they ſent two legions before them to occupy and to ſecure.

Having taken theſe preparatory ſteps, they decamped, defiled without moleſtation through the town of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to ſecure their reception; here they halted until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of ſome miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to paſs in their way to the Ebro. They might be expoſed to Cæſar's light troops in croſſing this plain; but as ſoon as they reached the mountains, they could, by ſecuring the paſſes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæſar, who had obſerved their intentions, and who had ſo far ſucceeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horſe, ſent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear of the enemy, and by all poſſible means to retard their progreſs.

This ſervice the cavalry performed with ſo much ſucceſs, that at break of day the Spaniſh army, in conſequence of the frequent interruptions they had received, were ſtill to be ſeen from Cæſar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were obſerved

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to attack them, but when the enemy halted, appeared to ſtop or retire, and were purſued in their turn. The army of Cæſar being ſpectators of this ſcene became extremely impatient, and with the greateſt ardour preſſed to be led againſt the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they obſerved of what conſequence it was, that an enemy who had been driven with ſo much labour from one poſt, ſhould not be ſuffered to retire in ſafety to another ſituation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæſar, affecting to be moved by theſe repreſentations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earneſtly deſired, inſtantly made his diſpoſitions to paſs the river. He ſelected the leaſt firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horſe in the river above and below the ford, to break the force of the ſtream, and to ſave thoſe who might be overpowered by the ſtrength of the current; in this manner he paſſed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loſs of a man. They had a circuit of ſix miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but notwithſtanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being diſcovered until it was day, ſuch were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the ſpeed with which the legions of Cæſar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occaſioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, ſtunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæſar at the head of his whole army, formed on a riſing ground to receive him; and both armies ſeemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæſar, knowing the neceſſity which the enemy were under of purſuing their retreat, and the proſpect he had of increaſing his advantage on the march, did not think it neceſſary to attack

them when in order of battle; he took his ground, however, ſo near them [52], that he could profit by every advantage they gave him, and in every attempt they ſhould make to change their ſituation, could puſh them into all the diſorders of a general rout.

In this poſition of the two armies, the Spaniards having ſome time remained in order of battle, again attempted to reſume their march; but having ſoon experienced the difficulties of that attempt with an enemy ſo near them, and being faint with hunger and the fatigue of ſo many tedious and fruitleſs operations, they determined to halt and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles to paſs on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverſe this ſpace before Cæſar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where ſhort of the mountains, where they looked for a perfect ſecurity.

Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when ſome priſoners that were brought to Cæſar gave information that the enemy were in motion, and muſt in a little time be ſo far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them any effectual trouble. On this ſudden emergence, although his army was by no means ready to march, he ordered every trumpet to ſound, as if he were actually in motion. This feint, however ſlight, had its effect; the enemy believed that they were to be inſtantly attacked, or cloſely purſued on the march, when diſordered and incumbered with baggage; they deſiſted from their intention, and gave the ſignal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the firſt part of their plan, which had been ſo reaſonably formed, began to loſe courage, and remained on this ground all night, and the following

[52] The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a ſuperior army to remain almoſt in contact with that it intended to haraſs.

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day perplexed with irreſolution and various counſels. So far, however, they determined, that before ſo vigilant an enemy it was ſafer to march by day than by night; and in this mind they remained yet a ſecond night in the preſent poſition.

In this interval Cæſar, having leiſure to viſit the country over which they were to paſs, found it practicable to turn their flank and get to the hills before them. He accordingly moved in the night, and at break of day, before the enemy judged it ſafe to decamp, he appeared on their right; but ſeeming to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleaſed to think that he had moved for want of proviſions, and applauded themſelves for having patiently waited ſo joyful an event. But as ſoon as he had got a ſufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and marched with all poſſible ſpeed to reach the mountains. They were no longer at a loſs to perceive his deſign, or the danger with which they themſelves were threatened. And they inſtantly, without ſtriking their tents or packing their baggage, moved in the greateſt haſte to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæſar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he ſhould reach the paſs of the mountains before the enemy, and ſo cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he ſhould be left in poſſeſſion of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of ſpeed, got the firſt of theſe advantages by being before them at the aſcent of the mountains, where he found a ledge or terras that was ſufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the paſs.

Afranius, on ſeeing Cæſar in poſſeſſion of this ground, ſent a conſiderable party to try the aſcent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the ſummits behind him; in hopes that, if this way was

practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and deſcend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this ſervice was, in preſence of both armies, ſurrounded by Cæſar's horſe, and put to the ſword. The reſt of the army, without making any attempt to reſcue their friends, beheld this ſcene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and ſtaggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæſar, who well underſtood theſe ſigns of extreme terror, became to a degree of mutiny impatient for action; and he himſelf was ſenſible that the enemy might in that moment be attacked with the greateſt advantage; but as he now thought himſelf ſure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to give them an opportunity, however unlikely to avail them, of making their eſcape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured accordingly to reſtrain the unſeaſonable ardour of his own men, the leaders of the Spaniſh army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy poſſeſſion of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their eſcape.

Cæſar having left proper guards to ſecure the paſſes of the mountains, followed the enemy, and took poſt, as before, ſo near them, that they could not move without being expoſed to his inſults.

In this poſition of the two armies, the centinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged viſits in their oppoſite camps. Officers of the Spaniſh army proceeded ſo far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their ſcruples in treating without proper authority from their generals, by propoſing to ſtipulate ſome honourable terms for them in the peace which they propoſed to conclude.

Cæſar

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Cæſar was appriſed of this correſpondence, and, however irregular, connived at a circumſtance which he hoped his ſuperior popularity and the ſplendour of his fortune, would turn to his own account. He flattered himſelf, that as he had been able to ſeduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, ſo he might now deprive his antagoniſts of the army they had formed in the field to oppoſe him.

The Spaniſh generals, being intent on a work they were executing to ſecure their acceſs to water, remained for ſome time unapprized of the diſorderly correſpondence ſubſiſting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge of what was paſſing, ſeemed to obſerve it with great indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard who uſually attended his perſon to the ſpace between the lines, diſperſed all thoſe who were found in conference together, and put all the ſoldiers of Cæſar's army who fell in his way to the ſword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart freſh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards aſſembled the whole at the uſual place of audience, before the general's tent; and in a ſpeech, compoſed of inſinuation and reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the ſoldiers of Cæſar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and ſlain.

Cæſar, at the ſame time, having many officers and men of the Spaniſh army in his camp, might have retaliated theſe acts of ſeverity; but he choſe rather to contraſt the character of clemency he himſelf had aſſumed, with the auſtere and mercileſs policy of his enemies; and for this purpoſe gave their freedom to ſuch officers or men as choſe to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honours ſuch of them as were inclined to remain in his ſervice.

Afranius

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Afranius and Petreius, by the timely diſcovery of theſe irregular practices, having eſcaped the diſgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his diſcretion, or to be ſpared only as objects of pity at the interceſſion of their own army, continued their plan of operations; but by perſevering in their reſiſtance, they only enabled their adverſary to give ſtill more evident proofs of his ſuperior ſkill and addreſs. They were ſenſible that their preſent poſt could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haſte to reach the mountains, from neceſſity, as an immediate reſpite from the attacks of an enemy who annoyed their march; and, beſides other inconveniences, had a difficult acceſs to water, the brook or river from which they were to be ſupplied being expoſed to the diſcharge of arrows, darts, and other miſſiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to ſerve them on the whole route to the Ebro was near exhauſted, and they had no immediate proſpect of ſupply. They entered therefore into anxious deliberation on the choice of a retreat, by which they might ſooneſt get beyond reach of an enemy who preſſed them with ſuch unremitted alarms. They heſitated whether they ſhould return to Ilerda, where they ſtill had ſome magazines, or ſhould attempt to reach Tarraco [99] on their left, at the diſtance of about fifty miles. The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be expoſed to Cæſar's attacks, determined them againſt the laſt; and they choſe the firſt, as promiſing the neareſt and moſt immediate relief from their preſent diſtreſſes. They accordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to Ilerda.

The Spaniſh infantry were now more expoſed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been ſo often diſcomfited, and had loſt courage ſo much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for ſafety into the centre of the infantry; the rear was therefore

[99] Tarragona.

cruelly

cruelly annoyed by Cæſar's horſe, ſupported by the whole force of his legions. In aſcending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on thoſe who attempted to purſue them from below; and with this ſuperiority they made a ſtand on every aſcent, to force their purſuers back to ſome diſtance; but in deſcending the hills, the ſame advantage being taken againſt themſelves, they generally ran in great diſorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march conſiſted of alternate ſtops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal conſequence, thought proper again to form upon a riſing ground, and attempted a ſtratagem to amuſe the enemy, and to gain ſome advance on the march before him. For this purpoſe, affecting to make ſome permanent lodgment in the place where they halted, they threw up a breaſt-work, but neither pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage, and were ready to depart the moment their purſuer gave them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæſar, truſting to the effects of his late attacks, and to the appearances which the enemy preſented, had no ſuſpicion of their purpoſe, gave orders to pitch, and even ſuffered his cavalry to ſeparate in parties to forage. This was no ſooner obſerved from the Spaniſh army, than they inſtantly reſumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made ſome way undiſturbed.

Cæſar ſeeing himſelf over-reached, inſtantly put his legions in motion, without ſtriking their tents or packing their baggage, and leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as ſoon as they could be aſſembled, endeavoured to keep cloſe to the enemy's rear. He was in this ſituation when the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardour their former operations, obliged the Spaniſh army again to ſuſpend their march, and, in deſpair, to take ſome reſpite from

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from the continual attacks with which they were haraſſed, by halting again in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were accordingly very much expoſed.

On this ground Cæſar had again a fair opportunity to attack them, and, with little doubt of the event, to terminate the war by a battle; but he perſiſted in his purpoſe of forcing this unfortunate army to ſurrender without any loſs or hazard to himſelf. In this mind he continued to obſerve them with a degree of inſulting indifference. They ſoon became ſenſible of the great diſadvantage of the poſition in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change it, without expoſing themſelves to the enemy, who was ſo near as to be able to diſturb them in every motion they attempted to make; for this purpoſe they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and retiring, as beſiegers advance in the attack of a fortreſs, changed their ſituation under the cover of works which they ſucceſſively raiſed [53].

In theſe ſlow and toilſome operations they perſiſted all the night and the following day, and got a new poſition, in which they were leſs expoſed to the enemy; but ſubject to a freſh inconveniency, till then unobſerved, in the great diſtance to which they were removed from water.

As ſoon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the ſoldier had conſumed what he commonly carried in his flaſk, they diſcontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man ventured abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehenſions of what they might ſuffer from this diſtreſs.

On the following day the Spaniſh army advanced in array to the watering-place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to ſupply themſelves with this neceſſary article. They were ſuffered to avail themſelves of this temporary relief; but none attempted to procure any food, and they ſoon after, in order to ſupply their own

[53] Cæſar de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 81.

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immediate wants, and to leſſen their conſumption of water and forage, killed all the beaſts of burden in their camp. While they endeavoured, by means of theſe temporary expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favour, Cæſar formed a deſign to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms. And the enemy, ſenſible of the extremity to which they were ſoon likely to be reduced, advanced in front of their camp to interrupt him; and there might have decided their fate by an action upon equal terms. But they had no courage left; the habit of acting upon the defenſive had impreſſed them with a ſenſe of inferiority, and their frequent miſcarriages had made them diſtruſt the conduct of their officers. Though now in a ſtate of ſuffering, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, or which nothing but the blood of their enemies could avenge, they, without making any effort for either purpoſe, retired again within their intrenchment.

In that ſituation, however, their diſtreſſes in a little time became entirely inſufferable. After four days had paſſed in their camp without water or ſuſtenance of any ſort, their leaders deſired an interview with Cæſar; and, not to expoſe themſelves in ſo humbling a ſtate to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The conference was accepted; but Cæſar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he inſiſted that Afranius and Petreius ſhould meet him in the ſpace between the two armies; and having previouſly demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the ſon of Afranius ſhould be delivered up as an hoſtage, he came to the place of meeting, ſurrounded by multitudes who crowded from both armies to witneſs the ſcene.

Afranius pleaded in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to Pompey, and no more than the ſervice of the province in which they had been ſtationed required;

quired; but acknowledged the diſtreſſes to which they were reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

Cæſar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that army with their obſtinate animoſity to himſelf, and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who had committed no other offence than that of having embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and that of being deſirous to terminate this unnatural quarrel in an amicable manner. "That "army," he ſaid, "had been raiſed and kept on foot for the ſole "purpoſe of making war upon him. For this purpoſe numerous "fleets had been equipped in times of profound peace, and ſeven "entire legions, under able and experienced officers, had been kept "in this peaceable province, where there was not the leaſt pretence "of a war; that every meaſure was concerted for his deſtruction; "that in order to raiſe one citizen to uncommon honours and "powers, a new ſpecies of arrangement had taken place, by which "a perſon remaining at the gates of Rome, governing in the city "and in every diſtrict of Italy, might likewiſe have the command in "two warlike provinces, and be allowed a great military eſtabliſhment "in time of profound peace; that, on the contrary, in order to "diſtreſs himſelf, the ordinary rules of the ſervice had been ſet aſide; "and that to him alone had been denied, what had always been "granted to every citizen who faithfully ſerved the republic, the "privilege of retiring, if not diſtinguiſhed with honours, at leaſt "without being loaded with injuries and affronts; that he had borne "theſe indignities, however, with patience, and mentioned them "now, not as a prelude to any ſeverities which he meant to inflict, "nor as an excuſe for any ſingular advantage he meant to take of "their preſent diſtreſſes; that he demanded no more than peace; his "antagoniſts ſhould go unhurt, provided they left the province, and "became bound not to ſerve his enemies for the future againſt him; "that no one ſhould be forced to take any active part on his ſide;

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" that all who committed no injury againſt him ſhould be conſidered " as his friends; and that every man now in his power ſhould be at " liberty, without any other conditions than theſe."

It is difficult to determine whether the ſword or the tongue of this ſingular man were moſt dangerous to the ſtate he attacked. It is probable that many of his preſent audience were as much convinced by his eloquence, as they had been ſubdued by his military ſkill, and thought him a perſon no leſs forced to his preſent extremities by the wrongs he had ſuffered, than able to do himſelf juſtice by the force of his arms. His ſpeech was received by the late partizans of his rival with evident ſigns of pleaſure. To be diſcharged after a certain period of the moſt faithful ſervices was all that a Roman ſoldier, in the ordinary times of the republic, could claim. To receive this favour at the hands of a victorious enemy, by whom they expected to be treated as captives, gave ſudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjuſted in this manner, ſome queſtions aroſe with reſpect to the time and place in which the vanquiſhed army ſhould be diſmiſſed from their colours. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been inliſted in Spain, and were natives or ſettlers in that province; others had been tranſported from Italy, and wiſhed to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the firſt ſhould be diſbanded immediately; the others march to the Var, and there be ſet free, and not be ſubject to be preſſed into any ſervice whatever. Cæſar undertook to ſupply them with proviſions on their march. He ordered their effects, if any were found in his camp, to be reſtored to them. He paid his own ſoldiers a high price for what they were in this manner deſired to reſtore. By this meaſure he gained ſeveral advantages; he lightened his baggage; he made a gratification to his own men, without the imputation of bribery; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generoſity. The vanquiſhed army accordingly came to Cæſar with all

Plate 3. fronting Page 428. Vol. 4.

THEATRE of the CAMPAIGN on the Segra or Sicoris.





their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impoſſible for mankind to reſiſt ſo much ability, inſinuation, and courage.

About a third of the captive army were diſmiſſed from their colours in Spain; the remainder paſſed the Pyrennees, preceded by one part of Cæſar's army, and followed by the other; who, being thus ſeparated to the van and the rear, and always encamping cloſe to their priſoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Ciſalpine Gaul [54].

While the main body of Cæſar's army thus conducted the remains of the Spaniſh legions to the place of their deſtination, Varro yet remained in the weſtern province of Spain; and Cæſar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to ſurrender, ſent Quintus Caſſius with two legions to that quarter, and himſelf followed with an eſcort of ſix hundred horſe. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as uſual, having taken their reſolution in favour of the ſucceſsful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro that lay at Gades [55] advancing in form with their colours, came forward to Hiſpales to receive him, and made offer of their ſervices. Varro himſelf agreed to ſurrender the forces he commanded, both by ſea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæſar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favours they had ſhewn to his cauſe, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had impoſed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to diſpel the fears which his enterpriſe at firſt had occaſioned, and ſecured the attachment of the provinces by a ſenſe of the eaſe and the freedom which his ſucceſs had procured them. The fleets and armies

[54] Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

[55] Now Cadiz.

which

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which joined him upon every conqueſt he made, enabled him to ſtation troops for the ſecurity of every new acquiſition, without dividing the forces on which he was to rely for the future operations of the war. He accordingly, in the preſent inſtance, left, under the command of Quintus Caſſius, five legions, conſiſting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himſelf embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by ſea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marſeilles.

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The Siege of Marſeilles continued.——Its ſurrender.——Cæſar named Dictator.——Return to Rome.——Mutiny at Placentia.——Cæſar with Servilius Iſauricus Conſuls.——Forces and Diſpoſition of Pompey.——Departure of Cæſar to Brundiſium.——Tranſports the firſt diviſion of his army to Acroceraunus.——Meſſage to Pompey, and their ſeveral Operations.——The Lines of Dyrrachium.——Cæſar baffled in his attempt to inveſt Pompey.——Action and Defeat of Cæſar.——His Retreat.——March of both Armies into Theſſaly.——Battle of Pharſalia.

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THE city of Marſeilles had not ſurrendered to the forces which Cæſar had left under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus to beſiege it. Brutus, according to the diſpoſition which had been made to block up the place by ſea, as well as by land, was ſtationed under the iſland at the mouth of the bay. His ſquadron conſiſted of twelve ſhips, but ſo haſtily built, that no more than thirty days had elapſed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the veſſels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæſar's legions; and, in order to fruſtrate any advantage which their antagoniſts might have in the conſtruction or management of their ſhips, they were furniſhed with contrivances to grapple and make faſt their gunwales to thoſe of the enemy, in order to decide the conteſt with their ſwords.

The Marſeillians had equipped ten gallies, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. Theſe they joined under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the Senate to ſucceed Cæſar in Gaul, with the ſeven ſhips which this officer had brought into their harbour; and having manned them with mariners from

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from the neighbouring coaſts, they came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his ſtation, and to open their communication with the ſea. In the beginning of the action, the Marſeillians being ſuperior to Cæſar's fleet in the number of their ſhips, and in the ſkill of their mariners, had a conſiderable advantage. But as ſoon as they ſuffered themſelves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gauliſh ſailors, though of a very hardy race, could not withſtand the arms and diſcipline of the legionary ſoldiers, and were defeated with the loſs of nine of their ſhips.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed ſo much to the reputation of Cæſar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda; and which, joined to the other circumſtances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of ſo many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his ſtation in the bay of Marſeilles, Trebonius practiſed all the uſual methods of attack to reduce the city. This place being covered on three ſides by water, and on the fourth only acceſſible by an iſthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height; he opened two ſeparate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the iſthmus, and at each of theſe attacks, appears to have employed the ſloping mound or terrace [a], which, in the ſieges of the ancients, where the defence depended on the height of the battlements, correſponded to the ſap of the moderns, and was calculated to conduct the beſiegers, by a gradual aſcent, to the top, as the other conducts them to the foot of the walls. This work was ſupported on the ſides chiefly with timber, and built up with faſcines, hurdles, and earth, riſing in the preſent caſe to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly obſerved in that employed againſt the Bituriges [b], probably no leſs than three hundred and fifty feet, ſo as to receive a proper column of infantry

[a] Agger. [b] Bourges.

in

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in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with ſkreens, mantlets, and penthouſes of great length; and ſuch was the conſumption of timber in the conſtruction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is ſaid to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long diſuſed to war, or accuſtomed to rely on foreign protection, we may ſuppoſe to have been ill provided, either in the ſtate of its arſenals, or in the ſpirit of its citizens, for ſuch an attack. But this little republic, ſtill bearing the character of an independent ſtate, being in the neighbourhood of mountains inhabited by fierce nations, who looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, and owing its ſafety to the ſtrength of its walls, and the ſtate of its arſenals, was ſtill ſuitably provided for its own defence; and the People, although long inured to peace, ſtill kept in mind the duties which the neceſſities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now ſupported by the preſence of the Roman Proconſul, and had hopes of a ſpeedy relief from Pompey, whom, in oppoſition to Cæſar, who was in rebellion againſt the legal government of his country, they conſidered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly exerted great perſeverance and valour in defence of their walls; and by a continual diſcharge from the battlements, and by frequent ſallies, in which they ſet fire to the works of the beſiegers, greatly retarded the progreſs of the ſiege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they darted arrows of a monſtrous ſize and weight, being beams twelve feet long, and proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, which none of the ſcreens or coverings, uſually employed in making approaches, could reſiſt; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the ſtrength of his timbers and penthouſes, and the thickneſs of his parapets, faſcines, and earth on his terrace, to the weight of theſe enormous weapons.

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While ſuch efforts were made on both ſides at this memorable ſiege, Pompey had detached Naſidius with ſixteen gallies from the coaſt of Macedonia to endeavour the relief of Marſeilles. This ſquadron had entered the ſtraits of Meſſina by ſurpriſe, and, having cut out of the harbour a ſhip which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their deſtination to the coaſt of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they ſent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with thoſe in the harbour of Marſeilles.

The beſieged were greatly animated with theſe hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ſhips as ſupplied the place of thoſe they had loſt in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at ſea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the ſervice, crowded to the ſhore, and with tears exhorted the ſoldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own and their country's honour, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the ſame time, drew forth in proceſſion, and crowded to the temples with prayers and ſupplications for the ſucceſs of this laſt effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This buſtle in the ſtreets of Marſeilles, with the motion of the ſhipping in the harbour, being obſerved from the camp of Trebonius, which was ſituated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave ſufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marſeillians, having found a favourable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his ſquadron, joined Naſidius at Tauroentum. Here an action ſoon after enſued, in which the Marſeillians made great efforts of valour; but were ill ſupported by Naſidius,

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ſidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intruſted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coaſt of Spain. The Marſeillians, being left to ſuſtain the conteſt alone, loſt nine of their ſhips, of which five were ſunk, and four were taken.

Theſe tidings were received at Marſeilles with inexpreſſible ſorrow; but did not alter the reſolution of the inhabitants to perſevere in their defence, and in the uſe of every poſſible method that could be employed to protract the ſiege, and to give Pompey time to deviſe more effectual means for their ſafety. They accordingly, with great vigour and ſucceſs, counteracted the ordinary operations of the ſiege, burning and demoliſhing a conſiderable part of the works which were raiſed up againſt them, and obliging the beſiegers frequently to renew their labours.

The firſt attack, againſt which the beſiegers were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan of the ſiege, but had been deviſed by the ſoldiers who had ſucceeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgment or cover to ſecure themſelves from ſurpriſe. It was at firſt no more than a ſquare of ten yards, incloſed with a brick wall five feet thick; but ſo ſituated, that if it were raiſed to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the beſieged. To give it this conſequence, maſons were employed to raiſe it, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable penthouſe, of great thickneſs in the roof, and ſcreened on the front and ſides with net-work made of cables, or the ſtrongeſt ropes, was raiſed on beams or rafters of a proportional ſtrength, and contrived to be hoiſted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they roſe on the ſucceſſive courſes of maſonry which they laid. With theſe precautions, a tower was gradually raiſed on the

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foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of ſix ſtories; and being furniſhed with ports or embraſures on every floor, gave the beſiegers, by means of their miſſiles, the command of all the ſpace from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines, that made a continual diſcharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and puſhed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this poſition, notwithſtanding all the efforts of the beſieged, by a continual diſcharge of heavy ſtones from the battlements, to deſtroy or overwhelm the ſupports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought ſome part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the ſight of a breach, which might ſoon be enlarged to admit of being ſtormed, made ſome ſignals of truce, and ſent to beſeech Trebonius that he would ſuſpend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæſar, in whoſe clemency they hoped to find ſome protection againſt the fury of troops, who had already threatened the inhabitants with a maſſacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by theſe intreaties, and by the inſtructions he had received from Cæſar, not to deliver up the town, in caſe it fell into his hands, to the rage of the ſoldiers, ſuſpended his operations, and ſuppoſing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of ſurrender on their part, entruſted his works to ſlender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the ſubmiſſive profeſſions of the people, were proportionally remiſs in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to ſtrike an important blow, and to throw back to a great diſtance all the poſts of the enemy, made a vigorous ſally from the town, and being favoured by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the beſiegers, ſet the whole on fire, and reduced to aſhes, in a few hours, what had been the labour of many months to erect.

As

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As Trebonius had already exhauſted the greater part of the materials which the country around him could furniſh, it appeared difficult for him to reſume the attack. But he himſelf, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exaſperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their loſſes. They ſubſtituted brick work for timber in ſupporting the ſides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with ſo rapid a progreſs in their new approach, that the beſieged, now greatly ſpent with toil, and diſappointed in their hopes of relief, were ſtruck with freſh and more alarming apprehenſions of what they might expect from the reſentment of troops whom they had incenſed with a recent and juſt provocation; and they returned to their ſuit for mercy, with more humble and more ſincere intentions of ſubmiſſion.

While meſſages were paſſing to this effect, Domitius Ahenobarbus, ſenſible that he could no longer ſerve the cauſe of his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys which ſtill waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favourable wind, which made it unſafe for the ſquadron of Brutus to weigh, or to quit their anchors in purſuit of him, he endeavoured to eſcape from the bay. In this attempt two of his veſſels were taken, the third, with himſelf on board, got off, and reſerved him to take that ſhare which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party throughout this diſaſtrous war.

Such was the ſtate of affairs when Cæſar arrived from Spain, and expecting, in the preſent conteſt for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency, as by the terror of his arms, liſtened to the ſupplications of the people of Marſeilles, and took poſſeſſion of the town without any act of reſentment or ſeverity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party in

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in the city had procured an act of the People to veſt him with the power of Dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the abſence of both Conſuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then Prætor in office, who, though a perſon of mean capacity, was, by the chance of his ſituation, involved in many of the greateſt affairs that followed; and, though but a ſingle accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, eſcaped its violences, to become almoſt the only example of an ignominy and diſgrace, which ſo many others had merited no leſs than himſelf.

Cæſar, being thus raiſed, though by an irregular ſtep, to a legal place in the commonwealth, haſtened to Rome, in order to be inveſted, for the firſt time, with the character of Dictator. In his way he was ſtopped at Placentia by ſome diſorders which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were aſſembled at that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a ſenſe of their own importance in a conteſt for the ſovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of diſcipline, and in haſte to avail themſelves of that military government they were employed to eſtabliſh. In entering Italy they treated Roman citizens as their ſubjects, and the country as their property. Being reſtrained, they reſented the ſeverities which were practiſed againſt them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæſar, and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the uſual courage and ability of this ſingular man ſupported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, and put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain the affections of the ſoldiers; but aſſured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn thoſe affections by making himſelf an accomplice in their crimes. "Shall we," he ſaid, "who profeſs to be the de-
"liverers of our country from oppreſſion, become ourſelves the
"greateſt oppreſſors? Shall I, who am intruſted with the command
"of a Roman army, become the patron of licentiouſneſs, and, in
"order

" order to indulge for a moment the paſſions of my ſoldiers, ſuffer " them to ruin their own fortunes for ever? What ſhould induce " me?—The fear of violence to my perſon, or the danger to which " my life may be expoſed?—If my life were attacked, there are enow " to defend it. But what is life compared to the honour of a Ro- " man officer, which I am concerned to maintain? There are perſons " who have ſaid, That they will deſert my cauſe, and go over to " Pompey. Let them. They ſhall ſoon have an opportunity to do " ſo. If Pompey be my enemy, what is there I ſhould more ear- " neſtly wiſh than to find his cauſe entruſted with ſuch men? men " who make war on their friends, and diſobey their officers. He " had been ſlow," he ſaid, " in proceeding to the fatal extremes which " were now become neceſſary. The guilty," he continued, " had " been long known to him; but he had endeavoured to conceal their " offences, in hopes that remorſe and ſhame, or the fear of juſtice, " would have made the actual application of puniſhment unneceſſary; " but that he muſt now, though with the greateſt reluctance, pro- " ceed to the laſt of remedies."

In order that he might not involve the whole of thoſe who were preſent in the ſame deſperate cauſe, he affected, in this harangue, to treat the offence he was to puniſh as the crime of a few. They were now to be ſet apart, he ſaid, and their puniſhment ſhould purge the army, and retrieve its honour. In purſuance of this plan, he affected to believe, that the ninth legion were the principal authors of this mutiny. He ordered a few of them for immediate execution, and boldly diſmiſſed the whole of the legion from his ſervice. The remainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation, in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding the juſtice of their general. Even the legion, which was diſmiſſed from the ſervice, deteſting, as a puniſhment on themſelves, what they had threatened to execute as an act of reſentment againſt their commander,

beſet

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beſet him with humble and earneſt intreaties, that he might be pleaſed to receive them again into his ſervice. He affected great difficulty in granting this requeſt; but, after much ſolicitation, ſuffered himſelf to be gained by their profeſſions of penitence [4].

With a conſiderable acceſſion of authority, acquired by his ſucceſs in quelling this mutiny, Cæſar proceeded to Rome, where he aſſumed the title and enſigns of Dictator; being the firſt example of any perſon, ſince the abdication of Sylla, intruſted with this alarming power. It was ſaid to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the abſence of both the Conſuls, to preſide at the elections. His own object, at the ſame time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the preſent, to perpetuate or even to exerciſe any of the high powers of Dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himſelf, together with Servilius Iſauricus, choſen Conſul for the following year. In the interval that followed, before their inſtallation, he continued to aſſemble the People in the character of Dictator, and obtained ſome laws reſpecting the times, and the diſtracted ſtate of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming ſtand; he procured an act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an eſtimate of what the different ſubjects might have been ſold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being ſuppoſed to hoard great ſums of money, as the only means of preſerving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on ſuch ſecurities as were then to be had, Cæſar

[4] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 27—35. Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. p. 547. Sueton. in Cæſ. c. 69. Lucan. lib. v. 244.

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procured another act, by which any perſon was forbid to have in his poſſeſſion, at once, above ſixty thouſand Roman money[5].

He obtained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, reſtoring perſons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the cenſure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the State; and, in purſuance of this meaſure, procured a pardon for all the diſorders which had been committed in oppoſition to the late government; but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in ſupport of it. He opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the Ciſalpine Gaul, and by a ſingle vote gave them a title to be enrolled with the People of Rome as members of the republic[6]. In theſe, and in other affairs of leſs moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he employed a few days in the city, and being ready to depart, reſigned the power of Dictator. This reſignation, made by a perſon poſſeſſed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was conſidered as an evidence of his moderation, and ſerved to diſpel the fears of thoſe who expected to ſee the immediate eſtabliſhment of a military government. He was now about to aſſume the office of legal magiſtrate, and to appear in the character of Roman Conſul againſt thoſe who, lately truſting to the name and authority of the republic with which they were veſted, had treated himſelf and his adherents as rebels; but who now, in their turn, might appear to incur all the diſadvantages of that imputation which he was about to retort upon them; and with the additional charge of an attempt to diſmember the empire, and to arm ſo many of the provinces againſt the ſovereignty of the State.

The competitors in this famous conteſt were in or but a little paſt the prime of life: Pompey was fifty-ſeven, and Cæſar fifty. The firſt had been early diſtinguiſhed as an officer, and for many

[5] About 500l. [6] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 36, 37, 38. Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

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years had enjoyed a degree of conſideration, with which that of any other Roman citizen was not allowed to compare. His reputation, however, in ſome meaſure, had ſunk, and that of Cæſar roſe on the firſt ſhocks of the preſent war; but the balance was not yet abſolutely ſettled, and the minds of many were held in anxious ſuſpence. Cæſar, wherever he acted in perſon, had always prevailed; but where he was not preſent, his affairs wore a leſs promiſing aſpect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an eaſy poſſeſſion of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his firſt ſucceſs, tranſported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to beſiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and by his perſonal animoſity to Curio, who, in his Tribunate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wiſely withdrew from Utica to a ſtrong poſt in the neighbourhood, and ſent orders into Sicily to haſten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that iſland. While he waited their coming, ſome Numidian deſerters arrived at his camp, and brought accounts that Juba, with the main body of his army, had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a ſmall diviſion, was come to give what ſupport he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a deſign to intercept the Numidian general before he could be joined by Varus; and for this purpoſe, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in with the Numi-

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dian horſe, and put them to flight. Encouraged by this advantage, he haſtened his march to complete the victory; and Sabura, by whoſe art the laſt intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewiſe, after a little reſiſtance, fled before him. By this means, Curio was gradually inſnared into the midſt of Juba's forces, was ſurrounded, and attacked on every ſide. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in view, and, with the greater part of his army, was put to the ſword. The few who eſcaped, with thoſe who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a paſſage into Sicily, and, being diſappointed, ſurrendered themſelves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being obſerved, and diſtinguiſhed by Juba, who arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

About the ſame time, Dolabella, to whom Cæſar had given the command both of his ſea and land forces on the coaſt of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to ſupport Dolabella, was ſhut up in a ſmall iſland, and, with his party, made priſoners[7].

The principal ſtorm, however, with which the new government was threatened, appeared on the ſide of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himſelf was now at the head of a great force. He had tranſported five legions from Italy; and, ſince the middle of March, when his laſt diviſion ſailed from Brundiſium, he had been in the quiet poſſeſſion of Greece, Macedonia, and all the eaſtern part of the empire. He had ſent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Aſia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of thoſe opulent countries; and diſpatched his own ſon Cneius with inſtructions to aſſemble all the ſhipping that could be found on that coaſt. He likewiſe ſent general orders to all the Roman officers

[7] Dio, Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 41 & 42.

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in different parts of the empire, and to the allies or dependants of the Roman People, to join him with every power they could raiſe. Seven thouſand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy [8]. Numbers of veterans, who had been ſettled in Theſſaly, repaired to his ſtandard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, another from Crete, and two from Aſia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had aſſembled three thouſand archers, and as many ſlingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thouſand foot and ſeven thouſand cavalry. Dejotarus ſent him ſix hundred horſe; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince, five hundred; the Macedonians furniſhed two hundred; five hundred, being the remains of Gabinius's army, had joined him; his ſon brought eight hundred from his own eſtates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred; amounting to fifty-five thouſand legionary troops, eight thouſand irregular infantry, and ten thouſand ſix hundred horſe. In all ſeventy-three thouſand ſix hundred [9].

He had likewiſe aſſembled a numerous fleet; one ſquadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his ſon Sextus; another from Aſia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria, under Caius Caſſius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred galleys, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the paſſage from Italy to Greece, and to obſtruct the communications of the enemy by the Ionian Sea.

Pompey had likewiſe formed large magazines of corn from Theſſaly, Aſia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal reſort of his land forces was at Berrhœa, on the fertile plains between the Axius and Haliacmon, that run into the bay of Thermæ. The Roman Senate

[8] Plutarch. in Pompeio.

[9] Cæſar. de Bello Civile, lib. iii.

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was repreſented at Theſſalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two Conſuls, held their aſſemblies, and aſſumed all the functions of the Roman State. The Roman People were likewiſe repreſented by the concourſe of reſpectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place[10]. But though ſo many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, conſidered themſelves as the real conſtituents of the commonwealth, they ſuffered the uſual time of elections to elapſe, and did not attempt to preſerve in their retreat the ſucceſſion of officers, in oppoſition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the ſeveral commands allotted to them, as uſual, under the title of Proconſul.

The general had been extremely active in forming, as well as in aſſembling this powerful armament. He intended, early in the ſpring, to take poſſeſſion of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coaſt, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which now appeared ſufficient to enſure the high reputation as a commander, which his ſucceſſes, on other occaſions, had procured him.

Cæſar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coaſt in the neighbourhood of Brundiſium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to paſs a ſea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coaſt where he had not a ſingle port, and in the face of a ſuperior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever ſuppoſed to excel. The formality of entering on the office of Conſul, to which he had been elected, it was ſuppoſed, might detain him at Rome till after the firſt of January; and Pompey accordingly made no haſte in

[10] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 43.

taking

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taking his intended ſtations on the coaſt of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defenſive, or invade Italy as the occaſion might require [11].

It was difficult, however, to foreſee what ſuch an enemy as Cæſar might attempt. Having ſtaid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of Dictator, and obtained his election as Conſul, without waiting for his admiſſion into office, he ſet out in December for Brundiſium. At this place twelve legions and all his cavalry were already, by his order, aſſembled. He found the numbers of his army conſiderably impaired by diſeaſe, being come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul to paſs the ſickly ſeaſon of autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his own, an army ſo reduced would have ſcarcely been fit for the defence of Italy againſt ſuch forces as were aſſembled to invade it; and his march to Brundiſium would have appeared altogether a defenſive meaſure, and intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the ſeas. The ſeaſon too appeared extremely unfavourable to any hoſtile attempts on Greece. Cæſar, however, had determined to prevent the deſigns of his enemy, and to keep him involved in all the diſadvantages of a defenſive war.

No more tranſports were collected in the harbour of Brundiſium than were ſufficient to receive about twenty thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe. Cæſar, nevertheleſs, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his reſolution to fix the ſcene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy tranſports with unneceſſary baggage and horſes, and exhorted them to rely on the conſequences of victory, and on his own generoſity, for a full reparation of any loſs they might ſuſtain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked ſeven legions in the firſt

[11] Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.

diviſion,

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U. C. 705. C. Julius Cæſar, P. Servilius Iſauricus.

diviſion, and with theſe he himſelf ſailed on the fourth of February. He turned from the uſual courſe, and ſteering unobſerved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really been appriſed of his embarkation, were leaſt likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coaſt, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroceraunus.

As ſoon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæſar having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a priſoner, he diſmiſſed him with a meſſage to his general in the following terms: "That both parties had already "carried their obſtinacy too far, and might learn, from experience, "to diſtruſt their fortunes; that the one had been expelled from "Italy, had loſt Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, with one hundred and "thirty cohorts (or thirteen legions)[10]; that the other had ſuſtained "the loſs of an army in Africa, cut off with its general[11], and had "ſuffered no leſs by the diſaſters of his party in Illyricum; that their "mutual diſappointments might inſtruct them how little they could "rely on the events of war; that it was time to conſult their own "ſafety, and to ſpare the republic; that it was prudent to treat of "peace while the fortunes and the hopes of both were nearly equal; "if that time were allowed to elapſe, and either ſhould obtain a "diſtinguiſhed advantage, who could anſwer, that the victor would "be equally tractable as both were at preſent?

"But ſince all former endeavours to procure a conference, or to "bring on a treaty between the leaders themſelves, had failed, he "propoſed, that all their differences ſhould now be referred to the "Senate and People; that, in the mean time, each of them ſhould "ſolemnly ſwear, at the head of their reſpective armies, That, "in three days, they ſhould diſband all their forces, in order that, "being diſarmed, they might ſeverally be under a neceſſity to ſubmit "to the legal government of their country; that he himſelf, to remove

[10] The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c. [11] The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

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" all difficulties on the part of Pompey, ſhould begin with diſ-
" miſſing all the troops that were under his command, whether in
" garriſon or in the field "."

It appears that Cæſar, if theſe declarations had been accepted, might have been ſomewhat embarraſſed for evaſions; but equally bold in all his meaſures, he riſked this event, or rather foreſaw it could not happen, as he was ſure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be conſidered as an effect of his weakneſs, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his raſh debarkation with ſo ſmall a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that his meſſage was intended, in the uſual ſtrain of his policy, to amuſe his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from himſelf. As he uſually accompanied ſuch overtures of peace with the moſt rapid movements and the boldeſt reſolutions, the moment Vibullius ſet out, he diſembarked his troops, and in the night diſpatched the tranſports on their return to Brundiſium to bring the remainder of his army.

His landing on the coaſt was the firſt intimation received by the enemy of his intention to paſs a ſea, which they ſuppoſed ſufficiently guarded by their fleets, and of his purpoſe to carry the war into a country, in which they thought themſelves ſecure by the ſuperiority of their numbers, and of their other reſources. Bibulus, upon this alarm, put to ſea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty tranſports on their return to Italy. Theſe he burnt; and, ſenſible of his own remiſſneſs in ſuffering ſo great a body of the enemy to paſs, he diſtributed his ſhips along the coaſt, and determined, for the future, to keep the ſea in the face of every difficulty, and under every diſtreſs.

In the mean time, Cæſar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pompey, was poſted, with orders to de-

[11] Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

fend

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ſend himſelf to the laſt extremity. But Cæſar, as ſoon as he appeared in the character of Roman Conſul, preceded by the enſigns of office, prevailed on the garriſon to deſert their commander, and to ſurrender the place. Without ſtopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the ſame manner by the inhabitants, in oppoſition to the officer who commanded for Pompey. In conſequence of theſe examples he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greateſt diſpatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his ſtores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to ſurpriſe that important place, and to make himſelf maſter of it, before a ſufficient force could be aſſembled to cover it.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coaſt of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius, and received from him the firſt intelligence of Cæſar's landing. He was not amuſed with the meſſage which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expreſſed himſelf in terms harſh and impolitic, "That he neither choſe to return to his country, nor "to hold his life by the conceſſion of Cæſar;" and, without returning any anſwer, detached ſome parties towards the coaſt where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waſte the country, break down bridges, deſtroy the woods, and block up the high ways with the timber they felled". He ſent expreſſes to Scipio, with an account of Cæſar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to haſten his paſſage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to aſſemble in Aſia. He himſelf advanced with great diligence; and being informed on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he haſtened to ſave his magazines and ſtores

[12] Appian. lib. ii.

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at Dyrrachium, and without ſtopping, night or day, marched in ſuch diſorder, that many deſerted as from a cauſe already ruined or deſperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the deſigns of Cæſar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, ſent a ſquadron of ſhips immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered ſuch a diſpoſition of the fleet as was moſt likely to prevent the paſſage of a ſecond embarkation from Italy.

Cæſar, finding himſelf prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apſus; and, in order to cover Epirus and wait for the ſecond diviſion of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himſelf on the banks of that river. Having accordingly ſecured the main body of his army in this poſt, he himſelf returned with a ſingle legion to receive the ſubmiſſion of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the ſupply of his camp.

In the mean time Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and commanded the paſſage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæſar, who had orders to loſe no opportunity of tranſporting his army from Brundiſium, actually embarked and put to ſea; but being met by a packet from Cæſar, with intelligence of the diſpoſitions which had been made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, ſuffering one of the veſſels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but ſhe was taken by the enemy and deſtroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæſar had poſted along the ſhore, forced to bring his daily ſupplies of wood, water, and other neceſſaries at a great diſadvantage from Corcyra, and reduced to great diſtreſs, endeavoured, under pretence of a negotiation, to obtain a ceſſation of arms. But Cæſar, who came in perſon to Oricum, on hearing of this propoſition, ſuppoſing that the deſign

deſign of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure ſome ſupply of proviſions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apſus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took poſt on the oppoſite bank of that river. Dion Caſſius and Appian agree that he made ſome attempt to paſs the Apſus, and to force Cæſar in this poſt; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæſar's own account, the armies continued to obſerve each other, and the troops, ſeparated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the oppoſite banks. It was underſtood that in theſe interviews no hoſtilities ſhould be offered. Of the two parties, that of Cæſar was the more engaging to ſoldiers; notwithſtanding his own affectation of regard to the civil conſtitution of the republic, his military retainers ſtill hoped to remain in poſſeſſion of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with thoſe of the oppoſite party. On this occaſion Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and raiſing his voice, complained of the harſh treatment lately offered to Cæſar, in the contempt ſhewn to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he ſaid, ſend a meſſage to another, when he means only to prevent the ſhedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of ſo many brave men as were likely to periſh in this quarrel; and was liſtened to with profound ſilence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place.

Theſe remonſtrances on the part of Cæſar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make ſo deep an impreſſion on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, ſeemed to be too ſerious to be ſlighted. An anſwer, therefore, was given by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varo ſhould be ſent to any place that ſhould be agreed upon as ſafe between the two armies, and there receive the propoſitions that ſhould be made to

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him. The parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey conſidering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave inſtructions to break up the conference, in a way that for the future ſhould keep the troops at a greater diſtance from each other. Soon after the officers met, ſome darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both ſides being alarmed by this circumſtance, they inſtantly parted, and withdrew under a ſhower of miſſiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war ſeemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæſar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or ſupplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerouſly ill; but could not, upon any account, be perſuaded to leave his ſtation, and died on ſhipboard. There being nobody appointed to ſucceed him in the command at ſea, the leader of each of the ſeparate ſquadrons acted for himſelf without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty galleys, ſet ſail from the coaſt of Epirus, ſteered towards Brundiſium, where he ſurpriſed and burnt ſome trading veſſels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæſar's camp. Encouraged by theſe ſucceſſes, he anchored under the iſland which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm, landed, in the night, parties of archers and ſlingers, with which he diſperſed or carried off the patroles which the enemy employed on the ſhore; and thus, maſter of the port of Brundiſium, expected fully to obſtruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coaſt. To this purpoſe he wrote to Pompey, that the other diviſions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his ſquadron alone, in the poſt he had taken, was ſufficient to cut off from Cæſar all reinforcements and further ſupplies. But in this he preſumed too much on the firſt effects of his own operations.

Antony,

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Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæſar in the town of Brundiſium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous ſhore, effectually excluded the ſquadron of Libo from any ſupply of wood or water, of which his ſhips, for want of ſtowage, could not have at any one time a conſiderable ſtock; and he reduced them to ſuch diſtreſs for want of theſe articles, that they were obliged to abandon their ſtation, and to leave the harbour again open to the ſea.

In the mean time, preſſing orders arrived from Cæſar to haſten the embarkation of the troops. Dion Caſſius and Appian relate, that he himſelf being impatient of delay, embarked alone in diſguiſe on board of a barge, with intention to paſs to Brundiſium; that, after he had been ſome time at ſea, the weather became ſo bad, as to determine the maſter of the veſſel to put back; but that being prevailed upon by the intreaties of Cæſar, he continued to ſtruggle with the ſtorm for many hours. They farther relate, that the mariners being likely to faint, the paſſenger at laſt diſcovered himſelf, and encouraged them to perſiſt, by telling them that they carried Cæſar and his fortunes; that, nevertheleſs, he was forced to give way, and afterwards intruſted his orders to a meſſenger; but that he returned to camp before it was known that he had been abſent. He himſelf ſays, that ſome months being paſt, and the winter far advanced, he ſuſpected that ſome opportunities of effecting the paſſage of his ſecond diviſion had been loſt; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to haſten the embarkation; informing his officers, that they might run aſhore any where between Oricum and Apollonia; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in thoſe parts, were frequently obliged, by ſtreſs of weather, to depart from the coaſt.

Upon theſe orders, the troops with great ardour began to embark. They conſiſted of four legions and eight hundred horſe, under the command of Mark Antony and Calenus. The wind being at ſouth,

and

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and no enemy appearing in the channel, they ſet ſail, and ſteered for the coaſt of Epirus, but were drove to the northward; and on the ſecond day paſſed Apollonia, and were diſcovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coaſt on which Cæſar had inſtructed them to land; and as it was vain for them with this wind to attempt getting to the ſouthward, they choſe to give way at once, and ſteer for ſome convenient harbour northward of all Pompey's ſtations. But in following this courſe, as they paſſed by Dyrrachium they were inſtantly chaſed by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's ſquadron at that place, chiefly conſiſting of Rhodian galleys. The wind at firſt was moderate, and Coponius expected eaſily to weather the head-lands that were to leeward of his poſt; and, though it roſe conſiderably after he ſet ſail, he ſtill continued to ſtruggle againſt it. As ſoon as Antony obſerved this enemy, he crowded ſail, and made for the neareſt harbour; being in the bay of Nympheus, about three miles beyond Liſſus [14], on the coaſt of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the ſouth, and was very acceſſible, though not ſecure with the preſent wind. He choſe, however, to riſk the loſs of ſome ſhips, rather than fall into the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour the wind ſhifted to the ſouth-weſt, from which his ſhips were now ſufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loſs. At the ſame time the wind, in conſequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the ſhore, where the greater part of his galleys, being ſixteen in number, were ſtranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's tranſports as got ſafe into the bay of Nympheus landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horſe. Two of his tranſports, one with two hundred and

[14] Cæſ. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 26.

thirty

thirty of the new raiſed troops; the other, with ſomewhat leſs than two hundred veterans, being heavy ſailors, fell aſtern; and it being night before they arrived, miſtook their way, and, inſtead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Liſſus. Ottacilius Craſſus, who was ſtationed with a body of horſe in that place to obſerve the coaſt, manned ſome ſmall boats, ſurrounded theſe tranſports, and offered the troops who were on board favourable terms if they would agree to ſurrender. Upon this ſummons the new levies accordingly ſtruck; but the veterans ran their veſſels aſhore, and having landed, fought their way, with the loſs of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

The colony at Liſſus had been ſettled by Cæſar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favour his cauſe; Ottacilius therefore thought proper to withdraw with his garriſon; and Antony having ſtationed ſome of the tranſports at this place to enable Cæſar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey ſhould attempt to remove the ſcene of the war into that country; and having ſent the remainder back for the troops which were ſtill left at Brundiſium, he diſpatched meſſengers to Cæſar with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this diviſion of the army under Antony, had been ſeen on the coaſt, from the ſtations both of Pompey and of Cæſar, ſteering to the northward; but it was not known for ſome days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himſelf in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or ſounding their trumpets, ſhould remain in profound ſilence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this diſpoſition of the enemy, did not

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advance. Cæſar, in the mean time, to favour his junction, was obliged to make a conſiderable circuit, aſcended on the banks of the river Apſus to a ford at which he paſſed; from thence continued his march to the northward, and ſeemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this ſituation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different ſides at once by Cæſar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his ſtation; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Aſparagium, a ſtrong poſt about a day's march from Dyrrachium.

Cæſar having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer ſo anxious as he had hitherto been for the preſervation of his poſſeſſions upon the coaſt. His enemies, by the ſuperiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular ſupply of proviſions from the ſea. It was neceſſary for him, therefore, in order that he might have ſome other reſource, and be in condition to act on the offenſive, to extend his quarters by land, and to cover ſome tract of country from which he could ſubſiſt his army. For this purpoſe he removed from Oricum the legion that was ſtationed at that place; taking ſuch precautions as were neceſſary to ſecure his ſhipping in the port from any ſurprize by ſea. He drew the greater part of the veſſels on ſhore, ſunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a conſiderable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus ſecured on the coaſt, he ſent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Caſſius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Theſſaly; C. Calviſius Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horſe, into Ætolia; Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia; giving ſtrict charge to each of theſe officers, that they ſhould collect all the forage and proviſions which thoſe or the neighbouring countries could furniſh.

As

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As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was veſted at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a diſpenſation from exerciſe of thoſe popular arts, with which Cæſar thought proper to recommend his cauſe, he threatened to puniſh the refractory, more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful; and he often therefore extorted ſervices from the provinces, neglecting the neceſſary attention to conciliate their affections; and ſuch were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared on the part of Cæſar were every where favourably received. Sabinus made himſelf maſter of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Theſſaly divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calviſius, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and diſtricts of the province, with aſſurances of favour and ſubmiſſion; and by theſe means the poſſeſſions of Cæſar, even in thoſe countries on which his antagoniſts had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to ſuffer his quarters to be over-run by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coaſt, and whoſe army was, in number of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, however, knowing the intereſt which Cæſar had in bringing the conteſt to a ſpeedy deciſion, did not chooſe to divide his forces, and he relied for the ſecurity of the ſouthern and inland provinces, on the legions which were ſoon expected to land from Aſia on the eaſtern ſhores of Macedonia or Theſſaly.

Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had been employed in aſſembling the forces of Aſia, and had, by ſevere exactions, availed himſelf of the reſources of that opulent province. He was ſtill occupied in this ſervice at Epheſus, when he received from Pompey an account of Cæſar's arrival in Epirus, and an order without delay to tranſport his army into Europe. He accordingly, ſoon after the

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arrival of Cæſar's detachments at their ſeveral places of deſtination, debarked in the bay of Thermé, or of Theſſalonica, and penetrated into Macedonia, directing his march towards the quarters of the two legions which Cæſar had ſent thither under the command of Domitius Calvinus, and gave a general alarm on his route; but being arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he turned on a ſudden into Theſſaly, as thinking Longinus, who was ſtationed in that country with one legion of raw troops, might be made an eaſier prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius on the Haliacmon, a river which ſeparates Macedonia from Theſſaly, and proceeded with great diſpatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This officer, greatly alarmed at his ſudden approach, and miſtaking, at the ſame time, for an enemy a body of Thracian horſe which were coming to his own aſſiſtance, haſtily withdrew by the mountains, and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio was about to purſue Longinus on the route he had taken, when he was recalled by earneſt repreſentations from Favonius, the officer he had left to guard his baggage; informing him, that his poſt was in the utmoſt danger of being forced by Calvinus, who was on his march through Macedonia for that purpoſe. Scipio accordingly returned with all poſſible diſpatch to the Haliacmon, and arrived at the poſt of Favonius, after the duſt which aroſe from the march of the enemy had appeared on the plain; and thus came barely in time to ſuſtain his party, and to reſcue his baggage.

The armies continued to occupy the oppoſite banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the flight of Longinus, was become maſter of all Theſſaly, Calvinus continued in poſſeſſion of Macedonia, and from thence ſecured a conſiderable ſource of ſupply to Cæſar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pompey's affairs, and not inconſiſtent with the dilatory plan he had formed for the conduct of

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the war, to have riſked an action between theſe ſeparate bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have ſuffered his enemy to retain the command of ſo many poſts of conſequence; and Scipio accordingly paſſed the river with a view to bring on an engagement; but after ſome ſtay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of ſucceſs, he repaſſed the river, and having occupied his former ſtation, there paſſed ſome partial encounters between ſuch as were advanced on the different ſides, but without any conſiderable event.

While ſo many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Theſſaly for the poſſeſſion of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the ſea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the diſtance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, when he had depoſited his magazines and ſtores, and from which he received his ordinary ſupply of proviſions, he had taken his meaſures to protract the war; and truſting to his own ſuperior reſources, both by ſea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæſar had occupied ſhould be exhauſted, he might force him to retire from the conteſt without the riſk of a battle. To haſten this event, he endeavoured every where to ſtraiten his quarters in the country, and to block up or deſtroy all the harbours he had on the coaſt.

Cnæus, the eldeſt of Pompey's ſons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan which had been laid to haraſs the enemy, without expoſing their cauſe to a general hazard, attacked Cæſar's principal naval ſtation at Oricum, raiſed the veſſel that had been ſunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was ſtationed before it, and carried off or deſtroyed all the ſhips that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Liſſus, burnt thirty

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tranſports which Antony had left in the harbour; but having made an attempt on the town, was repulſed with loſs.

Cæſar, on the oppoſite part, ſenſible of the intereſt which he had in bringing the war to a ſpeedy deciſion, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of ſome ſtrength that covered his front, and encamped in his preſence. The day after he arrived in this poſition, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of braving his antagoniſt, he formed his army on the plain between the two camps; but as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this inſult, and as the recent loſſes which Cæſar had ſuſtained in his ſhipping, and on the coaſt, rendered his proſpect of future ſupplies or reinforcements every day leſs ſecure, he projected a movement, by which he propoſed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his reſources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpoſe, and that Pompey might the leſs ſuſpect any important deſign, he decamped in the day, and having a large circuit to make, directed his march at firſt from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire for want of proviſions; but in the night he changed his direction, and with great diligence advanced to the town. Pompey having intelligence of the change which Cæſar had made in his route during the night, perceived his deſign; and having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, ſtill expected by a rapid march to arrive before him. But Cæſar having prevailed on his men, notwithſtanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march with little interruption all night, was in poſſeſſion of the only avenue to the town, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey thus ſhut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and ſtores, and from the only harbour he had on the coaſt, was obliged to take poſſeſſion of the Petra, a ſmall promontory which covered a little creek or bay not far from the town, and there endeavoured to ſupply the loſs of the harbour, by bringing ſhips of burden

to unload, and by procuring ſupplies in boats from his magazines and ſtores in the town; and in this manner was ſtill in condition to avoid any immediate riſk of his fortunes in a ſingle action.

Cæſar, on the other hand, being diſappointed in the deſign he had formed to exclude the enemy from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and ſeeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a ſpeedy deciſion, his own communication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, ſent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commiſſion to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring diſtricts, and to ſecure them at proper places for the uſe of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itſelf commonly ſupplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpoſe laid waſte by the enemy, was not likely to furniſh him with any conſiderable ſupply, or to enable him for any time to ſupport a dilatory war. His genius was therefore at work by ſome ſpeedier courſe to haraſs his enemy, and to haſten the end of the conteſt.

In theſe circumſtances, however, he did not neglect his uſual artifices to amuſe and diſtract his antagoniſts with great profeſſions of moderation, and with overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have deſpaired of obtaining peace by any farther direct applications to Pompey himſelf, and willing to appeal to the reaſon of the father-in-law againſt the obſtinacy of the ſon, he ſent Clodius, their common friend, with letters and inſtructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation, "all which, he preſumed, had hitherto "failed, through the unhappy timidity of thoſe he intruſted with his "meſſages, and from their not having courage to deliver them "properly to their general. But ſubjoined that, through the media-

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" tion of Scipio, who could deliver himſelf with ſo much freedom; " who could adviſe with ſo much authority; and who, being at the " head of a great army attached to his perſon, could even enforce " what was juſt, he might expect a different iſſue to propoſitions ſo " fair and ſo reaſonable. And that in this event Scipio would have " the honour of being the reſtorer of tranquillity and good order to " Italy, of peace to the provinces, and of proſperity to the whole " empire." Clodius was received with reſpect; but on delivering his meſſage, it appears, that all farther communication was refuſed him as a perſon who came to inſult or amuſe with falſe pretenſions. Cæſar, indeed, was himſelf, as uſual, ſo far from truſting to the effect of theſe propoſitions, or ſo far from remitting his own operations in order to confirm his pacific profeſſions, that he even redoubled his efforts in that very quarter which was entruſted to Scipio; and as he had already poſſeſſed himſelf of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia, he carried his views ſtill farther on that ſide, and ſent Fuſius Calenus to be joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and to endeavour, by the iſthmus of Corinth, to penetrate into Achaia.

He himſelf at the ſame time engaged in a project, which to thoſe who do not recollect the amazing works which were frequently executed by Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæſar himſelf, will appear ſo vaſt, and even romantic, as to exceed belief: this project was no leſs than to inveſt Pompey in his camp, though at the head of an army ſuperior to his own, and oblige him to recede from the coaſt, or ſubmit to be inveſted with lines, and completely ſhut out from the country. For this purpoſe he occupied ſeveral hills in the neighbourhood of Pompey's camp, ſtrengthened them with forts, joined thoſe forts by lines of communication acroſs the vallies, and ſoon appeared to have projected a complete chain of redoubts, and a line of circumvallation.

Pompey, to counteract this daring project, took poſſeſſion of ſome heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the ſame manner,

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and while the one endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compaſs of their works. The archers and ſlingers on both ſides, as in the operations of a ſiege, were employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and fought in detail for the poſſeſſion of advantageous grounds. When forced from one height which they attempted to occupy, they ſeized upon another that was contiguous, and ſtill continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

In theſe operations, a campaign, that began in January with the landing of Cæſar on the coaſt of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of ſummer, and both parties had undergone great labour, and were expoſed to peculiar diſtreſs. Cæſar's army, already inured at the blockade of Aleſia, and the ſieges of Marſeilles and of Avaricum, to toils like thoſe in which they were now engaged, flattered themſelves with a like glorious iſſue to their preſent labours. They were in want of bread, and obliged to ſubſtitute in its place a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardſhip with the proſpect of fields which were repleniſhed with ripening corn, and which gave the hopes of a plentiful harveſt. They not only continued their countervallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or ſprings that formerly watered the grounds on which the enemy were now encamped.

Pompey's army, on their part, were leſs inured to ſuch toilſome operations. They had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coaſts that were ſtill in their poſſeſſion, but were in great diſtreſs for want of water and forage: many of their horſes had died; the men, too long confined to the ſame ground, and to the ſame air, which was infected with filth, and the exhalation of putrid carcaſes, being reduced to the uſe of bad water, were become extremely ſickly.

Pompey,

Pompey, nevertheleſs, held his enemy at ſome diſadvantage by the ſuperiority of his numbers, and by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and to defend; and it appears that he availed himſelf of theſe advantages with all thoſe abilities of a great officer, which he was juſtly ſuppoſed to poſſeſs. He not only forced Cæſar, without hazarding a general action, to recede from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labour, to widen the compaſs of his lines; but likewiſe alarmed him by various attacks on the works which he had already completed, and in ſome places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him. But as Cæſar could preſent his whole army in many places to cover the works he was executing, it was impoſſible, without riſking a general action, which Pompey avoided, entirely to ſtop his progreſs.

In the courſe of theſe operations it appears, from the text of Cæſar's Commentaries, though incomplete, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments as well as the diſpoſition of ſome ſeparate poſts, and mutually haraſſed each other with frequent ſurprizes and alarms. And Cæſar mentions no leſs than ſix capital actions which happened in one day at the lines of circumvallation, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in moſt of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage, as he acted on the ſtring, or ſmaller circumference, while his antagoniſts moved on the bow, or the wider circle.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles, having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills over which it was carried. By this work he obliged Cæſar to recede half a mile beyond him, and to extend his compaſs to about ſeventeen miles in circumference.

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The extremities of both their works terminated on the ſhore; and Cæſar having no boats or ſhips to oppoſe to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by the conſideration of this very circumſtance, to have been diverted at firſt from his project. But as he ſought merely for occaſions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them even under ſuch diſadvantages. While he was obliged to remain with the ſtrength of his army at that end of his line which was neareſt the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the acceſs of Pompey to his magazines, he propoſed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the diſtance of two hundred yards from each other, two entrenchments, conſiſting of a parapet ten feet high, and of a ditch fifteen feet wide; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard againſt any ſurpriſe from parties which, coming by water, might land in his rear. He was likewiſe about to join theſe entrenchments by a traverſe or flank, to cover him from the ſea.

Before this work was completed, Pompey made a diſpoſition to force him at this extremity of his lines, and of conſequence to open a way to his rear over the whole extent of his works. For this purpoſe he brought in the night ſix entire legions, or ſixty cohorts, to that part of his own works which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, ſlingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and ſhields fortified, as it ſeems was the cuſtom, with baſket work, to break the force of the ſtones which were likely to ſhower from the enemy's parapets, and furniſhed with great quantities of faſcines and other materials proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night; and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæſar's entrenchments, and another part between them where the work was ſtill incomplete. Theſe ſeparate diviſions were to be ſupported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take

advantage of any effect which the miſſiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

Theſe attacks were accordingly made at day break, in three different places at once, and had all the conſequences of a complete ſurpriſe. They fell with the greateſt effect upon the ſtation of the ninth legion, of which the picquets and other guards being inſtantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to ſupport them; but ſoon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the neareſt ſtation on the heights, appearing in that inſtant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, ſtopped for a while the purſuit of the enemy, and furniſhed a retreat to the troops that were routed.

The alarm was conveyed to Cæſar himſelf, by fires lighted on all the hills, and he haſtened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be ſpared from the poſts in his way; but he came too late, Pompey had already forced the entrenchments, had burſt from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp in a new poſition, where, without loſing his communication with the ſea, he rendered abortive for a long time Cæſar's purpoſe of excluding him from the ſupplies of neceſſaries or conveniences which were to be derived from the land, and was now in a poſture to command a free acceſs to water and forage, from the want of which he had been chiefly diſtreſſed in his late ſituation.

Thus Cæſar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labour of ſo many months, began to incur the cenſure of a viſionary projector, who preſumed to practiſe on the ableſt captain of the age the arts with which he had ſucceeded againſt ignorant Barbarians, or, at moſt, againſt generals of mean capacity.

Theſe circumſtances, however, probably made no impreſſion on Cæſar himſelf, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army: he preſented himſelf again before the enemy in their new poſition, and pitched

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pitched his camp in their preſence, ſtill determined to act on the offenſive, even in the ſequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action accordingly followed, of which the reſult is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect text of his Commentaries, to aſcertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the laſt action; that in this remove Pompey had taken poſſeſſion of the camp which Cæſar had left; and as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæſar had done, he made a ſecond entrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by Cæſar. This camp was covered by a wood on one ſide, and by a river, at the diſtance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this poſition, he had thrown up a line of communication from the flank of his camp to the river, in order to cover his acceſs to water. But after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the diſtance of half a mile on his march to occupy a new ſituation, when, for ſome purpoſe that is not explained, he thought proper to ſend back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to reſume the poſſeſſion of the camp he had ſo recently left.

Cæſar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the laſt ſituation he had taken, and obſerving this detachment ſent off from the enemy, thought it gave him a favourable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had loſt in the late action. While, to amuſe the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himſelf marched with twenty-three cohorts, in two diviſions, under cover of the wood, came to the ground unobſerved, and with the diviſion which was led by himſelf, mixed with the enemy, who had already taken poſſeſſion of the exterior lines, and drove them from thence to the interior entrenchment, with great ſlaughter. The other diviſion being in the mean time to attack the

ſame works at a different place, miſtook the line of communication which covered the acceſs from the camp to the river for the entrenchment of the camp itſelf, and before they perceived their miſtake, had run along this line to a great diſtance in ſearch of an entrance; when obſerving, at laſt, that the line along which they ran was not defended, the infantry went over it firſt, and were followed by all the cavalry: but the time which they had loſt by their former miſtake gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As ſoon as he appeared, Cæſar's cavalry, finding themſelves entangled between the line of communication, the entrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confuſion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæſar, ſeeing themſelves likely to be ſupported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp; and the party which Cæſar himſelf commanded againſt them, obſerving the precipitant retreat of the other diviſion, ſaw dangers and difficulties accumulating on every ſide. Imagining that they were about to be ſurrounded, or ſhut up within the enemy's works, they betook them to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repaſs it, were killed in ſuch heaps, or were trodden under foot in ſuch numbers, that the ſlain filled up the ditch, and made a paſſage for thoſe that followed.

In this ſtate of general confuſion and terror, the preſence and authority of Cæſar, which, on other occaſions, uſed to be of ſo great effect, were entirely diſregarded. The bearer of a ſtandard, upon Cæſar's catching it, and endeavouring to ſtop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it; a rider, whoſe horſe he had ſeized by the bridle, diſmounted, and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongſt which the action began, as they embarraſſed the flight of the one party, ſo they retarded the purſuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect ſuch a victory,

remained

remained in ſuſpence. He miſtook the flight of Cæſar's army for a feint, to draw him into ſome ambuſcade. In this he was governed, probably, by the high eſtimation for diſcipline and valour to which Cæſar's army was ſo juſtly entitled; but which no troops can uniformly ſupport at all times: and if it be true, as is probable, that the flight of an army in actual rout may be always diſtinguiſhed from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable error; and Cæſar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the overſights, though not the advantages, of his enemy, owns that he himſelf loſt about a thouſand men, with above thirty ſtandards or colours, and owed the preſervation of his army to the exceſſive caution or incapacity of Pompey. He himſelf acted indeed like a perſon defeated, inſtantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his outpoſts; and to make head againſt the victor, brought all the ſcattered parts of his army together.

Pompey, in the mean time, loſt the deciſive moment, or was not ſenſible of his advantage till after the time for improving it was paſt. But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the preciſe moment in which a ſignal advantage could have been made of it, was preſently afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had from his own army the uſual ſalutations of triumph, or received the title of Imperator, which he continued to aſſume, and ſent his accounts of the action, by expreſſes, to every part of the empire; but had the moderation to abſtain from the practice that was uſual in the caſe of victories obtained over foreign enemies, that of binding his faſces and his diſpatches with laurel.

Cæſar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himſelf in a very arduous ſituation. He had paſſed over a ſea on which the enemy were maſters, and had invaded a country of which they were in poſſeſſion, with forces greatly ſuperior to his own: but this daring adventure, which, even in its firſt ſucceſſes, excited aſtoniſhment,

now

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now expoſed him to cenſure, and his attempt to inveſt ſo great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army ſuperior to his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common, began to be queſtioned by thoſe who, after the event, can inſtruct and correct every general, and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obſcured. He was even ſaid to have gained the Spaniſh army by corruption, and to have purchaſed with money the ſurrender which he pretended to have forced by his addreſs and his ſword. People returned to their firſt apprehenſions, that Pompey was the greateſt general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the preſent conteſt, and had left nothing for his party to do but to reap the advantages of the victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in ſuſpence, Cato, in one of the councils which had been ſummoned by Pompey, obſerved that Cæſar had acquired much popular favour by his oſtentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms againſt him; while Pompey and his followers, by publiſhing threats againſt all who did not actually eſpouſe their cauſe, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror; he therefore moved, that a proclamation ſhould be iſſued, containing aſſurances, that every town not actually in arms ſhould be protected, and that no blood ſhould be ſhed but in the field of battle. A reſolution to this purpoſe had been accordingly publiſhed [51]; but in the preſent exultation of victory was forgotten. The times were ſaid to require exemplary juſtice, and to juſtify executions and forfeitures, not only of thoſe who were actually in arms againſt their country, but of thoſe likewiſe who had betrayed its cauſe by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favourites of Pompey already, in

[51] Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 494.

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imagination, fated their revenge, and gratified their avarice, at the expence of the oppoſite party and of its abettors [16]. Every one conſidered the uſe which he himſelf was to make of the victory, not how it might be ſecured or rendered complete.

The ſhock which Cæſar had received in ſo critical a time and ſituation, was, not without reaſon, ſuppoſed to be deciſive; he had abandoned his lines, and called in all his out-poſts. His army appeared to ſink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their loſſes, and fallen in their own eſtimation, they were not ſoon likely to recover courage enough to contend for the field again with ſo renowned and ſo ſuperior an adverſary.

Cæſar, however, was not overwhelmed by theſe appearances; he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience of many years, to repoſe the utmoſt confidence in themſelves and in their general, and which was not likely to ſink, without hopes of recovery, under any ſingle event. He conſidered their apparent dejection as a ſymptom of indignation, and of rage more than of fear or debaſement; and, inſtead of blame or reproach, ſoothed them with conſolation, and with the apologies which he induſtriouſly framed for their late miſcarriage. He bid them recollect their former actions, and not be diſmayed by a ſingle accident which befel them in the midſt of a career ſuſtained with a ſpirit ſo much ſuperior to that of every enemy they encountered: "If fortune has croſſed us for "once," he ſaid, "we muſt retrieve our loſſes by diligence and re-"ſolution. Difficulties only excite the brave, and awaken their "ardour; you have formerly experienced difficulties, and every "ſoldier who was at Gergovia will remember the effects of perſeve-"rance and courage."

[16] Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. lib. iii. c. 88.

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He was ſenſible, however, that ſome particular officers had ſet a ſhameful example; and he ſuppoſed, that by ſingling out theſe for puniſhment, he might ſeem to exculpate the ſoldiers, and reinſtate them in their own eſteem. For this reaſon he diſmiſſed, with infamy, ſome bearers of ſtandards, who, he alleged, had miſled the troops, whoſe object it is never to part from their colours. By theſe means the ſullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience to retrieve their honour [17]. They did not preſume to importune their general to be entruſted ſo ſoon again with his fortunes; but they impoſed voluntary taſks, by way of penance, on themſelves, ſaying, That they had deſerved to be loaded with hardſhips. Many of the ſuperior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæſar, that whatever reſolution he might have taken for the future plan of the war, ſo favourable a diſpoſition in the army, and ſo fair an opportunity of yet ending the conteſt with honour on the very ground on which they had incurred their late diſgrace, ſhould not be neglected, nor ſuffered to eſcape. Cæſar, however, did not chuſe to ſtake his fortunes on the chance of a feveriſh ardour, which ſtill had ſome mixture of conſternation, nor to rely on a fury which had more of deſpair than of rational confidence, againſt the impetuoſity of a ſuperior army recently fluſhed with victory. Nor was he ſafe to remain in his preſent ſituation, without any poſts in his rear to ſecure his communication with the country, and without any immediate proſpect of ſupply for the ſubſiſtence of his army.

For theſe reaſons, Cæſar determined, without loſs of time, to decamp and to remove to ſome diſtance from the enemy [18]. In the firſt night after this reſolution was taken, and as ſoon as it was dark, the ſick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the eſcort of a legion, were ſent off, with orders that they ſhould not halt till they reached

[17] Cæſ. de Bel. Civ. lib. iii. [18] Ibid.

Apollonia,

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Apollonia, being a march of about thirty miles. At three in the morning the main body of the army, obſerving a profound ſilence, turned out of the camp by different gates, and took the ſame route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. Theſe, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, ſounded the uſual march to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move, and the whole being thus already on their way, and without any incumbrance, they ſoon gained a conſiderable diſtance from the enemy, who was likely to purſue them.

Pompey, as ſoon as he was appriſed of this retreat, drew forth his army, and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæſar's army at the paſſage of the river Genuſus; but being received by the enemy's horſe, interlined with infantry, could make no impreſſion, and ſaw them effect the paſſage of the river without any conſiderable loſs.

Cæſar, having completed an ordinary march, took poſſeſſion of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Aſparagium; but not intending to remain on this ground, gave orders to the legions to reſt on their arms. He ſent forth his cavalry by the front gate in ſight of the enemy, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to turn round the camp, and enter it again by the rear. Pompey ſuppoſing, from theſe appearances, that Cæſar had concluded his march, and that the buſineſs of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the ſame lines, which he likewiſe had formerly occupied at this place, and ſuffered his men to ſtray in ſearch of forage and wood; many alſo who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had left their baggage behind them, were now allowed to lay down their arms, and returned to Dyrrachium in ſearch of it.

Cæſar, who waited only until the halt he had made ſhould produce this effect in the camp of the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and without interruption, on the ſame day

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completed a ſecond march of eight miles; while Pompey's army, having already laid aſide their arms and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæſar continued his retreat during ſome of the ſubſequent days in the ſame order, having his baggage advanced ſome hours before him: and Pompey, having loſt ſome ground by the delay of the firſt day, and having haraſſed his army in attempting to regain it, on the fourth day intirely diſcontinued the purſuit.

This reſpite gave both parties leiſure to conſider the plan of their future operations. Cæſar repaired to Apollonia to lodge his ſick and wounded, to pay off the arrears of his army, and to make a proper diſpoſition for the ſecurity of the places he held on the coaſt. And having already one cohort at Liſſus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he continued his route from thence to the ſouthward. He propoſed, without delay, to penetrate into Theſſaly, and to occupy, for the ſubſiſtence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himſelf, that if Pompey ſhould follow him thither, to a diſtance from his magazines and his ſupplies by ſea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake Oricum and the towns on the coaſt, he muſt expoſe Scipio and the body under his command, in the eaſtern parts of Macedonia, to be ſeparately attacked; or, if he wiſhed to preſerve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his deſign upon Oricum in order to ſupport them. If he ſhould paſs into Italy, it was propoſed to follow him by the coaſts of Dalmatia. And this laſt alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the diſcredit to which it might have expoſed Cæſar's cauſe, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It was accordingly debated in council, Whether, being maſter of the ſea, and having abundance of ſhipping, he ſhould not tranſport his army, recover the poſſeſſion of the ſeat of government, and ſtrip his antagoniſt of that authority which he derived from this circumſtance? or, whether he ſhould not ſtay

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to finiſh the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to reſult from his return to Rome in the capacity of victor, after he had left it with ſome degree of diſgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared to be ſo near its concluſion, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfiniſhed. It was argued, that, by quitting the preſent ſeat of the war, Cæſar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of reſources, and would only exchange the weſtern part of the empire for the eaſt, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himſelf was now about to recover the city and the poſſeſſion of Italy.

But, what weighed moſt of all in theſe deliberations, the ſafety of Scipio required the preſence of Pompey in Macedonia. If he ſhould remove his army from thence, this officer, with the forces recently arrived from Aſia, would fall a ſacrifice to the enemy.

Upon theſe motives both armies, having their ſeveral detachments in Theſſaly, and ſeparate bodies to ſupport or to reſcue from the dangers which threatened them; the generals determined to march into that country, and calculated their reſpective movements, ſo as to cut off the enemy's parties, or to ſuſtain their own. Cæſar, by his march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and having the diſcredit of a defeat, and being ſuppoſed on his flight, was haraſſed or ill received by the country as he paſſed. The meſſengers, whom he had diſpatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made ſome movements in Macedonia in ſearch of proviſions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route, narrowly eſcaped, and only by a few hours, being ſurpriſed and taken.

Cæſar, having arrived in time to reſcue Domitius, and being joined by him as he paſſed the mountains into Theſſaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refuſed to admit him, he ſcaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by

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this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitleſs reſiſtance, he put all the inhabitants to the ſword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, threw open their gates; and Cæſar, to contraſt this with the former example, gave them protection. From hence to Lariſſa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Aliacmon, then lay with a conſiderable army, the country was open, and Cæſar, or his parties, were every where received without oppoſition. Having paſſed all the leſſer rivers which fall into the Penius, he took poſt on the Enipeus, which runs through the diſtrict of Pharſalia. Here he commanded extenſive plains, covered with forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great diſtance in his rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably likewiſe by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all amounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offenſive operations.

Pompey directed his motions likewiſe towards the ſame quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every where received as victor in the late action, was ſtill on his march. Scipio advanced from Lariſſa to receive him; and being joined, they took poſt together on a height near Pharſalus, and in ſight of Cæſar's ſtation, at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia, or about three miles [19]. The armies being ſome time fixed in this poſition, Cæſar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagoniſt. It was evidently not Pompey's intereſt to give an enemy, whom he had brought into conſiderable ſtraits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But as this was a defiance, and had ſome effect on the minds of the ſoldiers, it was proper to return it; and both ſides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their reſpective lines. Cæſar advanced, on each ſucceſſive day, ſtill nearer

[19] Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

to

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to Pompey's ground; but there were ſome difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he did not chuſe to engage himſelf in the preſence of an enemy, nor did Pompey chuſe to quit the eminence on which he had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The ſummer being far ſpent, and all the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being conſumed, Cæſar began again to ſuffer for want of proviſions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on this ground, he determined to change it, for ſome ſituation in which he could more eaſily ſubſiſt his own army, or by moving about, haraſs the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them perhaps to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having reſolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army ſhould move, the tents being already ſtruck, and the ſignal to march given, while the van was paſſing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was obſerved, that Pompey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than uſual before their lines. Cæſar immediately gave orders to halt, ſaying to thoſe who were near him, "The time we have ſo earneſtly wiſhed "for is come; let us ſee how we are to acquit ourſelves." He immediately ordered, as a ſignal of battle, a purple enſign to be hoiſted on a lance in the centre of the camp [20]. Appian ſays, That he likewiſe ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breaſt-work to be levelled in the front towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, not even behind their intrenchments [21].

It was evidently Pompey's intereſt to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the diſtreſſes to which Cæſar's army muſt have been expoſed on the approach of winter. But this is the moſt difficult part in war, requiring great ability in the general, together with tried courage and diſcipline in the troops. A general may be qualified to

[20] Plutarch. in Vita Pompei. [21] Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

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fight a battle, but not dextrouſly to avoid an enemy who preſſes him; an army may have that ſpecies of courage which impells them in action, but not that degree of conſtancy which is required to ſupport them long unemployed in the preſence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himſelf was qualified for the part which the ſervice required of him, he was attended by numbers of Senators and perſons of high rank, who, thinking themſelves in a civil or political capacity, equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military ſubordination with pain. They ſaid, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nurſed in luxury, and averſe to buſineſs, petulant in ſafety, uſeleſs in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their amuſements in the town; and anticipating the honours and ſucceſſions to office which they imagined due to their high merits in the preſent ſervice, they railed at the conduct of their general, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilſt in reality they only wiſhed to terminate the ſuſpence and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the reſolution to endure. Many of the allies, then alſo preſent in the army, who were princes of high ſtate in their own dominions, were impatient of longer delay; and the troops of every deſcription, in imitation of ſo many reſpectable examples, were loud in their cenſures of ſo much caution in their general.

Pompey, urged by the clamours of his army, thought himſelf under a neceſſity to come to a ſpeedy deciſion, and had prepared for battle on the morning of that very day on which Cæſar was about to decamp. Although he was ſenſible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his intereſt to hazard a battle, it is probable, that he did not think the riſk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, became elated and confident upon his late ſucceſs [22]. His numbers greatly

[22] Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. iii.

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ſurpaſſed thoſe of Cæſar, eſpecially in horſe, archers, and ſlingers; and he truſted, that, by this part of his army, he ſhould prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a ſmall river with ſteep banks, on his right, which ſufficiently covered that flank [23], he drew all the cavalry, amounting to ſeven thouſand, with the archers and ſlingers to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himſelf, therefore, took poſt to ſecond the operations of the cavalry, at the head of the two famous legions which he had called off from Cæſar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was poſted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spaniſh army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. The whole amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thouſand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep [24].

Cæſar, obſerving this diſpoſition, formed his army in three diviſions; the left was commanded by Antony, the right by Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was poſted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but theſe ſo incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty-two thouſand men. He ſaw the diſparity of his horſe and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thouſand horſe to oppoſe to ſeven thouſand of the enemy. In order to reinforce and ſuſtain them, he draughted a cohort from each of the legions in the right to form a reſerve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry with orders to ſuſtain them, or to repel the enemy's horſe, when they ſhould attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth diviſion of his army, not placed in the ſame line with the other diviſions; but

[23] Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. iii. [24] Frontinus de Stratagematis.

facing

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facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was expected to turn the flank, and to fall obliquely on the rear. He himſelf paſſed along the front of the right wing, and earneſtly intreated them not to engage till they got the ſignal from himſelf. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of the army, deſiring them to recollect with what ſolicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to ſave both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any diſpoſition wantonly to ſhed the ſoldiers blood. He was anſwered with ſhouts that expreſſed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers aſſembled on his left to begin the attack; and inſtructed them, as ſoon as they had driven Cæſar's horſe from the plain, to fall upon the flank and the rear of his infantry.

Theſe diſpoſitions being completed, a ſolemn pauſe and an interval of ſilence enſued. The ſame arms, and the ſame appearances preſented themſelves on the oppoſite ſides. When the trumpets gave the ſignal to advance, the ſounds were the ſame; many are ſaid to have ſhed tears[25]. Being ſo near, that they had only ſpace enough in which to acquire that rapid motion with which they commonly ſhocked, Cæſar's army began to ruſh forward, while Pompey's, agreeable to the orders he had given them, remained in their places, expecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double ſpace in coming to the ſhock, would be diſordered, or out of breath. But the veterans, in Cæſar's line, ſuſpecting the intention of this unuſual method of receiving an enemy, made a full ſtop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with the uſual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that reſiſtance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general near about the ſame time over the whole front. Pom-

[25] Dio. Caſſius, lib. xli. c. 58.

pey's

pey's horſe, as was expected, in the firſt charge, put Cæſar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and ſlingers, were haſtening to turn the flank of the enemy. But as ſoon as they opened their view to the rear, being ſurpriſed at the ſight of a body of infantry which was drawn up to oppoſe them, and being, probably, from their confidence of victory, negligent of order; in their attempts to recover it they were thrown into the utmoſt confuſion, and, although there was not any enemy in condition to purſue them, fled to the heights. The archers and ſlingers, being thus deſerted by the horſe, were put to the ſword. And Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not reſiſt him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæſar, in order to increaſe the impreſſion he had made, brought forward freſh troops to the front of his own line; and while his reſerve turned upon the flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withſtand.

Pompey, on ſeeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he ſo little expected, either thought himſelf betrayed, or deſpairing of the day, put ſpurs to his horſe, and returned into camp. As he entered the Prætorian gate, he called to the guards to ſtand to their arms, and to provide for the worſt. "I go the rounds," he ſaid, "and viſit the poſts." It is likely that ſurpriſe and mortification had unſettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greateſt dejection, and yet he awaited the iſſue [16]. His army, in the mean time, being routed, fled in confuſion through the lanes of their own encampment. It was noon, and the victors, as well as the vanquiſhed, were greatly fatigued; but Cæſar ſeldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their intrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be ſtormed, met with ſome little reſiſtance from the guards that were

[16] Caſſ. de Bello Civile, lib. iii. c. 94.

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placed on the parapet, but ſoon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the ſtreets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and paſſages through which the vanquiſhed crowded to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left ſtanding, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were ſtill diſplayed, as if intended for ſhow. Notwithſtanding this circumſtance, Cæſar had authority enough to reſtrain his troops [27] from plunder, and continued the purſuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquiſhed had occupied a hill in the rear of their camp, he made haſte to ſurround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themſelves having obſerved, that the place was deſtitute of water, abandoned it before they could be ſurrounded, and took the road to Lariſſa. Cæſar having ordered part of the army to keep poſſeſſion of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himſelf, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept the fugitives in their way to Lariſſa. He had the advantage of the ground; ſo that after a haſty march of ſix miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himſelf in their way, obliged them to halt. They took poſſeſſion of a height over a ſtream of water, from which they hoped to be ſupplied. Night was faſt approaching, and the purſuers were ſpent with fatigue; but Cæſar yet prevailed on his men to throw up ſome works to prevent the acceſs of the enemy to the brook. When overwhelmed with fatigue and diſtreſs, theſe remains of the vanquiſhed army offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was in dependence many among them, who were Senators and perſons of rank, withdrew in the night, and made their eſcape; the reſt ſurrendered at diſcretion. perſons of diſtinction, who had been formerly priſoners, and who had

[27] The ſpoils of an enemy were commonly ſecured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.

been

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been ſet at liberty, were now put to death. Some were ſpared at the interceſſion of their friends, to whom Cæſar permitted that each ſhould ſave one of the priſoners[22]. The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were enliſted in his army. Cæſar, having ordered ſuch of his men, as had been on ſervice all night, to be relieved from the camp, he himſelf marched with a freſh body the ſame day to Lariſa.

[22] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 62.

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Comparative Loſs on the different Sides in the late Action.——Pompey's Flight.——His Death.——Arrival of Cæſar at Alexandria.——Cato, with the Fleet and Remains of the Army from Pharſalia, ſteers for Africa.——State of Italy and of the Republican Party.——Adventures of Cæſar in Egypt.——Victory over Pharnaces.——Arrival in Italy.——Mutiny of the Legions.——Cæſar paſſed into Africa.——His Operations and Action with the Horſe and Irregulars of the Enemy.——Poſt at Ruſpina.——Siege of Uzita.——Battle of Thapſus.——Death of Cato.

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IN the famous battle of Pharſalia, Cæſar, by his own account, loſt no more than two hundred men, among whom were thirty Centurions, officers of diſtinguiſhed merit. He killed of the enemy fifteen thouſand, took twenty-four thouſand priſoners, with a hundred and eighty ſtand of colours, and nineteen Roman eagles and legionary ſtandards; and on this occaſion he cut off many Senators and many of the equeſtrian order[a], the flower of the Roman Nobility, who were the moſt likely to bear up the ſinking fortunes of the commonwealth.

Pompey, when he was told that Cæſar's troops had already forced his intrenchments, changed his dreſs, mounted on horſeback, and having paſſed through the rear gate of the camp, made his eſcape to Lariſſa. On the road he fell in with about thirty horſemen who joined him. At the gates of Lariſſa he received what he wanted for his journey, but declined entering the town, ſaying, That he

[a] Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

would

38 39

Bay of Nymphæum

Lissus

PART

Drilo Fl.

Genusus Fl.

Petra

Camp of Pompey

Camp of Cæsar

Asparagium

Camp of Pompey

Camp of Cæsar

Dyrrachium

Aous Fl.

OF

Camp of Pompey

Camp of Cæsar

Apsus Fl.

ILLYRICUM

MACEDONIA

41

Apollonia

Aous Fl.

March of Pompey

Oricum

March of Cæsar

Acroceraunus

EPIRUS

CORCYRA

40

Acheron

Ambracia

GULPH AMBRACIA

Actium

ACARNIA

Axius Fl.

Erigon Fl.

Edessa

Bar

Lhacmon Fl.

Pamisus Fl.

Gomphi

Ion Fl.

Peneus Fl.

Phana

THESSALY

THEATRE
of the
Campaigns
in
MACEDONIA and THESSALY.

39

37 38 39

Published according to Act of Parlia

Plate 4th. To be placed Vol. 2d fronting Page 484.

40 41 42

Pangeus Mountains

Nestus Fl.

Philippi

Camp of Octavius & of Antony

Camp of Brutus

Camp of Cassius

Strymon Fl.

Amphipolis

THASUS I.

BAY of STRYMON

MACEDONIA

Edessa

Thessalonica

Pella

Berrhœa

Pydna

Camp of Calvinus

Camp of Scipio

Scotusa

Cynocephalæ

BAY of THERMÆ

Chalcis

Antigonia

Olynthus

Mount Athos

Olympus

Peneus Fl.

TEMPE

Larissa

Metropolis

Phœnix Fl.

Apidanus Fl.

Camp of Pompey

Sicurium

Camp of Cæsar

Phera

Pelion

Magnesia

Demetrias

Sciathus

PHARSALIA

Enipæus Fl.

THESSALY

Spercheus Fl.

MALIAN BAY


Thermopylæ

PART of EUBŒA

40 41 42

Act of Parliament. by W. Strahan, and T. Cadell, in the Strand, Feb. 1st. 1783.

A Bell Sculpt.



CHAP. VII.

would do nothing to make a breach betwixt the inhabitants of that place and the victor[1]. From thence he paſſed by the valley of Tempé to the coaſt, and reſted only one night in a fiſherman's cottage. Next morning he put off from the ſhore in a ſmall boat, with a few of his attendants, and coming in ſight of a trading veſſel, made ſignals, and was taken on board. In this ſhip he ſteered to Amphipolis, came to an anchor before that place, and, probably to conceal his farther intentions, iſſued a proclamation addreſſed to all the diſtricts of Macedonia, and requiring new levies to be made, and all the youth of the province to aſſemble forthwith at this place. But having received ſome ſupplies of money, he remained only one night at Amphipolis. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngeſt of his ſons, were at Mitylené, in the iſland of Leſbos; thither he propoſed to ſail, and, without having ſettled his plan any farther, was anxious to ſave this part of his family from falling[2] into the hands of his enemies. Having taken them on board, and being joined by ſome galleys of the fleet, after a delay of ſome days, occaſioned by contrary winds, he ſet ſail, continued his voyage to the coaſt of Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. He meant to have landed in Syria; but being informed that the people of Antioch, upon the news of his defeat, had publiſhed a reſolution to admit none of his party, he dropt that intention, and contented himſelf with what aids and reinforcements he obtained on the coaſts of Cilicia and Cyprus. He ſeized the money which was found in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue; and having borrowed, or otherwiſe procured, conſiderable ſums, he armed two thouſand men, and having ſhipping ſufficient to tranſport them, continued his voyage to Egypt.

The late king, Ptolomy Auletes, had been indebted to the Romans and the patronage of Pompey; and the kingdom being now on a

[1] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xlii. c. 2. [2] Cæſar, Appian, Plutarch.

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reſpectable footing, having a conſiderable military force in the field; this Roman leader, though of the vanquiſhed party, flattered himſelf, that in the gratitude of the Egyptian court he might find ſome means to reinſtate his affairs.

On the death of that Ptolomy, who had been reſtored to his throne by Gabinius, two factions had ariſen in Egypt. The king leaving four children, Ptolomy the elder, Cleopatra, Arſinoë, and Ptolomy the younger, had by his will bequeathed his crown to Ptolomy the eldeſt of his ſons, together with Cleopatra the eldeſt daughter. This brother and ſiſter being by the laws permitted to marry, were in the capacity of huſband and wife aſſociated on the throne. But the council of the young king propoſed to ſet aſide the will by excluding Cleopatra. In execution of this deſign, having obliged her to leave the kingdom, and to fly for protection into Syria, they had taken poſt with a great army at Peluſium to prevent her return, ſhe being ſaid to have aſſembled a numerous force in Aſia for that purpoſe [4]. Pompey obſerving this army upon the ſhore, concluded that the king was preſent, came to an anchor, and ſent a meſſage with intimation of his arrival, and of his deſire to join his forces with thoſe of Egypt.

The council of Ptolomy conſiſted of three perſons, Achillas, who commanded the army; Photinus, an eunuch, who had the care of the finances; and Theodotus of Samos, who was the preceptor or literary tutor of the young king. Theſe counſellors, knowing that the Romans had been named executors of the late king's will [5], and in this capacity might reſtore Cleopatra to her ſhare in the throne, and that Pompey, in name of the republic, might aſſume the ſupreme direction in Egypt, were greatly alarmed upon receiving his meſſage, and came to a reſolution to put him to death. By this atrocious action they expected to rid themſelves of one dangerous intruder,

[4] Cæſar de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. [5] Cæſar, ibid.

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and to merit the favour of his rival, who by this deciſive ſtroke was to become the ſovereign of the empire, and fully able to reward thoſe who took a ſeaſonable part in his quarrel.

With this intention Achillas, with a few of his attendants, came on board in a ſmall boat, delivered a meſſage from Ptolomy, inviting Pompey to land. In the mean time ſome Egyptian galleys, with an intention to ſecure him, drew near to his ſhip; and the whole army, with the king at their head, were drawn out on the ſhore to receive him. The ſize of the boat, and the appearance of the equipage which came on this errand, ſeemed diſproportioned to the rank of Pompey; and Achillas made an apology, alleging, that deeper veſſels could not go near enough to land him on that ſhallow part of the coaſt. Pompey's friends endeavoured to diſſuade him from accepting of an invitation ſo improperly delivered; but he anſwered by quoting two lines from Sophocles, which implies, that *whoever viſits a king, though he arrive a free man, muſt become his ſlave.* Two of his ſervants went before him into the boat to receive their maſter; and with this attendance he put off from the ſhip. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngeſt of his ſons, with ſome other friends, remained upon deck, ſufficiently humbled by the preceding ſtrokes of fortune, anxious for the future, and trembling under the expectations of a ſcene which was acting before them. Soon after the barge had left the ſhip, Pompey looking behind him, obſerved among the Egyptian ſoldiers a perſon whoſe countenance he recollected, and ſaid to him, Surely, fellow ſoldier, you and I have ſomewhere ſerved together. While he turned to ſpeak theſe words, Achillas beckoned to the other ſoldiers, who underſtanding the ſignal to put the Roman general to death, ſtruck him with their ſwords. Pompey was ſo much prepared for this event, that he perceived the whole of his ſituation at once, and ſunk without making any ſtruggle, or uttering one word[s]. This was

[s] App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Plut. in Pomp. Livii epitome, lib. cxii.

done

done in the preſence of the king of Egypt and of his army, who were ranged on a kind of amphitheatre formed by the ſhore. The veſſel in which the unhappy Cornelia with her family was left, and the little ſquadron which attended it, as if they had received a ſignal to depart, cut their cables and fled.

Thus died Pompey, who for above thirty years enjoyed the reputation of the firſt captain of his age. The title of *Great*, originally no more than a caſual expreſſion of regard from Sylla, continued, in the manner of the Romans, to be given him as a mark of eſteem, and a name of diſtinction. He attained to more conſideration, and enjoyed it longer than any other Roman citizen; and was ſupplanted at laſt, becauſe, for many years of his life, he thought himſelf too high to be rivaled, and too ſecure to be ſhaken in his place. His laſt defeat, and the total ruin which enſued upon it, was the conſequence of an overweening confidence, which left him altogether unprepared for the firſt untoward event. The impreſſion of his character, even after that event, was ſtill ſo ſtrong in the minds of his enemies, that Cæſar overlooked all the other remains of the vanquiſhed party to purſue their leader.

The accounts which Cæſar received at Lariſſa made him believe that Pompey muſt have paſſed into Aſia; and he accordingly, on the third day after the battle of Pharſalia, ſet out in purſuit of him with a body of horſe, ordering a legion to follow. In paſſing the Helleſpont, he was ſaluted by ſome galleys which guarded the Straits, under Lucius Caſſius. Theſe ſurrendered themſelves, and, with their leader, made offer of their ſervice to the victor. From thence he continued his march by the coaſt of Ionia, receiving the ſubmiſſion of the towns in his way. And being come into Aſia, he had intelligence of Pompey's operations in Cyprus, of his departure from thence, and of his continuing to ſteer for the coaſts of Egypt. In order to be in condition to follow him thither, he put into the iſland of

Rhodes,

Rhodes, where he provided transports sufficient to embark the legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and another from Achaia, with eight hundred horse. To these he joined a convoy of ten armed galleys of this island, and some Asiatic ships [7].

With this force Cæsar set sail for Alexandria, and arrived, after a passage of three days [8]. Here he learned the catastrophé of Pompey's life; and had presented to him by the courtiers of Ptolomy, who were impatient to recommend their services, the head of the deceased severed from the body, with his seal, which was known throughout the empire, being that with which his signature was put to all letters, acts, and public writings: but Cæsar either really was, or affected to be, seized with a momentary compunction; is said to have turned away from the sight, and to have wept [9]. This able actor probably had tears, as well as words, at command; and could sanctify, under the most specious appearances, the evils which his ambition had produced. From this event, however, which he thus affected to regret, and no sooner, he became secure, and seems to have dated the termination of the war. He accordingly landed without precaution, and being detained at first by the usual periodical winds of the season, became entangled in difficulties, or engaged in pleasures, which occasioned a very unaccountable stay, suspended the expectations of the whole empire, and gave to those of the opposite party leisure to consult their safety in different ways.

Cato, upon the march of Pompey into Thessaly, had been left to command on the coast of Macedonia; and his quarters, after the battle of Pharsalia, became a place of retreat to many who escaped from the field, or who, at the time of the action, had been detached

[7] Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

[8] App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. The two legions which he led in this service amounted only to three thousand two hundred men; so much had the army in general suffered in their late campaigns.

[9] App. ibid.

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on different ſervices. He aſſembled great part of the fleet at Corcyra; and, with his ſea and land forces united, ſtill preſerved the aſpect of a vigorous party. Cicero, Cnæus the eldeſt ſon of Pompey, Afranius, Labienus, and other perſons of diſtinction had joined him. Among theſe Cicero, as being the firſt in rank, was offered the command; and having declined it, narrowly eſcaped with his life from the fury of young Pompey, who conſidered his refuſal as a deſertion of the cauſe, and as an act of perfidy to his father, whoſe fate was yet unknown [11]. Cicero, being protected by Cato and others, who were preſent, eſcaped into Italy; and declining the command of an army, reſerved, for ſcenes in which he was better qualified to act, talents which had been, on former occaſions, of ſo much uſe to his fellow citizens. It appeared that Cato had even diſapproved of his having joined either party in this war, and wiſhed him to have devoted his life and his abilities entirely to thoſe ſervices which he was better qualified to render to his country, in the Senate, and in the popular aſſemblies, than in the field.

It is probable that Cato had already taken his own reſolution not to ſubmit to Cæſar, nor to ſurvive the fall of the commonwealth; but he treated with great candour ſuch as choſe to make their peace, and to retire from the ſtorm. Having ſtaid a ſufficient time at Corcyra, to receive on board ſuch of the vanquiſhed army as choſe to take refuge in the fleet; and having afterwards put into Patræ, near the mouth of the Gulph of Corinth, for the ſame purpoſe, he ſtill gave every one his option to continue in arms, or to retire. He ſeems to have ſuppoſed that Pompey was gone into Egypt, and he determined to follow him; hoping, that after the junction of this great reinforcement, he might, either there or in the province of Africa, renew the war with advantage. Being, in purſuance of this

[11] Plut. in Vita Ciceronis. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xlii. c. 10—12.

deſign, arrived in the African ſeas, but weſt of the frontier of Egypt, he met the unhappy Cornelia, with the young Sextus Pompeius, who had recently beheld the death of the huſband and the father near the ſhore at Peluſium. The account which he received of this event determined him not to continue his voyage any farther to the eaſtward; but to return towards the Roman province of Africa, where the friends of the republic under Varus, in conſequence of the defeat of Curio, and the alliance of Juba, ſtill kept the aſcendant, and lately received an acceſſion of ſtrength by the junction of Scipio and of Labienus, who had eſcaped from Pharſalia. But the periodical winds which about the ſame time began to detain Cæſar at Alexandria, made it impoſſible, or at leaſt dangerous, for him to continue his voyage along a coaſt that was covered to a great extent by the famous ſhoals and ſand-banks of the Syrtes. For theſe, perhaps, and other reaſons which are not mentioned, Cato landed at Berenicé; and from thence conducting his army, then conſiſting of ten thouſand men, in ſmall diviſions, through the deſerts of Barca, and round the bay of the Syrtes; and having, during thirty days, encountered with many difficulties from the depth of the ſands and the ſcarcity of water, he effected his march to the frontier of the Roman province [a].

Cæſar, when he paſſed into Macedonia, had left Italy and the weſtern provinces in a ſtate not likely, in his abſence, to create any trouble. But the uncertain, and even unfavourable aſpect, of his affairs, for ſome time after his landing in Epirus, had encouraged thoſe who were diſcontented to queſtion the validity of his acts, and to diſregard his arrangements. The army in Spain having mutinied, deſerted from Q. Caſſius, and put themſelves under the command of M. Marcellus Æſerninus, who, however, did not openly declare

[a] Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 836.

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himſelf for either party, till after the event was decided in favour of Cæſar.

At Rome it is probable that few had remained beſides thoſe who were inclined to Cæſar's party, or at leaſt ſuch as were indifferent to both; and that ſome perſons, even of the laſt deſcription, thought they had an intereſt in his ſucceſs, as being their only ſafety againſt the menacing declarations of his adverſary, who, in all his proclamations, treated neutrality between the parties as treaſon to the commonwealth. But the uncertain ſtate of his fortunes, while the event of the war remained in ſuſpence, and ſtill more after his defeat at Dyrrachium, encouraged or tempted numbers, even in the city of Rome, to declare for Pompey. Marcus Cælius, who, in the preceding year, had, upon diſguſt, or hopes of promoting his own fortune, gone with Antony and Curio to join Cæſar, and who was now, by the influence of the prevailing party, elected one of the Prætors; being moved by a freſh diſguſt from the party he had joined, or by its apparent decline in the field, openly declared himſelf againſt Cæſar's meaſures, offered protection to debtors againſt the execution of his laws relating to bankrupts, drove his own colleague Tribonius by force from the Prætor's tribunal, and gave ſuch an alarm, that the Senate thought themſelves under the neceſſity of giving the Conſul Iſauricus the uſual charge to guard the commonwealth as in times of extreme danger. Upon this decree the Conſul took arms to preſerve the peace, and Cælius was obliged to leave the city. About the ſame time Milo, who ſtill lay under ſentence of baniſhment, ventured, at the head of an armed force, to land on the coaſt, and attempted to make himſelf maſter of Capua. While he was engaged in this enterprize he was joined by Cælius; but both were ſoon after ſurrounded and cut off by the forces which Cæſar had left for the protection of Italy [13].

[13] Liv. Epitome, lib. cxi. Dio. Caſſ. lib. xlii. c. 22, 26.

† Theſe

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Theſe diſturbances, and every appearance of oppoſition to the party of Cæſar, were again eaſily ſuppreſſed upon the news of his victory at Pharſalia. The populace, who generally range themſelves on the victorious ſide, and who are equally outrageous in every cauſe they eſpouſe, celebrated the occaſion, by pulling down the ſtatues of Pompey and of Sylla. There was either no Senate, and no aſſembly of the People to reſiſt the torrent with which fortune now ran on the ſide of military government, or the names of Senate and People were, without debate or difference of opinion, put to decrees, by which the ſupreme power of life and death over the ſuppoſed adherents of the vanquiſhed party was committed to the victor. By theſe decrees, the power of making war or peace, and of naming commanders and governors in all the provinces, was committed to Cæſar. He was, by a new and unheard-of reſolution, made Conſul for five years, Dictator for twelve months, and veſted with the ſacred character of Tribune for life. He alone was appointed to preſide in all public aſſemblies, except thoſe of the Tribes, in which the other Tribunes bore an equal part with himſelf.

When theſe decrees were preſented to Cæſar, then in Egypt, he aſſumed the enſigns and power of Dictator, and appointed Antony, who commanded in Italy, general of the horſe, or ſecond to himſelf in the empire. The reputation of Cæſar's clemency had encouraged many, who had recently oppoſed him, to lay down their arms, and to return to their habitations, truſting to this character of the victor, or to other conſiderations more particularly applicable to themſelves. Cicero returned to Italy, and waited for Cæſar in the neighbourhood of Brundiſium. Caius Caſſius, who had commanded the fleet which had been aſſembled for Pompey from the coaſts of Syria and Cilicia, having ſailed to Sicily, while the army yet lay in Pharſalia, ſurpriſed and burnt the ſhipping, amounting to thirty-five veſſels, of which twenty were decked, which Cæſar had aſſembled at Meſſina, and

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was about to have forced the town to ſurrender, when he was informed of the defeat of Pompey in Theſſaly, and ſet ſail for the coaſt of Aſia. Here he waited for Cæſar at the mouth of the Cydnus, without being determined, whether he ſhould attempt to deſtroy or ſubmit to the victor. From the correſpondence of Caſſius with Cicero, it appears that, like this diſtinguiſhed ſenator, he was about to withdraw from the ruins of a party which he could no longer ſupport. Cicero, nevertheleſs, afterwards aſcribes to him a deſign of killing Cæſar at this place, if the prey had not eſcaped him by going to a different ſide of the river from where he was expected to land. Upon this diſappointment Caſſius made his ſubmiſſion, and delivered up his fleet[14]. Quintus Cicero went to Aſia to make his peace with Cæſar; and many, expecting him in Italy, reſorted thither on the ſame errand. In this number, it was reported that Cato and L. Metellus meant to preſent themſelves as perſons who had done no wrong, and who came openly to reſume their ſtation in the commonwealth. Cæſar foreſaw the difficulties that might ariſe to himſelf from the preſence of ſuch men; that they would greatly embarraſs his government by oppoſing it, or, in order to rid himſelf of ſuch troubleſome gueſts, reduce him to the neceſſity of pulling off the maſk of moderation and clemency, which he had hitherto aſſumed. For theſe reaſons, he choſe rather to prevent their coming, than to contend with them after they were come; and ſent poſitive orders to Antony, to forbid Cato, Metellus, and every other perſon, to whom he had not given expreſs permiſſion, to ſet their foot in Italy[15].

U. C. 706. C. Julius Cæſar Dict. Iterum M. Antonius Mag. Eq.

Such was the ſtate of affairs at the end of the year of Rome 705, and beginning of the following year, which is dated in the Dicta-

[14] Cæſar de bello Civil. lib. iii. [15] Ibidem, ep. 6 & 7.

torſhip

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torſhip of Caius Cæſar. While he himſelf ſtill remained in Egypt, the government of Italy continued in the hands of Antony. All orders of men vied, in demonſtrations of joy, for the ſucceſs of the victor, and for the aſcendant which his party had gained. They ſtill probably hoped to have the form of the republic preſerved, while no more than the adminiſtration of it ſhould paſs from the ruined party to thoſe who were now in power: but in the firſt ſteps of the preſent government they found themſelves diſappointed. The uſual election of magiſtrates, which, even in the height of the war had never been omitted, now at the end of it, and when no enemy any where appeared to alarm the party, were all of them, except that of the Tribunes, entirely ſuſpended or laid aſide. All government centered in the perſon of Antony, and the adminiſtration was altogether military. He himſelf, immerſed in debauch, paſt the greateſt part of his time in the company of buffoons and proſtitutes; frequently ſhifted the ſcene of his frolics from the town to the country, and travelled through Italy with a field equipage, and a numerous train of carriages, filled with courtezans and their retinue. In theſe proceſſions he himſelf is ſaid to have ſometimes appeared in a carriage that was drawn by lions[86]. In this tide of ſucceſs, as he was ungracious and arrogant to citizens of the higheſt rank, ſo he was indulgent to the troops, and deaf to all the complaints that were made of their violence and rapine. Being equally apt to ſet the example of diſorder and licence in his own practice, as he was to indulge them in others, his retainers frequently alarmed the city with rapes, robberies, and murders, and made the pacific inhabitants of Italy expect, with the arrival of Cæſar, a continual increaſe of ſuch diſorderly maſters to ſport on the ruins of the Commonwealth.

The worſt men, as uſual, were the moſt forward in paying their court to the party in power. The neareſt relations became ſpies on

[86] Plut. in Vita Antonii, p. 74, 75.

informers

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informers againſt each other. Fears or complaints uttered were reported as crimes. A general ſilence and diſtruſt enſued, and all parties wiſhed or dreaded the arrival of Cæſar, according as they expected to loſe or to gain by the fall of the Commonwealth. In this interval of expectation, men diſcovered their gloomy apprehenſions, by propagating ſtrange fictions of ominous appearances, or by magnifying things natural into alarming preſages and prodigies[17].

The daily expectation of Cæſar's arrival, for ſome time, ſuſpended all the uſual factions in the city, and ſuppreſſed the hopes and deſigns of his opponents in all parts of the empire: but his unexpected ſtay at Alexandria, and the unfavourable reports of his ſituation, which were ſometimes brought from thence, began to turn the tide of popularity at Rome, and encouraged the remains of the late republican party, now forced to take refuge in Africa, again to lift up its head[18].

Dollabella, a young man of Patrician extraction, obſerving the road which others had taken, by becoming Tribunes of the People, to arrive at power in the commonwealth, procured himſelf, in imitation of Clodius, to be adopted into a plebeian family, to the end that he might be legally qualified to hold this office; and having accordingly ſucceeded in this deſign, revived the wild projects by which the worſt of his predeceſſors had endeavoured to debauch the lower ranks of the People. He propoſed an abolition of debts, and a reduction of houſe-rents. Being oppoſed by Tribellius, one of his colleagues, their ſeveral retainers frequently, as uſual, proceeded to violence in the ſtreets; and although the Senate paſſed a decree to ſuſpend every queſtion or ſubject of debate until the arrival of Cæſar, theſe Tribunes continued to aſſemble the People, kept them in a ferment by oppoſite motions, and filled the publick places with tumult

[17] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xlii. c. 26. [18] Cicero ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 16.

and

and bloodſhed [19]. Mark Antony, ſecond in command to Cæſar, under pretence that ſuch diſorders could not be reſtrained without a military force, took poſſeſſion of the city with an army; and while he ſometimes favoured one party, and ſometimes the other, continued to govern the whole at diſcretion [20].

The troops about the ſame time became mutinous in their quarters; and theſe diſorders roſe or fell according to the reports that were propagated from Aſia or Egypt relating to the ſtate of Cæſar's affairs. The ſpirits and hopes of the late Republican party, which yet had ſome footing in Africa and Spain, likewiſe fluctuated in the ſame manner. It is highly probable, that if Cæſar had purſued the other remains of this party with the ſame ardour with which he purſued Pompey in perſon, or if he could have returned to the capital immediately on the death of his rival, they never would have attempted, or would have been able to renew the conteſt; but the leiſure which he left them, and the ill aſpect of his own affairs, for ſome time encouraged and enabled them to recover a ſtrength, with which they were yet in condition to diſpute the dominion to which he aſpired.

Cato, who, with the remains of the Republican party from Epirus, had arrived on the coaſt of Africa, being informed that Varus ſtill held the Roman province on this continent in the name of the Republic, that Scipio was there, and that the king of Numidia perſiſted in his alliance againſt Cæſar, determined to join them. At his arrival, Scipio and Varus being on bad terms, he received an offer of the command from the general voice of the army: but his acceptance being likely to increaſe, rather than to appeaſe animoſities, and the preference being conſtitutionally due to Scipio as of conſular rank, Cato had no doubts in declining it. Neither Pompey nor Scipio ever conſidered him as their perſonal friend; his ſervices they knew were intended to the Republic, and would turn againſt them whenever

[19] Eight hundred citizens were killed in theſe frays. [20] Dio. Caſſ. lib. xlii. c. 29.

they came to make that uſe of their advantages to which it is likely they were both inclined. Pompey was accordingly ever jealous of Cato, and in the laſt part of the campaign in Theſſaly choſe to leave him behind on the coaſt. Scipio adopted the ſame conduct with reſpect to this partizan of the commonwealth, and joined to the motives of jealouſy, which actuated Pompey, a diſtruſt of the inclination recently ſhewn by the army to prefer him in the command. In order that he might not interfere in his counſels, he aſſigned or ſuffered him to take a ſeparate ſtation at Utica, where he continued to be the principal ſupport of the cauſe. The inhabitants of this place were obnoxious to Pompey's party; and having formerly received Curio with the forces of Cæſar, and ever favoured his intereſt, were now doomed to deſtruction, but ſaved at the interceſſion of Cato, who, in this extremity of political evils, wiſhed not to increaſe the ſufferings of mankind by unneceſſary acts of revenge and cruelty.

The ſpirit of the Republic thus reviving in Africa, and the party being in condition to receive all who fled to them for protection, and having the alliance of Juba, the moſt powerful prince of that continent, ſoon became formidable both by ſea and by land; and if they had choſen to invade Italy in the abſence of Cæſar, were in condition to have regained the capital of the empire. Young Pompey having, at the ſame time, paſſed into Spain, was favourably received by his father's adherents and clients in that province, and profiting by the miſconduct of Quintus Caſſius in thoſe parts, was likely to aſſemble a conſiderable force.

Gabinius, who commanded for Cæſar on the coaſt of Illyricum, attempting to penetrate by land into Macedonia, was cut off by Octavius, who had aſſembled a remnant of Pompey's army on the confines of that kingdom. Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæſar had appointed to command in Bithynia, had received a defeat from Pharnaces the ſon of Mithridates; and in general, the ſtate of his affairs in other parts of the empire was ſuch, while he himſelf continued unheard of

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in Egypt, as to raiſe a ſuſpicion of ſome misfortune, ſuppoſed to be the only way of accounting for his long ſtay in that country, and for the ſeeming neglect of all the advantages he had gained by a conduct hitherto in every inſtance deciſive and rapid. Pompey had fallen by treachery in Egypt, and ſo might Cæſar. It was now the middle of June, and there was no intimation received in Italy of the time at which he might be expected to return. He had written no letters ſince the middle of December, nor had any one come from him at Alexandria ſince the middle of March [21].

The imperfect accounts which remain of what paſſed in Egypt during this interval, are as follows: Cæſar, at his arrival, had found the young king under the direction of Pothinus; and Arſinoë, the ſiſter of the king, in the keeping of Ganimedes, two eunuchs, who had the care of their education. From his manner of receiving the preſent of Pompey's head, theſe officers conjectured that they had gained nothing by the murder of one of the rivals, that they were engaged in this conteſt for the Roman empire; and that this action, although it freed Cæſar of an enemy whom he reſpected and feared, was not to be publicly avowed or rewarded by him. They dreaded the interpoſition of this dangerous man in their affairs, more than they had dreaded even that of Pompey.

The troops now in Egypt, were the remains of that army with which Gabinius had reſtored the late king, and which he left to ſecure his eſtabliſhment. They were recruited by deſerters from the Roman provinces, and by banditti from Syria and Cilicia. They retained the form of the Roman legion; but had precluded themſelves from any proſpect of return to the Roman ſervice by a mutiny, in which they had murdered the two ſons of Bibulus, then Proconſul of Syria. Numbers of the men were married, and had families in Egypt; they were in the practice of diſpoſing of the lives

[21] Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 16 & 17.

and properties of the people, of the offices at court, and of the crown itſelf at their pleaſure. A party of this inſolent rabble, then in garriſon at Alexandria, and in the character of guards to the perſon of the king, took offence at the parade with which Cæſar landed, and were offended with the number and ſhow of his Lictors, by which he ſeemed to encroach on the majeſty of their ſovereign. Frequent tumults aroſe on this account, and numbers of Cæſar's attendants were murdered in the ſtreets. The weſterly winds were then ſet in, and he finding himſelf detained in a place where he was expoſed to ſo much inſult, ordered a reinforcement of troops from Aſia, and employed Mithridates of Pergamus to bring all the forces he could aſſemble there to his relief. The party of Cleopatra applied to him for his protection; ſhe herſelf, being ſtill in Syria, ventured to paſs into Egypt, came to Alexandria by ſea, and is ſaid to have been carried, wrapped up in a package of carpet, to the preſence of Cæſar.

In this manner, it is pretended that Cæſar became acquainted with the perſon of this celebrated woman, then in the bloom of youth, and poſſeſſed of thoſe allurements by which ſhe made different conquerors of the world, in their turns, for a while renounce the purſuits of ambition for thoſe of pleaſure. She is ſuppoſed at this time to have become the miſtreſs of Cæſar, and to have made him, though turned of fifty years, to forget the empire, the republic, the factions at Rome, and the armies which in Africa and Spain were aſſembling againſt him. Under the dominion of his paſſion for Cleopatra, he took a reſolution to carry into execution the deſtination made by the late king, and in the quality of Roman Conſul and repreſentative of the Roman People, to whom this office had been entruſted by the will, he commanded both parties to lay down their arms, and to ſubmit their claims to his own arbitration.

Pothinus, fearing the total excluſion of the young king, his pupil, in favour of Cleopatra, called Achillas with the army to Alexandria,

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in order to defeat Cæſar's purpoſe, and oblige him to leave the kingdom. This army conſiſted of twenty thouſand men inured to bloodſhed and violence, though long diveſted of the order and diſcipline of Roman troops. Cæſar hearing of their approach, and not being in a condition to meet them in the field, ſeized and fortified a quarter of the town, in which he propoſed to defend himſelf. The young Ptolomy being in his power, was prevailed on to diſpatch two perſons of diſtinction with a meſſage to Achillas, ſignifying the king's pleaſure that he ſhould not advance; but the bearers of this meſſage, as being ſuppoſed to betray the intereſt of their maſter, in whoſe name they appeared, were by the orders of Achillas ſeized and ſlain. Cæſar, however, being ſtill in poſſeſſion of Ptolomy's perſon, repreſented Achillas as a rebel and an outlaw, and ſtill, in name of the king, iſſued repeated orders and proclamations againſt him.

Achillas being arrived at Alexandria, entered the city, and endeavoured to force Cæſar's quarters; but being repulſed, took poſſeſſion of that part of the town which was open to him, and blocked up the remainder both by ſea and land. The city being thus divided, the Egyptians and Romans fought in the ſtreets, and from the houſes which they ſeverally occupied. Cæſar, as he deſpaired of being able to receive any ſuccours by land, endeavoured to keep open his communication by ſea, and ſent preſſing orders to Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, and Crete, for reinforcements of men and of ſhips. Having early diſcovered that Pothinus, who was ſtill in his power, correſponded with the enemy, he ordered him to be put to death, continued to ſtrengthen his diviſion of the town by additional barriers; and in order to prevent ſurpriſe, demoliſhed and cleared away many of the buildings adjoining to his works. Achillas, finding ſo much unexpected reſiſtance, ſent for reinforcements, and a ſupply of ſtores and warlike engines, from every part of the kingdom. He traverſed, with breaſt works, the ſtreets leading to Cæſar's quarters, and demoliſhing the houſes in

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his way, effected a chain of works parallel to thoſe of Cæſar, conſiſting of a parapet and frequent towers. He exhorted the Egyptians to exert themſelves for the independency of their kingdom; repreſented to them, "That the Romans were gradually aſſuming the ſovereignty "of Egypt; that Gabinius had come as an auxiliary, but acted as a "maſter; that Pompey, on being defeated in Theſſaly, came into "Egypt [22], as to a property which he had a right to employ in re-"pairing his ruined fortunes; that Pompey had fallen in vain, if "Cæſar were tamely ſuffered to ſucceed him; that if this intruder "were allowed to keep poſſeſſion of the city, until his ſuccours "ſhould arrive from Aſia, all Egypt for the future muſt expect to be "the ſlaves of the Romans."

The danger to which Cæſar was expoſed, aroſe no leſs from the remains of the republican party now aſſembling againſt him in Africa, than it did from the force with which he was actually aſſailed in Egypt. If Scipio had been appriſed of his condition in that country, he might in a few days have ſailed to Alexandria, and in conjunction with the Egyptians, who would now have accepted of any aſſiſtance againſt Cæſar, have recovered the fall of their party at Pharſalia; but the beſt opportunities are ſometimes loſt, becauſe it is not ſuppoſed that an enemy could be ſo raſh as to furniſh them.

The ſcene in Egypt was frequently changing by the intrigues and the treachery of different parties in the court. Ganimedes, who had the charge of the young princeſs, Arſinoë, being hitherto lodged in the quarters of Cæſar, found means to make his eſcape, together with his ward; and finding the troops diſpoſed to lay hold of Arſinoë as a branch of the royal family, employed aſſaſſins to put Achillas to death; and, in name of the princeſs, took on himſelf the command of the army. His abilities as an officer, which were very

[22] Hirtius de bello Alexandrino.

conſiderable,

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conſiderable, and his bounty, ſecured to him the affection of the ſoldiers. He continued the attack on Cæſar's quarters in all the ways which were already begun by his predeceſſor. The town being furniſhed with water by ſubterraneous paſſages from the neighbouring heights, he uncovered the conduits which led to Cæſar's diviſion of the town; and, to render theſe conduits unſerviceable, forced into them great quantities of brine from the ſea. The loſs however was ſoon ſupplied from wells, in which, at a moderate depth, the beſieged found plenty of freſh water.

While Cæſar thus counteracted the arts which were employed to diſtreſs him, the eighteenth legion, with a conſiderable ſupply of proviſions, military ſtores, and engines of war, being arrived on the coaſt, but unable to reach Alexandria on account of the winds, he thought proper to embark and put to ſea, in order to cover this reinforcement, while they made for the port. On this occaſion, he was attacked by the Egyptian fleet; but gained a victory, deſtroyed a great part of the enemy's ſhips, and brought his own reinforcement ſafe into harbour. The Egyptians, with great ardour, ſet to work in all the docks on the Nile, to repair the loſs they had now ſuſtained, and were ſoon maſters of a fleet, conſiſting of twenty-two veſſels of four tire of oars, five of five tire, and many of ſmaller dimenſions. Cæſar had to oppoſe them, nine galleys from Rhodes, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the coaſt of Aſia. Five were of five tire of oars, and ten of four tire. The remainder were of ſmaller dimenſions, and moſt of them open. With theſe forces, having once more engaged off the mouth of the harbour, the Egyptians were again defeated, with the loſs of one galley of five tire of oars, another of two tire taken, and three ſunk. The remainder retired under cover of the Mole, and of the towers of the Pharos.

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Soon after this action at ſea, Cæſar attacked the Pharos, forced the enemy to fly from thence, moſt of them ſwimming acroſs the harbour, killed many, and took ſix hundred priſoners. He forced them at the ſame time to abandon the tower, which commanded the entrance of the mole on that ſide. As he purſued them in their flight, and as the mole itſelf became crowded with his ſoldiers, who advanced to puſh the attack, or who came unarmed from the ſhips, and all the ſtations around, to witneſs the ſcene; the Egyptians ſeeing theſe crowds, laid hold of the opportunity, mounted the mole, threw thoſe who were upon it into confuſion, forced them over the quay into the water, or into their boats. Cæſar himſelf endeavouring to eſcape in this manner, and finding that the boat into which he went, being aground and overloaded, could not be got off, he threw himſelf into the water, and ſwam to a ſhip. In this tumult, he loſt four hundred men of the legions, and an equal number of the fleet. The Egyptians recovered all the ground they had loſt, got poſſeſſion again of the tower at the head of the mole, and of the iſland which ſecured their ſhips.

In ſuch operations, with various events, the parties in Egypt paſt the winter and ſpring. Cæſar ſtill retained the perſon of Ptolomy in his poſſeſſion, and made uſe of his name to countenance his own cauſe, or to diſcredit that of his enemies; but the king being extremely averſe to this uſe being made of his authority, and deſirous to recover his liberty, entered into a concert with ſome officers of his army, to find a pretence for his releaſe. In purſuit of their deſign, they conveyed ſecret intimation to Cæſar's quarters, that the troops were greatly diſguſted with Ganimedes, and that if Ptolomy ſhould make his appearance in perſon, they would certainly ſubmit to his orders, and commit the whole ſettlement of the kingdom to the arbitration of Cæſar. The king was inſtructed to affect a great diſlike to this propoſal, and with tears intreated that he might

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might be allowed to remain in the palace. Cæſar, either being deceived by theſe profeſſions, or believing the name of the king to be of little conſequence, conſented to let him depart; but this artful boy, as ſoon as he was at liberty, laid aſide his diſguiſe, laughed at the ſuppoſed credulity of thoſe he had deceived, and urged the attack on the Roman quarters with great animoſity.

While affairs at Alexandria were in this ſituation, accounts were brought that Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Cæſar had ſent to procure ſuccours from Aſia, was actually arrived at Peluſium with a conſiderable force; that he had reduced that place, and only waited for inſtructions from Cæſar how to proceed. Theſe accounts were brought to both parties about the ſame time, and both determined to put their forces in motion. Ptolomy leaving a proper guard on his works, embarked his army on the Nile, having a conſiderable navigation to make by the different branches of that river. Cæſar, at the ſame time, put his army on board in the harbour, and having an open courſe by the coaſt, arrived at Peluſium before the king; and being joined by Mithridates, was in condition to take the field againſt the Egyptian army. Ptolomy, to prevent the return of Cæſar by land to Alexandria, had taken a ſtrong poſt on one of the branches of the Nile; but here, after a few ſkirmiſhes, he was attacked, defeated, and driven from his ſtation. Endeavouring to make his eſcape by water, the barge [23] which carried him being overloaded it ſunk, and himſelf, with all his attendants, periſhed.

Immediately after this action, in which the Egyptian army was routed and diſperſed, Cæſar, eſcorted by a ſmall party of horſe, returned to Alexandria, and having received the ſubmiſſion of the inhabitants, made ſuch arrangements as he thought proper in the ſucceſſion to the kingdom. He placed Cleopatra on the throne, in conjunction with her younger brother; and, to remove any farther oc-

[23] Hirt. de Bello Alex.

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caſion of diſturbance to this ſettlement, he ordered her ſiſter Arſinoë to be tranſported to Rome. He left great part of the army to ſupport this new eſtabliſhment in Egypt, and he himſelf, after this ſingular interlude, in the midſt of the conqueſt of the Roman empire, marched with the ſixth legion by land into Syria. At Antioch, he received ſuch reports of the ſtate of affairs, as required his preſence in different quarters. Nine months were elapſed, ſince any orders or directions had been received from him. During this time, the factions of the city, the relaxation of diſcipline in the army, and the threats of invaſion from Africa, had placed his affairs in ſuch a ſtate of hazard, as to urge his immediate appearance in Italy and at Rome; but he thought it of conſequence to his authority to leave no enemy behind him in the field [24], nor to ſuffer the remains of diſorder in any of the provinces through which he was to paſs. Pharnaces, the ſon of Mithridates, to whom Pompey had aſſigned the kingdom of the Boſphorus, imagining that the civil wars, in which the Romans were engaged, made a favourable opportunity for the recovery of his father's dominions, had paſſed with an army into Pontus, and from thence invaded the leſſer Armenia and Cappadocia, which had been ſeparately allotted by the Romans to Dejotarus and to Ariobarzanes. At the inſtances of theſe princes, Domitius Calvinus, who had been diſpatched by Cæſar after the battle of Pharſalia with three legions to receive the ſubmiſſion of the Aſiatic provinces, hitherto in the intereſt of Pompey, diſpatched to Pharnaces a meſſenger, requiring him inſtantly to withdraw his troops from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, in order to give the more weight to this meſſage, he himſelf at the ſame time took the field with one Roman legion, together with two legions that had been formed by Dejotarus in the Roman manner, and two hundred Aſiatic horſe. He at the ſame time ordered Publius Sextius

[24] Hirt. de Bello Alex.

and C. Prætorius to bring up a legion which had been lately raiſed in Pontus, and Q. Patiſius to join him with ſome light troops from Cilicia. CHAP. VII.

Theſe forces being aſſembled at Camana in Cappadocia, the meſſenger, who had been ſent to Pharnaces, returned with an anſwer, that the king was willing to evacuate Cappadocia; but that, having a juſt claim to Armenia, in right of his father, he would keep poſſeſſion of that province until the arrival of Cæſar, to whoſe deciſion he was willing to ſubmit his pretenſions. Domitius, not being ſatisfied with this anſwer, put his army in motion towards Armenia. While he advanced, Pharnaces endeavoured to amuſe him with negociations, and to put him off his guard, by permitting the country to receive him with all the appearances of peace and ſecurity. Being arrived at Nicopolis, the capital of Armenia, he there received orders from Cæſar to march into Egypt; but being unwilling to quit his ſuppoſed prey, riſked a battle with the forces of Pharnaces, was defeated, and obliged to fly with the remains of his army, by the route of the mountains which ſeparated Armenia from the Roman province.

Elated with this victory, Pharnaces, at the time of Cæſar's departure from Egypt, had returned into Pontus, had taken poſſeſſion of the principal towns, and with great ſeverity exerciſed the ſovereignty of the kingdom. About the middle of July, Cæſar, having diſpatched Trebonius from Antioch with an account of his own operations, and with inſtructions to thoſe who commanded in Italy [23], went himſelf by ſea to Tarſus, where he received, as has been mentioned, the ſubmiſſion of Caius Caſſius, who waited for his coming; and who, according to the account of Cicero, till then was undetermined, whether he ſhould make his peace with the victor, or attempt to aſſaſſinate him.

[23] Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 23.

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At Tarſus, Cæſar held a convention of the principal inhabitants of Cilicia, and from thence marched into Cappadocia, ſtopped at Comana to make the neceſſary arrangements in that province, and continued his route to the frontiers of Galatia and Pontus. Hither Dejotarus, who had eſpouſed the cauſe of Pompey, who had fought under his banners in Pharſalia, and who, by the gift of that unfortunate officer, ſtill retained the ſovereignty of Galatia, came to make his ſubmiſſion. He laid down his diadem, and the enſigns of royalty; and, preſenting himſelf in the habit of a ſuppliant, pleaded, that, in the late war, the eaſtern part of the empire, being ſubject to Pompey, the princes of that quarter had not been free to chuſe their party; that he was himſelf not qualified to decide in a queſtion on which the Roman People was divided; that he thought it his duty to follow the Roman ſtandard wherever it was erected, without conſidering by whom it was carried. Cæſar, rejecting the plea of ignorance or incapacity, inſiſted, that any prince in alliance with the Romans could not be ignorant who were Conſuls in the year that ſucceeded the Conſulate of Lentulus and Marcellus, and who were actually in the adminiſtration of the ſtate at Rome; that they could not be ignorant who was at the head of the republic, and in poſſeſſion of the capital, and of the ſeat of empire; and who of conſequence was veſted with the authority of the commonwealth. But that he himſelf, in the capacity of a private man, was willing, in conſideration of this prince's age, his character, and the interceſſion of his friends, to forgive the part which he had taken againſt him. He deſired him, therefore, to reſume the crown and other enſigns of royalty, and to keep poſſeſſion of his kingdom, reſerving the diſcuſſion of the title, by which he held any particular territory, to a future day.

Being joined by a legion which Dejotarus had lately formed in the Roman manner, Cæſar's force now conſiſted of this, together with the remains of the two legions that eſcaped with Domitius from Nicopolis,

copolis, and of the ſixth, which had accompanied himſelf from Egypt, now reduced by the ſword, and by the fatigues of ſervice, to no more than a thouſand men. With this army he advanced towards Pontus. Upon his approach, Pharnaces ſent forward a meſſenger to preſent him, in honour of his late victories, with a crown of gold, and made offers of ſubmiſſion, expecting to appeaſe him, or to fill up the time until Cæſar ſhould be obliged, by the neceſſity of his affairs, to give his preſence elſewhere. "Come not againſt me," he ſaid, "as an "enemy: I never took part with Pompey, nor declared war againſt "Cæſar. Let me not be treated with more ſeverity than Dejotarus, "who did both." Cæſar replied, That he would liſten to Pharnaces when he had acted up to his profeſſions; that he had forgiven Dejotarus, and many others, with pleaſure, the injury done to himſelf; but that he could not ſo eaſily overlook inſults which were offered to the Roman State; and that he did not pardon wrongs done in the provinces of the Roman empire, even by thoſe of his own party. "Your not having joined with Pompey," he ſaid, "has ſaved you "from being a partner in his defeat, but was not the cauſe of my "victory." With this reply to the meſſages of Pharnaces, Cæſar demanded the inſtant ſurrender of the kingdom of Pontus, and full reparation of all the damages ſuſtained by any Roman citizens ſettled in that province. Pharnaces profeſſed an intention to comply with theſe demands; but under various pretences delayed the performance of his promiſe. He had fixed on a hill in the neighbourhood of Ziecla, a place that became famous by the victory which his father Mithridates had there obtained over a Roman army under the command of Triarius: and in order to ſecure himſelf, repaired his father's lines, and ſeemed to be determined to maintain this poſt.

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Cæſar, having lain for ſome days within five miles of the enemy, advanced to an eminence ſeparated from the camp of Pharnaces only by a narrow valley ſunk between ſteep banks. He came upon

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this ground in the night, and began to intrench himſelf as uſual, having a party under arms to cover the workmen. As at break of day the greater part of his army appeared to be at work, this ſeemed to be a favourable opportunity to attack them; and Pharnaces began to form for this purpoſe. Cæſar, imagining that he only meant to give an alarm, and to interrupt his workmen; even after he was in motion, did not order the legions to deſiſt from their work, nor to arm: but ſeeing him deſcend into the valley, and attempt to paſs it in the face of his advanced guard, he ſounded to arms, and was ſcarcely formed when the enemy had paſſed both banks of the vale to attack him.

The troops of Pharnaces began the action with an ardour that was ſuited to the boldneſs with which they had advanced; and Cæſar's contempt of their deſigns had nearly expoſed him to a defeat. But the action, which was doubtful every where elſe, was decided by the veterans of the ſixth legion, before whom the enemy began to give way, hurried with precipitation down the declivity, and fell into a general rout. Pharnaces fled with a few attendants, and narrowly eſcaped being taken [24]. This victory gave Cæſar an opportunity to compare his own glories with thoſe of Sylla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey; and was on this account, probably, regarded by him with ſingular pleaſure. "How cheap is fame," he ſaid, "when obtained "by fighting againſt ſuch an enemy [25]?" And in the triumphs which he afterwards led in the ſequel of theſe wars, the trophies of this particular victory were diſtinguiſhed by labels, expreſſing in theſe words, "I came, I ſaw, I vanquiſhed [26]."

From the peculiar oſtentation of the eaſe with which this victory was obtained, appearing to Cæſar as a meaſure of his own ſuperiority to Sylla and Pompey, we may ſuſpect that vanity, not leſs than ambition, was the ſpring of that emulation from which he had raiſed

[24] Hirtius de Bello Alex. Velleius. Florus. Liv. Epitome, &c.
[25] Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 185. [26] The famous words, *Veni, vidi, vici.*

ſuch

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ſuch a flame in the empire [36]. Having, by this defeat, extinguiſhed all the hopes and pretenſions of Pharnaces, he reſtored Domitius Calvinus to his command in that quarter, and to a general inſpection of affairs in Aſia. This province, which had furniſhed a principal ſupply to the public revenue of the State, as well as to the private fortune of Roman adventurers, was now made to pay large contributions in name of arrears of what had been promiſed to Pompey, or of forfeiture for offences committed againſt the victorious party.

Cæſar, having iſſued his orders for the contributions to be levied in Aſia, ſet out by Galatia and Bithynia towards Greece, in his way to Italy; he landed at Tarentum, having been near two years abſent from Rome. Many citizens had waited near twelve months at Brundiſium in anxious expectation of his coming, and under great uncertainty of the reception they were to meet with. Cicero, being of this number, ſet out for Tarentum as ſoon as he heard of Cæſar's arrival, and met him on the road. When he preſented himſelf, Cæſar alighted from his carriage, received him with marks of reſpect, and continued to walk and to diſcourſe with him aſide for ſome time. There is no particular account of what paſſed between them in this converſation. On the part of Cicero, probably, were ſtated the reaſons which he aſſigns, in a letter to Atticus, for his conduct before the battle of Pharſalia, bearing, that he had been averſe to the war, that he thought the republic had nothing to gain by the victory of either party, and that he joined Pompey, more influenced by the opinion of others, than decided in his own [37]. Under theſe impreſſions, though courted by Cæſar, who wiſhed to have the credit of his name in ſupport of the meaſures now to be taken at Rome, he choſe to withdraw to a life of retirement, and devoted his time to literary amuſements and ſtudies. At this time he probably compoſed

[36] Sueton. in Vit. Cæſaris, c. 37.

[37] Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 11.

moſt

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moſt of his writings on the ſubject of eloquence, as he did ſome time afterwards thoſe which are termed his philoſophical works [88].

U. C. 706. C. Jul. Cæſar, M. Æmilius Lepidus.

Cæſar arrived at Rome in the end of the year ſeven hundred and ſix of the Roman æra, in which he had been named a ſecond time Dictator. This year, as has been related, he had paſſed chiefly in Egypt. Being elected, together with M. Emilius, Conſul for the following year, he applied himſelf, for a little time, in the capacity of civil magiſtrate to the affairs of State; endeavoured to reſtore the tranquillity of the city, which had been diſturbed in his abſence, and to wipe away the reproach which the levities of Antony had brought on his party. He ſtifled the unreaſonable hopes of a general abolition of debts, with which Dolabella had flattered the more profligate part of the community. He told the People, on this occaſion, that he himſelf was a debtor; that he had expended his fortune in the public ſervice, and was ſtill obliged to borrow money for the ſame purpoſes. With reſpect to the general policy of the city, and the caſe of inſolvent debtors, he revived the laws which he himſelf had procured, about two years before, in his way from Spain to Epirus. But while he appeared to be intent on theſe particulars, his thoughts were chiefly occupied in preparing to meet the war which the remains of the antient Senate and of the republican party were reſuming againſt him in Africa.

This province, in which Varus, ſupported by the king of Numidia, had been hitherto able to keep his ſtation as an officer of the commonwealth, was now become the ſole or the principal refuge of the republican party. Three hundred citizens, many of them Senators, and exiles from Italy, as well as ſettlers in that province, had aſſembled at Utica, and conſidering every other part of the empire as under the influence of a violent uſurpation, ſtated themſelves as the only

[88] Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xv. ep. 13.

free

free remains of the Roman republic; held their meetings in the capacity of Senate and People; authoriſed, under theſe titles, the levies that were made in the province, and contributed largely to ſupply the expence of the war. Many officers of name and of rank, Labienus, Afranius, Petreius, as well as Scipio and Cato, with all the remains they had ſaved from the wreck at Pharſalia, were now ready to renew the war on this ground. The name of Scipio was reckoned ominous of ſucceſs in Africa, and that of Cato, even if the origin or occaſion of the preſent conteſt were unknown, was held a ſufficient mark to diſtinguiſh the ſide of juſtice, and the cauſe of the republic.

Theſe leaders of the republican party, having a conſiderable force at ſea, and having acceſs to all the ports, not only of Africa, but likewiſe of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, had furniſhed themſelves plentifully with all the neceſſaries for war [29]. They had muſtered ten legions, which, according to the eſtabliſhment of that time, may have amounted to fifty thouſand Roman foot. They had twenty thouſand African horſe, a great body of archers and ſlingers, with a hundred and twenty elephants. They expected to be joined by the king of Numidia, who, to the eſtabliſhed character of his countrymen for ſtratagem and valour, joined the glory of his late victory over Curio; and was ſuppoſed to muſter, at this time, beſides numerous bodies of horſe, of archers, of ſlingers, and a great troop of elephants; thirty thouſand foot, armed and marſhalled, for the moſt part, in the manner of the Roman legion [30].

The army already in Africa, as well as the remains of the ſea and land forces of Pompey, who were lately arrived from Macedonia, were willing, as has been mentioned, to have placed Cato at their head. But the eſtabliſhed order of the commonwealth, for which all the party con-

[29] Dio. Caſſ. lib. lxii. c. 5. [30] App. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Hurt. de Bell. African.

tended, requiring that Scipio, who was of conſular rank, ſhould have the preference, Cato, who had no more than the rank of Prætor, and who could not be acceſſary to the infringement of any eſtabliſhed or conſtitutional form, declined the command. By this circumſtance we are deprived of an opportunity to judge how far the military abilities of this great man kept pace with his integrity, judgment, and courage in civil and political affairs.

Scipio being the officer of higheſt rank in the republican party, and having the ſupreme command of their forces, notwithſtanding that the coaſts of Italy were expoſed to his attempts, and notwithſtanding that the condition of Cæſar himſelf, if his ſituation at Alexandria had been known, gave ſufficient opportunities for enterprize, took all his meaſures for a defenſive war.

Such was the ſtate of affairs in Africa when Cæſar, who, with all his military character and authority, frequently experienced the difficulty of commanding mere ſoldiers of fortune, taught to diveſt themſelves of civil principle, or regard to public duty, was likely to periſh in a mutiny of his own army, and to end his career by the ſwords which he himſelf had whetted againſt the republic.

The legions, which after the defeat of Pompey had been ordered into Italy, becoming inſolent in the poſſeſſion of a military power which they ſaw was to be formed on the ruins of the commonwealth, and feeling their own importance, eſpecially in the abſence of their leader, would not be commanded by ſubordinate officers; nor did they, on the return of Cæſar himſelf, diſcontinue habits of diſorder and licence which they had ſome time indulged. Being ſtationed in the neighbourhood of Capua, from whence it was expected they ſhould embark for Africa, they decamped without orders, and marched towards Rome; paid no regard to the authority of Salluſt, who, in the capacity of Prætor, with which he had

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been veſted by Cæſar, endeavoured to ſtop them, killed many officers and perſons of rank who ventured to oppoſe them, and threw the city into great conſternation. On the approach of this formidable body, Cæſar himſelf is ſaid to have wavered in his reſolution. He had ſome troops attending his perſon, and there was a legion which Antony had ſtationed in the city on occaſion of the late commotions. With theſe he at firſt propoſed to meet and reſiſt the mutiny; but he recollected, that even theſe troops might be infected with the ſame ſpirit of diſobedience, and that if he were not able to command by his authority, and were forced to draw the ſword againſt his own army, the whole foundations of the power he had erected muſt fail. While he was agitated by theſe reflections, he ſent an officer with orders to enquire for what purpoſe the mutinous legions advanced? This officer was told, "That they would "explain themſelves to Cæſar." Having this anſwer, and expecting their arrival at the gates, he choſe that they ſhould appear to do by his permiſſion, what they were likely to do without it; he therefore ſent them another meſſage, informing them that they had his leave to enter the city with their arms. They accordingly came in a body, and took poſſeſſion of the field of Mars. There, contrary to the advice of his friends, they were received by Cæſar himſelf in perſon. Being raiſed on a conſpicuous place, they crowded around him; and, from many different quarters at once, complained of the ſcanty rewards which they had received [30], enumerated their ſervices and the hardſhips they had ſuffered, and with one voice demanded their inſtant diſcharge. Cæſar knowing that they only meant to extort ſome conceſſions, which they hoped the conſideration of the war, which was ſtill impending in Africa, would oblige him to make; that they were far from wiſhing to be diſmiſſed, or to reſign thoſe arms to which they

[30] Dio. Caſſius, c. 51—55.

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owed their own conſequence, and on which they grounded their preſent preſumption, affected to comply with their requeſt, owned that their demand was highly reaſonable; adding, that the ſervice for which they had been hitherto retained was now at an end, and that he was ſenſible they were worn out, and unfit to contend with new fatigues.

Cæſar, in concluding a ſpeech which he made to this purpoſe, employed the appellation of *Quirites*, or fellow citizens; and obſerved how proper it was that all, who had ſerved out the legal time, ſhould receive the accuſtomed diſmiſſion. In ſpeaking theſe words, he was interrupted by a general cry, that they were no Quirites, but ſoldiers, willing to ſerve. It is alleged, that the name of Roman citizens [a], though the moſt reſpectable form of addreſs in the political aſſemblies of the People, carried contempt to theſe military adventurers, and inſinuated a ſtate of degradation from that in which they affected to ſtand. An officer who was prepared for the occaſion, or who wiſhed to improve this ſentiment in favour of Cæſar, deſired to be heard; made an apology for what was paſt, and offered to pledge himſelf for the duty and future obedience of the troops. He was anſwered by Cæſar, That the ſervices of this army were now of little moment to him; that as they deſired their diſmiſſion, while by their own confeſſion they were yet in condition to ſerve, he had taken his reſolution, and ſhould inſtantly diſmiſs them with the uſual rewards. "No man," he ſaid, "ſhall complain that in time of need I em-"ployed him, and now at my eaſe forget the reward that is due to "him. Such as continue in the ſervice until the public tranquillity "is fully reſtored ſhall have ſettlements in land; ſuch as have received "promiſes of money at any time during the war, ſhall be paid now, "or in a little time hereafter, with intereſt." He concluded, however,

[a] Quirites, Roman citizens.

ever, with saying, "That as he asked no man to remain in the "service, so he should not reject the duty of those who were will- "ing to abide by their colours; that he owed this indulgence to their "present requests, and to their merit on former occasions." The whole with one voice desired to be comprehended in this act of indulgence, and went headlong into all the extremes of submission, as they had lately gone into every excess of disorder and insolence; Cæsar was thus again in full possession of his power; but he did not venture to punish the authors of the mutiny. It was safer to reward such as were conspicuous in any particular merit; he therefore selected a few to be distinguished by immediate effects of his bounty, and put the remainder in motion towards Africa, where they might have an opportunity of earning future rewards and the pardon of past offences; and where they might spend against enemies that fury which, at every interval of leisure to recollect their pretensions and their consequence, they were so likely to turn against their leader[32].

The year was now, according to the vulgar computation at Rome, and in consequence of the usual intercalations being neglected, nominally advanced to the middle of December, but was in reality little past the autumnal equinox[33], or was in the end of September, when Cæsar, having made the proper arrangements in the city, and in the manner related, appeased the mutiny which threatened to deprive him of his army, was again in motion to carry the war into Africa. The season, which was thought unfit for operations at sea, and which had actually forced his antagonist's ships into port, gave him the opportunity he wished for to effect his passage into that province. He knew that the enemy's fleet could not continue to cruize for any time to observe his motions; and that he might escape them with the advantage of a favourable wind, he had chosen the same opportunity, and

[32] Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 51—55.

[33] Plut. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 154.

in

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in the ſame ſeaſon, two years before, to tranſport his army into Macedonia againſt Pompey, who, truſting to the numbers and vigilance of his fleet, ſuffered himſelf to be ſurpriſed, and to be diſpoſſeſſed of a country which he occupied with ſo ſuperior a force. Cæſar having gained ſo much on that occaſion, by the rapidity of his motions, now made war with many accumulated advantages of reputation and power, which increaſed his boldneſs, and facilitated his ſucceſs.

Having ordered troops and ſhipping from different quarters of Italy to aſſemble at Lillybæum, from whence he had the ſhorteſt paſſage to Africa, he himſelf arrived there on what was nominally the ſeventeenth of December, but in reality no more than the thirtieth of September; and although he found no more of his army arrived than one legion, or five thouſand men, of the new levies, and ſix hundred horſe, he ordered theſe, notwithſtanding, to embark on board ſuch ſhips as were then in the harbour; and if the wind had ſerved, would have inſtantly ſailed, even with this ſmall force, truſting that he might be able to ſurpriſe ſome port on the oppoſite ſhore, and prepare a ſafe landing-place for the troops that were to follow. But while he continued windbound at Lillybæum, he was joined ſucceſſively by a number of legions, which he ordered to embark as faſt as they arrived; and, that they might be ready to put to ſea with the firſt fair wind that ſerved, ſent the tranſports to lie under an iſland near the mouth of the harbour.

Being in this ſtate of readineſs with ſix legions, or about thirty thouſand foot, together with two thouſand horſe; and the wind coming fair on the twenty-eight of December, or, as it is computed, on the twelfth of October, he himſelf went on board, and leaving orders for the troops that were ſtill in motion towards Lillybæum to follow him without delay, he ſet ſail for the neareſt land in Africa. Not knowing of any port to which he might ſecurely repair, he could not, as uſual, aſſign a place of general reſort in caſe of ſeparation, and only gave

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gave orders to the fleet to keep cloſe together; and deferred the choice of a landing-place till after he ſhould have obſerved the coaſt, and ſeen in what part of it the enemy were leaſt guarded againſt a deſcent. Soon after he got to ſea a ſtorm aroſe, which diſperſed the fleet; he himſelf, with the ſhips that ſtill kept him company, after being toſſed four days in a paſſage of no more than twenty leagues, got under the land of the promontory of Mercury, and from thence, to avoid the forces of the enemy, which were ſtationed near Utica and round the bay of Carthage, ſteered to the ſouthward.

The coaſt of Africa, from this cape or promontory to the bottom of the great Syrtes, over three degrees of latitude, or about two hundred miles, extends directly to the ſouth. It abounds with conſiderable towns, which, on account of their commerce, were anciently called the Emporiæ; and by their wealth, tempting the rapacity both of the Numidians and of the Carthaginians, were long a ſubject of contention between theſe powers. Adrumetum lay on one ſide of a ſpacious bay, bounded by the head of Clupea on the north, and that of Vada on the ſouth. The ſouthern coaſt of this bay contained, beſides Adrumetum, the following ſeaports: Ruſpina, Leptis, and Thapſus; the bay itſelf extending from the firſt of theſe places to the laſt about thirty-ſix miles. Scipio had ſecured Adrumetum and Thapſus, being the extremity of this line, with conſiderable forces. In order to render the province unfit for the reception of an enemy, he had laid waſte the country, and had collected all the proviſions and forage into theſe and other places of ſtrength for the uſe of his own army.

Conſidius being ſtationed at Adrumetum with two legions, and Virgilius with a proper force at Thapſus, the ports of Ruſpina and Leptis, as well as many of the inland towns, were intruſted to the keeping of their own inhabitants. But theſe, on account of the general devaſtations lately committed by order of Scipio, were extremely

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tremely diſaffected to his party, and inclined to favour any enemy againſt him.

Cato was ſtationed at Utica as the laſt retreat of the Roman Senate, the centre of all their reſources, and the ſeat of their councils.

Scipio had collected the main body of his army near to the ſame place, ſuppoſed to be the principal object of any attempt that might be made from Italy.

Labienus and Petreius had ſeparate bodies, at proper ſtations, to guard the inlets of the coaſt round the bay of Carthage; and were ſo diſpoſed of, that they could eaſily join and croſs over land to the bay of Adrumetum upon any alarm of an enemy, from that ſide.

Varus had the direction of the fleet. He had kept the ſea during ſummer and on the approach of autumn, but had then withdrawn to Utica, and laid up his ſhips for the ſtormy ſeaſon.

Cæſar, however, according to his cuſtom of taking opportunities when his enemies were likely to be off their guard, venturing to ſea, even in this ſeaſon, ſeems to have had no information to direct him on his approach to the coaſt, beſides the general report that the enemy were ſtrongeſt and moſt to be avoided in the bay of Carthage. In this belief he paſſed the head-lands of Clupea and Neapolis, and ſtood in to the bay of Adrumetum. Being ſeen from the ſhore, he was followed by Cn. Piſo from Clupea, with three thouſand Numidian horſe, and was received at Adrumetum by Conſidius, with a force greatly ſuperior to that with which he himſelf had brought to the coaſt. But ſo little had he attended to the ſtrength of the enemy, or ſo much was he determined to brave it, that he landed near Adrumetum on the nominal firſt of January, or about the middle of October, with three thouſand foot and an hundred and fifty horſe. This hazardous ſtep his high reputation ſeemed to require or to juſtify. The enemy might not be appriſed of his preſent weakneſs, it being occaſioned to the accidental ſeparation of his fleet. They were

N. C. 6. Jul. Cæſar Dictat. 3tio, M. Emil. Lepidus, M. Eq.

likely

likely to be awed by his name, and to remain at a diſtance long enough to let him be joined by the remainder of his army. In the mean time he ſupported the courage of his own people, by proceeding againſt the enemy with his uſual confidence.

The garriſon of Adrumetum, upon this ſudden appearance of a force which came to attack them, were thrown into ſome confuſion, and Conſidius, inſtead of taking meaſures to cruſh ſo inferior an enemy before he ſhould receive any reinforcement, thought of nothing but how to ſecure himſelf from ſurpriſe; ſhut his gates, manned his walls, and placed all the troops under his command at their poſts of alarm. Cæſar, to confirm him in this diſpoſition, ſent him a ſummons to ſurrender at diſcretion; and afterwards, at the ſuggeſtion of Plancus, who had been in habits of intimacy with Conſidius, endeavoured to corrupt or to gain him by an inſinuating meſſage; but this officer, being more a man of integrity than he had ſhewn himſelf to be an able general, ordered the bearer of the meſſage to be put to death, and ſent the letter unopened to Scipio.

Cæſar having received no return to his meſſage, and ſuſpecting that his attempt to corrupt the commander of the forces at Adrumetum might betray his weakneſs, after only one night's ſtay in this dangerous ſituation, determined, on the day after he landed, to remove to ſome place of greater ſecurity. With this view he marched to the ſouthward, and though haraſſed in his rear by the enemy's horſe, continued his march without any conſiderable interruption or loſs. As he advanced to Ruſpina, a deputation from the inhabitants of that place came forward to meet him, with offers of every accommodation it was in their power to ſupply, and of an immediate reception into their town. He encamped one night under their walls; but being inclined to ſee more of the coaſt, and not being in condition to divide his little force, he proceeded with the whole to Leptis. Here he was received with equal favour; and

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having entered the town, took measures to protect the inhabitants from the licentiousness of his own people.

This was a convenient post for the reception of his transports; and a few of them accordingly, having some cohorts of foot and troops of horse on board, it being now the third day after he himself had debarked, or about the twentieth of October, put in to the harbour of Leptis. By the report of persons who came in these ships he learnt, that numbers of the fleet, after they had parted company, appeared to be steering for Utica; a course by which they must either run into the hands of the enemy, or lose much time before they could correct their mistake, or recover their way to the southward.

In a state of anxious suspence, occasioned by these circumstances, Cæsar seems to have deliberated, whether it were not proper for him again to embark; and in consequence of his doubts, probably, though under pretence of the want of forage, he still kept his cavalry on board, and with great difficulty continued to supply them with fresh water from the land. But as soon as he determined to keep his footing in Africa, he landed his cavalry, and took the necessary measures to procure supplies of provisions by sea. He sent back the empty transports to receive any troops that might be arrived at Lillybæum, and ordered ten galleys from the harbour at Leptis to cruize for the missing ships of his last embarkation. He dispatched expresses to Sardinia and other maritime provinces, with orders to hasten the reinforcements of troops and the supplies of provisions which were expected from thence; and having intelligence that the enemy had some magazines in the island of Cercina, near the coast of Africa, he sent thither Crispus Sallustius, the celebrated historian, now serving in his army, to endeavour to secure those magazines for his use.

Being determined to keep both the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which the enemy seemed to have abandoned to him, he was now,

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by the arrival of the cohorts which joined him at Leptis, in condition to garriſon the town with three thouſand men, while he himſelf returned with the remainder of thoſe who were landed, to keep his poſſeſſion, at the ſame time, of Ruſpina. This place being unprovided of every neceſſary for the ſupport of a garriſon, he determined to try what proviſions could be found in the neighbourhood to ſubſiſt his troops till they could be otherwiſe ſupplied, or enabled to penetrate farther into the country. For this purpoſe he advanced with the whole of his little army to forage, followed by all the carriages that could be aſſembled, and had them loaded with corn, wood, and other neceſſaries, to form ſome ſpecies of magazine for the troops he intended to place in the town. As ſoon as he had effected this ſervice, it appeared that he had taken the reſolution to go, in perſon in ſearch of the tranſports, on board of which the greater part of his army was diſperſed. And with this view having poſted ten cohorts at Ruſpina, he himſelf, with the ſeven others, that made the whole of his ſtrength now on ſhore, went down to the harbour, which was about two miles from the town, and embarked in the night.

The troops that were to be left at Ruſpina, without the leader, in whom their confidence was chiefly repoſed, were aware of their danger; ſo few, ſurrounded with numerous armies who were likely to aſſemble againſt them. They had now been three days on ſhore, and the enemy had full time to be appriſed of their ſituation and of their weakneſs. The preſence of their general had hitherto ſupported their courage; they relied on his abilities to repair the effects whether of miſtake or temerity; but in his abſence they loſt all hopes, and expected to become an eaſy prey to their enemies.

Cæſar, however, fully determined to put to ſea, having paſt the night on board, ſtill continued at anchor; when at break of day being about to weigh, ſome veſſels came in ſight, and were known to be a part of the fleet which he ſo anxiouſly looked for. Theſe

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were ſoon followed by other ſhips which appeared ſucceſſively, and brought him the greater part of the ſix legions with which he had originally ſailed from Lillybæum. Being thus prevented in his intended excurſion, he returned to Ruſpina, and took poſt between the town and the ſhore.

In the mean time it appears, that Labienus and Petreius, commanding the horſe and light troops of Scipio's army, in the angle that is formed by the promontory of Clupea, between the bays of Carthage and Hadrumetum, having intelligence that Cæſar was landed, with the utmoſt diligence aſſembled their forces, and marched towards the coaſt from which they had received the alarm.

Cæſar had taken a defenſive ſtation behind the town of Ruſpina, the place which he choſe for the reſort and ſafe reception of his convoys and reinforcements by ſea; but he was far from limiting his plan of operations to the defence of this place. On the fourth or fifth day after his landing, although by his own account he had yet no intelligence of the enemy's motions, he thought proper to continue the alarm he had given, and marched from Ruſpina with a body of thirty cohorts, or about fifteen thouſand foot, and four hundred horſe, to penetrate into the country to obſerve its ſituation, or to extend the ſource of his ſupplies. After he had begun his march for this purpoſe, and was about three miles from his camp, the parties that were advanced before him fell back on the main body, and informed him that they had been in ſight of an enemy. Soon after this report clouds of duſt began to riſe from the plain, and about noon an army appeared in order of battle. To obſerve them more nearly, Cæſar, after he had made the ſignal for the cohorts to form, and to be covered with their helmets, went forward with a ſmall party to view the enemy. He ſaw bodies of cavalry in every part of the field; and from the imperfect view which could be had of them, as the air was clouded with duſt, he ſuppoſed their line to conſiſt

intirely of horſe. He thought himſelf ſecure againſt ſuch an enemy, provided he could ſufficiently extend, his front and cover his flanks; and for this purpoſe he divided his ſmall body of horſe to the right and the left; and that he might not be outlined, diminſhed the depth to increaſe the length of his ordinary column. In making this diſpoſition, however, he had miſtaken the enemy's force; it did not conſiſt, as he ſuppoſed, intirely of cavalry, but of troops of horſe interſperſed at intervals with bodies of foot, and he had not obſerved that conſiderable detachments were ſent under cover of the hills to turn his flanks, and fall upon his rear.

Under theſe diſadvantages on the part of Cæſar, the action began in front by a ſcattered charge of the Numidian horſe, who came in ſquadrons from the intervals at which they were placed among the infantry, and advancing at full gallop, threw their javelins and darts, and preſently retired to their former ſituation. In this retreat, under cover of the infantry whoſe intervals they occupied, they inſtantly rallied, and prepared to repeat the charge.

While Cæſar's infantry was occupied in front with this unexpected mode of attack, his horſe were defeated on the wings; and the enemy, in conſequence of the diſpoſition they had made, were already on his right and left, even began to cloſe on his rear, and, by the ſuperiority of their numbers, were enabled to continue the impreſſion they made on every ſide; his men giving way, to ſhun the arrows and darts of the enemy, were preſſed from the flanks to the centre; ſo that they were forced into a circle, without any diſtinction of front or rear, and were galled with a continual diſcharge of miſſiles, which did great execution [1].

Cæſar, who ſo far had ſuffered himſelf to be ſurpriſed and overreached, in this difficult ſituation, took the benefit of that confidence which his known ability and preſence of mind ever pro-

[1] Cæſaris copiis in orbem compulſis, intra cancellos omnes conjecti pugnare cogebantur.

cured

cured him from his troops. Recollecting that the enemy muſt have weakened their line in every part, by attempting to ſtretch it over ſo great a circumference, he prevailed on his legions again to extend their ranks, ordered the cohorts to face alternately to the right and the left, and making a front in both directions, charged the enemy on the oppoſite ſides, and drove them in both ways to a diſtance from the ground. Without attempting, however, to improve his advantage, or to urge the purſuit, he took the opportunity of the enemy's flight to effect his own retreat, and fell back to the camp behind Ruſpina, from which he had moved in the morning.

The ſpeedy march of Labienus and Petreius, from a diſtance which could not be leſs than eighty or a hundred miles, accompliſhed by the fourth or fifth day after the arrival of Cæſar, and their diſpoſition on the day of battle, to avail themſelves of their numbers and manner of fighting, was able and ſpirited. But the event is ſufficient to ſhow that the uſe of mere miſſile weapons in the open plain againſt troops who are armed and diſciplined for cloſe fight, although it may haraſs and diſtreſs an enemy, cannot have any deciſive effect.

In about three days after this encounter, Cæſar had intelligence that Scipio himſelf was advancing with the whole force of his infantry, conſiſting of eight legions, or about forty thouſand men, and four thouſand regular horſe: an army which he was not in condition to oppoſe in the field, and which obliged him, contrary to his uſual practice, to adopt a plan of defence. Ruſpina lay along the coaſt, and at the diſtance of two miles from the ſhore. As his army lay behind the town; covering part of the ſpace between it and the ſea with the fortifications of his camp, he threw up an intrenchment from his camp on one ſide, and from the end of the town on the other, quite to the ſhore; ſo that, by means of the town in front, the fortifications of his camp and theſe lines in flank, the whole ſpace between Ruſpina and the ſea was covered with works. And the harbour was thus ſecured from any attempts of the enemy.

enemy. In order to man and defend theſe fortifications, he landed his engines from the galleys, and brought the mariners to ſerve them on ſhore.

The choice of this ſituation, cooped up in a narrow place, expoſed to be deprived of any communication with the country, might, in caſe the enemy had ſeized their advantage, or in caſe the reinforcements which Cæſar had expected from the ſea, had by any accident been long delayed, have expoſed him to the greateſt calamities. He himſelf would not have neglected to hem in an enemy ſo poſted with a line of circumvallation; but the undertaking was too vaſt for thoſe who were oppoſed to him, and he was ſuffered in ſafety to wait the arrival of his reinforcements, and to collect ſome immediate ſupply of proviſions from the neighbouring country, as well as to receive convoys which he had ordered from every maritime province.

While Cæſar remained in this poſt, Scipio arrived at Adrumetum, and having halted there a few days, joined Labienus and Petreius in the ſtation they had choſen, about three miles from the town of Ruſpina. Their cavalry immediately over-ran the country, and interrupted the ſupplies which Cæſar derived from thence. The ſpace he had incloſed within his entrenchments being about ſix ſquare miles, was ſoon exhauſted even of forage or paſture, and his horſes reduced to feed on ſea-weed, which was ſteeped in freſh water, in order to purge it as much as poſſible of its ſalt.

To encourage the hopes which Scipio entertained from all theſe circumſtances, the king of Numidia, with a powerful army, was on the march, and likely to join him before Cæſar could receive any conſiderable addition to his preſent force; but whatever might have been the conſequence of this junction, if it had really taken place, it was delayed for ſome time by one of thoſe ſtrokes of fortune to which human foreſight cannot extend. Publius Sitius, a Roman citizen,

citizen, who had been an accomplice with Cataline in his deſigns againſt the republic, and who, on this account, had fled beyond reach of the Roman power, had aſſembled a band of warriors or lawleſs banditti, at the head of which he made himſelf of conſequence on the coaſts of Africa, and was admitted ſucceſſively to join the forces of different princes in that quarter. Being now in the ſervice of Bogud, king of Mauritania, and being diſpoſed to court the favour of Cæſar, or hoping to make his peace at Rome by means of a perſon ſo likely to be at the head of the Roman ſtate, he perſuaded the king of Mauritania to take advantage of Juba's abſence, and with ſuch troops, as he had then on foot, to invade the kingdom of Numidia. Juba being about to join Scipio near Ruſpina, when the news of this invaſion of his own country overtook him, found himſelf obliged not only to return on his march, but to call off from his allies great part of the Numidian light troops, who were already in their camp.

Scipio, though thus diſappointed of the great acceſſion of force which he expected to receive by the junction of Juba, and though even ſomewhat reduced in his former numbers, ſtill continued to act on the offenſive; and in order to brave his enemy, and to receive ſome ſpecies of triumph from ſuppoſed offers of battle, repeatedly formed his army on the plain between the two camps. In repeating theſe operations, he advanced ſtill nearer and nearer to Cæſar's entrenchments, and ſeemed to threaten his camp with an attack. In return to this inſult, or to take off its effects, Cæſar, knowing the ſtrength of his works, affected to hear of the enemy's approach with indifference; and without moving from his tent, gave orders for the ordinary guards, which lay without the entrenchments, not to be diſcompoſed, but as ſoon as the enemy approached them, to retire behind the parapet with the utmoſt deliberation; and Scipio, upon this reception, when ſeemingly moſt bent on aſſaulting the lines, being ſatisfied

ſatisfied as uſual with this diſplay of his ſuperiority, returned to his camp.

During theſe operations, and while Juba was ſtill detained in Numidia by the diverſion which Sitius had occaſioned in his kingdom, Cæſar had frequent deſerters from the African army, and received deputations from different parts of the country, with profeſſions of attachment to himſelf as the relation of Marius, whoſe memory was ſtill recent and popular in that province. Among theſe advances, which were made to him by the natives of the country, he had a meſſage from the inhabitants of Acilla, a place ſituated about ten miles from the coaſt, and equally diſtant from Adrumetum and from Ruſpina, offering to come under his protection, and inviting him to take poſſeſſion of their town. The people of this place, like moſt other towns of the province, were extremely diſaffected to Scipio, on account of the ſeverities which he exerciſed, by laying waſte their poſſeſſions on the approach of Cæſar; and as they dreaded a repetition of the ſame meaſure, they were deſirous to put themſelves in a poſture of defence againſt him. Cæſar accepted of their offer, and ſent a detachment of his army, who turning round the enemy's flank, after a long night's march entered the town without oppoſition. Conſidius having intelligence of what was in agitation at Acilla, ſent a detachment at the ſame time from Adrumetum to ſecure the place; but coming too late, and finding that the enemy had already entered the town, brought forward ſome more forces on the following day, and endeavoured, but in vain, to diſlodge them.

While Cæſar was thus endeavouring to extend his quarters in Africa, and to enlarge the ſource of his ſubſiſtence, Criſpus Salluſtius ſucceeded in the deſign upon which he had been ſent to the iſland of Cercina, and was able to furniſh a conſiderable ſupply of proviſions from thence. There arrived at the ſame time from Allienus, at Lylybæum,

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lybæum, a large convoy and fleet of tranſports, having on board two intire legions, the thirteenth and fourteenth, together with eight hundred Gauliſh cavalry, a thouſand archers and ſlingers, and a large ſupply of proviſions. As ſoon as theſe troops were landed, the tranſports were ſent back to Lillybæum, in order to receive the remainder of the army which was ſtill expected from thence. Theſe ſupplies and reinforcements at once relieved Cæſar's army from the diſtreſs which they ſuffered; and by ſo great an acceſſion of ſtrength, amounting to twelve thouſand men, put him in condition to break from the confinement in which he had ſome time remained, and to act on the offenſive.

The firſt object upon this change in his affairs, was to ſeize upon ſome riſing grounds in the neighbourhood of Ruſpina, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, and from thence to purſue ſuch advantage as he might find againſt the enemy. For this purpoſe, he decamped after it was dark, on the ſuppoſed twenty-ſixth of January or eighth of December, and turning by the ſhore round the town of Ruſpina, arrived in the night on the ground which he intended to occupy. This was part of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coaſt, at a few miles diſtance from the ſhore, and which, on the north of Ruſpina, turns in the form of an amphitheatre round a plain of about fifteen miles extent. Near the middle of this plain ſtood the town of Uzita, on the brink of a deep marſhy tract, which is formed by the water of ſome rivulets that fall from the mountains, and ſpread upon the plain in that place. Scipio had poſted a garriſon in the town, and had occupied the ridge on one ſide of the amphitheatre beyond the marſh, but had neglected the heights, of which Cæſar now took poſſeſſion. It ſeems, that on theſe heights there remained a number of towers, or a ſpecies of caſtles conſtructed by the natives in the courſe of their own wars. In theſe Cæſar was furniſhed with a

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number of ſeparate lodgments, which he joined by lines, in order to continue his communication with the camp he had left, and with the port of Ruſpina.

He had, in one night, made a conſiderable progreſs in theſe works, and being obſerved at day-break, Scipio, in order to interrupt him, advanced into the plain, and formed in order of battle, about a mile in the front of his own encampment. Cæſar, notwithſtanding this movement of the enemy, did not at firſt think it neceſſary to interrupt his works; but Scipio ſeeming to come forward with intention to attack him, while ſo great a part of his army was at work, he ordered the whole under arms, ſtill keeping the advantage of his ground on the heights. Some parties of cavalry and light troops came near enough to ſkirmiſh between the two armies, and Labienus being advanced on the right beyond the main body of Scipio's forces, Cæſar ſent a detachment round a village to attack him, and obliged him to fly in great diſorder, after having narrowly eſcaped being entirely cut off. This flight of Labienus ſpread ſo great an alarm over Scipio's army, that the whole, with precipitation, retired to their camp. Cæſar returned to his poſt, and without any farther interruption, continued to execute the works he had already begun. As ſoon as theſe were finiſhed on the following day, he again formed in order of battle, to return the defiance which the enemy had ſo often given him, while he lay in the lines of Ruſpina; and obſerving that Scipio remained in his camp, he marched on to the town of Uzita, which lay between the two armies. Scipio being alarmed for the ſafety of this place, at which he had depoſited ſome part of his magazines, advanced to ſuſtain the troops he had poſted in the town; and Cæſar, believing that an action was likely to follow, made a halt, with the town of Uzita before his centre, having both his wings extended beyond it to the right and the left. Scipio, not to extend his front beyond the walls of the town, drew up his army in four lines, conſiſting of

many ſeparate bodies interſperſed with elephants; but as Cæſar did not chuſe to attack the town, ſupported as it was by Scipio's army, neither did Scipio chuſe to expoſe any part of his line by advancing beyond it. Both armies having remained in this poſture till ſun-ſet, returned at night to their reſpective camps.

Cæſar ſtill perſiſting in his deſign to oblige the enemy to hazard a battle in defence of Uzita, projected double lines of approach from his preſent camp to the town. As the place was acceſſible to the enemy, and when their army ſhould be drawn up in order of battle, might be made a part of their line, it was impoſſible for Cæſar to inveſt the town, or even to approach the walls without hazard of being attacked on his flanks from the field, as well as in the centre from the town itſelf. In order to cover the approach which he intended to make to the walls, he carried on from his camp on the hills two entrenchments on the right and the left, forming a lane of ſufficient breadth to embrace the town. Between theſe parallel lines his troops advanced to the walls with perfect ſecurity, and under cover from any attacks that might be made on their flanks. As ſoon as this lane was effected to within the neceſſary diſtance of the walls, he threw up in front a breaſt work oppoſite to the ramparts of the town, and from thence began to conſtruct the works that were uſually employed in the reduction of fortified places.

During the dependance of this ſiege, both parties received great reinforcements. Scipio was joined by the king of Numidia, who having repelled the enemy who attempted to invade his own kingdom, now came with three bodies of regular infantry, formed in the manner of the Roman legion, eight hundred heavy armed or bridled cavalry, with a great multitude of light or irregular troops. Cæſar's army, on the appearance of this new enemy, were much diſcouraged; but on ſeeing that Scipio, even after he was joined by the king of Numidia, ſtill remained on the defenſive, they re-

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ſumed their former confidence, and were themſelves ſoon after reinforced by the arrival of two more legions, the ninth and the tenth, who on their firſt approach to the coaſt, miſtook for an enemy ſome galleys which Cæſar had ſtationed off the harbour of Thapſus, and under this miſtake ſtood off again to ſea, where they ſuffered many days from ſickneſs, want of proviſions, and of water.

Theſe legions having been the principal authors of the late mutiny in Italy, are ſaid to have now come without orders, intending to evince their zeal, and to court their general's favour, at a time when their ſervice might be not only acceptable, but neceſſary to his ſafety. The principal hiſtorian of this war[34], however, relates only, that Cæſar having obſerved Tribunes and Centurions of theſe legions to have occupied intire tranſports with their own equipage, to the excluſion of the troops which were then ſo much wanted for the ſervice, he took this opportunity to execute a piece of juſtice, which he had thought proper to remit, or to defer on a former occaſion. That he diſmiſſed ſeveral officers of theſe legions from the ſervice, with the following terms of reproach: "For you, who have incited "the troops of the Roman people to mutiny againſt the republic, "who have plundered the allies, and been uſeleſs to the ſtate; who, "in place of ſoldiers, have filled tranſports with your ſervants and "horſes; who, without courage in the field, or modeſty in your "quarters, have been more formidable to your country than to her "enemies, I judge you unworthy of any truſt in the ſervice of the "republic, and therefore order you forthwith to be gone from the "province, and to keep at a diſtance from all the ſtations of the "Roman army."

The other incidents, which are dated by hiſtorians during the dependance of the ſiege of Uzita, do not ſerve to make us acquainted

[34] Hirtius.

with

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with its progreſs, or with the detail of its operations. The ſeaſon we are told was ſtormy, and Cæſar's army, in order to crowd the more eaſily on board of the tranſports, had left great part of their equipage behind them in Sicily, and were now without any covering, beſides their ſhields, expoſed to heavy rains and hail, accompanied with thunder and appearances of fire, which, to their great amazement, inſtead of the ordinary flaſhes of lightning, became ſtationary, and for a ſenſible time continued to flame on the points of their ſpears. While this ſtorm continued, the ground upon which they lay was overflowed with water, or waſhed with continual torrents from the hills. Cæſar, nevertheleſs, perſiſted in the attack of Uzita, and ſeemed ſtill to flatter himſelf that the defence of this place would lay the enemy under ſome diſadvantage, which might furniſh him with an opportunity to decide the war. The armies were accordingly often drawn out in order of battle, and were preſent at partial engagements of their cavalry or irregular troops, but without any general action.

In the midſt of the great expectations which muſt have attended the operations of this ſiege, Cæſar had one of the many occaſions, on which he was ever ſo ready to commit his genius, his reputation, and his life, in acts of ſeeming temerity, which perſons of inferior ability may admire, but never can ſafely imitate. Varus, with a fleet of fifty galleys, had ſurpriſed and burnt the greater part of his ſhipping at Leptis, and was in chace of Acquila, who, with an inferior ſquadron, was flying before him to the ſouthward. Cæſar apprehended that the enemy, in conſequence of this advantage, if not ſpeedily checked, muſt ſoon be maſters of the ſea, ſo as to cut off all his ſupplies and reinforcements from the coaſts. He knew that reputation gained or loſt on ſmall occaſions, often decides of the greateſt affairs; and that adverſe circumſtances, which if ſuffered to accumulate, may obſcure the brighteſt fortune, can, if ſeaſonably encountered, by

daring efforts of reſolution and courage, be actually turned to advantage. He inſtantly therefore went in perſon to Leptis, from whence he put off in a barge, and having overtaken his own ſquadron, which was flying before the enemy, he ordered them to put about, and to ſteer directly againſt their purſuers. Varus was ſtruck with this unaccountable change in the conduct of his enemy, and ſuppoſing them to have come in ſight of ſome powerful ſupport, he fled in his turn, and crowding ſail, ſteered for the port he had left. Cæſar gave chace, overtook ſome of the heavieſt ſailors that fell aſtern, and forced the remainder to take refuge in the harbour of Adrumetum. Here he preſented himſelf with an air of defiance; and having given this turn to the ſtate of his affairs at ſea, and left peremptory orders to his fleet not to reſign the advantage which they had gained by the enemy's flight, he returned to the attack of Uzita. In ſuch actions the fortunate often ſucceed, becauſe the attempt appears to be impoſſible; and men of great ability may no doubt venture into the midſt of difficulties, with which perſons of inferior capacity are by no means fit to contend.

Cæſar, notwithſtanding that by this ſtroke of fortune he preſerved his communication with the ſea, and received conſiderable ſupplies from thence, as well as from the country around him, in which he was favoured by the natives; yet being greatly circumſcribed by the ſuperiority of the enemy's light troops, he ſuffered conſiderably in his camp from ſcarcity of proviſions; and being, in his preſent operations againſt Uzita, to fight with a numerous army in detail, behind the walls of a fortified town, without being able to engage them upon equal terms in any deciſive action, he took his reſolution to diſcontinue the ſiege, and remove to a more advantageous ſtation; or to undertake ſome enterpriſe, in which he was more likely to ſucceed. He accordingly decamped in the night, ſet fire to the wood and ſtraw that was amaſſed upon the ground, left the lanes he had fortified

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fied with ſo much labour, and marching by the ſhore, placed his baggage between the column of the army and the ſea, and thus covered it from the enemy, who he expected were to follow him by the ridge of hills which overlooked the line of his march.

The retreat of Cæſar was ſufficient to confirm the leaders of the republican party, in the hopes they had formed of being able to wear him out by a dilatory war. They followed him accordingly by the heights, and having obſerved that he ſtopped at Agar, a town which he held by the affections of the natives, they took poſt on three ſeveral heights, at the diſtance of about ſix miles from his camp. In this poſition, they were not able to hinder him from making in the contiguous villages and fields a conſiderable acquiſition of proviſions and forage, which greatly relieved his army; but, to prevent his farther excurſions into the country, and to ſecure its produce to their own uſe, they ſent two legions, under the command of Caius Mutius Reginus, with orders to take poſſeſſion of the town of Zeta, which lay about twenty miles from Agar, and on the right at ſome diſtance beyond their preſent camp. Cæſar had intelligence from the natives, that theſe troops were frequently employed abroad in collecting proviſions and forage, and that they might eaſily be cut off, and the town be ſurpriſed. He accordingly formed a deſign for this purpoſe; and with a view to the execution of it, removed from the plain of Agar, and fortified a ſtrong camp on a height nearer to the enemy. Here leaving a ſufficient guard for his lines, he put the remainder of the army in motion in the night, paſſed by the enemy's ſtations, and ſurpriſed the town of Zeta, which he entered by break of day, while the greater part of the garriſon had left the place in perfect ſecurity, and were ſcattered in foraging parties over the neighbouring country. Having placed a ſufficient detachment to ſecure this new acquiſition, he ſet out upon his return, making a diſpoſition, not to paſs the enemy unobſerved, which was no longer practicable, but to force his

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his way through any impediment they might oppoſe to his march. The night could no longer be of any advantage to him; he ſet out, therefore, by day, leading the governor of Zeta, with P. Atrius, who belonged to the aſſociation of Utica, his priſoners, together with ſome part of Juba's equipage, and a train of camels, loaded with plunder which he had taken in the place.

The enemy were by this time appriſed of his motions. Scipio was come out of his lines; and, not far from Cæſar's route, had poſted himſelf in order of battle. Labienus and Afranius, with a great power of cavalry and light infantry, had taken poſſeſſion of ſome heights under which he was to paſs, and were preparing to attack him on his flanks, and on his rear. Cæſar was aware of theſe difficulties; it was nevertheleſs neceſſary to encounter them. He truſted, that the head of his column muſt force its way; and he placed his whole cavalry to cover the rear of his march. When he came abreaſt of the enemy, being aſſailed, as uſual, by the African cavalry with peculiar efforts of agility and cunning, he made a halt; and in order, by ſome great exertion, if poſſible, to clear his way, and procure to his people ſome reſpite in purſuing the remainder of their march undiſturbed, he ordered the legions to lay down the loads which they uſually carried, and to charge the enemy. They accordingly put all the Africans to flight; but no ſooner reſumed their march, than they were again attacked, and repeatedly forced to renew the ſame operations. They had already been detained four hours in paſſing over a hundred paces, or leſs than half a quarter of a mile, from the place at which they were firſt attacked. The ſun was ſetting, and the enemy were in hopes of being able to oblige them to halt for the night on a field, which was deſtitute of water. Scipio, for this purpoſe, ſtill kept the poſition which he had taken in the morning, and from thence obſerved, and occaſionally ſupported, the operations of the light troops.

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Cæſar perceived the danger to which he muſt be expoſed, if he ſhould halt on this ground, and ſaw the neceſſity of continuing his march: but obſerving, that as often as the cavalry in his rear was engaged, whether they repulſed or gave way to the enemy, he was obliged to ſtop in order to ſupport them, or to wait till they had recovered their ſtation, he thought proper to change his diſpoſition, brought forward the horſe to the head of his column, and ſubſtituted a choſen body of foot in the rear, who, although under an inceſſant diſcharge from the enemy, continued to move, and enabled him, though ſlowly, to effect his retreat with a regular and uninterrupted pace. In this manner, notwithſtanding the great danger to which he had been expoſed, he regained his camp, near Agar, with a very inconſiderable loſs.

Having thus got poſſeſſion of Zeta, a poſt on the flank or rear of the enemy, Cæſar formed ſucceſſive deſigns on Vacca, Sarſura, and Tyſdra, places ſimilarly ſituated round the ſcene of the war. His deſign on the firſt of theſe places was prevented by the Numidians, who, having intelligence of his coming, entered before him, and reduced the town to aſhes. Both armies being in motion for ſome days, he forced Sarſura; but advancing to Tyſdra, with the ſame intention, he thought proper, upon obſerving the ſtrength of the place, not to make any attempt againſt it; and, on the fourth day, having returned to his ſtation near Agar, the enemy likewiſe reſumed their former poſition.

While Cæſar remained at this poſt, he received a reinforcement of four thouſand men, conſiſting chiefly of the ſick, who had been left behind the army in Italy, and who now joined their legions, together with a body of four hundred horſe, and a thouſand archers and ſlingers. With this acceſſion of ſtrength, he formed a deſign on Tegea, which was occupied by a detachment of the enemy, ſupported by the whole of their army, encamped at the diſtance of a few miles behind the town; and having advanced, in hopes to force or ſurpriſe it, about

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eight miles on the plain, he was obſerved by Labienus and Scipio, who came forward, at the ſame time, about four miles beyond their own ſtation, in order to ſuſtain their detachment. Theſe conſiſting of four hundred horſe, divided themſelves on the right and the left of the town; and the main armies being formed in order of battle, with this poſt between them, Cæſar gave orders, that the party of horſe, which ventured to ſhew themſelves without the walls of Tegea, ſhould be attacked. The events which followed this firſt encounter, brought into action ſeveral detached bodies, both of horſe and of foot, that were ſent from the different ſides to ſuſtain the parties engaged, but did not lead to any general or deciſive action; and both armies retired at night to their reſpective lines.

In many of theſe partial engagements which happened in this campaign, Cæſar's cavalry gave way to that of the Africans. In one of their flights Cæſar met an officer, who was running away with his party, and affecting to believe him under a miſtake, took hold of his bridle, "You are wrong," he ſaid, "for it is this way you muſt go "to the enemy." Even the legions ſtood greatly in awe of the Numidian irregulars, by whom they were, on many occaſions, ſurpriſed with ſome new feat of agility or cunning; and they were conſiderably intimidated by the number and formidable appearance of the elephants, which they knew not how to withſtand. To fortify the minds of his men, and to prepare them to meet ſuch antagoniſts, Cæſar had a number of elephants brought to his camp, armed and harneſſed like thoſe of the enemy. He exerciſed his horſes in preſence of theſe animals, taught his men in what places to ſtrike where the beaſt was vulnerable, and how to elude their fury. He likewiſe made ſome change in the uſual exerciſe of the legion, ſuch as might the better qualify his men to baffle or repel the artful and deſultory attacks of the Numidians; and as he frequently employed his regular troops in foraging parties, he inured them by degrees to depart from

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their uſual forms, without loſing their courage, and to recover from any caſual diſorder into which they might be thrown. To ſhow his own confidence in the ſuperiority of his men, he frequently made an offer of battle on equal ground; and, in the manner that was, in their turns, common to both parties, drew a ſpecies of triumph from his enemy's declining to fight.

In theſe operations the campaign drew on to the middle of February, and had laſted about five months; during this time Cæſar had ſurmounted very great difficulties, ariſing from the diſperſion of his fleet, the uncertainty of his communication with Italy, and the ſcarcity of proviſions in a country laid waſte or poſſeſſed by his enemies. He was now become maſter of many towns on the coaſt, and of a conſiderable extent of territory; but from the many objects which required his attention in different parts of the empire, he remained under great diſadvantage in ſupporting a dilatory war, in which it appeared that Scipio and Labienus were reſolved to perſiſt. In order, if poſſible, to break their meaſures, he formed a deſign upon Thapſus, their principal garriſon and ſea-port on the ſouthern boundaries of the province. With this view he decamped in the night from his ſtation near Agar, and directing his march to the ſouthward, arrived before Thapſus on the following day. As he had formerly, in order to ſecure his convoys againſt any attempts from thence, blocked up the harbour with his ſhips, he now ſeized all the avenues which led to the town, and inveſted it completely from the land.

Scipio and Juba, greatly intereſted to preſerve a place of ſo much conſequence, put their armies in motion, and, to counteract that of Cæſar, followed him by the route of the hills. Seeing him inveſt Thapſus, they took their firſt poſts on two ſeparate heights, about eight miles from the town. Cæſar, with his uſual induſtry and diſpatch, executed lines both of circumvallation and of countervallation. By theſe lines, which were in the form of a creſcent, terminating at both ends in the ſea, he embraced the town, and propoſed to encamp his army

army between them. Scipio was ſufficiently acquainted with the ground, to know, that there was near the harbour a narrow channel, or ſalt-pit, ſeparated from the ſea, by a ſecond beach or ſand-bank, which it was poſſible the enemy might not have obſerved, and by which he might ſtill have an entry to the town, or be able to throw in his ſuccours. He therefore advanced with his whole army; and while he made a feint to interrupt Cæſar in the works he was carrying on, ſent a party to occupy the ſand-bank, or to throw themſelves into the town of Thapſus by that communication. Cæſar, however, had already taken poſſeſſion of this paſſage, and ſhut it up with three ſeveral intrenchments or redoubts, ſo placed as to ſecure it at once againſt any ſallies from the garriſon, as well as attacks from the field. CHAP. VII.

The combined army, on being thus diſappointed of any communication with the town of Thapſus, remained all the day under arms, and gave the enemy an opportunity, which he often affected to deſire, of terminating the war by a battle. But Cæſar, either becauſe he had not ſufficiently fortified his intrenchments to ſecure his rear from the town, or becauſe he would not chuſe that moment to fight, when the enemy was prepared to receive him, made no advances to engage on that day.

Scipio, remaining on the ſame ground all night, took his reſolution to encamp, and at break of day appeared to be forming the uſual intrenchments. Cæſar had then probably completed his own works; and thinking the opportunity fair, or being determined not to ſuffer the enemy to effect a lodgment in his preſence, he made the uſual ſignal to prepare for action; and leaving a proper force to man his intrenchments againſt the town, drew out the remainder of his army to the field, ordered part of his fleet to get under ſail, to turn a head-land in the rear of the enemy; and as ſoon as the action began in front, to alarm them with ſhouts, or a feint,

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to land and to attack their rear. Having made theſe diſpoſitions, he put his army in motion, and being come near enough to diſtinguiſh the poſture of the enemy, obſerved, that their main body was already in order of battle, with the elephants diſpoſed on the wings; and that numerous parties were ſtill at work on the lines, within which they meant to encamp. He halted, and made a diſpoſition ſuitable to that of the enemy. His centre conſiſted of five legions, his wings each of four; the tenth and ſecond legions compoſed the right wing, the eighth and ninth compoſed the left. Five cohorts, together with the cavalry, were ſelected to ſupport the archers and ſlingers that were to begin the attack on the enemy's elephants. Cæſar himſelf went round every diviſion on foot, exhorted the veterans to be mindful of the high reputation which they had to ſupport, and recommended to the new levies to take example from thoſe who were already poſſeſſed of ſo much glory, and who were inſtructed by long experience, in the arts to be practiſed in the day of battle againſt an enemy.

While Cæſar was thus employed, the legions of Scipio appeared to reel; they at one time retired behind their imperfect works, again changed their purpoſe, and came back to their ground. Many of Cæſar's officers, and many of the veteran ſoldiers, well acquainted with this ſign of diſtraction and irreſolution, called aloud for the ſignal of battle. But he himſelf, poſſibly to whet their ardour, as well as to keep them in breath, again and again halted the whole line.

In this ſituation of the two armies, Cæſar is ſaid to have been ſeized with a fit of the epilepſy, to which he was ſubject; a diſeaſe which, although it attacks the ſeats of underſtanding and of ſenſe, and ſuſpends, for a time, all the exerciſes of them in the moſt alarming manner, does not appear from this example to impair the faculties, nor to be inconſiſtent with their higheſt meaſures, and their ableſt exertions.

ertions. The report, however, is not conſiſtent with the narration of Hirtius. This hiſtorian, although he allows that the troops, in the laſt part of their motion to engage, acted without any orders; and while Cæſar wiſhed them to advance more deliberately, that they forced a trumpet on the right to ſound the uſual charge, and that the whole line, without any other ſignal, overwhelming by force all the officers who ventured to oppoſe them, continued to ruſh on the enemy: yet he obſerves that Cæſar, inſtead of being out of condition to act, took his reſolution to excite an ardour which he could not reſtrain; and, in order that he might bring his whole army at once with united force into action, commanded all his trumpets to ſound, and himſelf, mounting on horſeback, rode up with the foremoſt ranks. The battle began on the right, where the enemy's elephants being galled with a ſhower of arrows and ſtones, reeled back on the troops that were poſted to ſuſtain them, trod part of the infantry under foot, and broke over the unfiniſhed intrenchments in their rear.

The left of Scipio's army being thus routed, the main body ſoon after gave way; and the whole fled to the camp which they had formerly occupied; but in their flight, being thrown into the utmoſt confuſion, and ſeparated from their officers, they arrived at the place to which they fled, without any perſon of rank to rally or command them. In this ſtate of conſternation they threw down their arms, and attempted to take refuge in the camp of their Numidian ally. But this being already in poſſeſſion of the enemy, they continued their flight to the neareſt heights; and being without arms, awaited their fate in a ſtate of helpleſs deſpair. When they ſaw the troops that purſued them advance, they made ſigns of ſubmiſſion, and ſaluted the victors with a ſhout; but in vain. They were inſtantly attacked by the victorious army of Cæſar, who, though affecting clemency on former occaſions, now ſeemed to be actuated with a paroxiſm of rage and thirſt of blood; contrary to the orders

and intreaties of their general, they put the whole of this unarmed and defenceleſs multitude to the ſword. They are ſaid, on this occaſion, to have ſeized the opportunity of ſatiating their revenge on ſome of their own officers who had offended them. One was actually murdered, another, being wounded, fled to Cæſar for protection; and many perſons of diſtinction, Senators and Roman Knights, obſerving their danger, thought proper to withdraw to ſome place of concealment, till the preſent fury of the troops ſhould abate.

In the beginning of this memorable action, the garriſon of Thapſus had ſallied, but were repulſed with loſs. When the conteſt was over, Cæſar, to induce the town to ſurrender, diſplayed the trophies of victory; but had no anſwer. On the following day, he drew up his army under the walls of the town; and in that place pronounced his thanks to the legions for their behaviour, and, without any reproach for the diſorder and cruelty of the preceding day, declared what were to be the rewards which he intended, at a proper time, for the veterans; and, by ſome immediate mark of his favour, diſtinguiſhed a few who had ſignalized themſelves. He appointed Caius Rubellius, with three legions, to continue the ſiege of Thapſus, and Cn. Domitius, with two others, to reduce Tyſdra; and having ſent forward M. Meſſala, with a body of horſe on the road to Utica, he himſelf followed with the remainder of the army[33].

At Utica were aſſembled, from every part of the empire, all who were obnoxious to Cæſar, or who, from a zeal for the republic, had refuſed to ſubmit to his power. On the third day after the battle, towards night, a perſon who had eſcaped from the field of battle coming to Utica, this unhappy convention of citizens was ſtruck with the greateſt alarm. Under the effects of their conſternation, they met in the ſtreets, ran to the gates, and again returned to their habitations. They crowded together in the public places, and ſeparated by turns, and paſſed the night in extreme

[33] Hirt. de Bello Af.

confuſion.

confuſion. Cato repreſented to them, that the accounts they received might be exaggerated, and endeavoured to compoſe their fears. As ſoon as it was day he called them together, and laid before them a ſtate of the place, of the works, military ſtores, proviſions, arms, and numbers of men; and having commended the zeal, which they had hitherto ſhown in defence of the republic, exhorted them now to make the proper uſe of the means they ſtill had of defending themſelves, or at leaſt of making their peace in a body: declared, that if they were inclined to ſubmit to the victor, he ſhould impute their conduct to neceſſity; but if they were determined to reſiſt, he ſhould reſerve his ſword for the laſt ſtake of the republic, and ſhare with them in the conſequences of a reſolution, which he ſhould love and admire. He contended, that they were now to conſider themſelves as aſſembled, not in Utica, but in Rome; "That the force of "the republic was yet great, and might ſtill, as on former occaſions, "riſe again from its ruins; that the forces of Cæſar muſt ſtill be diſ-"tracted or ſeparate, to make head againſt enemies who were ap-"pearing in different parts of the empire; that in Spain his own "army had deſerted from him, and the whole province had de-"clared for the ſons of Pompey; that Rome, the head of the com-"monwealth, was yet erect, and would not bend under the yoke of "a tyrant; that his enemies were multiplying while he ſeemed to "deſtroy them; that his own example ſhould inſtruct them; or "rather, that the courage which he exerted in the paths of guilt and "of infamy, ſhould animate thoſe who were about, either to die with "honour, or to ſecure for their country bleſſings in which they "themſelves were to ſhare." At this aſſembly a reſolution was accordingly taken to defend the city of Utica, and numbers of ſlaves, who were ſet free by their maſters for this purpoſe, were armed and inrolled. But it ſoon appeared, that the aſſembly conſiſted of perſons unable to perſiſt in this reſolution, and who were preparing ſeparately

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to merit the favour of the conqueror by an intire and early ſubmiſſion. They ſoon made a general profeſſion of this deſign, expreſſed their veneration of Cato; but confeſſed, that they were not qualified to act with him in ſo arduous a ſcene; aſſured him, that if they were permitted to ſend a meſſage to Cæſar, the firſt object of it ſhould be to intercede for his ſafety; and that, if they could not obtain it, they ſhould accept of no quarter for themſelves. Cato no longer oppoſed their intentions; but ſaid, that he himſelf muſt not be included in their treaty; that he knew not of any right Cæſar had to diſpoſe of his perſon; that what had hitherto happened in the war only ſerved to convict Cæſar of deſigns which were often imputed to him, and which he always denied. He will now, at leaſt, own, he ſaid, that his opponents had reaſon for all the ſuſpicions they ſuggeſted againſt him.

While matters were in this ſtate, a party of Scipio's horſe, which had eſcaped from the field of battle, appeared at the gates of the town, and were with difficulty, by Cato's intreaties, hindered from putting every Roman, who offered to ſubmit to Cæſar, as well as the inhabitants of the place, to the ſword. Being diverted from this act of violence, and furniſhed with ſome money for their immediate ſubſiſtence, they continued their retreat. Moſt of the Senators, who were preſent, took ſhipping, and eſcaped. Lucius Cæſar undertook to carry to his kinſman a petition from ſuch of the Roman citizens as remained; and ſaid to Cato, at parting, that he would gladly fall at the victor's feet to make *his* peace. To which Cato anſwered, "If I "were diſpoſed to make my peace with Cæſar, I ſhould repair to "him in perſon; but I have done him no wrong, I am not an ob-"ject of his pardon, and ſhall not requeſt what it were inſolence in "him to offer me as a favour." He, however, on this occaſion, obſerved to his own ſon, that it would not become him to leave his father. "At a fit time," he ſaid, "you will put yourſelf on the

"victor's

"victor's mercy; but do not take part in public affairs; the times do "not afford a ſtation in which it would be proper for you to act." "And why," ſaid the young man, "will you not take the benefit "of the victor's clemency for yourſelf, as well as for me?" "I was "born to freedom," he ſaid, "and cannot, in my old age, be re-"conciled to ſervitude. For you theſe times were deſtined; and it "may become you to ſubmit to your fate." Having paſſed the day in aiding his friends to procure the means of their eſcape, he went to the bath, and ſupped as uſual, without any marks of dejection or affectation of eaſe; and being retired to his chamber, after ſome time which he employed in reading, he killed himſelf. His attendants, upon hearing a noiſe which alarmed them, burſt open the door, and would have dreſſed the wound, but he tore it up with his hand, and expired in making this effort[36]. Every one, through the day, had been anxious to know what was the deſign which Cato covered under the appearance of ſo much concern for others, and of ſo little care for himſelf. On the firſt report of his death, multitudes crowded to the door of his quarters, and gave the moſt unfeigned demonſtrations of dejection and ſorrow. The colony of Utica, though originally hoſtile to his cauſe, and ſtill in the intereſt of Cæſar, ordered a public funeral, and erected his ſtatue in the place of interment.

Cato died in the vigour of life, under fifty; he was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper; comprehenſive, impartial, and ſtrongly poſſeſſed with the love of mankind. But, in his conduct, probably became independent of paſſion of any ſort, and choſe what was juſt on its own account. He profeſſed to believe, with the ſect whoſe tenets he embraced, that it might or might not, in particular circumſtances, be expedient for a man to preſerve or lay down his life; but that, while he kept it, the only good or evil competent to him

[36] Dio. Caſſ. Appian. Plutarch. Hirtius de Bello Africano.

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conſiſted in the part which he took, as a friend or an enemy to mankind. He had long foreſeen the dangers to which the republic was expoſed, and determined to live only while he could counteract the deſigns that were formed againſt it [37]. The leader of the ſucceſsful party thought proper to apologize for himſelf, by decrying the virtues of Cato; but the bulk of mankind, in his own and the ſubſequent ages, were equally pleaſed to extol them; and he is a rare example of merit, which received its praiſe even amidſt the adulation that was paid to his enemies [38]; and was thought, by the impartial, equally above the reach of commendation or cenſure [39].

[37] Sed verè laudari ille vir non poteſt, niſi hac ornata ſunt; quod ille ea, quæ nunc ſunt, et futura viderit, et ne fierent contenderit, et facta ne videret, vitam reliquerit. Cicer. ad Att. lib. xii. ep. 4.

[38] See the writings of Virgil and Horace.

[39] Cujus gloriæ neque profuit quiſquam laudando, nec vituperando quiſquam nocuit, quum utrumque ſummis præditi fecerint ingeniis. Frag. Livii ex Hieronym. Prolog. lib. xi. in Oſeam.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

Plate 5th at the End of the 2d Vol.





